

**A VALUABLE PARTNERSHIP? THE BRITISH CONSERVATIVE PARTY AND THE EU'S
COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (2010-2022): PERSPECTIVES AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR A POST-BREXIT SECURITY AND DEFENCE PARTNERSHIP**

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List of Contents

ABSTRACT p.6

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS p.7

INTRODUCTION p.9

1.1 Objectives p.9

1.2 Methodology p.10

1.3 Theoretical framework p.11

1.4 Outline of the thesis p.15

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction p.18

2.2 History of the security and defence relationship between the UK and the EU
p.18

2.3 The Conservative Party and its relationship with the EU and EU security and
defence p.22

2.4 The security and defence relationship between the UK and the EU immediately
prior to Brexit p.24

2.5 The security and defence relationship between the UK and the EU
presently/post-Brexit p.27

2.6 Original contribution p.32

CHAPTER ONE: A BRIEF HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CSDP AND AN OUTLINE OF
THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Introduction p.33

3.2 The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) p.33

3.3 Whose perspectives? p.34

3.4 A brief history of the CSDP and the UK's role within it p.35

3.4.1 The Marshall Plan (1947) p.37

3.4.2 The European Coal and Steel Community (1950) p.38

3.4.3 The European Defence Community (1952) p.39

3.4.4 The Western European Union (1954) p.43

3.4.5 The Fouchet Plan (1961-62) p.44

3.4.6 European Political Cooperation (1970) and the Single European Act
(1983) p.48

3.4.7 The Treaty on European Union/Treaty of Maastricht (1992) p.49

***3.4.7.1 The Second Pillar: the establishment of a Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP)*** p.49

3.4.8 St. Petersburg Tasks (1992) p.51

3.4.9 St Malo Summit 1998 and Helsinki European Council (1999) p.51

3.4.10 Lisbon Treaty (2009) p.52

- 3.4.10.1 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy** p.52
- 3.4.10.2 European External Action Service (EEAS)** p.53
- 3.4.10.3 European Defence Agency (EDA)** p.53
- 3.4.10.4 CSDP** p.54
- 3.4.10.5 European Parliament** p.55
- 3.4.10.6 'Permanent structured cooperation'** p.55
- 3.4.10.7 Mutual assistance and solidarity** p.56
- 3.4.10.8 Expansion of the St. Petersburg Tasks** p.56
- 3.5 The legal and political framework of the CSDP (2010-present)** p.57
- 3.6 The UK: a difficult partner?** p.60
- 3.7 Conclusion** p.63

CHAPTER TWO: CAMERON, MAY, JOHNSON THE CONSERVATIVES AND EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE (2010-2016)

- 4.1 Introduction** p.65
- 4.2 Conservative ideology and the Party's attitude towards European Security and Defence: from Macmillan to Thatcher** p.67
 - 4.2.1 One Nation' Conservatism and Europe** p.67
 - 4.2.2 'Thatcherism' and Europe** p.72
 - 4.3.3 Influence of conservative ideologies on Cameron and his contemporaries** p.76
- 4.3 May and Johnson** p.78
 - 4.3.1 May, the Conservative's and her attitude towards the EU and security and defence** p.79
 - 4.3.2 Johnson, the Conservative's and his attitude towards the EU and security and defence** p.82
- 4.4 Liberal Conservatism and Cameron's personal attitudes** p.85
 - 4.4.1 Liberal Conservatism** p.85
 - 4.4.2 Cameron's personal attitudes towards Europe and EU Security and Defence** p.89
 - 4.4.3 Early Years: special adviser, MP for Whitney and Education Secretary (1990-2004)** p.90
 - 4.4.4 Cameron's security and defence policies and approach to the EU as leader of the opposition (2005-2009)** p.102
 - 4.4.4.1 Leaving the European People's Party (2005-2009)** p.110
 - 4.4.4.2 The Lisbon Treaty (2007-2009)** p.115
- 4.5 The Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government and its approach to EU security and defence (2010-2011)** p.119
 - 4.5.1 The Conservative Manifesto (2010)** p.119
 - 4.5.2 UK General Election (2010)** p.121
 - 4.5.3 The Liberal Democrats: their perspectives and influence on EU policy** p.122
 - 4.5.4 The ideological makeup of the Conservative Party following the 2010 General Election** p.125

4.5.6 Cameron's cabinet and ministerial picks: their perspectives on and role in EU security and defence p.126

4.5.5.1 A Prime Ministers role in EU Security and Defence p.128

4.5.5.2 Foreign Secretary p.128

4.5.5.3 Secretary of State for Defence p.131

4.5.5.4 Minister of State for Europe p.134

4.5.6 Strategic Defence and Security Review (2010) p.137

4.6 Conclusion p.141

CHAPTER THREE: THE UK, THE EU AND THE CSDP IN ACTION: LIBYA (2011) AND UKRAINE (2014)

5.1 Introduction p.144

5.2 UK Position on CSDP at the beginning of the Cameron Premiership (a recap)
p.145

5.3 Case Study 1: Libya (2011) p.146

5.3.1 Background p.146

5.3.2 Developments prior to the 2011 Libyan conflict p.149

5.3.2.1 Lancaster House Treaties (2010) p.149

5.3.2.2 UK domestic affairs (2010-2011) p.154

5.3.3 UK perspectives on the Libyan conflict p.156

5.3.3.1 Initial response p.156

5.3.3.2 UN Support for military intervention p.158

5.3.3.3 Extraordinary EU Council meeting p.158

5.3.3.4 NATO intervention in Libya p.161

5.3.3.5 Blocking of the CSDP Operational HQ (2011) p.164

5.3.3.6 Action following the Libyan Conflict (2011-2016) p.165

5.3.3.7 EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM) p.168

5.3.3.8 EUNAVFOR Med 'Operation Sophia' p.171

5.4 Case Study 2: Ukraine Conflict (2014) p.174

5.4.1 Background p.174

5.4.2 UK position on EU intervention in Ukraine p.179

5.2.2.1 EU Sanctions p.179

5.2.2.2 EUAM Ukraine p.184

5.2.2.3 UK perspectives following EU sanctions and EUAM Ukraine
p.186

5.5 Conclusion p.191

CHAPTER FOUR: THE UK/EU SECURITY AND DEFENCE PARTNERSHIP (2010-2016): ITS ROLE IN BREXIT AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR A POST-BREXIT SECURITY AND DEFENCE PARTNERSHIP

6.1 Introduction p.197

6.2 The role of EU security and defence in the Brexit referendum p.199

6.2.1 Leave perspectives on EU security and defence p.202

6.2.1.1 Vote Leave p.202

6.2.1.2 Leave.EU and other pro-Leave voices p.206

6.2.2	Remain perspectives on EU security and defence	p.208
6.2.2.1	<i>Britain Stronger in Europe and the UK Government</i>	p.208
6.3	UK perspectives on a post-Brexit security and defence partnership	p.214
6.3.1	May Government perspectives on a post-Brexit security and defence partnership	p.216
6.3.2	Johnson government perspectives on a post-Brexit security and defence partnership	p.225
6.4	EU perspectives on a post-Brexit security and defence partnership	p.235
6.4.1	EU's Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (2016)	p.235
6.4.2	EU Strategic Compass (2022)	p.238
6.4.3	EU's Negotiating Mandate (2020)	p.238
6.4.4	EU Security and Defence Ambitions Post-Brexit	p.239
6.4.4.1	<i>Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)</i>	p.240
6.4.4.2	<i>European Defence Fund (EDF)</i>	p.243
6.4.4.3	<i>European Intervention Initiative (EI2) (2018)</i>	p.244
6.4.4.4	<i>Aachen Treaty (2019)</i>	p.245
6.4.4.5	<i>Changes in EU Rhetoric</i>	p.246
6.4.5	Towards a Defence Union?	p.248
6.5	Potential post-Brexit partnerships	p.249
6.5.1	Integrated player	p.250
6.5.2	Associated partner	p.252
6.5.3	Detached observer	p.253
6.5.4	What next?	p.256
6.6	Implications for LI Theory	p.258
6.7	Conclusion	p.261
	CONCLUSION	p.267
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	p.274

ABSTRACT

It is a commonly held assumption in the academic literature that the security and defence partnership between the UK and the EU, historically, was a bad one.

Furthermore, at present, there exists no post-Brexit agreement between the UK and the EU on security and defence. It appears to be the current UK government's view that a post-Brexit partnership with the EU is not needed and that the UK's security and defence interests can be better served by forming alliances elsewhere. By analysing the relationship between the UK and the EU in security and defence in years leading up to Brexit, this thesis explores whether this commonly held assumption about the UK and EU's partnership is true or whether in fact the partnership was much more valuable. In turn, this thesis will also explore whether a post-Brexit security and defence partnership is worth pursuing and, if so, what that partnership could look like. This thesis hopes to shed new light on the UK and EU's past security and defence relationship to help better inform any future negotiations on any post-Brexit security and defence partnership.

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For a safer Europe

Introduction

The UK's security and defence partnership with Europe faces arguably one of its biggest challenges since the end of World War Two (WWII). The UK's departure from the EU means it leaves the umbrella of both the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and, in turn, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), in both of which it has played a role since 1992. The British Isles' proximity to mainland Europe has meant that the UK's and the EU's security and defence interests have always been intertwined. As Sir Austen Chamberlain (older half-brother of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain) noted in 1930 in response to the rise of Nazi Germany: *'we cannot separate our fortunes from those of Europe'*. The UK's membership of the EU since 1975, and the subsequent creation of the CFSP under the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, brought these security and defence interests more closely intertwined and provided a forum within which they could be officially formulated and implemented. The nature of the UK's security and defence partnership with the EU, and determining that partnership's success, has never been easy to determine. Since the UK's accession to the EU, the partnership has provided many hurdles, as well as many mutual benefits, for both parties. The UK's departure from the EU, has also presented similar challenges and opportunities.

1.1 Objectives

The thesis seeks to answer two questions: firstly, whether the security and defence partnership between the UK and the EU during its final years was an effective and beneficial one for both parties. The second, is whether a post-Brexit security and defence partnership is possible and worth pursuing for both parties. To help answer these overarching questions, this thesis has the following objectives:

1. This thesis will seek to determine what perspectives and policies drove the UK's security and defence partnership with the EU in its final years. This will require an analysis of the Conservative Party's policies towards the EU and

the perspectives of some of its key people in the Party and Cameron government;

2. This thesis will seek to analyse how the policies and perspectives of the Cameron government worked in action using two case studies and determine whether or not this partnership was successful in terms of meeting the security and defence needs of each party in each case study;
3. This thesis will seek to determine how EU security and defence influenced the EU referendum and to explore how a future security and defence partnership could look between the UK and the EU, if at all, in the future.

1.2 Methodology

The sources of research for this thesis are doctrinal (or documents), and include studying primary and secondary sources such as original legal documents, books, journal articles, blogs and news articles. Speeches, manifestos, policy documents and parliamentary and committee meeting minutes will also be studied. In turn, the research method adopted throughout this thesis is qualitative content analysis. Qualitative content analysis is underpinned by interpretivism, which stands in contrast to Positivism, and holds that reality is subjective, socially constructed, and a composite of multiple perspectives. Critical analysis focuses on the characteristics of language as communication with attention to the content or contextual meaning of the text.¹ Hsieh and Shannon identify three categories of qualitative content analysis.² These include: conventional, directed, or summative. Hsieh and Shannon state that in conventional content analysis, coding categories are derived directly from the text data. With a directed approach, the authors state that analysis starts with a theory or relevant research findings as guidance for initial codes. Finally, the authors describe a summative content analysis as involving counting and comparisons, usually of keywords or content, followed by the interpretation of the underlying context. This thesis employs the latter category of qualitative content

¹ See R Budd, R Thorp, & L Donohew, *'Content analysis of communications'* (Macmillan, 1967)

² H Hsieh and S Shannon, *'Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis'* (2005), *Qualitative Health Research*, 15 (9), 1277

analysis, namely summative qualitative content analysis. This thesis analyses the contents of speeches, policy documents and journal articles, amongst other doctrinal sources, and seeks to interpret the meaning behind them, as well as put them in a historical context to further help understand the meaning behind them. This thesis also attempts to identify trends within the text of these documents, for example, the mentioning of cooperation with the EU through the CSDP. This thesis also compares documents and highlights differences of the text contained within them. As this thesis aims to understand the perspectives held and how they affected the partnership, this is why this methodology has been used.

1.3 Theoretical framework

It is important to note that this thesis is interdisciplinary and therefore does not simply involve legal analysis but also historical analysis, examining the UK and EU's past relationship and drawing conclusions about how it might and how it should affect their future relationship. This thesis is also interdisciplinary in the sense that it incorporates theories emanating from disciplines such as International Relations (IR) and Political Science. With that said, the theoretical framework that this thesis grounds itself in is the theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism. The reasons for this will be explained below. There are a number of IR theories that exist and some will be discussed in this section. One of the leading IR theories that exists is the theory of 'Realism'. There are several key points to note about this theory: firstly, realism assumes that the nation-state is the principal actor in international relations. Whilst other bodies exist, such as the EU for example, their power is often limited. Secondly, realism assumes the state is a unitary actor and acts solely on the basis of self-interest, making decisions only when they further national interests. Finally, realism assumes that states live in a state of anarchy, in that there exists no truly neutral third-party, able to wield significant enough power to mediate disputes that inevitably arise between nation-states. Realists argue that in the absence of this neutral third-party power, states ultimately have no other option but to rely on themselves for their own security and the protection of their interests. Realism is borne out of the theory that humans are ultimately bound by their natural condition,

which, it is argued, that they are naturally selfish, possess an inherent desire for power and have an inability to trust others. Realists argue that these traits of self-interest, greed and distrust are also inherent in nation states and stem from individuals' human self-interest, greed and distrust. Ultimately, realists argue that the relationships between nation-states mirror and are directly linked to the relationships that once existed between individuals prior to the creation of the nation state – the state of anarchy.

Specifically, the theoretical framework this thesis draws upon is the version of Realism put forward by Waltz (1979),³ which he called 'Structural Realism'. Waltz sought to move Realism away from its mere assumptions about human nature and devised a formula, a 'structure', to explain the behaviour of nation states. Structural Realism argues that, first, all states are constrained by anarchic nature of international relations. Second, any action on behalf of the nation state is based on the relative power it wields when measured against other states. Waltz version of Realism therefore uses social scientific methods rather than political and philosophical theories to measure and understand international relations and explain and predict the behaviour of states. Realists argue that their theory most closely describes the image of world politics held by the practitioners of statecraft (heads and representatives of government) and that is why it is regularly utilised in the world of policymaking by practitioners.

Realism has not been immune from criticism and there are several theories that oppose its claims. One of the primary arguments made against Realism is that the theory helps perpetuate the violent and confrontational world that Realists describe. Realism's critics argue that by assuming humanity's uncooperative and egoistic nature and the anarchic state of international relations, Realists encourage states to act in ways based on suspicion, power and force, thus making Realism a self-fulfilling prophecy. The theory has also ran into a number of obstacles in attempting to explaining international relations, further strengthening criticism against it. Realism

³ K Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Waveland Pr Inc, 1979)

was not able to predict or explain the end of the Cold War between the United States of America (US) and the Soviet Union in 1991, which saw a positive transformation of international politics, not in keeping with Realist theory. The rapid growth and continued integration of the EU has also up until now been a thorn in the side of Realism. In response to these challenges, new theories on international relations emerged, one in particular being Neofunctionalism. Neofunctionalism was developed by Ernst B Haas⁴, as a way to explain the integration of Western Europe following WW2. Neofunctionalists argue that by states integrating in a particular sector, by handing over control of that sector to a central institution, this will automatically create pressure to extend that institution's control over other neighboring areas of policy – for example, an institution's control over currency exchange rates will inevitably lead to it controlling taxation, wages and so on. Neofunctionalists label this the 'spill-over' effect and argue that long-term this process will ultimately lead to central institutions absorbing all of the functions of the nation state. Both the UK's departure from the EU and the fact that a no post-Brexit security and defence partnership exists between them, however, challenges and calls into question the credibility of Neofunctionalism.

Whilst both these theories go some way to explaining the behaviour of nation states and the relationship between them, they both fall at different hurdles: Realism struggles to explain the birth of institutions such as the EU or the end of conflicts such as the Cold War, and neofunctionalism struggles to explain how a nation like the UK can simply leave the EU and be immune from the so-called 'spill over' effect. 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism' (LI), it is argued, does a better job at explaining this behaviour. LI has been utilised by a number of leading academics in the field - such as Moravcsik – to explain the EU integration process.⁵

LI developed during the 1960s as an alternative to neofunctionalism – the prevailing

⁴ E Haas, *Beyond the Nation-state: Functionalism and International Organization* (Rowman & Littlefield International, 1964)

⁵ See also: A Millward, *The European Rescue of the Nation State*, (Routledge, 1999) and S Hoffman, *The European Sisyphus: Essays On Europe, 1964-1994 (The New Europe: Interdisciplinary Perspectives)*, (Routledge, 1995)

theory at the time. It revised the assumptions made by intergovernmentalism and, since its inception, has served as a major reference in the theoretical debate on international relations. The theory assumes two things about international politics: firstly, that states are critical actors in the context of international anarchy and seek to achieve their goals via intergovernmental negotiation, as opposed to doing it through a central authority. The second assumption made by proponents of LI theory is that states are purposive and rational. This means that states calculate the utility of alternative courses of action and ultimately choose the one option that maximizes their utility under the particular circumstances of the time. The formation of international institutions such as the EU is explained as a collective outcome of interdependent rational state choices realised through intergovernmental negotiation. One of the most important studies of using LI theory to investigate and explain the evolution of the EU was by Moravcsik in the *'The Choice for Europe'*.⁶ Here, Moravcsik concludes that EU integration can be best understood as a series of rational choices made by national leaders and that these choices responded to issues and constraints stemming from issue-specific societal interests of domestic constituents, the relative power of states stemming from asymmetrical interdependence and the role of institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments. Moravcsik ultimately argued that state actors would ultimately act rationally in the interests of their citizens, who in turn would act rationally based on commercial and material cost-benefit calculations, as opposed to nationalistic feelings.

Whilst it is this theory – specifically the one advocated by Moravcsik – that this thesis claims to have its grounding in, the recent period in European integration – namely the UK's departure from the EU – constitutes a very different setting from the dynamic progress of European integration in the 1990s, when Moravcsik published *'Choice for Europe'*. Since Brexit, the relevance of LI theory in explaining the EU integration process has been called into question. The LI theory that Moravcsik put forward was a theory that focused on explaining the major steps that the EU has

⁶ A Moravcsik, *'The Choice for Europe'*, (Cornell University Press, 1998)

taken towards further integration – including the Single Market, the Monetary Union and the Schengen free-travel area, amongst many other advances. In stark contrast to this, the UK's departure from the EU – an integral member of the Union – has threatened the EU integration process and the very idea of 'ever closer union'. On reflection, Moravcsik ultimately underestimated the value that citizens could attribute to nationalism and, specifically, European politics. Rather than favouring what Moravcsik would define as the more economically beneficial option of remaining in the EU, citizens in turn favoured more nationalistic and Eurosceptic feelings of anger and distrust towards the EU. In turn, the UK government followed the wishes of British voters and departed the EU. In direct contrast to Moravcsik's theory, Brexit saw British citizens supporting an adversely economic political direction, and the UK government, who according to LI will act rationally in the interests of its citizens, doing the opposite.

Though LI faces some major challenges, this thesis, however, contends that LI may still be able to help explain the past security and defence partnership between the UK and the EU as well as the 2016 referendum result and the UK's strategic direction going forward. In terms of explaining the Cameron government's approach to the CSDP pre-Brexit, this thesis contends that Using LI, the argument could be made that the UK pursued a security and defence partnership with the EU via the CSDP because it served its interests at the time, and can also be used to explain its departure, as it was responding to the interests of its domestic constituents at those particular times. Each chapter in this thesis will devote some analysis of the UK's partnership with the EU through the lens of LI theory.

1.4 Outline of the thesis

This thesis aims to define and evaluate the effectiveness of the security and defence partnership between the UK and the EU in its final years, during the Cameron Premiership (2010-2016). This thesis will also aim to outline future security and defence partnership options for the UK and the EU and determine the value, if any, of them for the UK and the EU post-Brexit. It is hoped the findings of the thesis will

contribute to a better and more accurate understanding in the field of the UK and EU's security and defence partnership in the past and that they may help policy makers make more informed decisions on the future of the UK and EU's security and defence relationship. To achieve this, the thesis will be set out as follows:

Chapter 1 will seek to explore the perspectives and policies of the UK government during the Cameron Premiership (2010-2016) on EU security and defence and, specifically, the CSDP. The Chapter will begin first by exploring the ideology that guided Cameron and his government's policies towards the EU and CSDP. This will include analysing the evolution of Conservative ideology specifically towards the EU. The Chapter will also look at how this ideology affected Cameron's approach to the EU and Cameron's own perspectives towards the EU and CSDP, namely his new brand of Conservative ideology 'liberal conservatism'. The Chapter will finally then look at how liberal conservatism and Cameron's personal attitudes influenced his Party and his 2010 government's position and policies pertaining to EU security and defence policy at the outset of his premiership (2010-2011).

Chapter 2 will look at how these policies formed by Cameron's government were implemented and their impact on the UK and EU's security and defence partnership between 2010-2016. To do this, three case studies will be analysed: Libya 2011, Syria 2012 and Ukraine 2014. Each case study will seek to determine the policies taken by the UK in relation to the crisis, the UK's level of involvement and contribution to CSDP and the impact of the UK's involvement or absence in CSDP on the resolving of the crisis and the UK and EU's security and defence partnership.

Finally, Chapter 3 will seek to define the partnership, analyse its effectiveness in furthering UK security and defence interests and, ultimately, determine whether this is a partnership worth pursuing for both parties post-Brexit and why. To do this, this Chapter will draw on the findings of Chapter 2 to form an overall conclusion about the nature of the partnership during the Cameron premiership, evaluating the most difficult and beneficial aspects of the security and defence relationship between the UK and the EU for both parties. The Chapter will also explore what has been said by

both the UK government and EU leadership since Brexit in relation any post-Brexit security and defence partnership, to determine each parties' positions and aims. The Chapter will then seek to assess the main difficulties and opportunities that now present themselves for the UK and the EU post-Brexit in terms of security and defence. Finally, the Chapter will seek to determine what a future security and defence relationship might look like between the UK and the EU by exploring potential scenarios, before determining whether a post-Brexit partnership is something worth pursuing for both parties.

Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This literature review will analyse the existing literature that centres around the four themes of the thesis. These are: the history of the security and defence relationship between the UK and EU; the relationship between the Conservative Party and the EU and EU security and defence; the UK and EU's security and defence relationship immediately prior to Brexit; and the current relationship between the two parties post-Brexit. This literature review, and the literature presented within, will be split into these four themes. This review will aim to establish what themes have already been covered in the existing research, to what extent they have been covered and, in concluding, will highlight the gap this thesis intends to fill in the existing field of research.

2.2 History of the security and defence relationship between the UK and the EU

The vast majority of the literature in the more general area of EU security and defence, is primarily focused on the history of the EU security and defence. This literature generally branches into two categories: the first consist of literature that focuses on the evolution of EU security and defence. Literature of this nature generally tracks the evolution of EU security and defence from its early beginnings under the proposed (and failed) European Defence Community (EDC) 1952, to the inception of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, to the latest, and most significant, reforms – for EU security and defence at least – established under the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. The second branch of literature focusing on the history of EU security and defence focuses on the EU's response to a specific conflict – often comprising of a critical analysis of the CFSP, and the more recent Common Security and Defence Policy's (CSDP) effectiveness in responding to and dealing with a particular conflict. Under these two branches, there has been little research conducted into the relationship between the EU and

any individual Member State in the area of security and defence. More often than not, any reference to the Member States is made in regard to them as a collective.

One piece of literature of this sort in particular is *Smith (2015)*⁷. Smith is a leading commentator in this area. Her primary focus has been on the inner workings of the EU's security and defence policy and its position as a global actor in international affairs. Although Smith has produced some important literature on the effects of Brexit for the EU, Smith's work is less focused on any one Member State, and instead focuses on the EU as an actor itself. In the aforementioned piece of literature, Smith focuses on the internal relations that currently exist between the EU and its member states, explaining why the EU often falls short in its security and defence objectives. Smith explains that the intergovernmental nature of the CSDP ultimately results in a security and defence policy that is inconsequential and weak. Importantly, Smith's focus is specifically on the tensions that exist between the EU and its member states collectively. Smith does not venture into much detail on the EU's relationship with any particular Member State or the consequences that follow from that relationship.

McCormick's research follows in a similar vein to Hill's. McCormick has produced a wealth of literature on the subject of EU security and defence. In his book the *'European Superpower'*,⁸ McCormick argues that the EU has become an economic and political superpower and argues the case that Europe, economically, has more power and influence on the world stage than the US. He also argues that the EU has the potential to overtake the USA in terms of its political influence and military capabilities. He continues this argument in his later book, *'Why Europe Matters'*,⁹ in which he makes a case for the benefits of European integration, including in the area of security and defence. McCormick argues how the EU has made the lives and societies of Europeans safer and how further integration has given the EU a more powerful presence on the world stage. Whilst these are two important pieces of literature in the field of European security and defence studies, McCormick, like

⁷ K Smith, *'European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World'* (Polity Press, 2015)

⁸ J McCormick, *'The European Superpower'*, (Palgrave, 2006)

⁹ J McCormick, *'Why Europe Matters'*, (Red Globe Press, 2013)

many of his contemporaries, makes the EU his primary focus, as opposed to the EU's relationship with any specific Member State.

Cardwell is one of the leading scholars in the area of EU external relations, foreign policy and security and defence. In his 2012 book *'EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era'*,¹⁰ a section is dedicated to the CFSP in the Post-Lisbon Era. The literature contained within the chapters in this section contains some of the most detailed analysis of EU foreign, security and defence policy in the post-Lisbon era. These chapters focus on the evolution of the CFSP¹¹ and the theoretical principles guiding that evolution,¹² as well as its many strengths and shortfalls.^{13,14} Again, whilst these pieces of literature have provided valuable contributions and insights in explaining the history and development of EU security and defence, as well as its legal and political framework, there is no focus on the history and development of EU security and defence in the context of any specific Member State.

EU security and defence has been examined through many different lenses, however, as mentioned above, the EU's relationship with its Member States as a collective is a recurring trend in the literature. Hill (2002)¹⁵ focuses on the CSDP in practice but argues that its political ineffectiveness is a result of a lack of shared European identity amongst EU member states. Hill does not depart completely from what Smith says, however, his focus is much more on the effects flowing from a lack of shared identity on EU security and defence capabilities rather than on the effects

¹⁰ P Cardwell, *'EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era'*, (TMC Asser Press, 2012)

¹¹ A Sari, *'Between Legalisation and Organisational Development: Explaining the Evolution of EU Competence in the Field of Foreign Policy'* 59-95, in P Cardwell, *'EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era'*, (TMC Asser Press, 2012)

¹² A Bendiek, *'European Realism in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy'*, 35-57, in P Cardwell, *'EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era'*, (TMC Asser Press, 2012)

¹³ U Puetter, *'The Latest Attempt at Institutional Engineering: The Treaty of Lisbon and Deliberative Intergovernmentalism in EU Foreign and Security Policy Coordination'*, 17-34, in P Cardwell, *'EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era'*, (TMC Asser Press, 2012)

¹⁴ M Brkan, *'The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Field of Common Foreign and Security Policy After the Treaty of Lisbon: New Challenges for the Future'* 97-115, in P Cardwell, *'EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era'*, (TMC Asser Press, 2012)

¹⁵ C Hill, *'The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy'* (Taylor and Francis, 2002)

of the conflicting interests and agendas of the Member States. Important to note again, it is the Member States as a collective that are the focus of Hill's analysis, not the EU's relationship with any individual Member State *per se*.

Krotz (2009)¹⁶ follows in the same vein as Smith and Hill in studying the effectiveness of the EU security and defence in practice. Krotz, however, argues that the EU's ineffectiveness stems from the failure of the EU's foreign policy making 'system'. Krotz considers that the legal framework and the system in which the EU's security and defence policy is formed – such as the use of unanimous decision making – is the greatest obstacle to the CSDP being used to its full potential. As mentioned above, a great deal of literature in the area focuses on specific CSDP missions themselves. Howorth (2011)¹⁷ studies CSDP missions between the years of the late 1990's up until 2010, exploring specifically what was successful, what could have worked better, what failed and why for each individual mission during this period, as well as assessing how the EU's role as a security and defence actor developed as a result of these missions. In the same vein as much of the literature in this field, Howorth's sole focus is not on the contribution or behaviour of any member state in particular. Instead Howorth explores the contributions of the member states as a whole to each particular CSDP mission that he analyses.

There is also a significant body of literature that analyses EU security and defence capabilities in terms of how it shapes the EU's role as a global actor. Hill, Smith and Vanhoonacker (2017)¹⁸ have produced research on the CSDP under the banner of International Relations (IR). They argue that the EU security and defence is ultimately shaped by external events i.e. changes in the political landscape outside the EU, and that the EU's action in the global arena is ultimately reflexive rather than progressive or cumulative. They also argue that this is a result of the EU member

¹⁶ U Krotz, 'Momentum and impediments: why Europe won't emerge as a full political actor on the world stage soon' (2009), *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 47 (3)

¹⁷ J Howorth, 'Decision-Making in Security and Defence Policy: Towards Supranational Intergovernmentalism?' (2011), Working Paper Series, 25

¹⁸ C Hill, M Smith and S Vanhoonacker, 'International Relations and the European Union' (Oxford University Press, 2017)

states' conflicting interests as well as an ineffective system to deal with those conflicts interests, which ultimately results in policy only being founded when the stakes are high. Bretherton and Vogler (2006)¹⁹ follow this same approach and attempt to explain the role security and defence plays in the EU's status as a global actor both politically and economically. Bretherton and Volger draw a link between the EU's status as a military actor with its status as a political and economic actor. They argue that the EU's identity as a purely civilian and economic actor is and can be transformed by its security and defence capabilities. They argue that only by the EU acquiring a greater role militarily can the EU continue to wield its so-called 'soft power' – economic and diplomatic power – effectively.

Whilst the subject of Brexit is currently of the utmost interest and relevance in EU studies, and across almost every area of academic study currently, it is still a relatively new and emerging issue. As detailed and as comprehensive as the existing literature is, literature on Brexit is still rather thin relative to the substantial body of research that has been produced in relation to EU studies as a whole. Thinner still is the literature that focuses on Brexit and its implications for the EU and UK's security and defence partnership. Although a significant body of literature is emerging, as will be seen below, this is limited to a handful of commentators. Thus far, there is a very small amount of literature to date that focuses on the security and defence relationship between the UK, and there exists even less literature on it in the context of Brexit. It is within this gap where this thesis would seek to make an original contribution.

2.3 The Conservative Party and its relationship with the EU and EU security and defence

A primary focus of this thesis is on the Conservative Party's relationship with the EU and its record and perspectives on EU security and defence. This will help understand the policies that informed the UK's interaction with EU security and

¹⁹ C Bretherton and J Volger, *'The European Union as a Global Actor'* (Routledge, 2006)

defence and with the CSDP throughout 2010-2016 during the Cameron premiership. To date, there have been a range of literature published on this subject. The two outstanding pieces of literature on this subject, however, have been 'The Conservatives under David Cameron: Built to Last?' by Lee and Beech.²⁰ The other is 'Cameron and Liberal Conservatism: Attitudes within the Parliamentary Conservative Party and Conservative Ministers' by Heppell.²¹ In their book, Lee and Beech provide the first and definitive analysis of the development of what they call the 'New Conservative' ideology and policy during the early years of David Cameron's leadership. The book identifies continuities in Conservative policy under Cameron but also identifies how this might change under his leadership. The book provides a comparison of Cameron's policies to that of his predecessors, namely Thatcher and Major. Lee and Beech also take each policy area in turn and seek to determine Cameron's policy on that area and also predict how he may implement that policy if and when in government. As for the EU and EU security and defence, Lee and Beech describe Cameron as someone who is less Eurosceptic than Thatcher but is still opposed to EU security and defence and the CSDP. Whilst Lee and Beech are correct in describing Cameron as less Eurosceptic than Thatcher, they are wrong in their predictions about Cameron as leader. Whilst this book is valuable and accurate in the analysis it gives on Cameron's position in relation to the EU as leader, it is limited in that it is not able to analyse how Cameron operated as PM. This thesis expands on Lee and Beech's analysis of Cameron and his Conservatives and, with the benefit of hindsight, is able to analyse how Cameron operated in practice as PM.

The other key piece of literature on the Cameron and the Conservative's relationship with the EU was a study published by Heppell in 2012. Heppell's study seeks to contribute to the development of academic research on the internal dynamics of the Conservative Party under the leadership of Cameron. Heppell's study identifies the ideological composition of the parliamentary Conservative party (PCP) in order to

²⁰ S Lee and M Beech, 'The Conservatives under David Cameron: Built to Last?' (Springer, 2009)

²¹ T Heppell, 'Cameron and Liberal Conservatism: Attitudes within the Parliamentary Conservative Party and Conservative Ministers', (2012), *British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, 15 (3)

determine the location and numeric strength of the critics of Cameron. By constructing a data set of attitudes across two ideological divides—the social, sexual and morality divide and the European divide—the study identifies that despite Cameron's social liberal emphasis both the PCP and his ministerial team is predominantly Thatcherite—i.e. socially conservative. The study also identifies that, despite numerically having a Eurosceptic PCP and ministerial team, with Europhilia now an inconsequential rump, Cameron faces a minority 'hard' Eurosceptic faction of rebels who oppose his and his ministerial team's 'soft' Euroscepticism. Furthermore, the study identifies that the influx of new parliamentarians elected in 2010 may increase social liberal strength, but they are overwhelmingly Eurosceptic, with a significant tranche of hard Eurosceptics amongst them. Finally, through a process of ideological mapping of these two ideological divides the study identifies a core of 50 socially conservative and hard Eurosceptics who are the critics of Cameron. Heppell's study is an extremely valuable and detailed piece of research on the makeup of Cameron's PCP in 2012. This thesis will draw on Heppell's research but will focus more on Cameron's cabinet and their attitudes towards EU security and defence, something Heppell does not focus in on. In contrast to Heppell, this thesis will seek to isolate the key people in Cameron's cabinet in terms of EU security and defence policy, i.e. the Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary and Minister for Europe, and explore and define their perspectives towards EU security and defence.

2.4 The security and defence relationship between the UK and the EU immediately prior to Brexit

Whilst there has been a significant amount of research exploring the history and evolution of EU security and defence with the EU as a global actor acting as the primary focus, there has been much less research conducted into the EU's security and defence relationship with any particular Member State, and even less on its security and defence relationship with the UK. There exists only a handful of literature, at least amongst the leading commentators in the area, that have been conducted into the UK and EU's relationship prior Brexit. One such study was

produced by *Cardwell (2017)*.²² Although much of Cardwell's focus is on what lies ahead for the UK and EU's security and defence partnership post-Brexit, he does devote some attention to the UK and EU's security and defence partnership prior to Brexit. Cardwell looks at the UK's consistent opposition to further integration in EU security and defence since the inception of the CFSP under the Treaty on European Union, questioning whether they can be fairly described as an 'awkward partner' to the EU. He also looks at the lack of discussion around EU security and defence during the lead up to the Brexit referendum and the problems associated with it. Cardwell also explores how the UK's departure will affect the EU's security and defence capabilities and what a future security and defence partnership may look like. Whilst Cardwell's analysis of the pre-Brexit partnership makes an extremely valuable contribution to the field, this only forms half of his overall analysis.

Cardwell (2013) has also provided a detailed analysis of the functioning and nature of the CFSP just 3 years prior to Brexit.²³ In this piece of literature, Cardwell explains the CFSP's position in the EU's legal order, post-Libson and how, as Cardwell describes, it has been 'ring-fenced'. Cardwell looks at how this ring-fencing operates in practice by analyzing Court of Justice (CJEU) judgments in relation to the Treaty-based loyalty clause relating to CFSP. Cardwell provides a detailed analysis of the CFSP and explains the ways in which the CFSP operates differently to other areas of the EU. Cardwell's thorough analysis of the legal standing and operation of the CFSP makes a very valuable contribution to the area and is one of the last prior to the Brexit referendum. This thesis will draw on this piece of research, however, it will try to provide an account of the CSDP this time in the context of the UK and Brexit and with a greater emphasis on it.

²² P Cardwell, *'The United Kingdom and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU: From Pre-Brexit 'Awkward Partner' to Post-Brexit 'Future Partnership'?*, (2017), *Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy*, 13(13)

²³ P Cardwell, *'On 'ring-fencing' the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the legal order of the European Union'*, (2013), *Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly*, 64(4), 443–463

Another study, amongst the few, that was conducted into the UK and EU's security and defence relationship prior to Brexit was conducted by *Whitman (2010)*.²⁴ Although not strictly immediately prior to Brexit, *Whitman* provides a comprehensive study into the UK and EU's security and defence relationship during the 2005-2010 Parliament. *Whitman* explores the key foreign policy issues of the UK during this time and how they varied between Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. *Whitman* also studies what role security and defence issues played during the 2010 General Election campaign, focusing importantly on the position of its would be winner, David Cameron's security and defence policies and how they contributed to his victory. Whilst *Whitman* provides a comprehensive analysis of the UK and EU's security and defence partnership during this time, it is too long before the Brexit referendum to be able to contribute to any understanding of the relationship immediately prior to Brexit, which had changed significantly from 2010 to 2016. *Whitman's* analysis is, however, good for context, particularly in supporting the argument for the UK being an awkward partner and historically opposing integration in the CFSP.

*Whitman (2016)*²⁵ does, however, provide a more recent analysis of the security and defence relationship between the UK and the EU. *Whitman* begins by analyzing the relationship between the UK and EU at this time, explaining the UK's lack of involvement in the CFSP/CSDP and the intergovernmental nature of the EU's collective foreign and security policy. In doing this, *Whitman* goes on to argue that the UK's departure from the EU would be relatively straightforward in terms of security and defence, in that the UK and other Member States already enjoy autonomy and independence in this area. *Whitman's* research again, is very valuable, however, it is done with the referendum as its focus and does not provide as much analysis as it could on the partnership that existed between the UK and the EU at this time.

²⁴ R Whitman, 'The calm after the storm? Foreign and security policy from Blair to Brown', (2010), *Parliamentary Affairs*, 834-848

²⁵ R Whitman, 'The UK and EU foreign and security policy: an optional extra', (2016) *The Political Quarterly*, 87 (2), 254-261

Another important piece of literature on this topic was also produced by *Witney* (2016).²⁶ Here Witney provides a comprehensive analysis of the UK and EU's security and defence partnership. Witney looks at how EU security and defence policy has been shaped by UK interests, in relation to EU policy on Russia and Syria. Witney also looks at how the UK has benefitted from EU security and defence, specifically police cooperation, counter terrorism and intelligence sharing. He warns against British withdrawal, arguing that the UK would be less safe and less influential outside the EU. Witney also explores how the UK has shaped not just EU policy but also its implementation, specifically EU sanctions. Witney also looks at the benefits of the security and defence partnership for the UK's influence on the world stage, including the added influence the UK has inside the EU (supported by one of the most powerful economic superpowers in the world) and NATO's desire to see the UK to remain inside the EU. Again, like Witman, Witney makes a very valuable contribution to the field, however, his focus is more on the potential consequences of the Brexit referendum and less on the UK's relationship with the EU in security and defence.

2.5 The security and defence relationship between the UK and the EU presently/post-Brexit

Since the Brexit referendum, there has been a substantial body of research devoted to studying the implications and consequences of Brexit to the UK and the EU. This is the true also for the area of UK and EU security and defence. Although research on this has been light in relation to other areas of EU law and EU studies, there does exist a number of very important pieces of literature dedicated to it. As already mentioned above, *Cardwell* (2017) published an important piece of literature

²⁶ S Dennison, M Leonard and N Witney, '*One hundred years of British solitude: Magical thinking about Brexit and security: A British exit from the EU would make it harder to fight crime and terrorism, reduce Britain's ability to lead and influence its partners, and weaken NATO*', European Council on Foreign Relations (16 May 2016) https://ecfr.eu/publication/one_hundred_years_of_british_solitude_magical_thinking_about_brexit_an/ (accessed 29/10/21)

dedicated to exploring a potential post-Brexit partnership.²⁷ In the second half of his article, Cardwell looks at if and how any post-Brexit partnership would have to fulfil the goals of the UK's recent Global Strategy. Cardwell highlights the UK's apparent enthusiasm to pursue shared foreign policy goals and explores how it might be able to achieve that. Cardwell gives a number of forecasts and warnings in relation to EU security and defence capabilities post-Brexit. He warns that EU integration will not necessarily be a given and that the EU 27 Member States must do more to show commitment to EU security and defence and must do more to pursue further integration. He also warns against the difficulties the UK and the EU may encounter in the future, arguing that any post-Brexit partnership may be a long-term challenge to broker.

*Cardwell (2021)*²⁸ has also produced a more recent piece of literature dedicated to understanding the effects of Brexit on EU external relations, including its security and defence capabilities. In this piece, Cardwell explores a number of potential consequences that look likely to impact the EU's external relations. Cardwell's analysis covers the impact of Brexit on the EU's external action institutional frameworks; trade and the Common Commercial Policy; and bilateral agreements with third countries or regions. As well as this Cardwell provides a comprehensive analysis of the impact of Brexit on the law and policy relating to EU foreign, security and defence policies. Although published in 2021, the article was written during 2017/18 and can therefore be more speculative as opposed to studying the current impact of Brexit on these areas that have emerged since the UK's departure on 31st January 2020.

Witman, another lead commentator in the field of EU security and defence, has produced 3 very significant pieces of literature on the impact of Brexit on UK and EU

²⁷ P Cardwell, *'The United Kingdom and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU: From Pre-Brexit 'Awkward Partner' to Post-Brexit 'Future Partnership'?*, (2017) *Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy*, 13(13)

²⁸ P Cardwell, *'Considering EU External Relations after Brexit: Introduction. Europe and the World: A law review'*, (2021) 5(1), 1-3

security and defence. *Witman* (2016)²⁹ produced a comprehensive piece of literature dedicated to exploring potential post-Brexit partnerships. Witman evaluates the CFSP and CSDP partnership between the UK and the EU prior to the 2016 referendum and assesses the degree to which the UK was integrated within decision making and implementation process. Witman outlines 3 potential post-Brexit scenarios for the UK and the EU, which he calls '*integrated*' (close relationship with the EU), '*associated*' (loose relationship with the EU) and '*detached*' (UK isolationism or bespoke/bi-lateral security and defence partnerships with global actors other than the EU). For each, Witman assesses the costs and benefits of each possible future partnership. *Witman* (2019)³⁰ has also produced a more recent piece of literature concerning the impact of Brexit on UK and EU security and defence. In this piece, Witman's focus is on the impact of Brexit on the UK, specifically the UK's diplomatic strategy and diplomatic capabilities. Witman argues that due to the UK government's inability to provide a comprehensive plan for a post-Brexit security and defence partnership with the EU, this has also meant the future of UK diplomacy with the EU also lies in doubt. Witman provides a comprehensive analysis of what future UK-EU diplomatic relations might look like and how they may help the UK to address future security and defence issues with Europe.

Witman (2020)³¹ has also provided an equally comprehensive analysis of the impact of Brexit for the UK and EU's foreign, security and defence partnership post-Brexit. Witman warns against the challenges that both sides face in brokering any post-Brexit security and defence deal. Witman explores what has been said about both sides in the negotiation process and speculates what that might mean for the UK and EU's future partnership. Given the absence of formal discussions between the UK and EU on post-Brexit security and defence cooperation, Witman predicts that a formal partnership may well be replaced by a partnership that operates on a mere

²⁹ R Whitman, '*The UK and EU foreign, security and defence policy after Brexit: integrated, associated or detached?*', (2016) National Institute Economic Review, 43-50

³⁰ R Whitman, '*The UK's European diplomatic strategy for Brexit and beyond*', (2019) International Affairs, 95 (2), 383-404

³¹ R Whitman, '*Missing in Action: The EU-UK foreign, security and defence policy relationship after Brexit*', (2020), European View, 19 (2), 222-229

ad-hoc basis; ‘muddling through’, as he describes it. This piece of literature is thorough and paints an accurate picture of the positions of the UK and EU in relation to their security and defence partnerships at this time. It makes a very important contribution to the field.

Another leading commentator who has produced literature on this topic is Witney (2018).³²

Here, Witney conducted a comprehensive analysis of security in Europe, post-Brexit, drawing on a number of findings produced in a reflection group with other experts. In this piece, Witney puts forward the case for a closely-integrated partnership between the EU and the UK post-Brexit. Witney proposes a partnership, in which the EU and UK are integrated in varying degrees in different areas. Witney recommends that the EU should embrace the UK’s, then, recent proposal for a treaty on intra-EU security and recommends that each side should aim for an interim agreement extending existing arrangements until one is in place. Witney also warns against allowing the UK, as he says, a seat at the table, recommending that each side should establish a separate arrangement enabling separate channels through which both parties can cooperate on security and defence related matters. Whilst UK security and defence post-Brexit is an important aspect of this piece, it forms only part of Witney’s focus, which is also dedicated to understanding the security and defence implications for the EU.

Witney (2019)³³ has also produced an important piece of literature dedicated to understanding the security and defence challenges that lie ahead for the EU post-Brexit. Here, Witney outlines a number of security and defence challenges and opportunities, and also makes a number of recommendations for how EU security and defence should press ahead in a post-Brexit world. As part of the challenges he

³² N Witney, ‘*Keeping Europe safe after Brexit: Findings of a reflection group led by Marta Dassù, Wolfgang Ischinger, Pierre Vimont, and Robert Cooper*’, (20 March 2018) https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/Keeping_Europe_Safe_After_Brexit2.pdf (accessed 02/11/21)

³³ N Witney, ‘*Building Europeans’ capacity to defend themselves*’, European Council on Foreign Relations (25 June 2019) https://ecfr.eu/publication/building_europeans_capacity_to_defend_themselves/ (accessed 01/11/21)

outlines, Witney warns that the EU should prepare to be less reliant on the US for their security. In doing this, he recommends that the EU should take a greater share of the burden of defending Europe, with an emphasis on capabilities and operational commitments. He also recommends that the EU should do more to support NATO and develop a greater level of ambition to assist NATO in its defence of Europe. He discusses the benefits of the new European Intervention Initiative (EII) and how that may lead to a new European Air Intervention Group to assist in EU CSDP operations around Europe as well as globally. He also makes the recommendation for a new European Security Council, which could cooperate and collaborate with the US on bigger security and defence issues. Whilst Witney's research makes a valuable impact in understanding the consequences of post-Brexit EU security and defence capabilities, discussion on the future of UK security and defence features only briefly.

More recently, Witney (2021)³⁴ has provided some key insights into the new, and highly controversial, AUKUS deal between the UK, US and Australia. Witney outlines the key features of the new security and defence partnership between these nations and outlines some key challenges that he believes AUKUS will encounter. He highlights the damage that it has done, not just the relationship between the UK and France – who were angry to have been left out of the defence pact – but also the EU, whose new Indo-Pacific Strategy was overshadowed and who now, as Witney says, will be emboldened by the fallout from AUKUS to strengthen its own security and defence capabilities in response. Witney critically evaluates the UK's ability to deliver on weapons systems manufacturing, a key part of the AUKUS pact. Witney believes that the UK will not be able to deliver to Australia and the US what is expected of it under AUKUS. He warns against the UK becoming a third wheel in this partnership and views the partnership as one that will be averse to the UK's interests, and one in which it will simply have to follow the USA's lead.

³⁴ N Witney, 'AUKUS: After the sugar rush', European Council on Foreign Relations (24 September 2021) <https://ecfr.eu/article/aukus-after-the-sugar-rush/> (accessed 30/10/21)

2.6 Original contribution

In conclusion, the original contribution of this thesis consists of drawing on all of the literature included here. What distinguishes this research is that, to date, there exists no one research study that combines the historical relationship between the UK and EU security and defence, the Conservative's perspective on it, and the partnership during the Cameron premiership, all in the context of Brexit and a future partnership. In turn, through a critical analysis of the available data, as well as a qualitative content analysis of documents such as speeches and official statements etc., this thesis seeks to bring all of this literature together in a cohesive manner, to shed new light on the existing partnership as well as help inform how a future partnership might be developed. This thesis also seeks to make the argument that the UK and EU's security and defence partnership was in fact a more valuable and positive one than it has been widely portrayed to be. It is hoped that the findings of this thesis will not just shed new light on the past security and defence partnership between the UK and the EU, but will also help inform policy makers both in Britain and in the EU in the future if and when they comes to negotiate a post-Brexit security and defence partnership between the two parties.

Chapter One: A brief historical analysis of the CSDP and an outline of the current legal framework

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter will be to outline what the specific focus of the thesis will be when referring to EU security and defence, namely the EU's common security and defence policy (CSDP), as well as give some background to the CSDP and to outline the legal framework that surrounds it. This is to both provide the thesis with a historical and legal grounding and to prevent further unnecessary and repetitive clarification of terms used throughout the thesis. This chapter will begin by outlining what the CSDP is and what aspects of it this thesis is concerned with and why. It will also establish whose perspectives will be analysed for the purposes of this thesis and why. This chapter will then provide a summary of the history surrounding the CSDP and the UK's role in shaping it, from its inception under the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSP) following WW2, up to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 and any subsequent developments up until the present day. Finally this chapter will provide a summary of the legal framework that governs the CSDP, as well as the roles played by the Member States, European institutions and the various offices and agencies within that framework.

3.2 The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

A logical place to begin would be to clarify what is meant by EU security and defence policy in the context of this thesis. The EU conducts its foreign and security policy by means of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which covers all areas of EU foreign policy and EU security and defence matters. Within the CFSP, exists the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) which covers specifically all aspects of EU military and civilian crisis management policy.³⁵ Up until the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European security and defence policy was known as the

³⁵ 'Foreign & security policy at EU level', EUR-LEX <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:ai0025> (accessed 14/05/2018)

ESDP. Today, under the terms of the Treaty, it has been renamed the CSDP. In the interests of uniformity, this thesis will continue to refer to it as the CSDP throughout.

CFSP is multifaceted and covers a wide ambit: CFSP is comprised of policies such as external trade policy, development cooperation, economic and financial cooperation with third countries, humanitarian aid, sanctions and international agreements, which fall under its 'external action' umbrella. It also includes policies such as energy, environmental, and migration and asylum policy, which fall under its 'external dimensions of internal policies' umbrella. CSDP is just one of several policy areas covered by the CFSP. CSDP provides a political and legal framework for the EU, within which it can plan, implement and control military operations and civilian missions, with the purpose of implementing and furthering the overall CSFP.³⁶ As the title suggests, CSDP deals specifically with policy pertaining to the security and defence of the EU and its Member States. This thesis is concerned only with the CSDP and, more specifically, how the CSDP is planned and implemented externally. It is in this area only, that the nature of the security and defence partnership between the UK and the EU during the Cameron premiership (2010-2016) will be analysed.

3.3 Whose perspectives?

It is also important to clarify what is meant by 'perspectives' and whose perspectives will be analysed. This thesis will focus primarily on the perspectives of the **UK government** on the EU's security and defence policy, or the CSDP. For the first two chapters, the focus of the thesis will be on the perspectives held by the **Cameron government, between 2010 and 2016**. In the final chapter, the focus of the thesis will be on the perspectives of both the **May government (2016-2019)** and the current **Johnson government (2019-2022)**. The perspectives of each government will also be limited to a number of members who have been identified as holding roles which have significant influence over the formation and implementation of the UK's policy on EU security and defence. Those roles include, but are not limited to, the

³⁶ S Keuklaire, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union* (2nd edn, Red Globe Press 2014) 12

Prime Minister (PM), Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary and Minister for Europe.

The perspectives of other figures will be explored, but they will not form the primary focus of this thesis. The **perspectives of the EU** towards its security and defence partnership with the UK will form the secondary focus of this thesis. The EU's perspectives will only be explored as far as its perspectives on the UK's involvement in the CSDP. The perspectives of the EU will also be limited to a number of figures and bodies, which have been identified as holding roles which have significant influence over the formation and implementation of the CSDP. These figures and bodies include, but are not limited to, the **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR)**, the **European Defence Agency (EDA)** and the **European External Action Service (EEAS)**. There will be some mention of the perspectives of the Heads of State and Foreign Ministers from various **EU Member States** on the UK's policy towards and involvement in the CSDP, as and when they become relevant to the discussion. It is entirely possible to write another thesis on the EU's and the Member States' perspectives on the UK and EU's security and defence partnership, and it is for that reason that these perspectives will serve as a tertiary focus for this thesis.

3.4 A brief history of the CSDP and the UK's role within it

The establishment of a fully functioning and fully integrated EU security and defence policy has been a subject of contention since the EU's conception. Today the EU is equipped with considerable and far-reaching capacities to develop policy in many policy areas. For example, in the areas of economic and monetary policy, agriculture and fisheries, environment and energy, to name but a few, the EU enjoys a high level of control and the balance of power tilts in favour of the EU's supranational institutions, i.e. the Council of the EU ('The Council'), the Commission, the European Parliament (EP) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). As the EU has developed over time, slowly the member states have transferred increasingly more powers to the EU through the process of integration. Whilst member states however, have been willing to transfer more sovereignty to the EU in certain areas they have been more reluctant to do so in other areas. One area in particular in which member states have

been rather reluctant to give up more sovereignty is in the area of security and defence. The EU's powers in this area are limited and unlike the areas listed above, power rests firmly with the member states.

Security and defence has been a contentious issue in the development of the EU for one primary reason: a monopoly on violence is the hallmark of the nation state.³⁷ This idea was famously proposed by sociologist Max Weber, who, drawing on the previous works of philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, Jean Jacques Rousseau and Jean Bodin, argued that the defining feature of the state was its '*monopoly on the legitimated use of physical force*'.³⁸ He argued that through its exclusive right to use, threaten, or authorize physical force against residents of its territory, and against its enemies abroad, a state is able to keep its citizens safe, and in doing so, this justifies its existence.³⁹ Whilst member states have been willing to transfer sovereignty to the EU in areas such as trade, energy and agriculture for example, almost all have viewed the transfer of sovereignty to the EU as a step too far. It has been regarded by many commentators in the field of EU studies that after transferring so much sovereignty to the EU already, the transfer of control over security and defence policy by member states to the EU would mean surrendering the last bastion of nationhood. The relationship between a state's 'monopoly on violence', as Weber defined it, and its identity as a 'nation' are therefore tightly intertwined and it is one of the primary reasons why member states have fought to retain control over EU security and defence policy.

Retaining this control has meant the relationship between the member states and the EU has been strained at times and has led to several stumbling blocks for the EU in the development of a security and defence policy. Since the end of the Second World War (WW2), the EU has been unable to develop any meaningful security and defence policy nor has it been able to acquire any effective means by which to

³⁷ See M Weber, *Politics As a Vocation* (Fortress Press, 1965)

³⁸ M Weber, *Weber's Rationalism and Modern Society*, translated and edited by Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters (Palgrave Books, 2015) 129

³⁹ Weber, *Supra* 37

enforce it. Whilst security and defence considerations played a major role in the early beginnings of the EU, with prominent federalists playing an integral part in its creation, the desires for deeper integration in these areas quickly diminished. This ultimately resulted in what exists today: a European security and defence policy under the full control of the EU's member states.

3.4.1 The Marshall Plan (1947)

Today, ideas such as European army, 'European Defence Union' and federal union are widely considered 'dirty' words amongst Europe's mainstream media. In the present age of Brexit, these topics are highly sensitive and often provoke similar responses when they are broached. It is surprising, therefore, to imagine that at the beginning of the EU's integration process, these ideas were at the heart of the 'European project'. The idea of a union amongst European nations emerged following the end of WW2. It was hoped that by uniting the warring nations of Europe both economically, socially and politically that this would make a future war between European states impossible. Plans for such a union began two years after the WW2 with the Marshall Plan of 1947. The plan was devised by its namesake, General George Marshall, the then US Secretary of State. The aim of the Marshall Plan was to tackle the 'root causes' of WW2 by creating new structures through which to govern relations between European states.⁴⁰ As part of the plan the US provided the EU with \$20 billion for economic relief, specifically to be spent on improving the socio-economic difficulties experienced by Europe's nations following the war and restoring order and stability in Western Europe. One of the main characteristics of the Marshall Plan was that it was centred around the concept of European 'ownership'. It was hoped by Marshall and US, that once the plan had achieved its aim of rebuilding Europe both economically and politically, that Europe would be in a position to take the lead in governing its own affairs. In order to achieve this, the US put pressure on the former Western European allies of WW2 to work together with their former enemies, now West Germany and Italy. The plan

⁴⁰ Keuklaire, *Supra* 36, at 35

was largely successful and the emerging partnership between these states laid the foundations for the next key development in EU security and defence, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

3.4.2 The European Coal and Steel Community (1950)

The ECSC was first conceived by French political economist (later President of the High Authority of the ECSC) Jean Monnet. Monnet, a federalist and advocate of European political unity, devised what became known as the 'Monnet Plan'. The plan outlined proposals for the reconstruction of France following the end of WW2. The plan's primary proposal was French ownership of the coal and steel industries located in the previously German occupied area of the Ruhr and the Saar. Monnet envisioned that over five years, this plan would enable France to reach 150% of pre-war industrial production. The Monnet Plan, however, had one major flaw: its punitive intentions towards Germany. Whilst the Monnet Plan aimed at strengthening France economically, it was at Germany's expense, removing from Germany its coal and steel resources, the industries which fuelled both world wars, and placing them under sole French ownership, making it impossible for Germany to wage another war on France and the allies again. Reminded, however, of the irreparable consequences the punitive measures contained under the Treaty of Versailles of 1920 had on Germany, the US intervened. Instead, the Monnet Plan would serve as the foundation for an entirely novel approach towards future European relations.

Bolstered by the Marshall Plan and supposed US support for European multilateralism,⁴¹ France was encouraged to make West Germany a partner as opposed to an unwilling participant in the rebuilding of France and the European continent. Building on Monnet's preparatory work, in 1950 French Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Schuman presented a new plan for the reconstruction of

⁴¹ A Milward, G Brennan and F Romero, *The European Rescue of the Nation-state* (2nd edn, Routledge 1999) 335

Europe, later known as the 'Schuman Declaration'. Schuman called for the creation of an independent and common 'High Authority' to which France and West Germany could transfer control over their coal and steel industries. What was significant about the Schuman Declaration was that it was not only concerned with rebuilding Europe economically but also uniting it political. Schuman made it clear in his proposal that the 'federation of Europe' should be one of the most important aims of this project:

*'the pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe (...)'*⁴²

The proposals made under the Schuman Declaration were later established in the Paris Treaty 1950, which created the ECSC and was ratified by six European states: France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. Economically, the ECSC was a success and a major logistical achievement, however, its most lasting achievement was political in nature. The ECSC had permanently altered the psychology of Europe's nations: historical enemies were now irreplaceable partners and the integrated economies of these states now meant that war between them was not only undesirable but, as Schuman had hoped, 'materially impossible'.⁴³

3.4.3 The European Defence Community (1952)

Although Europe was in the process of rebuilding itself, the threat to its stability had not gone away. The threat which had once been Nazi Germany was now replaced by the threat of the Soviet Union, which continued to occupy East Berlin, East Germany and most of Eastern Europe. Whilst one of the ambitions of the ECSC had been the creation of a federation of European states, Europe was still weak and remained in

⁴² R Schuman, 'Schuman Declaration' (1950) https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu/1945-59/schuman-declaration-may-1950_en (accessed 06/07/19)

⁴³ *Ibid*

the early stages of its reconstruction. Furthermore, it was not at all clear what kind of military structures would be established to organise Western Europe's collective defence.⁴⁴ The growing threat of the Soviet Union therefore caused the western European nations to call for continued US support, not just economically, but also in terms of security and defence. In August 1949, with this threat in mind, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed between the US, Canada and ten West European countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the UK. Whilst the US was keen for Europe to develop its own defence capabilities and take its own security and defence into its own hands,⁴⁵ the US had realised that Europe was in no position to defend itself. With Europe placing increasing pressure on the US to provide leadership in security and defence, combined with the invasion of South Korea by the North and the subsequent outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the North Atlantic Treaty was upgraded into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

The creation of NATO drastically altered the course of European security and defence. The security and defence aspirations the US had for Europe (and which Europe had for itself) of a European initiative in security and defence were instead replaced with direct American leadership through the vehicle of NATO.⁴⁶ European and US foreign security and defence policy were now bound together by the same common enemy – the Soviet Union.⁴⁷ Although the US understood the reality of Europe's situation, its military support came at a cost for Europe. In return for NATO protection, the US expected European support in its foreign policy endeavours. The consequences of European support for US leadership during this time, whilst it had the short-term advantage of helping maintain stability during the recovery of European states, meant that Europe would become subservient to US foreign policy for the best part of a century and would lead to some of the most catastrophic failures of European security and defence (most notably the Balkans Crisis on the

⁴⁴ Keuklaire, *Supra* 36, at 38

⁴⁵ *Ibid* at 39

⁴⁶ *Ibid*

⁴⁷ *Ibid* at 40

1990s, in which the EU was powerless to prevent a genocide from being perpetrated in its own neighbourhood).

US protection for Europe was offered also on the condition that Europe increased its efforts in developing its own military capabilities to assist NATO. In order to meet these expectations, the six member states of the ECSC agreed on the creation of the European Defence Community (EDC). The EDC was proposed by the then French Prime Minister Rene Pleven. Pleven proposed the creation of a defence community existing alongside the ECSC, incorporating the armies of six nations, including Germany and Italy, into an integrated supranational European army. Pleven's proposal became known as the 'Pleven Plan' and resulted in the EDC Treaty, which six member states of the ECSC signed in May 1952. The opening article of the Treaty stated that the EDC would be supranational in character, comprising of common institutions, a common armed force and a common budget. The proposal called for the creation of a European armament and equipment programme which would be drawn up and carried out under the authority of a European Defence Minister, who in turn would operate under a European Defence Council. Although sceptical at first, the United Kingdom eventually gave its agreement to the initiative. "Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland believe that the European Defence Community will be an essential factor in strengthening the defence of the free world through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and desire to establish the closest partnership with it", read an official British statement in April 1954, adding that "the United Kingdom will also join in developing a common policy in technical fields such as training, tactical doctrine, staff methods, logistics, and standardisation of equipment".⁴⁸

Whilst on the surface the Treaty appeared to follow the example set by the ECSC, in appearing truly supranational in character, a closer analysis of the treaty showed the EDC was really more intergovernmental. Whilst the desire for European defence

⁴⁸ European Defence Agency, '*10 years of working together*' (EDA, 2012) 8
https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-publications/eda_10years (accessed 13/08/19)

capabilities appeared to be there – the views expressed by the founding fathers and signatories seemed to indicate an intent for the ECSC's Member States to integrate fully, including on security and defence'⁴⁹ – there were a number of obstacles in the way. In financial terms, this would be difficult to achieve. Europe was still reeling from WW2 which had decimated most of the continent just five years previous. Furthermore, political tensions were still high and the concept of Germany regaining a military foothold in Europe was one which Europe's nations were not ready to embrace at the time. As logical as a defence union might have been, was and as destructive as the previous international political order had been for Europe's nations, the Allies' victory in WW2 had reinvigorated a new sense of national pride and confidence within their respective states.

Ultimately, the renewed sense of national pride amongst the signatories to the EDC combined with their fear of future German rearmament meant that the EDC was doomed to fail from the beginning. Upon being signed, the Treaty was submitted to the member states' respective national parliaments for ratification. France, who was initially a supporter and the key architect of the EDC, had become divided on the EDC. The Mouvement républicain populaire ('Popular Republican Movement' – MRP) led by one of the EU's founding father and federalist Robert Schuman, fought for the ratification of the EDC, which it considered to be the most effective way for Europe to move towards federal unity and to prevent a renewed sense of German nationalism.⁵⁰ On the other hand, the French Communist Party (PCF) and the Rassemblement du peuple français ('Rally of the French People' – RPF), led and created by General de Gaulle, fought against its ratification, believing it to be an unwarranted and unacceptable surrender of France's national sovereignty, whilst providing an opportunity for Germany to rearm itself.⁵¹ Internal division combined with international developments – the death of Stalin in 1953 and the end of the Korean war had made the EDC project seem less urgent – eventually sealed the

⁴⁹ European Parliament, *'The First Treaties'* (European Parliament, 2018) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.1.1.pdf (accessed 13/08/19)

⁵⁰ A Kanter, *The European Defense Community in the French National Assembly: A Roll Call Analysis* Comparative (1970) 22 (2) Politics 204

⁵¹ *Ibid*

EDC's fate, and on 30th August 1954, the French National Assembly decided by 319 votes to 264 to postpone discussion of the EDC Treaty and, in effect, rejected it.⁵² Instead, the EDC was replaced by the less supranational, and arguably weaker, Western European Union (WEU).

3.4.4 The Western European Union (1954)

Established on 23rd October 1954,⁵³ in place of the EDC, the WEU was created. Whilst Europe's nations were still fearful of German rearmament, the US was still concerned with integrating West Germany into NATO. The WEU was regarded as a tempered or 'watered down' version of the EDC due to it being less supranational. The WEU grew out of the Brussels Treaty of 1948, an agreement between the nations of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the UK to provide for collective defence. Although the UK never joined the European Community until 1973, its involvement with the WEU is arguably the first sign of its support for and involvement in the European integration process. The WEU acted as a liaison between the UK and the European supranational institutions. The WEU still allowed for joint military actions between the original signatories to the Brussels Treaty, however, it made several modifications: West Germany and Italy were now to be included in this defence pact and West Germany was to renounce its production, storage and use of weapons in return for its military integration into NATO, which it would now serve as its primary source for security and defence.⁵⁴

The crucial difference between the WEU and the EDC was that whereas the EDC was supranational in nature and aimed towards the creation of common European armed forces, the WEU was purely intergovernmental, relying on the individual armed forces of member states. The signatories to the WEU made this clear when outlining the objectives of the WEU. Whilst two of those listed objectives were to

⁵² This decision by the FNA became known by federalists as the 'crime of 30th August', as it destroyed what they perceived Europe's best hopes for a federal state

⁵³ Kanter, *Supra* 50

⁵⁴ Smith, *Supra* 7, at 23

create a firm basis for European economic recovery and to promote unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe, one of the most significant was that the members intended:

*'To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression.'*⁵⁵

Whilst this was progress, it was significantly less ambitious than the supranational European army proposed under the failed EDC Treaty. The WEU also had a heavy reliance on the US and NATO. Article IV of the Modified Brussels Treaty stated that:

*'Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council [of the WEU] and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.'*⁵⁶

The WEU seemed to represent a missed opportunity and set a precedent for EU security and defence which still applies today: EU security and defence was now intergovernmental instead of supranational, its security and defence policy now Atlantic instead of European, and in place of a common army Europe was instead now almost wholly reliant on support from the US and NATO for its security and defence needs.⁵⁷ Europe had missed the opportunity to make its own choices on security and defence which would be something which would come back to haunt it, particularly following the outbreak of the Yugoslav war of the 1990's.

3.4.5 The Fouchet Plan (1961-62)

⁵⁵ Preamble, Modified Brussels Treaty 1954
https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2003/11/26/7d182408-0ff6-432e-b793-0d1065e695/publishable_en.pdf (accessed 15/08/19)

⁵⁶ Article IV, Modified Brussels Treaty 1954
https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2003/11/26/7d182408-0ff6-432e-b793-0d1065e695/publishable_en.pdf (accessed 15/08/19)

⁵⁷ Keuklaire, *Supra* 36, at 41

Following its creation, the WEU served merely as a forum for consultation for the WEU's member states. Via a council, the foreign ministers of the six member states of the WEU still met to agree policy formulation at least twice each year.⁵⁸ However, its reliance on NATO as the member states' primary source of defence meant that the WEU was very rarely utilised and never truly fulfilled its role as a defence organisation.⁵⁹ Not long after its creation, the WEU fell into what has been regarded as a 'hibernation period' in which the WEU became almost redundant. It was not until 1984 that the WEU would be 'reawakened' and would begin to have any meaningful effect on European security and defence.

In the years following the creation of the WEU, progression in European integration was mainly limited to the economic field. With the Treaties of Rome of 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Community for Atomic Energy (Euratom) were established, in which the six member states of the ECSC ('the Six') were now to be bound together economically through a common market and customs union, as well as creating a specialist market for nuclear power through which cooperation could be fostered amongst them in the then emerging field of atomic energy. Several further attempts were made aimed at the creation of a European security and defence policy. In 1960, concerned with the establishing of an independent European foreign and security policy, distinct from that of the US and NATO, and in an attempt to improve European political cooperation, French president Charles de Gaulle proposed the 'Fouchet Plan'.⁶⁰ The plan called for the creation of a single foreign and security policy amongst the six founding member states of the EEC, to be formed on the basis of intergovernmental cooperation.⁶¹ De Gaulle's aim was to transform the European Communities into something more coalesced, resembling more of a confederation, with France and Germany at the

⁵⁸ This was usually in Paris, although the WEU's headquarters were situated in Brussels

⁵⁹ Smith, *Supra* 7, at 23

⁶⁰ Named after the French ambassador to Denmark Christian Fouchet, the person responsible for drafting the plan

⁶¹ Keuklaire, *Supra* 36, at 41; the plan wasn't limited to foreign policy, security and defence. It also covered areas such as culture and economics (find what it covered specifically)

helm, enabling Europe to react quicker and more effectively to ensure its own security without the help of the US or NATO.

The draft treaty of 1961 (Fouchet Plan I) sought the establishment of an indissoluble union of States based on intergovernmental cooperation, with respect for the identity of Member States and their peoples.⁶² The draft treaty also provided for the establishment of a Council, composed of Heads of State and Government, which would meet three times a year and adopt decisions on the basis of unanimity.⁶³ Fearing France's domination of this new 'defence union' and the possibility that this union would undermine the supranational nature of the ECSC, EEC and Euratom ('the European Community' (EC)), the remainder of the Six rejected the draft treaty. Moreover, the Netherlands was reluctant to complicate the Common Market negotiations which were underway with the UK, over concerns they would be put off by the emergence of a more politically integrated looking EU, as well as concerns over jeopardising the future discussions between Europe and the US on the future of NATO.⁶⁴

In response to this opposition, in 1962 France submitted a revised draft treaty (Fouchet Plan II). Surprisingly, de Gaulle had changed his stance, not by way of concessions, but by a significant hardening of his position.⁶⁵ The second draft treaty went further than the original, accentuating the intergovernmental character of the proposed Union and enhancing its ability to act independently of the US. Moreover, the second draft treaty made no reference to NATO therefore strengthening opposition from France's would-be partners. The rest of the Six, particularly Belgium and the Netherlands, were keen to see the UK join the EC and were largely supportive of an Atlanticist European foreign policy and defence. For de Gaulle, however, these were concessions that he was not prepared to make in return for

⁶² Fouchet Draft Treaty 1961

https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/draft_treaty_fouchet_plan_i_2_november_1961-en-485fa02e-f21e-4e4d-9665-92f0820a0c22.html (accessed 20/08/19)

⁶³ *Ibid*

⁶⁴ *Ibid*

⁶⁵ A Teasdale, *The Fouchet Plan: De Gaulle's Intergovernmental Design for Europe* (2016) 117 LEQS 36

Belgium, the Netherlands and the other states' agreement to the Fouchet Plan. De Gaulle recognised that once the UK was admitted to the EC, the UK would pose a substantial threat to France's leadership.

The negotiations eventually broke down and came to nothing. The EEC partners could not accept de Gaulle's proposals which were ultimately aimed at undermining the Atlantic alliance and the community method of the EC. The failed negotiations led to a deepened rift in relations between France on the one side and the US, NATO and states who supported the Atlantic alliance – in particular the UK – on the other. The failure of the Fouchet Plans resulted in a revengeful and vindictive response from de Gaulle. The consequences were threefold: De Gaulle hardened his attitude towards European integration. He launched a number of scathing verbal attacks on the EC and the US, in one speech claiming the EC had missed an opportunity to take control of its own affairs and that instead it would be the US who would become the true 'federator of Europe'.⁶⁶ De Gaulle also renewed his commitment to strengthening relations with West Germany. This resulted in the signing of the Treaty on Franco-German Cooperation in 1963, which was almost identical to the plans laid down in Fouchet, covering foreign policy and defence related matters. The commitments contained within the Treaty included that the French and German leaders would meet at least twice a year to reach, wherever possible, common positions on issues of mutual concern.⁶⁷ Most significantly, one of the major consequences of the failure of Fouchet was to De Gaulle's veto of UK membership of the EC in January 1963.

The failure of Fouchet had significant long-term effects for European integration. In short, although it led to a deepening relationship between France and Germany, it also led to an increasingly embittered relationship between France and the UK. European political integration would stall for six years, until the setting up of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1969/70 and the UK's entry into the

⁶⁶ A Moravcsiik, *De Gaulle and Europe* (1998) Program for the Study of Germany and Europe Working Paper Series 49 http://aei.pitt.edu/39396/1/PSGE_WP8_5.pdf (accessed 20/08/19)

⁶⁷ Teasdale, *Supra* 65, at 52

Community would not be for another ten years (1973). In the interim, it also led to France withdrawing from NATO in 1965, after the US and the UK rejected its request to be on an equal footing with the UK in the NATO command structure. Although Fouchet appeared to be doomed to fail from the beginning, its failure had a major impact on the future progress of European security and defence. Its failure resulted in the emergence of political fault lines between France and Germany on the one side and the UK on the other, something which to this day continues to play a decisive role in the direction and formation of European security and defence policy.

3.4.6 European Political Cooperation (1970) and the Single European Act (1983)

In 1969 further progress was made with European political integration, when de Gaulle resigned as president of France and was replaced by his successor, Georges Pompidou. The new French political leadership made the political atmosphere in Europe more conducive to discussions on political union. The political events taking place beyond Europe – the Cold War, Korean War and Vietnam – gave more impetus for Member States to align their foreign policies with one another more closely. On 27th October 1970, Foreign Ministers meeting in Luxembourg adopted the ‘Davignon Report’, which laid the foundations for political cooperation between Member States in the area of foreign policy.⁶⁸ Further progress was made in Paris on 9th December 1974, when Heads of State or Government committed their respective nations to cooperation and to coordinate diplomatic action in all areas of international affairs affecting the interests of the EEC. Real progress, however, did not come in relation to the EPC until 1983, with the Stuttgart Declaration, which recognised the European Council’s leading political role and which granted the Commission, the Council and Parliament a direct say in EPC and in the future development of the EU. Stuttgart led to the Single European Act (SEA) 1986, which institutionalised the EPC, enshrined in law previous EPC practices and established a permanent secretariat in Brussels to assist the Presidency of the Community. It set

⁶⁸ Davignon Report 1970 https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/4/22/4176efc3-c734-41e5-bb90-d34c4d17bbb5/publishable_en.pdf (accessed 21/08/19)

the objective of a European foreign policy, extending it to include the political and economic aspects of security but excluding the area of defence.⁶⁹ The SEA stated that Member States should consult each other in order to adopt common political positions of foreign policy, if possible. Although the SEA showed progress, security and defence were still outside of the remit of Europe's supranational bodies.

3.4.7 The Treaty on European Union/Treaty of Maastricht (1992)

The idea of a 'union' was first discussed by the European Community at a summit held in Paris in 1972. The aim of the Community was to create a union under which all policy areas, including foreign policy, would be decided at supranational level by the Union. The SEA, as discussed above, constituted the first step towards the establishment of the EU, by institutionalising foreign policy cooperation alongside the existing European Communities' system.⁷⁰ In 1990, two parallel Intergovernmental Conferences were opened in Rome: one tasked with drawing up plans for an economic and monetary union and the other with drawing up plans for a future political union. The result of these two conferences was the Treaty on European Union, under which, as Germany's Chancellor Helmut Kohl famously stated, all policies were brought under one 'European roof'.⁷¹

3.4.7.1 The Second Pillar: the establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

One of the most significant developments in European security and defence came with the establishment of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) under the Treaty of Maastricht. During discussions at the intergovernmental conference in Rome, although France and Germany pledged their support for a truly common

⁶⁹ Single European Act 1986 <https://www.cvce.eu/en/collections/unit-content/-/unit/df06517b-babc-451d-baf6-a2d4b19c1c88/23bbb26c-a69c-40f1-954c-6b3cb1392b4d> (accessed 25/08/19)

⁷⁰ *Ibid*

⁷¹ CVCE, *The end of the Cold War: Towards the establishment of a new partnership (1989–2011)* <https://www.cvce.eu/en/collections/unit-content/-/unit/df06517b-babc-451d-baf6-a2d4b19c1c88/67c44d6d-34a9-4370-9f68-644adf62f7cd> (accessed 25/08/19)

CFSP, the UK made clear that it did not support a common defence policy. As a result, a compromise was reached, in which the CFSP would become part of a so-called 'pillar structure': the first pillar consisted of the European Communities and provided a framework enabling powers for which Member States had transferred sovereignty in areas governed by the Treaty to be exercised by the Community institutions. The second pillar was the common foreign and security policy laid down in Title V of the Treaty. The third pillar was cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs laid down in Title VI of the Treaty.⁷² Titles V and VI provided for intergovernmental cooperation, with certain supranational features such as involving the Commission and consulting Parliament.

The objectives of the CFSP were to 'to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union' and 'to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways'. It also aims 'to preserve peace and strengthen international security', 'to promote international cooperation' and 'to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms'.⁷³ The Member States were to support this policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.

Whilst the Treaty provided for 'systematic cooperation between Member States on foreign and security policy issues', as the CFSP was made purely intergovernmental in nature, the European Council (Heads of State) and the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, had overall control of the CFSP. Heads of State and Foreign Ministers must unanimously define a common position in areas of mutual interest between themselves. Each Member State holds a veto. Once a common policy is founded, HoS and/or Ministers may unanimously adopt joint actions and set out its aims and objectives and can decide these via qualified majority voting (QMV). In terms of the influence the EU has over the CFSP, whilst the Commission does not have, as it does

⁷² Title VI, Treaty on European Union 1992 <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/cy/eut/teu/title/VI/data.pdf> (accessed 25/08/19)

⁷³ Title V, Treaty on European Union 1992 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A11997M011> (accessed 25/08/19)

in Community affairs, the right to put forward proposals upon which the Council must take a decision, it may refer matters to the Council. The economic means used in the conduct of foreign policy, however, do lie within its responsibility. The role of the European Parliament is also very limited. Whilst it can be informed about the CFSP, hold debates and can address questions and recommendations to the Council, the EU Parliament's role is solely consultative. The Court of Justice of the European Communities has no jurisdiction, since the Member States reject any legal involvement in the CFSP.

3.4.8 St. Petersberg Tasks (1992)

Maastricht was followed by the establishment of the 'Petersberg tasks', which were agreed upon also in 1992 by Western European Union (WEU) Council of Ministers in Bonn, Germany. The Petersberg tasks outlined the purposes for which EU military units could be deployed. These were: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. The Petersberg tasks were later incorporated into Article 17 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) through the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997. They would also be expanded upon in the Treaty of Lisbon 2009, as will be seen below.

3.4.9 St Malo Summit 1998 and Helsinki European Council (1999)

The UK was instrumental in the next phase of reinforcing the CFSP with the establishment of the EU's common security and defence policy (CSDP). Proposals for an independent European military capability came about at the St. Malo Summit of 1998. Led by Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac, the two leaders signed the St. Malo declaration, declaring that the EU should have 'the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, in order to respond to international crises.'⁷⁴ The declaration at St. Malo led to the establishment of the 'Headline Goal' at

⁷⁴ Franco-British summit, Joint declaration on European defence 1998.
<http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html> (accessed 26/08/19)

Helsinki in 1999. Here, EU leaders sought to provide the EU with the autonomous ability to deploy 60,000 troops in 60 days for an operation lasting as long as one year to conduct the Petersberg Tasks. A deadline was set for December 2003, although this deadline was extended in 2001, before eventually being achieved in 2007. There has since been a new Helsinki headline goal in 2010. The UK – and France – through the St. Malo Declaration was instrumental in the creation of the EU's CSDP. The UK's previous and subsequent reluctance to bolster the EU's military capabilities has puzzled academics as to why the UK took such a position. This will be discussed in more detail below.

3.4.10 Lisbon Treaty (2009)

The Lisbon Treaty was signed in 2007 and implemented in 2009. The Treaty amended the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Arguably one of its greatest achievements was the establishment of a legal personality for the EU, however, in security and defence terms, it signalled the establishment of a stronger and more focused central foreign, security and defence policy, with new posts and powers for the EU's supranational institutions. In purely semantical terms, Lisbon removed the 'ESDP' and established the 'CSDP', as it is referred to today. Although it removed the pillar structure established under Maastricht, and the influence of the EU's supranational institutions was strengthened, the strict intergovernmental nature of the CFSP and CSDP was retained, with decisions continuing to be taken unanimously by Member States in the Council.

3.4.10.1 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

In terms of content, the Treaty introduced a number of changes to the CSDP. Arguably one of the most significant features of Lisbon was the establishment of the role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). This replaced the old title of 'Union Minister for Foreign Affairs'. shapes and conducts the EU's common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including its common

security and defence policy, presides over the Foreign Affairs Council (the Council when it sits in its Foreign Affairs configuration), heads the European Defence Agency (EDA), and is one of the vice-presidents of the European Commission. It is provided under Lisbon that the HR will conduct the Union's common foreign and security policy, sitting in the Commission as a Vice President and using its resources, but answerable to Member States in the Foreign Affairs Council, over which they will preside. The HR ensures the consistency of the EU's external action. They are in charge, within the Commission, of responsibilities incumbent to their mission in external relations and of coordinating other aspects of the EU's external action. The HR is appointed by the European Council acting by a qualified majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission for a mandate of 5 years.

3.4.10.2 European External Action Service (EEAS)

In carrying out their mission, the HR is supported by the European External Action Service (EEAS) — the EU's diplomatic service. The EEAS supports the HR in fulfilling their mandate of conducting the CFSP and CSDP. The EEAS works in cooperation with EU countries' diplomatic services. It comprises officials and agents from the EU as well as personnel seconded from national diplomatic services. The Political and Security Committee (PSC), comprising ambassadors from the 27 EU countries, also acts under the responsibility of the HR. It monitors the international situation in the areas covered by the CFSP and plays a key role in defining and following up on the EU's response to a crisis.

3.4.10.3 European Defence Agency (EDA)

Although the EDA was not created under Lisbon, the Treaty did expand the activities of the Agency and giving it more involvement in the development of EU military capabilities. The EDA was established under a Joint Action of the Council of Ministers on 12 July 2004 (2004/551/CFSP) to *“support the Council and the Member States in their effort to improve the EU's defence capabilities in the field of crisis management*

*and to sustain the ESDP as it stands now and develops in the future”.*⁷⁵ The EDA’s primary objectives are to develop defence capabilities; promote defence research and technology (R&T); foster armaments co-operation; and to create a competitive European Defence Equipment Market as well as to strengthen the European Defence, Technological and Industrial Base.

Under Lisbon, its activities included the ability to: Identify operational requirements; Promote measures to satisfy those requirements; Contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector; Define a European capabilities and armaments policy; and Assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities. It also enabled the agency to: evaluate the progress made by each Member State in fulfilling its capability commitments; Promote the harmonisation of operational requirements and put forward measures to satisfy those requirements, including compatible procurement methods and multilateral projects. Multinational projects would be managed by the agency and specific groups would be set up to bring together Member States involved in those joint projects; Support defence technology research and plan and coordinate joint research activities to meet future operational needs; Contribute to the strengthening of the defence industrial and technological base; and Identify measures to improve the effectiveness of defence spending.

3.4.10.4 CSDP

Most significantly, the Treaty, under Article 17 TEU, makes provision for “the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so (unanimously) decide”. CSDP will be an integral part of the Union’s CFSP agenda. It will provide the Union with an operational capability for use in peacekeeping missions outside the Union’s sphere

⁷⁵ COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2004/551/CFSP 2004
https://eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/council_joint_action_2004_551_cfsp.pdf (accessed 01/09/19)

of influence, for use in conflict prevention and in strengthening international security. The military and civilian capabilities required for performing these tasks will be agreed upon and provided by the Member States, while decisions on the implementation of the CSDP, including the launch of operations, will be adopted by unanimity within the Council of Ministers. The High Representative will have the right of initiative alongside Member States and will also be able to make proposals to the Council of Ministers in conjunction with the Commission.

3.4.10.5 European Parliament

Lisbon gave the European Parliament a greater role in foreign policy and defence issues by providing for regular consultation between the Parliament and the High Representative on CFSP/CSDP issues, with the Parliament's views being taken into consideration, with a twice-yearly EP debate on CFSP and CSDP, compared with the current one annual debate.⁷⁶

3.4.10.6 'Permanent structured cooperation'

The Treaty also set in motion the potential for EU member states to engage in what it called 'permanent structured cooperation'.⁷⁷ Permanent structured cooperation, or 'PESCO' as it is otherwise referred to, gave Member States, whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria ("able to supply combat units and supporting elements, including transport and logistics, deployable within 5 to 30 days, sustainable for an operation lasting between 30-120 days")⁷⁸ and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area, with a view to the most demanding missions, to establish permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) within the EU framework under Lisbon. Lisbon provided that the Council would decide by

⁷⁶ Article 1(40), Lisbon Treaty 2009 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF (accessed 01/09/19)

⁷⁷ Article 28A(6), Lisbon Treaty 2009 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF (accessed 01/09/19)

⁷⁸ Article 1(b), Lisbon Treaty 2009 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF (accessed 01/09/19)

QMV, after consulting the High Representative, to establish permanent structured cooperation and determine the list of participants. PESCO was regarded as a way to enable truly common defence, as provided for in Article 17. It would not be until 2017 that PESCO would be created – which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

3.4.10.7 Mutual assistance and solidarity

The Treaty also introduced solidarity and mutual assistance clauses. The former states that ‘the Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if an EU Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster’.⁷⁹ The mutual assistance clause, inspired by NATO’s Article 5 ‘Collective Defence’, states that ‘if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 (the right to self-defence) of the United Nations (UN) Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States’.⁸⁰ The clause, however, includes a caveat that ‘commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation’.

3.4.10.8 Expansion of the St. Petersberg’s Tasks

Finally, Lisbon expanded the St. Petersberg’s Tasks. The Treaty expanded the tasks to include: humanitarian and rescue tasks; conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking; joint

⁷⁹ Article 222, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12016E222> (accessed 02/09/19)

⁸⁰ Art. 42.7, TEU 1992
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede200612mutualdefsolidarityclauses/_sede200612mutualdefsolidarityclauses_en.pdf (accessed 02/09/19)

disarmament operations; military advice and assistance tasks; post-conflict stabilisation tasks.

3.5 The legal and political framework of the CSDP (2010-present)

Although the CSDP has evolved and there have been a number of landmark pacts and agreements (i.e. PESCO) since Lisbon, the 2009 Treaty still provides the overall framework for today's CSDP. Article 41 of the TEU outlines the funding of the CFSP and CSDP. The policy is further described in Articles 42 to 46, in Chapter 2, Section 2 of Title V ('Provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy'), and in Protocols 1, 10 and 11 and Declarations 13 and 14. Under the former TEU, CSDP legal instruments could take the form of principles and general guidelines, common strategies, joint actions, common positions or decisions. Since Lisbon, these have been replaced with one instrument: decisions. Decisions incorporate all of the former and outline the actions that Member States should take. Although the clarity on this, there is still no mechanism for the Commission to monitor the implementation of CSDP decisions and the ECJ has no jurisdiction to condemn or imposes any penalties on the Member States for non-implementation.

As noted, the defining characteristic of the CSFP and CSDP, is its intergovernmental nature, making it distinct from the rest of the EU's supranational capabilities. To ensure Member States retain control over the CSDP, although there are some exceptions,⁸¹ the Council of the EU is the key decision making body and almost all decisions are taken exclusively by unanimity. Article 24 of the TEU clearly states that:

"The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise..."⁸²

⁸¹ For example, the European Council can request for a decision to be taken under QMV, but the decision to request this must be taken by unanimity.

⁸² Article 24, Lisbon Treaty 2009 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF (accessed 03/09/19)

Further, although Lisbon did strengthen their influence somewhat, the Commission and the Parliament's roles are significantly reduced under the CSDP than in all other EU policy areas. The European Parliament does have the power to ask questions to the Council and the High Representative in relation to the CFSP and CSDP, and it can make recommendations on policy, however, the Parliament's questions and recommendations can be ignored.⁸³ The Parliament does have some power but only through its control over the EU budget. The Commission's role is also limited. Unlike other policy areas, it does not have the right of initiative under the CFSP or CSDP, although it does retain some influence through the HR's role as Vice President of the Commission.

The HR, supported by the EEAS, play a key role in the formation and implementation of the CSDP. As noted above, the High Representative is also one of the Vice-Presidents of the European Commission and chairs the Council of the EU when it sits in its Foreign Affairs configuration. The High Representative also attends European Council meetings, is Head of the EDA and represents the EU internationally, in organisations such as the United Nations. The EEAS, which supports the HR, works in co-operation with EU member states' diplomatic services. It is comprised of officials from the EU, as well as personnel from Member States' national diplomatic services.

EU "external relations" includes two different decision-making structures. A breakdown of the CSDP decision-making process can be seen below in Figure 1.:

⁸³ Article 36, Lisbon Treaty 2009 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF (accessed 03/09/19)




Figure 1. Source: HM Government, 'Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European Union: Foreign Policy', July 2013, p.19

As can be seen, EU external policy areas such as international trade, aid and sanctions are much more supranational. This is evident from the fact that decisions are made on the basis of QMV and the involvement of the Parliament and the Commission in the decision-making process is much greater. In these policy areas, Member States are not free to pursue their own individual policies as the legal competence rests partially or entirely with the EU. All bilateral or multilateral trading agreements with non-EU countries are negotiated solely by the European Commission and Member States cannot negotiate their own trade deals. Decisions on the issuing of sanctions against non-EU countries, meanwhile, follow a two-stage process: first, the Council of Ministers agrees—unanimously—to a framework for sanctions; then, the Commission and the HR/VP together draft more specific proposals, which are eventually agreed by the Council by Qualified Majority Voting.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ Foreign Affairs Committee, *Implications of the referendum on EU membership for the UK's role in the world* (2015) <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmffaff/545/54506.htm> (accessed 10/09/19)

The decision-making in foreign policy and defence, on the other hand, is entirely intergovernmental. As noted above, decisions in this area are made on the basis of unanimity in the Council of Ministers and are implemented by the HR assisted by the EEAS, according to a framework set by Member States. Due to the requirement for unanimity, the EU as a whole cannot undertake any action in CFSP or CSDP if even one Member State dissents or vetoes. Unlike with international trade, aid and sanctions, Member States are able to pursue their own independent foreign policies outside of the EU.

3.6 The UK: a difficult partner?

Since 2003 and the first interventions in the Western Balkans, the EU has launched and run 36 operations and missions on three continents. As of May 2021, there were 17 ongoing CSDP missions and operations, 11 of which are civilian and 6 military, involving around 5 000 EU military and civilian staff deployed abroad.⁸⁵ The intergovernmental nature of the CSDP has made forming policy very difficult at times and, despite its successes, the CSDP's achievements to-date have been modest. When it comes to the CSDP, unanimous decision-making, and in turn Member States' right to veto policy, has placed the power in the hands of the EU's Member States. The opposing foreign policies of Member States has meant that, many times, vetoes have been invoked and a CSDP has ultimately failed to be formed. Some Member States – like France and Germany, for example – are more attuned to the CSDP and the concept of European defence. Furthermore, some Member States' foreign policies are very similar and, in turn, finding common ground in terms of the CSDP is much easier to find. Other Member States, however, are more opposed to the idea of European defence and have much different foreign policy interests in comparison to other Member States. It is this latter category that the UK has falls into.

⁸⁵ EEAS, *Missions and operations* (EEAS, 2021) https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en (accessed 03/10/21)

In the years following Maastricht, development of EU security and defence was slow. Even after Lisbon, which did much to strengthen the power of the EU in security and defence, integration has moved at a slower pace relative to other policy areas. This has largely been due to the reluctance of Member States to integrate further in this area. For the UK, the EU has been a key part of its foreign policy since its accession in 1973. The UK has had a long history of, at times, being a difficult member of the EU when it has come to security and defence. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 1, the UK's close ties to the US through the 'special relationship' has meant that it has always had a preference for developing a European identity within NATO, as opposed to duplicating NATO via separate EU military capabilities. The UK has not always been opposed to the development of a military force and has, at times, worked to develop certain aspects of its security and defence capabilities. As noted above, the UK, with France, was instrumental in establishing the ESDP under the St. Malo Summit 1998. Together with France, the UK set in motion the early development of an EU military force.

Despite its integral role in the establishment of the CSDP, however, successive UK governments have continued to support and advocate for the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP and CSDP. For all the reforms under Lisbon and previous treaties, the UK has maintained its support for Member States' control over the CSDP via its veto powers and has resisted the 'communitisation' of the CSDP by preventing the Commission from taking a leading role in initiating policy proposals, and seeking to improve the effectiveness of the CFSP via greater use of the EU's own financial resources and power as a trading bloc.⁸⁶ Furthermore, its Atlantacist outlook has meant that the CSDP has not been at the core of its foreign policy and, as noted, the UK has placed its security and defence partnership with the US and NATO ahead of the one it shares with the EU.

In turn the UK has made a modest contribution to the *military* side of the CSDP, however, in terms of its contributions to civilian missions (i.e. peacekeeping missions

⁸⁶ Whitman, *Supra* 29, at 3

such as border control/observation and capacity building missions for third states). As Whitman notes, the UK has been a key player in the EU's civilian missions addressing failing and failed states. Independent analysts have credited the UK with shaping the EU's agenda in this area.⁸⁷ As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, the UK has also deepened its bilateral partnership with France, via the Lancaster House Treaty 2010, which focuses on nuclear weapons technology collaboration and increased collaborations between its armed forces. This has been with a view to encourage and facilitate greater burden sharing within the EU. Particularly from the point of view of France, this was also done with the hope that the UK and France would take a lead on the coordination of a successful CFSP and CSDP. On the part of the UK, much of this has stemmed, not just from having a stake in the security of Europe, but also due to diminished public expenditure on defence and the shrinking of the UK's diplomatic and military resources. Furthermore, political developments, such as the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan have forced the UK to rethink its strategic choices and where it should focus its military and defence efforts.

It is clear, therefore, that the UK has made some positive contributions to EU security and defence and, considering its substantial contributions to the civilian strand of the CSDP, has no doubt benefited from its security and defence partnership with the EU. This said, the majority of the literature in the area defines the partnership between the UK and the EU as awkward, troubled and detrimental for both parties, but this predominantly refers to the UK's military contributions.⁸⁸ There is no definitive analysis of this partnership – whether it was an effective or ineffective. Defining this partnership and the UK's contributions and benefits from in its final 10 years, will be a key aim of this thesis.

⁸⁷ See A Wittkowsky and U Wittkamp *Pioneering the comprehensive approach: how Germany's partners do it* (2013) ZIF: Center for International Peace Operations Policy Briefing

⁸⁸ A Huckle, *The Awkward European: Britain and the Common Security and Defence Policy* (2017) E-IR 6 <https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/69081> (accessed 12/09/19)

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has clarified that the focus of this thesis is on the CSDP's external crisis management within the European neighbourhood. It distinguishes between the CFSP, which is multifaceted and covers a wide ambit, including external trade policy, development cooperation, economic and financial cooperation with third countries, humanitarian aid, sanctions and international agreements, which fall under its 'external action' umbrella. It also includes policies such as energy, environmental, and migration and asylum policy, which fall under its 'external dimensions of internal policies' umbrella. This chapter has clarified that it is only the CSDP that it is concerned with and that it will only focus on crises occurring within the European neighbourhood that occurred within the timeframe of the Cameron premiership. In terms of perspectives, this chapter has also clarified that it is primarily the perspectives of the UK government (under Cameron, May and Johnson) that are being analysed, with a secondary focus on the perspectives of the EU towards its security and defence partnership with the UK. This chapter also highlighted the turbulent history of EU security and defence. EU security and defence started out with good prospects when the ECSC was founded following WW2. There were multiple attempts to establish a permanent and fully integrated defence union throughout the history of the EU, however, as time went on, European states became less and less enthusiastic about the ideas of a European defence union and many, particularly the UK, became hostile to the idea of a European army and European defence minister. Ultimately, the Member States have established a framework within which to cooperate and collaborate on security and defence, but no EU army or defence union was ever founded. The legal framework agreed amongst the EU Member States in relation to security and defence cooperation reflects their uneasiness and hostility towards a defence union. Whilst under Lisbon, the power of the EU institutions were bolstered, aided by the increased influence of bodies such as the European Parliament and the creation of new roles such as the High Representative, power rests firmly with the Member States when it comes to the CSDP. This is an area of EU policy which is entirely intergovernmental still. Member States have ensured they still each have a veto and that all decisions must

be taken unanimously. This has made and continues to make forming security and defence policy under the CSDP extremely difficult for the EU. Now that a historical context and the legal landscape of the CSDP has been established, attention can now be turned to how the UK and EU's partnership operated during 2010-2022 under the Cameron, May and Johnson premierships.

Chapter Two: Cameron, May, Johnson, the Conservatives and European Security and Defence (2010-2016)

4.1 Introduction

Since the European referendum was announced in 2016, many scholars in the field of European studies have warned of the potentially seismic effects that the UK's departure from the EU will have on the economic, legal and political stability across both the UK and Europe. Some of those forecasted socio-economic, political and legal implications have already begun to be observed at the time of writing this chapter. Although a withdrawal agreement and deal has been secured regarding the future economic relationship between the UK and the EU, what lies ahead for the two parties in other policy areas remains less certain. There are therefore still many unanswered questions regarding the long-term effects of Brexit on the UK and the EU. Given this uncertainty, the need to understand how Brexit might continue to affect the UK and the EU in the years and decades to come has become a very pertinent question for all scholars in the field of European studies.

Included in these many unanswered questions, is the UK's future relationship with the EU in security and defence. There has been very little research conducted into the Cameron premiership and its attitudes towards EU security and defence policy. It is contended, that in order to truly understand what lies ahead for the UK and the EU post-Brexit and the future of any security and defence partnership, the two parties' past relationship, specifically during the Cameron years in which the seeds of Brexit were sown – and reaped – is essential. Only by understanding what drove and guided the Cameron premiership's security and defence partnership with the EU, only then can then the true nature of the relationship be ascertained and fully understood. Put simply, to determine whether a future partnership is worth pursuing, it must first be understood what shape that partnership was in, and to answer that question, we must first understand what it was that shaped that partnership. It is these questions that this thesis aims to answer.

In pursuance of these aims, this chapter will explore the ideology that would guide Cameron and his government during his first and brief second premierships. The chapter will seek to explore and analyse three things. In the first section of this chapter, the evolution of the two most prominent branches of British conservative ideology, namely 'One Nation' Conservatism and Thatcherism. Firstly, this section will touch on the distinctive features of 'One Nation' conservatism and Thatcherism but primarily it will look at the ways in which different PMs and governments who represented these ideologies have historically approached the subject of Europe and European security and defence. The section will analyse how various events shaped the approach of these governments and how their approach affected the partnership between the UK and Europe.

In the second section, the chapter will then turn to analyse the impact these ideologies had on Cameron and on the emergence of a third branch of conservative ideology, namely liberal conservatism. In context of the EU's security and defence policy, this section will explore the influence that One Nation and Thatcherite conservatism had on the development of liberal conservatism, and in turn how they have been shaping Cameron's own personal attitudes towards both the EU generally and EU security and defence.

Finally, drawing on the previous two sections, this Chapter will conclude by analysing how liberal conservatism and Cameron's personal attitudes have influenced his Party and his 2010 government's position and policies pertaining to EU security and defence policy at the outset of his premiership (2010-2011).

Overall, this chapter will argue that, whilst Cameron's political views are borne from the Thatcherite tradition, his speeches and policy statements over the years have revealed that he holds both a more liberal perspective and takes a more pragmatic approach than Thatcher and many of his more Thatcherite contemporaries in the Conservative Party. This chapter will argue that this is also true when it comes to the subject of Europe and EU security and defence. Whilst Cameron can be fairly

described as a Eurosceptic, his Euroscepticism is much softer than that of many in his Party. This Chapter will also rely on the theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) to argue that Cameron was able to utilise the UK's partnership with the EU in security and defence due to the EU question not being as polarising as it would become in 2016 and the years following his premiership. The cost-benefit analysis was in favour of collaborating with the EU under the CSDP at this time, and this outweighed feelings of nationalism and Euroscepticism in the Conservative Party and in the UK were not at the levels they are currently. This gave Cameron the opportunity to utilise the UK's relationship with the EU without any major pushback. Ultimately, following his election as leader of the Party, Cameron would create a Party and government in his own image. It would be this Party and this government, with its soft-Eurosceptic approach, that would be responsible for shaping the UK's security and defence partnership with the EU in the years directly preceding the UK's 2016 referendum on EU membership.

4.2 Conservative ideology and the Party's attitude towards European security and defence: from Macmillan to Thatcher

From the early 20th Century up until today, British Conservative ideology has evolved into three main branches: 'One Nation' conservatism, Thatcherism and liberal conservatism. All three ideologies share the same foundations – a belief in free market capitalism and the limited role of the state in the functioning of society and the life of the citizen. The proponents of each branch are, however, at odds with each other in many policy areas, none more so than when it comes to the subject of the UK's place in Europe.

4.2.1 'One Nation' Conservatism and Europe

One of the most prominent conservative Prime Ministers of the late 19th Century was Benjamin Disraeli. He has widely been credited by historians as founding the 'One Nation' ideology, or tradition, in the Conservative Party. Disraeli famously

outlined his government's programme in the lead up to the 1872 elections when he declared:

The Tory Party, unless it is a national party, is nothing. It is not a confederacy of nobles, it is not a democratic multitude; it is a party formed of all the numerous classes in the realm – classes alike and equal before the law, but whose different conditions and different aims gives vigour and variety to our national life.⁸⁹

Disraeli was giving life to an idea he propounded in his 1852 novel '*Sybil*' (also known as '*The Two Nations*') in which he argued that if the Conservative Party wanted to continue winning general elections, then they had to represent the 'numerous classes' across British society, not just the ruling and the upper-class. The two classes were regarded as the 'Two Nations' of British society, hence 'One Nation'. Successive conservative Prime Ministers of the 20th Century would take Disraeli's One Nation' vision further. Conscious to appeal to the working class electorate, Prime Ministers such as Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain introduced supported and introduced policies of government intervention in areas such as healthcare and housing. Baldwin, for example, in his second term as PM (1924-1929)⁹⁰, supported massive government intervention to help tackle the global economic crash of 1929. Following a landslide election defeat to Labour in 1945 and six years of a Labour government under Clement Atlee (1945-51), the Conservatives were forced to rethink their election strategy and accept notions such as welfare state, government intervention in the economy, limited nationalisation of industries and good relationships with the trade unions – all things once considered to be exclusively associated with the left and Labour. Many historians of this period have largely agreed that due to the adoption of the 'One Nation' tradition, there was a consensus between the two leading parties from 1945 up until when Margaret Thatcher

⁸⁹ B Disraeli quoted in D Seawright, *The British Conservative Party and One Nation Politics*, (New York, The Continuum Publishing Group Ltd., 2010) 5

⁹⁰ Stanley Baldwin served as PM for three terms (1923-1924, 1924-1929 and 1935-1937)

became leader of the Conservative Party in 1975.⁹¹ The key features of ‘One Nation’ conservatism are an acceptance and support of the welfare state, a mixed economy – a free market blended with state interventionism to redress British economic decline as and when required⁹² – and a cross-party approach to industrial policy.⁹³

This liberal and left-leaning approach taken by ‘One Nation’ conservatives also appeared to extend to the subject of Europe. Whilst not all One Nation conservatives could be said to be pro-European, it was a position that would become synonymous with the tradition. Notable ‘One Nation’ Conservative Prime Ministers, such as Harold Macmillan and Edward Heath, were openly sympathetic to the idea of the transfer of powers to a supranational body to tackle what they saw as common problems faced by all of European nations. They were also supportive of the idea of the European single market.

Macmillan would be the first PM to attempt to take the UK into the European Economic Community (EEC). Prior to this he had established himself as a PM clearly willing to cooperate economically with Europe when he formed the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) along with Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland, which from 3 May 1960 established a free-trade area. Macmillan also saw the value in the EEC, to which his government sought entry in January 1963, although the UK’s entry was blocked by French President de Gaulle who distrusted the UK’s ‘special relationship’ with the US. Heath followed in Macmillan’s footsteps. He undoubtedly did more than any other PM for the One Nation tradition and has been widely regarded as the torch bearer for pro-European Conservatives. Heath founded the One Nation Group and was unapologetically pro-European. Heath, held up the single market as the centrepiece of his desire for the UK to join the EEC in the 1970s. As PM, Heath led negotiations on the UK’s membership of the EEC

⁹¹ See P Dorey and M Garnett, *The weaker-willed, the craven-hearted’: the decline of One Nation Conservatism in Global Discourse. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought* (Routledge Taylor and Francis Group 2015) 69-91

⁹² A Williamson, *Conservative Economic Policymaking and the Birth of Thatcherism, 1964–1979* (Palgrave Macmillan 2015) 126

⁹³ Lee and Beech, *Supra* 20, at 21

throughout the early 1970s and in 1972 Heath signed Britain's Treaty of Accession to the EEC, doing what both Macmillan, and Labour PM Harold Wilson, could not.⁹⁴ Although Heath had the support from the majority of his Party, the support was undoubtedly less about a sincere belief in the European project and more about preventing the UK from losing influence on the continent. The UK had not long lost its colonies and its position both globally and in Europe was tenuous at best.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, Heath successfully negotiated membership for the UK and, judging by the result of the 1975 referendum held by his successor Wilson on the UK's membership of the EEC, he had successfully convinced the British public of the benefits of the EEC.

Whilst the British public appeared in favour of Europe by 1975, the Conservatives appeared to be heading in a different direction. Following the election of Thatcher as leader, the 'One Nation' tradition appeared to petering out in the Party and 'One Nation' conservatives found themselves now in the minority (why this ideological shift occurred in the Party will be analysed further below in Section 2.2.). The ultra-conservatism that defined Thatcherism has dominated the Party ever since, with Thatcherites arguably becoming more pro-free market and more anti-European than Thatcher herself had ever been.⁹⁶ Whether this was because Thatcher and her new breed of conservatives had never experienced first-hand the working-class struggles that had been brought on by the Great Depression or the Second World War, as British political historians Dorey and Garnett suggest is unclear.⁹⁷ What is clear, is that from 1975, Thatcherism and Euroscepticism reigned supreme.

Upon the resignation of David Cameron in June 2016, the stand-off which had originally been between pro-Europeans and Eurosceptics within the Party now, as Lynch notes, became a stand-off between 'soft' and 'hard' Eurosceptics over who

⁹⁴ This was the UK's second attempt at joining the EEC. Its first application to join in 1960 was rejected

⁹⁵ N Piers Ludlow, *When Britain first applied to join the EU: what can Macmillan's predicament teach us?* (LSE 2016) <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2016/04/15/when-britain-first-applied-to-join-the-eu-what-can-macmillans-predicament-teach-us/> (accessed 02/12/19)

⁹⁶ R Kilty, *What Does It Mean to Be Leader of a "One Nation Conservative Government"?* The Case of Boris Johnson (2020) 25 (3) 5

⁹⁷ Dorey and Garnett, *Supra* 91, at 76

would become leader and lead the UK out of the EU.⁹⁸ All five of the leadership candidates who entered the race were, unsurprisingly, Eurosceptic/pro-Brexiters.⁹⁹ Under the victor of the leadership contest, Theresa May, 'One Nation'/pro-European conservatives were side lined. Three pro-European Conservative MPs left the Party in February 2019 to form the independent political party 'Change UK'.¹⁰⁰ Soubry was quoted as saying the Party had been taken over by the 'hardline, right-wing, awkward squad'.¹⁰¹

There was some resurgence of the 'One Nation' tradition during the leadership race following the resignation of Theresa May in 2019. Parts of the British media and number of local election results, seemed to indicate that the public were becoming tired of Brexit and the repeated failure of the UK government to negotiate a deal with the EU.¹⁰² More and more politicians, were becoming worried about a no Brexit deal. The pro-European conservatives still left in the Party saw this as their opportunity to try revive the 'One Nation' tradition. During the leadership race, a new Tory group calling themselves 'the One Nation Caucus' led by Secretary of State for Work and Pensions Amber Rudd, was formed in a bid to block candidates who backed no-deal Brexit in the leadership contest.¹⁰³ The Group supported Jeremy Hunt, who was ultimately defeated by Johnson. Whilst Amber Rudd resigned and 'One Nation' pro-European conservatives were once again side lined, following his election success, in an address given at Downing Street in December 2019, Johnson announced the formation of what he described as a "new 'One Nation' Conservative

⁹⁸ P Lynch, *Conservative modernisation and European integration: From silence to salience and schism* (2015) *British Politics* 10(2) 185

⁹⁹ P Walker, *Conservative leadership race: who are the five candidates?*, *Guardian UK* (London, 30 June 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/30/conservative-leadership-race-who-are-the-five-candidates> (accessed 04/12/19)

¹⁰⁰ These MPs were Anna Soubry, Heidi Allen and Sarah Woolaston

¹⁰¹ H Zeffman, 'Awkward squad' has taken over Tory Party, Anna Soubry, Heidi Allen and Sarah Wollaston warn, *The Times* (London, 20 February 2019) <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/anna-soubry-heidi-allen-and-sarah-wollaston-quit-tories-to-join-the-independent-group-vp2j2w3mn> (accessed 04/12/19)

¹⁰² L McGee, *Brexit disaster is making Britain a weird place to live in*, *CNN* (London, 05 May 2019) <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/04/uk/brexit-fatigue-is-making-britain-weird-analysis-intl-gbr/index.html>

¹⁰³ Kilty, *Supra* 96, at 1

government – a people’s government”.¹⁰⁴ Johnson’s invoking of the so-called ‘One Nation’ spirit, however, undoubtedly had less to do with Europe and more to do with appealing to working-class voters – of which Johnson’s conservatives had received many votes from in the 2019 general election.¹⁰⁵

Today, in the right-leaning government of Boris Johnson, One Nation conservatives remain the minority in the Party. On the One Nation Caucus’s website, it states that One Nation conservatives consist of just 100 Conservative MPs, accounting for just under one-third of the parliamentary party.¹⁰⁶ The number of those who identify as pro-European (as opposed to ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ Eurosceptic is likely even to be lower.¹⁰⁷ In their declaration of values created in May 2019, the Group states that they are ‘patriotic Conservatives who reject narrow nationalism and, on the subject of security and defence, state that the UK must be a leader on the world stage through its security commitments and must tackle global challenges through a strong defence and soft-power commitment.¹⁰⁸

4.2.2 ‘Thatcherism’ and Europe

Thatcherism and its core tenets – Euroscepticism and an unwavering belief in free-market economics – have dominated the Conservative Party since the days of Thatcher’s premiership.¹⁰⁹ The ‘New Right’, as she and her supporters became

¹⁰⁴ B Johnson, PM statement in Downing Street: 13 December 2019

<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-in-downing-street-13-december-2019> (accessed 20/12/19)

¹⁰⁵ *Tories won more votes than Labour from manual workers and households below £20,000 income*, Independent (London, 17 December 2019)

<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/election-results-working-class-age-tories-labour-boris-johnson-yougov-a9249936.html> (accessed 02/01/20)

¹⁰⁶ One Nation Conservatives, ‘About us’ <https://one-nation-conservatives.com/about/> (accessed 02/01/20)

¹⁰⁷ According to the Financial Times, as of March 2019, only 6 MPs were openly pro-European, supporting a second Brexit referendum. All have since been voted out of office or left the Party (<https://ig.ft.com/brexit-tory-tribes/>) It appears only two MPs – Stephen Hammond and Flick Drummond – both of whom were members of the now disbanded Conservative Group for Europe, are the two openly pro-European MPs in the Party today

(<https://www.conservativegroupforeurope.org.uk/people>)

¹⁰⁸ One Nation Conservatives, ‘Declaration of Values’ <https://one-nation-conservatives.com/about/#jp-carousel-69> (accessed 04/01/20)

¹⁰⁹ Heppell, *Supra* 21, at 299

known, rejected the post-war consensus between Conservatives and Labour who agreed that addressing the nation's socio-economic problems required increased State intervention. Thatcher and her supporters instead sought to re-establish the free-market economy and reduce the size of the State in terms of the Government's public expenditure, regulation of the economy and increase its contracting out of public services to private companies.¹¹⁰ Although Thatcher sought to reduce the role of the State in economic terms, she sought to maintain a strong state in political terms. Politically, she was hostile to the idea of devolution to Scotland, Wales and local authorities and also aimed to strengthen and deepen the 'special relationship' between the UK and the US. In turn, she and her supporters took a hostile approach to Europe. It was during her premiership that Britain's relationship with Europe – then the European Community – became increasingly conflictual and, as a result, also when divisions over Europe deepened within the Conservative Party.¹¹¹

The conflict stemmed from both EC policies and the socio-economic change in direction by the Thatcher government.¹¹² Whilst Thatcher had initially supported UK membership of the EC in the 1975 referendum on European membership, she encountered a number of issues with the EC throughout the 1980s which made her increasingly Eurosceptic, which in turn influenced opinion within the Party.

The first clash between the EC and the UK was economic and two-fold: firstly, the UK found itself contributing more to the EC Budget than other Member States. This was due to an EC policy which required Member States pay 1% of their indirect tax revenues into the EC Budget, which Thatcher's government had increased to off-set cuts they had made in income tax.¹¹³ Thatcher set about on a campaign to 'get our money back', which culminated in substantial rebate by the EC to the UK following

¹¹⁰ B Williams, *The 'New Right' and its legacy for British conservatism* (2021) *Journal of Political Ideologies* 28 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137445810_3 (accessed 01/05/21)

¹¹¹ P Dorey, *Towards Exit from the EU: The Conservative Party's Increasing Euroscepticism since the 1980s* (2017) *Politics and Governance* 5(2) 28

¹¹² C Hay and S Farrall, *Interrogating and conceptualizing the legacy of Thatcherism*, in S. Farrall & C. Hay, *The legacy of Thatcherism* (Oxford University Press, 2014) 9

¹¹³ Dorey, *Supra* 111, at 28

the Fontainebleau Summit in June 1984.¹¹⁴ Secondly, the ratification of the Single European Act (SEA), whilst it was commensurate with Thatcher's ideal of economic liberalism, brought with it reforms in EC decision making such as the introduction of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). QMV diminished Member States ability to veto policy and legislative proposals and was at odds with the Thatcherite idea of Parliamentary sovereignty. Whilst Thatcher and the Party accepted the reforms – mainly to protect the single market which she regarded as a personal achievement – it still stirred further distrust of the EC in the Party.¹¹⁵

Euroscepticism was fueled further during Thatcher's premiership due to the emergence in the late 1980's of the emergence of what has been regarded as the 'social European agenda'.¹¹⁶ Europe's transition to a single market brought with it a corresponding increase in employment rights and protection for workers (to name but a few reforms introduced) which were entirely against Thatcher's neo-liberal economy, which included ensuring a flexible labour market and giving employers the right and the freedom to manage their employees.¹¹⁷ Thatcher expressed her dismay at these reforms in her Bruges speech in 1988, in which she accused the EC of 'spreading socialism' and being 'bureaucratic'.¹¹⁸ In her memoirs, published in 1993, she also described the EU as a 'Franco-German bloc with its own agenda'.¹¹⁹

In terms of security and defence, Thatcher, like almost every world leader, for the most part had to adopt a pragmatic approach. As Lonsdale argues, a state's security and defence policy is determined by events rather than by party traditions and ideology.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, whilst every government must deal with the security

¹¹⁴ N Watt, *Margaret Thatcher's European rebate demand was defeat - Mitterrand aide*, Guardian (London, 04 July 2009) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/jul/04/margaret-thatcher-france-claim> (accessed 05/01/20)

¹¹⁵ S Letwin, *The anatomy of Thatcherism*, (Fontana, 1992) 284

¹¹⁶ Dorey, *Supra* 111, at 28

¹¹⁷ *Ibid*

¹¹⁸ Margaret Thatcher, Speech to the College of Europe (Bruges) 1988 <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332> (accessed 20/01/20)

¹¹⁹ See M Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, (Harper Press, 2012)

¹²⁰ D Lonsdale, *Conservative Defence and Security Policy under David Cameron*, In S Lee and M Beech, *The Conservatives under David Cameron: Built to Last?*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 151

environment it finds itself in, traditions and ideology can still guide and influence a nation's security and defence policy. Thatcher, in her time as PM, would both establish and deepen a number of Conservative security and defence traditions, which would later influence successive Conservative and Labour governments to follow.

When Thatcher was elected in 1979, she faced a security environment that was occupied almost entirely by the so-called Soviet threat. For Thatcher, her security and defence priorities could be said to be three-fold: upholding of the nuclear deterrent; developing the special relationship with the US (also known as 'Atlanticism'); and the UK's commitment to NATO. As far as the nuclear deterrent, Thatcher remained steadfastly committed to maintaining it. As for the special relationship, Thatcher was committed to deepening it. She would support America's invasion into Grenada whilst the US in return supported the UK's war with Argentina over the Falklands Islands. Thatcher would also, famously, develop her own special relationship with US president Ronald Reagan.

Thatcher's commitment to the special relationship was also illustrated in her commitment to the NATO alliance. Thatcher and her government regarded it as the most reliable instrument for ensuring European security, mainly because it tied the US into the defence of Western Europe.¹²¹ This priority was reflected in the Nott Defence Review 1981, which sought to reduce the UK's maritime capabilities in favour of a greater emphasis on the UK's role to assist with defending Western Europe, an operation which was led by the US and NATO. It also stated that the UK would only act as part of NATO for overseas expeditionary operations (although these proposals were soon scotched by the experience of the Falklands War in 1982).¹²² Nevertheless, for all the harsh rhetoric Thatcher had made about Europe, her government under the Defence Review deployed 55,000 British soldiers – the

¹²¹ *Ibid* 153

¹²² House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, *Eighth Report* (03 September 1998) <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmdfence/138/13804.htm#note73> (accessed 30/01/20)

British Army on the Rhine (BOAR) – to Western Germany. Although this was to assist in the NATO effort to defend Western Europe against the Soviet threat, it clearly showed an appreciation by Thatcher of the strong presence that the UK must have on the continent of Europe.

The argument has been made by many commentators in the field, that issue of Europe within the Conservative Party was what led to the breakdown of both Thatcher and her Party – Its role in dividing the Party is something which will be considered further below. In terms of Thatcher's downfall, whilst Euroscepticism was a core tenet of Thatcherism and Thatcher's premiership, it would also cause her to lose support from some in her Party, including close and influential members of her Cabinet. At the heart of the two resignations which delivered the fatal blows to Thatcher's premiership, was the issue of Europe. In October 1989, her Chancellor, Nigel Lawson, resigned over disagreement with her on the UK's membership of the EC's Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM).¹²³ The following year, her Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey Howe, would also resign in November 1990, following his displeasure at Thatcher's increasing Euroscepticism. Famously, in his resignation speech, Howe denounced Thatcher's 'unfair' and 'nightmarish' characterization of Europe and how her position on the bloc was damaging both Britain's economic interests and political influence in both Europe and globally. Howe's resignation was the death blow to Thatcher's premiership, and within weeks she resigned as PM. Although Thatcher found herself banished from the higher echelons of the Party, Thatcherism as an ideology was very much alive and well amongst the younger generation of the Party in the wake of her resignation. Whilst Major took over the role of PM and would lead the Party into another four years of government in 1992, it would be young conservatives, like Cameron and Osborne, who would eventually take over the Thatcherite mantle.¹²⁴

4.3.3 Influence of conservative ideologies on Cameron and his contemporaries

¹²³ See N Lawson, *The view from no. 11: Memoirs of a Tory radical* (Bantam Press, 1992) Chapter 76

¹²⁴ Hansard. (1990) House of Commons debates <https://hansard.parliament.uk> (accessed (02/02/20)

Looking back on the battle of ideas within the Conservative Party, Thatcherism has undoubtedly prevailed over One Nation Conservatism. In terms of Europe, whilst there are still many in the Party who are pro-Europeans, as well as many non-Party-member Conservative voters that support Europe, Eurosceptics make up the majority by a country mile.¹²⁵ Thatcher created an entirely new generation of Conservatives during her premiership. Young Conservatives – people like Cameron, Osborne, Hague, Ian Duncan Smith (IDS) and Johnson – who grew up under the reign of Thatcher, were not only imbued with her free-market economy philosophy, but many also adopted her ruthless and hardline Euroscepticism.

Since the end of Thatcher's premiership, this new generation has become increasingly more Thatcherite in outlook and the number of Conservative MPs who identify as Eurosceptics has grown significantly. As Bale notes, it was recorded in the late 1980s, towards the end of Thatcher's premiership, that only 19% of MPs in the Party identified as Thatcherite. After the 1997 general election, however, it was recorded that 140 of the 165 Conservative MPs elected in 1997 identified as Eurosceptics.¹²⁶ Bale also notes that this ideological trajectory continued also after the 2001 general election, when it was recorded that 90% of MPs identified as Eurosceptic. This drastic swing towards Thatcherism and, in turn, Euroscepticism in the Party was unequivocally clear.¹²⁷

It has been argued by some, that not only did Thatcher create Eurosceptics, but her severe rhetoric and hardline stance against Europe led to 'Eurosceptic-Extremists'. From the perspective of this new breed of Eurosceptics, every new European Treaty, which signed more authority over to the Commission or extended the use of QMV in European decision making, was seen to further diminish the UK's parliamentary sovereignty and further fuelled conspiracies about the creation of a 'United States of

¹²⁵ Heppell, *Supra* 21, at 340

¹²⁶ T Bale, *The Conservative Party: From Thatcher to Cameron*, (Polity, 2010) 68

¹²⁷ *Ibid* 136

Europe'.¹²⁸ Consequently, when it came to matters of international and European security and defence, for this new breed of Eurosceptics, there was no argument that these matters were under the exclusive control of the Members States. Increased supranationalism in this area is seen as strictly off limits.¹²⁹

It was this new generation of Conservatives, that Cameron, Hague, Osbourne, Johnson and many other contemporaries of Cameron can be said to have been a part of. Euroscepticism was therefore in the early political DNA of Cameron, as it still is in many other Conservatives of his generation. As noted, it has been argued by many commentators in the field that this generation were even more Thatcherite in outlook and policy than Thatcher herself.¹³⁰ As will be discussed below, however, the crushing defeat of John Major in the 1997 election and the Party's subsequent 13-years spent in the political wilderness in the shadow of a Labour government, would force many Conservatives to rethink the Party's political strategy, particularly when it came to Europe. The Party would find itself with no choice but to bring itself closer to the centre if it was to have any hope of getting back into government again. In turn, it paved the way for a new brand, or branch, of Conservative thinking. The 'children of Thatcher' would be the ones to lead the Conservative Party into the 21st Century, Cameron in one direction and May and Johnson in another.

May and Johnson

Before turning to Cameron and analysing the evolution of Conservative Party policy towards EU security and defence in chronological, it is important to touch on the backgrounds of Cameron's successors who had equal impact on the UK's security and defence partnership with the EU, both of whom will form the focus of the final chapter to this thesis.

¹²⁸ Dorey, *Supra* 111, at 30

¹²⁹ *Ibid* at 35

¹³⁰ *Ibid* at 30; See also Bale, *Supra* 126, at 122

May, the Conservative's and her attitude towards the EU and security and defence

In contrast to Johnson, May's Conservatism is a little easier to ascertain. Theresa May has been involved in politics at all levels for many years. She served as a councillor in the London Borough of Merton before being elected as the Member of Parliament for Maidenhead in 1997. She held several roles as a member of the Shadow Cabinet from 1999 to 2010, including as the first female Chairman of the Conservative Party. Following the general election of 2010, she was appointed Home Secretary. Following Brexit and Cameron's resignation, May was elected as Leader of the Conservative Party and appointed as Prime Minister on 13th July 2016.

Like David Cameron before her, Theresa May has repeatedly spoken of herself as a 'one-nation' conservative. Her Conservatism has more in common with Cameron than Johnson's does. As noted above, this particular brand of Conservatism has its roots in the premiership of Disraeli, famous for extending Conservatism to some of the working class in the UK for the first time in the 1867 Great Reform Act. Disraeli believed that workers had much in common with Conservatives, in particular a patriotic outlook that led them to support institutions such as monarchy, church and empire. Therefore, the Conservative Party needed to capitalise on this potential common ground by putting forward a programme that catered to the workers' interests. In turn, he instituted a series of reforms designed to improve the lot of the impoverished workers, including better factory and housing regulations, free primary education and the legalisation of trade unions.

In one of her first notable speeches, at the Conservative Party conference in 2002, May argued that the party had lost touch with ordinary people and had come to be seen as representing a privileged and selfish elite, with outdated reactionary views. This was where she famously labelled the Conservative's as 'the Nasty Party', which stole headlines around the country at the time.¹³¹ May was effectively calling for a

¹³¹ T May, Conservative Party Conference Speech (2002)
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2002/oct/07/conservatives2002.conservatives1> (accessed 13/01/23)

total 'rebranding' of the party — and the speech gained traction, feeding into David Cameron's later attempts to 'soften' the party's image under the guise of 'Liberal Conservatism', something which will be analysed in more detail later in this chapter.

Upon Cameron's election as PM in 2010, as part of the coalition government, May was made home secretary, a post she retained until becoming prime minister following the Brexit referendum. This allowed her to demonstrate what 'Liberal Conservatism' meant to her and how it would operate in practice. Vowing to take on the perceived impunity of the police force, she demanded that they clean up their act on issues such as police brutality, racialised use of stop-and-search powers, and unauthorised surveillance. To this end, she set up enquiries into issues such as Hillsborough, illegal surveillance of the Lawrence family and black deaths in police custody

As PM, May has sought to bolster this image as the defender of the downtrodden. Her maiden speech outside Downing Street spoke of the 'burning injustices' faced by the poor, the black community, the working class and women, and vowed to govern in the interests not of the 'privileged few' but of all those who are 'just about managing'. More of May's premiership will be looked at in more detail in the final chapter of this thesis, particularly in relation to Brexit, however, looking back at her political career prior to Brexit, all of this suggests a decisive rejection of the Thatcherite laissez-faire orthodoxy that economies work best when governments keep out.

That said, on the other hand, May, like Cameron and Johnson, was a child of Thatcher. May was also responsible for drastic cuts to public spending, and to welfare in particular, Further Thatcherite measures were evident in several new tax cuts, including a promise to slash £6.7 billion from business rates and to reduce corporation tax from 20% to 17%. All this appears to be moving in the opposite direction from the traditional one-nation view she has espoused in her speeches, of taxing the rich to fund quality public services for the poor. Even as Home Secretary, there were elements of the old 'nasty party' in May's policies, which May had once

criticised. In October 2014 the Italian Navy ended their highly successful ‘search and rescue’ operation, which had rescued 150,000 migrants in the Mediterranean, under pressure from the British government. The British position was that saving migrants only encouraged them to flee, while leaving them to drown might act as a deterrent to others seeking a new life in Europe.

This lack of so-called ‘Liberal Conservatism’ was also evident in a number of other international policy announcements May made when becoming PM. In September 2016 it was announced that the government’s commitment to meet the UN’s goal of contributing 0.7% of GDP on international development programmes was to be watered down, following a right-wing press campaign vilifying such programmes as a waste of money. Then in February 2017 an inquiry into human rights abuses by British soldiers in Iraq was closed down, with hundreds of cases still unheard. In the same month the government announced that it was no longer willing to take in the 3,000 unaccompanied child refugees it had promised to accept only the previous year.

It can be seen that whilst Theresa May is strong on one-nation rhetoric, her practice is less so. This has been true also on the subject of Europe and the EU. As will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter of this thesis, prior to Brexit, May, whilst arguably still a Eurosceptic, took a softer approach to hardliners. Whilst she did not want to cede more powers to the EU, she was in favour of the UK remaining inside the bloc. When the Brexit referendum was announced in early 2016, May affirmed her position as a Remainer. She claimed that Brexit was ‘not just about a vote to withdraw from the EU’ but it ‘was about something broader – something that the European Union came to represent’.¹³² In an attempt to convince Leavers and hard-line Eurosceptics in her party about the need for change, she warned them about the consequences of ignoring the Brexit vote arguing that if the Party did not respond and if it did not don’t take the opportunity to deliver the change the British public

¹³² E Goes, ‘*Defining Mayism*’, (The UK in a Changing World, 2017) <https://ukandeu.ac.uk/defining-mayism-one-nation-conservatism-with-a-hint-of-papal-purple-and-a-dash-of-labour-red/> (accessed 15/01/23)

wanted, resentments would grow and would be exploited by parties who would embrace, as she called, 'the politics of division and despair'. May also presented Brexit as an opportunity to address Britain's long-term economic problems – namely, low productivity and an overreliance on the financial services industry based in London – which she argued would be exacerbated by Britain's withdrawal from the EU. For May's pro-EU stance, however, upon becoming PM, what she did in practice as PM, did not match up to her rhetoric on the EU prior.

May's approach was and is ultimately classic conservatism — driven not by commitment to any particular principle, but rather by a pragmatic concern for the profitability of British capital and the interests of the Party and the UK. This was true economically and in terms of her position on the EU. It was clear from May's response to the Brexit referendum that she was a Remainer and soft-Eurosceptic at heart, but she was prepared to put the views of her Party and the country ahead of principle. May would lay a lot of the groundwork for the UK's departure from the EU, however, ultimately she would fail to get Brexit done. How May's Euroscepticism and policies towards the EU worked in practice in relation to the UK's partnership with the EU, will form part of the focus of the final chapter of this thesis.

4.3.2 Johnson, the Conservative's and his attitude towards the EU and security and defence

It is difficult to define Johnson's position as a Conservative. Like Cameron and May, Johnson was a 'child of Thatcher', growing up within the Party under her premiership. Like Thatcher, Johnson is undoubtedly a Eurosceptic. Johnson has had a varied political career in terms of the roles he has undertaken. He has been an MP, a two-term Mayor of London, Foreign Secretary under Theresa May, with his political career culminating with becoming PM, winning by a landslide both the Conservative Party leadership race in 2019 and the 2019 General Election, handing Labour its worst result at a general election in 84 years. Johnson's Conservatism was difficult to pin point in the years prior to Brexit. Like all Conservative leaders, Johnson draws selectively on the Conservative past, constructing a constellation of ideas and

positions in response to contemporary political pressures. His Conservatism in his earlier years was not that of Macmillan, Cameron or even Thatcher. It draws on longer changes in the party, that make Johnson as much a symptom as a source of the new Conservatism.

In terms of euroscepticism, since Brexit, Johnson has affirmed his stance, not just as a Eurosceptic but as a hard-line Eurosceptic. Yet prior to Brexit, it was difficult to ascertain exactly his position on the EU. He first became associated with Euroscepticism in the early 1990s, when he wrote a string of articles for the Telegraph attacking the EU for what he regarded as ‘over-zealous EU regulations’.¹³³ Yet, for all Johnson’s attacks, it is difficult to determine what type of Eurosceptic he is: hard-line or soft. There have been many contradictions and changes of heart during his career. Johnson once said he was “a bit of a fan” of Brussels, and he famously wrote an unpublished column declaring his support for the remain campaign.¹³⁴ On why Britain should stay in the EU, Johnson was once quoted as stating that the UK would lose influence in the designing of the continent of Europe.¹³⁵ Johnson was also quoted as describing himself as a fan of the EU, stating “I am not by any means an ultra-eurosceptic. In some ways, I am a bit of a fan of the European Union. If we did not have one, we would invent something like it”.¹³⁶ Johnson was also quoted as saying that the UK is responsible for its own problems and that there was no use in blaming the EU. Johnson described the UK’s problems as being caused by ‘chronic British short-termism, inadequate management, sloth, low skills, a culture of easy gratification and underinvestment in both human and physical capital and infrastructure’.¹³⁷ – Johnson also heaped praise on the EU for its security and defence achievements. Johnson applauded the EU for how it has, as he described, ‘created the longest period of peace since the Roman era’. In a biography

¹³³ P Worrell, ‘How Boris Johnson has Changed his Views on Europe’, (Channel 4, September 2019) <https://www.channel4.com/news/factcheck/how-boris-johnson-has-changed-his-views-on-europe> (accessed 24/01/23)

¹³⁴ *Ibid*

¹³⁵ A Mackaskill, ‘Die-hard eurosceptic or opportunist? Boris Johnson’s views on the EU’, (Reuters, 23 July 2019) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-leader-johnson-europe-fact-idUSKCN1UI19E> (accessed 24/01/23)

¹³⁶ *Ibid*

¹³⁷ *Ibid*

on Winston Churchill, published in 2014, Johnson stated that “the European Community, now Union, has helped to deliver a period of peace and prosperity for its people as long as any since the days of the Antonine emperors.”¹³⁸

In recent years, since Brexit, however, Johnson has contradicted his statements made earlier in his political life. Johnson became one of the leading figures within the Leave campaign – as will be looked at in more detail later in the thesis. Johnson allegedly wrote an unpublished piece supporting the Remain campaign in which he supported the single market, before switching his allegiance to Remain.¹³⁹ In the run-up to the Brexit referendum, Johnson stated that the UK was seeing what he described as “a slow and invisible process of legal colonization, as the EU infiltrates just about every area of public policy”.¹⁴⁰ In stark contrast to his support for EU security and defence, in a May 2016 article, Johnson attacked the EU and described it as resembling Nazi Germany, stating that ‘the EU is an attempt to do this by different methods, but that fundamentally what is lacking is the eternal problem, which is that there is no underlying loyalty to the idea of Europe.’¹⁴¹ As will be seen later in the thesis, Johnson would be highly critical of May, positioning himself to the right of her and her cabinet, even arguing for a no-deal Brexit. For all his contradictions, Johnson would ultimately be the PM that would, as he promised in his election victory speech, ‘get Brexit done’. In contrast to May’s pragmatism and loyalty to the Party, Johnson was more of an opportunist and, unlike May, his loyalty appeared to be more to himself and his supporters, as opposed to his Party and the country. How Johnson’s Euroscepticism and policies towards the EU worked in practice, will form part of the focus of the final chapter of this thesis.

¹³⁸ See B Johnson, *The Churchill Factor*, (Hodder, 2014)

¹³⁹ See T Shipman, *All Out War* (William Collins, 2016)

¹⁴⁰ Mackaskill *Supra* 135

¹⁴¹ *Ibid*

4.4 Liberal Conservatism and Cameron's Personal Attitudes

4.4.1 Liberal Conservatism

Whilst Cameron appeared to differ with Thatcher on a number of policy areas¹⁴², on the whole, in his early years, he seemed to have adopted Thatcherism as his political ideology. It would seem in many regards that this would also apply to Cameron's approach to Europe. As will be discussed below, throughout his early political career, Cameron talked of taking back more power from the EU and made a number of Eurosceptic comments and speeches denouncing the EU as a 'political bloc'.¹⁴³ In his time as leader of the opposition, he would also go on to remove his party from the pro-European and centre-right European People's Party (EPP) and, as PM, he would campaign throughout his premiership for reforming the EU and the UK's role in it. That said, as will be discussed below, political circumstances such as the rise of New Labour and threat of a schism within his Party between centrists and the right-wing, would push Cameron and the Conservative Party to rethink their strategy on many policy areas, including Europe, in order to give themselves a greater chance of getting back into government.

As will be analysed in more detail later in the Chapter, the Conservatives would undergo a metamorphosis over the course of the leaderships of William Hague, IDS and Michael Howard, culminating in a new brand of Conservatism under David Cameron. New Labour had dominated the British political landscape for over 13-years, winning three consecutive general elections. The election defeats for Cameron's predecessors were not only an embarrassment for the Party, but they were also forced, albeit slowly, to embrace the new political consensus that New Labour and PM Tony Blair had helped forge.¹⁴⁴ The comparison has been made by

¹⁴² Cameron supported a greater role for the UK in international development, greater spending on public services, protection of the environment, national minimum wage, tax credits, and did not wish to see an aggressive roll back of the welfare state

¹⁴³ Cameron's views will be explored in more detail below

¹⁴⁴ N Robinson, *The Long Goodbye*, BBC (London, 10 May 2007)

https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/nickrobinson/2007/05/the_long_goodby_1.html (accessed 10/02/20)

some, that if Blair and New Labour were Thatcher's greatest legacy, then Cameron and Liberal Conservatism were Blair's.¹⁴⁵ Some have labelled this 'third-way' in Conservative thinking established by Cameron as 'Neo-Thatcherite' – embracing the majority of Thatcherism, but acknowledging that there is more to conservative ideology than just the free market and that state intervention domestically, and some form of loose surpranationalism internationally, was a necessary evil.¹⁴⁶ Others, have labelled it 'Neo-Con' – an American tradition associated with centrist politicians who espouse a robust and ideals-driven foreign policy – but Cameron would and has been quick to shun that label.¹⁴⁷ Whatever label commentators ascribed to it, Cameron was keen to label this new branch of Conservative ideology 'Liberal Conservatism'. Cameron would set about coining the phrase 'Liberal Conservatism' upon his election as Party leader. One of the first times he used the phrase was during a speech he gave in Bath in March 2007, in which he described himself as a 'liberal Conservative'.¹⁴⁸ Explaining what he meant by the term, Cameron explained that he was:

Liberal, because I believe in the freedom of individuals to pursue their own happiness, with the minimum of interference from government. Sceptical of the state, trusting people to make the most of their lives, confident about the possibilities of the future – this is liberalism. And Conservative, because I believe that we're all in this together – that there is a historical understanding between past, present and future generations, and that we have a social responsibility to play an active part in the community we live in.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid*

¹⁴⁶ R Hayton, *Constructing a new conservatism? Ideology and Values*, in G Peele and J Francis, J, *David Cameron and Conservative Renewal: The Limits of Modernisation? New Perspectives on the Right*, (Manchester University Press, 2016) 9

¹⁴⁷ Independent, *The Big Question: What is neo-conservatism and how influential is it today?*, Independent (London, 12 September 2006)

<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/the-big-question-what-is-neo-conservatism-and-how-influential-is-it-today-415637.html> (accessed 11/02/20)

¹⁴⁸ David Cameron, *Speech on Liberal Consensus*, (2007) <https://www.ukpol.co.uk/david-cameron-2007-speech-on-liberal-consensus/> (accessed 11/02/20)

Cameron's use of this label was employed to illustrate three things. Firstly, he did it to distance himself from Thatcher, Major, Hague, IDS and Howard, who, although he supported, he still regarded as sitting to the right of the political spectrum to him.¹⁴⁹ Secondly, he did it to indicate his Party's shift towards social liberalism, as part of his attempt to 'decontaminate the brand'¹⁵⁰ and changing the perception of the Conservatives as, what Theresa May once noted, the 'nasty party':¹⁵¹ old fashioned, inward looking and out of touch with the ordinary person,¹⁵² something Cameron's predecessors Hague, IDS and Howard were unable to do. In order to demonstrate his Party's shift towards being more socially liberal, Cameron set about implementing some changes to the Party and altering their rhetoric on traditionally non-Conservative issues.¹⁵³ To reflect a shift in environment policy, for example, Cameron revamped the Party's logo in 2006, changing it to a green tree from the traditional torch.¹⁵⁴ The same year, Cameron also started riding his bike to work and would go on to make his 'hug a huskey' remarks whilst on a visit to the Arctic. His similar and later 'hug a hoodie' remarks were also made to symbolise his re-engineering of the Conservatives' image on crime and to demonstrate his Party's new sympathetic approach to youth crime. Other examples to reflect his Party's progressive shift, was Cameron's announcement of his plans to increase the number of females and minority members within the Party, which did increase as a result.¹⁵⁵ His almost 'One Nation' Conservative 'Big Society' Programme – the flagship programme of Cameron's 2010 general election campaign to give individuals and community groups the opportunity to run post offices, libraries, transport services

¹⁴⁹ Cameron stated that he initially supported Hague's attempts to modernise the Party before he 'changed tack'; See D Jones, *Cameron on Cameron: Conversations with Dylan Jones*, (Fourth Estate, 2008) 75

¹⁵⁰ T Quinn, *The Conservative party and the centre ground of British politics*, (2008) *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 18 (2) 179

¹⁵¹ Theresa May, Conservative Party Conference Speech (2002) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2002/oct/07/conservatives2002.conservatives1> (accessed 11/02/20)

¹⁵² S Fielding, *Cameron's Conservatives*, (2009) *Political Quarterly* 80 (2) 168

¹⁵³ Quinn, *Supra* 150

¹⁵⁴ The logo was changed to a green tree to symbolise the Party's concern with environmental issues

¹⁵⁵ Bale, *Supra* 126, at 283

and shape housing projects, amongst other things – was another example of Cameron’s attempt to distance himself and his Party from Thatcherism.¹⁵⁶

Whilst some heralded Cameron’s modernisation project as one of the most successful political reinventions ever, alongside ‘New Labour’,¹⁵⁷ others regarded it as an empty gesture, a mere ploy to get the Conservatives back into government.¹⁵⁸ As Evans notes, this was almost certainly the view of the Parliamentary Conservative Party (PCP), with whom Cameron’s modernisation project garnered little support but were willing to tolerate if it achieved the aim of getting them back into government.¹⁵⁹ Empty or meaningful, Cameron’s modernisations had certainly ushered in a new era for the Conservatives and it would be a makeover that would prove to be effective following their election victory in 2010. Yet, whilst Conservative policy could be said to have clearly shifted in some areas, the same could not be said about their position on Europe. Nor was Cameron’s position on it any clearer.

As stated above, Thatcher’s premiership had led to a new and more extreme breed of Eurosceptic. Post-Thatcher, pro-European Conservatives were in the minority of the Party, and, as Dorey notes, the former division between pro-Europeans and Eurosceptics in the Party has now been superseded by a division between soft-Eurosceptics and hard-Eurosceptics.¹⁶⁰ According to Taggart and Szczerbiack, ‘soft’ Euroscepticism consists of, not so much principled objections to EU integration or EU membership, but concerns about certain policy issues and qualified opposition to the EU, or a sense that the national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU’s trajectory.¹⁶¹ In turn, soft-Eurosceptics favour continued membership of the EU but on a renegotiated looser or more flexible basis. This could certainly be said to have

¹⁵⁶ R Kilty, *David Cameron, Citizenship and the Big Society: a New Social Model?*, (2016) *Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique* 21 (1) 4

¹⁵⁷ Bale, *Supra* 126, at 283

¹⁵⁸ S Evans, *‘Consigning its past to history? David Cameron and the Conservative party’*, (2008) *Parliamentary Affairs* 61 (2) 301

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid* 291

¹⁶⁰ Dorey, *Supra* 111, at 36

¹⁶¹ P Taggart and A Szczerbiack, *Introduction: Opposing Europe? The politics of Euroscepticism in Europe*, in A. Szczerbiack and P. Taggart, *Opposing Europe: The comparative party politics of Euroscepticism* (Oxford University Press, 2008) 8

been Cameron's stance in the EU referendum at least. In contrast to this, hard-Eurosceptics share a total opposition to the EU and EU membership.¹⁶² They are fundamentally opposed to EU integration in almost every policy area. As Taggart and Szczerbiack note, nothing short of complete and irrevocable withdrawal from the EU will suffice for hard-Eurosceptics. In Cameron's early years as leader, although the 'hard' Eurosceptics did not constitute the majority of the Party's MPs,¹⁶³ they still exercised a considerable amount of influence over the Party, including increasingly proactive agenda-setting and assertively framing the debates within the Party, highlighting key issues of concern concerning Britain's relationship with the EU.¹⁶⁴ As Dorey notes, as a consequence of this, Cameron throughout his time as leader and PM has been vulnerable to pressure from the hard-Eurosceptics to do more in Europe to protect and promote Britain's economic and political interests.

How this pressure from the hard-right affected Cameron's liberal conservative modernising project in the area of Europe will now be something that will be explored in more detail below, along with a number of other questions: What were Cameron's own views on Europe and EU security and defence? Did Cameron hold the same vehement Eurosceptic views as his political hero Thatcher or was he now setting a different course? How did Cameron's modernisation the Party affect the Party's approach to Europe and EU security and defence? Was Cameron kept on a leash by the dominant hard-Euroseptic wing of his Party or was he able to bring them along with him for some time? A detailed analysis of Cameron's attitudes towards the EU and EU security and defence and its effects on the direction of the Party in terms of policy on Europe will now be studied in more detail below.

4.4.2 Cameron's personal attitudes towards Europe and EU security and defence

¹⁶² *Ibid* 7

¹⁶³ Heppell's study states that hard-Eurosceptics comprised 35.4% of the Party at the time of his first premiership in 2010; *Supra* 21, at 347

¹⁶⁴ Dorey, *Supra* 111, at 36

Understanding the perspectives of Cameron towards the EU goes a long way to explaining the perspectives and actions of his government in EU security and defence between 2010 and 2016. In order to fully understand Cameron's perspectives on Europe and why such perspectives were held, it is essential to understand how Cameron's perspectives on the EU were shaped and what shaped them. This requires an analysis of his early years in politics, from his time as a special adviser to John Major, to him becoming an MP and then leader of the party. As will become evident below, Cameron's perspectives on Europe have shifted and altered significantly and, although he led the Remain campaign in the referendum, categorising him as simply a pro-European or Eurosceptic is no easy task. Although some of Cameron's actions at times can clearly be regarded as pro-European or Eurosceptic in nature, his overall position on the EU is difficult to pin down. The veracity of his Euroscepticism varies from policy area to policy area. As will become clear below, Cameron's position on the EU is in a grey area and could be argued to be, as Dorey asserts, soft-Euroscepticism.

4.4.3 Early Years: special adviser, MP for Whitney and Education Secretary (1990-2004)

Cameron's political career began in the late 1980's when, after leaving Oxford University, he joined the Conservative Research Department (CRD) in September 1988. This was during the time of one of the most crucial issues of the day, the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), which then PM, Thatcher, had ruled out Britain's full membership of. Former Downing Street foreign policy adviser Sir Stephen Wall, describes Cameron as someone who, during this period, was someone for whom loyalty to the then Conservative leader and PM, Thatcher, meant being Eurosceptic.¹⁶⁵ Wall also recounts a story regarding a meeting between Cameron and former Labour MP and ex-Europe Minister Denis MacShane, at which, in

¹⁶⁵ T McTague, *David Cameron, the accidental European*, Politico (London, 20 May 2016) <https://www.politico.eu/article/david-cameron-accidental-european-brexit-referendum-conservative-tory-euroskeptical/> (accessed 20/02/20)

response to advice given by McShane on how to 'handle' Europe, Cameron is alleged to have said 'you don't seem to realize that I am a sceptic, that is my view.'¹⁶⁶

Whether because of true Eurosceptic conviction or as an act of devotion to his party leader, Cameron appeared to be a Eurosceptic during the early years of his career. In his capacity as a researcher, Cameron found himself briefing senior members of the Conservative Party,¹⁶⁷ and after impressing he was promoted to head of the political section of the CRD. This placed Cameron at the heart of the Conservatives propaganda machine, at a time when the subject of Europe was as divisive and highly charged as it is in the Party today. This was during the time when the debate over the ERM was playing out very publicly between Thatcher and two of the most influential men within her government, Geoffrey Howe and Nigel Lawson. It was Cameron's job during this period to prepare briefings for Conservative MP's and ministers and prepare lines of attack and defence in relation to Tory policy. Cameron's department was responsible for churning out much of the Conservative rhetoric on Europe, making Cameron a key component in producing the Party's Eurosceptic propaganda of the time.

This valuable education at the CRD, however, would come to an end for Cameron upon the resignation of Margaret Thatcher on 22nd November 1990. It was the subject of Europe, specifically British membership of the ERM, which ultimately ended Thatcher's 11-year premiership. In the running to become the next leader of the party was John Major, Michael Heseltine and Douglas Hurd. In the immediate aftermath of Thatcher's resignation, it was reported that Central Office (the headquarters of the CRD) went into lockdown.¹⁶⁸ Cameron and other staffers were instructed to remain neutral in the leadership contest and were banned from assisting candidates, however, this did not dissuade Cameron from visiting all three of the leadership candidates outside of office hours. In the unofficial biography of

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*

¹⁶⁷ A Cooke, *Tory Policy-Making: The Conservative Research Department, 1929-2009* (Conservative Research Department, 2009) 95

¹⁶⁸ M Ashcroft and I Oakeshott, *Call Me Dave: The Unauthorised Biography of David Cameron*, (Biteback, 2015) 93

Cameron, its authors, Ashcroft and Oakeshot, allege that Cameron pledged his support and allegiance to all three candidates.¹⁶⁹ As Ashcroft and Oakeshot note, whether this was the early example of an astute political operator or a sign of someone who lacked principle or a willingness to deceive and mislead others, it certainly gave a glimpse into the pragmatic PM and Party leader that Cameron would later become. When Major won, Cameron's hedged bets paid off, and under Major's new premiership Cameron received his next appointment of helping the new PM prepare for the weekly Prime Minister's Questions (PMQ's).

Major's stance on Europe was different to that of his predecessor, Thatcher. Major was undoubtedly a pro-European, and the Eurosceptic Cameron now had one-to-one access with Major twice a week. It could be argued that Cameron's close rapport with the pro-European Major went some way to tempering Cameron's Eurosceptic views.¹⁷⁰ After playing his part in the Conservatives 1992 election victory, Cameron was rewarded with another promotion. He was moved to the Treasury and appointed as special adviser to Chancellor Norman Lamont. Cameron had the job of dealing with Lamont's media and communications, which included writing speeches, liaising with journalists and advising Lamont ahead of media appearances. Whatever Cameron achieved or experienced during his time at the Treasury, this was all overshadowed by the events of 'Black Wednesday' 1992.

In late 1990, as an example of his pro-European stance, Major had persuaded Thatcher to take Britain into the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM). By late 1992, however, the pound had plummeted and the Bank of England was doing everything within its power to shore up the pound's value and keep it tethered to the Deutschmark, spending over £3 billion in the process.¹⁷¹ By 16th September 1992, the situation had got so bad for the pound and the Bank of England that Lamont was forced to announce the departure of the UK from the ERM. The only thing more

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid*

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*

¹⁷¹ 'The road from Black Wednesday to Brexit', Financial Times, (London, 12 September 2017) <https://www.ft.com/content/a331a3ca-96d8-11e7-a652-cde3f882dd7b> (accessed 19/03/20)

damaged by 'Black Wednesday' than the British economy was the Conservative Party.¹⁷² Opinion polls against the Conservatives had plummeted¹⁷³ and despite the strong bounce in the economy between late 1992 and May 1997, voters neither forgave nor forgot the Conservatives management of this crisis.¹⁷⁴ For Labour, the crisis was seen as a major development which paved the way to three consecutive election victories. For the Conservatives, the Party was split on what the crisis meant for the future of the Party. Whilst for many in the Party, particularly Major and other pro-Europeans, the crisis was seen as a fatal blow to the Party's credibility and electability. For the Eurosceptics, however, it was seen as a moment of liberation for the UK in taking back control over its monetary policy from Europe. Philip Stephens argues that a straight line could potentially be drawn from Black Wednesday to Brexit and that the crisis ignited and would continue to fuel Eurosceptic feelings within the party for years to come.¹⁷⁵ Cameron had campaigned throughout for the UK to leave the ERM, breaking the Party lines, whose official policy was to 'wait and see'. With Lamont, Cameron drafted a pamphlet entitled 'Europe: A Community not a Superstate', explaining the consequences of leaving the ERM and the broader lessons for the UK's European policy.¹⁷⁶ In the pamphlet, Cameron and Lamont argued that the UK's membership of the EU was necessary for trade and cooperation, but that they would not and never welcome the political aspects of the Union i.e. EU army, defence minister, defence headquarters etc.¹⁷⁷ Cameron and Lamont even went as far as saying that 'no one would die for Europe'.¹⁷⁸ Cameron spoke in his 2019 memoir about his time working for Lamont, stating that his time in the treasury had made him a 'Eurorealist' or a Eurosceptic, but he reiterated that

¹⁷² See W Keegan, D Marsh and R Roberts, *Six Days in September: Black Wednesday, Brexit and the Making of Europe*, (OMFIF Press, 2017)

¹⁷³ Gallup poll indicated that their intended share of votes had plummeted from 46% to 23%; See T Smith, *Public Opinion Polls: The UK General Election*, (1992) *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 159 (3)

¹⁷⁴ L Elliot, *Black Wednesday, 20 years on: a bad day for the Tories but not for Britain*, *Guardian UK*, (London, 13 September 2012) <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/sep/13/black-wednesday-bad-day-conservatives> (accessed 04/04/20)

¹⁷⁵ *Supra* 171

¹⁷⁶ D Cameron, *For the Record*, (William Collins, 2019), 42

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid*

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid*

that did not make him anti-European.¹⁷⁹ Even for someone like Cameron, who would go on to become less Eurosceptic in the years ahead, the crisis served as a reminder for the majority of Conservatives in the Party as to why the UK should never join the Euro or fix the pound to an exchange rate ever again.

After eight months following ‘Black Wednesday’, Lamont was sacked by Major, and this forced Cameron out of a job. He would go on to advise the then Home Secretary Michael Howard at the Home Office and in 1994 worked on the corporate affairs team at Carlton Communications. Cameron did not stay out of politics for long and he returned in 1996 to stand as an MP. His first attempt at gaining a seat came in 1996, when he was selected by the Conservative Party to be their candidate for a seat in Stafford. Although Cameron would ultimately lose the seat, the EU was a running theme in the lead up to the election. Black Wednesday was still fresh in the media and the public mind, as was the ‘*Maastricht Rebels*’ debacle, in which 22 MPs rebelled against PM John Major and the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty into British law in 1992.¹⁸⁰ Furthermore, a new Eurosceptic political party was on the rise in the form of the ‘Referendum Party’. The party was set up by financier and tycoon Sir James Goldsmith, whose aim, as the Party’s name suggests, was to force the government to hold a referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU.¹⁸¹ For the Conservatives, the party’s creation threatened its monopoly on Euroscepticism in the UK.

In his first election campaign to become an MP, in Stafford, Cameron could not dodge the issue of Europe. He would find himself torn between toeing the official Party line – Major’s pro-European position of campaigning for continued EU membership but resisting any moves towards a federal state – and giving into pressure from the Eurosceptic majority of the Party, which appeared even more

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid*

¹⁸⁰ O Bowcott, *John Major had a 'full gloat' after defeating rebels on Maastricht*, Guardian UK, (London, 24 July 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jul/24/john-major-full-gloat-defeating-rebels-maastricht-european-union> (accessed 05/04/20)

¹⁸¹ Following the Referendum Party’s disbandment in 1997 in wake of the sudden death of Sir James Goldsmith, UKIP – which existed alongside the Referendum Party, having been created in 1992 – would scoop up most of the Eurosceptic electoral pot

tempting at the time given the threat of the Referendum Party. Whilst Cameron broadly stayed loyal to Major, he was among a number of 200 Conservative candidates during the election who made it clear they opposed monetary union, placing them out of step with Major, who had not at this stage ruled out such a move.¹⁸² Whether because of conviction or whether it was a tactical move to discourage Referendum Party candidates standing against him in Stafford, Cameron demonstrated that he was still at this time willing to take a hard Eurosceptic stance if necessary to protect his and the Party's prospects of winning elections. Cameron ultimately lost the seat to Labour MP David Kidney, with a 12.6% swing to Labour. Whilst even with the Referendum Party's votes Cameron would not have beaten Labour,¹⁸³ the Referendum Party had proven to be a formidable threat.

After a brief return to Carlton Communications, Cameron again turned his attention to becoming an MP again in 2001, this time in the Southern-England town of Witney. The Conservatives were now under a new leader, William Hague. Hague, like Cameron, was a 'child of Thatcher', although, unlike Cameron, his stance on Europe during his leadership was unquestionable. His four-year tenure as Party leader was filled with hard-line anti-European campaigning.¹⁸⁴ Witney was and still remains a hotbed of Euroscepticism and if the Conservatives were to win the seat in 2001, they needed somebody who was an unwavering Eurosceptic. Since 1997, Witney's MP had been Shaun Woodward, a Conservative yet discreetly pro-European politician whose differences in opinion with Hague on the subject of the EU caused him to cross the floor and join Labour in 1999. Woodward's defection was a source of outrage and embarrassment for both Hague, the Party and the constituency of Witney, and all were determined to oust Woodward and replace him with an Eurosceptic candidate.

¹⁸² Ashcroft and Oakeshot, *Supra* 168, at 149

¹⁸³ The Referendum Party had got 2.2% of the vote which would have brought the Conservatives up-short

¹⁸⁴ N Kent, 'The party I joined was full of nice old people; today it is full of nasty old people', *Guardian UK*, (London, 05 December 2001)

<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/dec/05/conservatives.uk2> (accessed 05/04/20)

Cameron, with a history of some Eurosceptic leniencies, was identified as a possible candidate to capture the seat, however, a question mark was quite literally placed over his head. In an online campaign listing and categorising hundreds of Conservative MPs and parliamentary candidates as either 'Europhiles' or 'Eurosceptics', a question mark was placed next to Cameron's name, questioning his stance on Europe.¹⁸⁵ The list, known as 'Candidlist', was compiled by Dr Sean Gabb. Its purpose was to prevent sitting Conservative MPs and prospective Conservative parliamentary candidates from deceiving candidate selection panels in relation to their stance on Europe.¹⁸⁶ Whilst the list was passed off by some members of the Party as unsupported and unreliable, others at the time took the list very seriously, with even some of those listed threatening to sue Gabb. The criteria for being labelled a 'sceptic' on Gabb's 'Candidlist' was to answer in the affirmative to two questions:

1. *If elected or re-elected to Parliament, would you oppose our joining the Eurozone even if joining were to be recommended by the Party leadership?*
2. *If elected or re-elected to Parliament and required to choose between accepting the supremacy of European Union law in this country and leaving the European Union, would you vote for British withdrawal?*¹⁸⁷

Placing a question mark over Cameron in respect of his stance Europe could have been extremely damaging to his prospects becoming, not just an MP for Witney, but becoming a Conservative MP entirely. As an attempt to rectify the situation, Cameron contacted Gabb. Their correspondence had been published by Gabb on his website containing the 'Candidlist and gives some insight into his views on the EU at the time'.¹⁸⁸ Cameron argued that he should instead be categorised as a Eurosceptic on the basis of his opposition to the single currency and his opposition to any further

¹⁸⁵ M Ashcroft, *Did I really say that about Europe?* The Sunday Times, (London, 04 October 2015) <https://www.lordashcroft.com/2015/10/did-i-really-say-that-about-europe/> (accessed 06/04/20)

¹⁸⁶ S Gabb, 'The Candidlist' (2002) <https://www.seangabb.co.uk/candidlist/index.htm> (accessed 06/04/20)

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid*

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid*

transfer of sovereignty from the UK to the EU.¹⁸⁹ Cameron, however, did admit that he did not favour withdrawal. Whilst Gabb initially refused to change Cameron's classification on the list from 'Europhile' to 'sceptic', after some further exchanges between the two, Gabb eventually conceded and reclassified Cameron as a 'sceptic'.¹⁹⁰

The list would have little to no effect on Cameron's chances of capturing the Conservative safe seat of Witney and Cameron found himself elected with a majority of 8,000 - a substantial victory. In a Guardian blog immediately following his election victory, Cameron appeared keen to reinforce views on Europe, possibly in an attempt to clear up any doubts for anyone questioning his Euroscepticism:

*What are the four touchstones for the Conservatives? Our clearest policy - opposition to joining the Euro - is also our most popular. This is going to be my killer question for all the leadership contenders.*¹⁹¹

The Conservatives defeat at the 2001 General Election forced Hague to resign, and this triggered a leadership contest. The three outright runners for the leadership were the Eurosceptics, IDS and Michael Portillo, and, the passionately pro-European, Ken Clarke. Speaking in a Guardian blog, Cameron gave some insight into the candidate he was backing for the leadership and further insight into his position on the EU at the time:

I remember Christ Patten asking me in Hong Kong, circa 1995, who should be the next leader of the Conservative Party. 'Michael Portillo', I replied. He looked at me quizzically and said: 'I am not sure we are ready for a Spanish

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid*

¹⁹⁰ As a point of interest, Cameron's classification was later changed by Gabb to 'sceptic', however, next to Boris Johnson's name still remains a question mark. Johnson's position on the EU will be discussed below

¹⁹¹ D Cameron, *Election Success at Last*, Guardian UK (London, 11 June 2001) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/jun/11/campaigndiary> (accessed 20/04/20)

*Prime Minister.’ Rich, really, for a Europhile. But in a strange way, he turned out to be right.*¹⁹²

His support for the hard-line Eurosceptic Portillo, who ironically would later attack Cameron for not doing enough to leave the EU during his time as PM, indicates Cameron’s possible position on the EU.¹⁹³ Although he could not be said to be a pro-European at this point of his political career, if ever, his opposition to withdrawal combined with his support for a clear hard-line Eurosceptic would indicate that at this time he positioned himself somewhere between a soft and hard Eurosceptic – based on Dorey’s measurements.

With his first choice out, Cameron lent his support to IDS, another hardline Eurosceptic.¹⁹⁴ IDS had been a vehement critic of the EU, attacking the Maastricht Treaty even during his maiden speech in Parliament in 1992.¹⁹⁵ He also introduced a private member’s Bill in 1996 which would have enabled Parliament to overrule some decisions of the European Court. IDS also gave some insight into his views on EU security and defence, when he publicly warned the US that he feared a potential EU military force could destroy NATO.¹⁹⁶ In terms of security and defence, isolationism was the backbone of his campaign and his shadow-cabinet selections reflected his intentions – virtually all were Eurosceptics.¹⁹⁷ His views on Europe seemed to be supported by the majority of the Party at this time, when 300,000 members voted IDS as leader. Although not his first choice, Cameron’s support for IDS over the pro-European Ken Clarke, and the accepting of IDS’s anti-European

¹⁹² ‘*The Cameron Diaries*’, Guardian UK (London, 18 July 2001)

<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/Columnists/Archive/0,,649666,00.html> (accessed 20/04/20)

¹⁹³ T Ross, *David Cameron attacks Tory ‘pessimists’ who say Britain should leave EU*, The Telegraph (London, 08 May 2013) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/10046232/David-Cameron-attacks-Tory-pessimists-who-say-Britain-should-leave-EU.html> (accessed 21/04/20)

¹⁹⁴ F Elliott and J Hanning, *Rise of the New Conservative*, (Fourth Estate, 2007) 199

¹⁹⁵ Iain Duncan Smith, Maiden Speech in the House of Commons (1992) <https://www.ukpol.co.uk/iain-duncan-smith-1992-maiden-speech-in-the-house-of-commons/> (accessed 21/04/20)

¹⁹⁶ Iain Duncan Smith, NATO First speech (2001) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/oct/10/conservatives2001.conservatives4> (accessed 21/04/20)

¹⁹⁷ *Profile: Iain Duncan Smith: Mr ‘Lite’ with bite*, Politico (Brussels, 03 October 2001) <https://www.politico.eu/article/profile-iain-duncan-smith/>

policies, illustrated that Cameron was someone who was willing to put Party before politics.

During IDS's time as leader, Cameron gave a glimpse into his approach to global foreign, security and defence issues, most notably in his response to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In February 2003, Cameron was quoted as saying he felt 'uneasy about the invasion' and described himself as a 'confused and uncertain sceptical Tory'.¹⁹⁸ Whilst he would be prepared to vote for the invasion in the right circumstances, Cameron caveated his support by stating he was not certain that a war would be the right strategy in dealing with the problem of Iraq.¹⁹⁹ When the vote came before the Commons, Cameron did support the war and voted in favour of pre-emptive intervention. Again, his actions at this time gave some insight into the pragmatic approach he was willing to take, prepared to sacrifice principle if he felt it served the Party and, in this case, the nation's interests.

Whilst Cameron supported Blair on the issue of Iraq, Cameron, in his early years as an MP, was very critical of Blair's approach to the EU, regularly using his Guardian column as a platform to launch attacks against the PM – famously labelling Blair a 'Euro-maniac'.²⁰⁰ The UK's involvement in the negotiations of a draft EU Constitution would also give some insight into Cameron's position on Europe at that time. The Constitution was regarded as the completion of a long process of European integration, following a period of 51 years of ever closer integration amongst EU Member States and prior to the successive enlargement of the EU, particularly in Eastern Europe.²⁰¹ It was thought the Constitution would tie up neatly any political and legal loose ends and bring all of Europe's treaties under one single EU Constitution. The Constitution sparked a debate between the major political parties in the UK over whether the UK Parliament's ratification of it should be put to a

¹⁹⁸ F Elliot and J Hanning, *Supra* 194, at 209

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid* at 209

²⁰⁰ D Cameron, 'A Safe Bet', Guardian UK, (London, 28 May 2003)

<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/may/28/davidcameron.eu> (accessed 05/05/20)

²⁰¹ C Carter, 'The ill-fated European Constitution is signed in Rome', Money Week (London, 29 October 2015) <https://moneyweek.com/413539/29-october-2004-the-ill-fated-european-constitution-is-signed-in-rome> (accessed 05/05/20)

referendum. Labour initially opposed a referendum, but in the event of one happening, it vowed to campaign in favour of the Constitution. Official Conservative policy on the other hand was in favour of a referendum and vowed to campaign against it. Most Conservatives regarded the constitution as a 'Trojan Horse', through which the UK would be forced to integrate further and eventually transfer further powers to the EU.²⁰²

In his Guardian blog from May 2003, as mentioned above, Cameron labelled Blair a 'Euro-maniac'²⁰³ and made a number of arguments both in favour of holding a referendum and against ratifying the EU Constitution. Through these blogs, Cameron revealed himself to be someone for whom the question of Europe was not one that placed high on his list of concerns – he describes himself as 'no Euro-obsessive', arguably implying he was not a Eurosceptic, or more likely that he was not a hard-Eurosceptic. It also further consolidates the argument that he was someone who was willing to obey the Whip and follow the Party line, regardless of his own personal feelings on Europe.²⁰⁴ Whether Cameron genuinely cared about the outcome of the referendum on the EU Constitution, his desire to answer the European question once and for all appears clear.²⁰⁵

In May 2003, during the EU Constitution row, IDS's leadership came to an abrupt end following a vote of confidence against him.²⁰⁶ Just days later, Michael Howard was appointed as leader after running unopposed.²⁰⁷ Cameron was quickly made a key component of Howard's leadership, being appointed a special adviser to Howard. Whilst the Howard's leadership initially appeared to offer stability to the party, it

²⁰² See L Betten, *The EU Charter on Fundamental Rights: A Trojan Horse or a Mouse?* (2001) *Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations* 17 (2)

²⁰³ *Supra* 200

²⁰⁴ D Cameron, 'Second time lucky', *Guardian UK*, (London, 22 April 2004)

<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/apr/22/davidcameron.politicalcolumnists> (accessed 01/06/20)

²⁰⁵ *Ibid*

²⁰⁶ IDS lost by 75 for to 90 against; See 'Tory Leader Ousted', *BBC News*, (London, 29 October 2003) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3225127.stm

²⁰⁷ M Tempest, 'Howard wins Tory leadership by default', *Guardian UK*, (London, 06 November 2003) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/nov/06/conservatives.uk2> (accessed 04/06/20)

was very short-lived. The row over the EU Constitution and the divisions it was causing within his party would eventually lead to his downfall. Howard's position on Europe was not dissimilar from Cameron's. He was sceptical about Europe and opposed deeper integration but he was not in favour of leaving the EU. In a speech made in 2004, opposing the new EU Constitution, he warned against things such as interference by the CJEU in reviewing the actions of the British army, the creation of a European army and the establishment of a single European foreign policy.²⁰⁸ In the same speech he also warned against the establishment of a federal European super state.²⁰⁹ On the question of the EU Constitution and a referendum, Howard maintained his predecessor's position, launching his policy under a new slogan '*Right to Choose*', which he planned to be the Conservatives cornerstone policy in the 2004 local election campaigns. In a dramatic U-turn, however, Blair dramatically altered Labour's position on the Constitution and agreed to accept Tory demands for a referendum.²¹⁰ This U-turn presented Howard with two problems: it effectively removed the cornerstone of his local election campaign, whilst also opening his party to attacks from UKIP, who offered outright withdrawal of the EU which had the potential to steal would-be Conservative votes from hard-Eurosceptic voters.

In an attempt to address the UKIP threat, Howard sought a new strategy, one which would see the Conservatives campaign for a referendum on a renegotiation Britain's membership with the EU. Howard's pledge included British withdrawal from the EU, ditching its obligations of membership, such as fisheries policy for example – an issue amongst the Party's Eurosceptics – and the launching of a campaign to rejoin the EU with the hope of negotiating a better deal for the UK. It was reported that Cameron was allegedly appalled by Howard's new strategy.²¹¹ In an attempt to dissuade Howard, Cameron allegedly arranged a meeting with Tory businessmen, who had been involved in supporting the 'No' campaign against the EU Constitution, at which

²⁰⁸ Michael Howard, Speech on Europe (2004) <http://www.ukpol.co.uk/michael-howard-2004-speech-on-europe/> (accessed 04/06/20)

²⁰⁹ *Ibid*

²¹⁰ M Tempest, '*Blair confirms EU referendum u-turn*', Guardian UK, (London, 20 April 2004) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/apr/20/eu.politics6> (accessed 04/06/20)

²¹¹ Ashcroft and Oakeshot, *Supra* 168, at 124

they explained to Howard that they would not support any such referendum and, as a result, Howard abandoned his plans.²¹² Evidently for Cameron, this was regarded as a step too far. Cameron, although a major opponent of the EU Constitution and advocate of a referendum on it, still seemed to value the benefits of being a member of the EU. Throughout this period, he was someone for whom further EU integration was not something he wished to deepen, however, he was also someone who was keen to ensure that the relationship was maintained.

4.4.4 Cameron's security and defence policies and approach to the EU as leader of the opposition (2005-2009)

Unable to mount an effective strategy against the surge in UKIP support, the local elections of June 2004 proved disappointing for the Conservatives. In just under a year later, following French public's decision not to ratify it, the EU Constitution referendum, that Howard had gambled so much of his Party's local election campaign on, collapsed, as would Howard's leadership.²¹³ Confidence in Howard had been rocked and fear spread through Tory ranks about a third successive defeat to Labour at the approaching 2005 General Election, which the Conservatives did lose.²¹⁴ Following the election defeat, Howard immediately announced that he would stand down as leader, triggering yet another leadership contest in the Party.

Even before Howard's defeat in the 2005 general election, Cameron had been favourite amongst the majority of the Party to take over as leader. Up until this point, the Party has suffered three consecutive general election defeats and after 8 years in opposition it has failed to convince the electorate that they were a credible and better alternative to Labour. It was felt that a comprehensive review of party policy, ideology and strategy was required.²¹⁵ Launching his leadership bid on 29th

²¹² F Elliot and J Hanning, *Supra* 194, at 242

²¹³ The French referendum result was a victory for the "No" campaign, with 55% of voters rejecting the treaty on a turnout of 69%

²¹⁴ Labour took 356 seats to the Conservative Party's 198

²¹⁵ M Ashcroft, *Smell the Coffee: A Wake-up Call for the Conservative Party* (Michael Ashcroft, 2005)

September 2005, as explained above, Cameron set about portraying himself as the candidate who represented modernisation of the Conservative Party.

A study conducted by Lord Michael Ashcroft into the public's opinion of the Conservatives during the 2005 general election, found that the general public felt the Party was out of touch. They believed the Conservatives still represented the 'well-off' rather than the 'have-nots' and they had 'less trust in the Party at the end of the (2005) election campaign than they did at the beginning'.²¹⁶ The study also found that as little as 38% of voters thought the Conservatives were on the right track to winning an election.²¹⁷ It was clear to Cameron that a change in direction was required if the Party was to have any hope of winning another election in the future, which set the stage for Cameron and his plans for modernisation. Cameron's campaign slogan was '*Change to Win*'. In his keynote speech at the Conservative Party Conference in 2005, Cameron urged the Party that the answer for the Party was not to move further right and that they had to concede that were failing to engage with the under-35's, women, minorities, and that public servants no longer believed the party was on their side. Cameron told the conference that change to the party could no merely be a re-branding exercise, but had to be a fundamental change, not just to the party's culture, but also of its attitudes and identity. In short, Cameron stated, he hoped this would breed a new generation of what he labelled '*Modern Compassionate Conservatism*', which he would later officially brand Liberal Conservatism.²¹⁸

Cameron's plans to modernise were well received by the party, and he was elected leader on 6th December 2005, after beating opponent David Davis by a landslide in the final round of voting.²¹⁹ He made it clear to the party that his landslide victory

²¹⁶ *Ibid*

²¹⁷ *Ibid*

²¹⁸ David Cameron, Conservative Party Conference Speech, (2005)
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/oct/04/conservatives2005.conservatives3> (accessed 01/07/20)

²¹⁹ Cameron took 60% of the votes from Party members

meant that he had a clear mandate for bringing about change within the party.²²⁰ Upon election, Cameron sought to minimise the highly divisive policy area of the EU in an attempt to bring about some unity within the Party. In his 2006 Conservative Conference speech, he urged Conservatives to stop ‘banging on’ about Europe, along with other emotive issues like immigration.²²¹ This was all part of his early attempts to detoxify the Conservative Party’s image, by placing much less emphasis on traditional Conservative (or Thatcherite) themes such as Euroscepticism, and in turn immigration, and more on promoting progressive issues such as environmentalism, eradicating poverty, same-sex relationships and social justice.²²² That said, for all Cameron’s attempts to try and move the Party’s attention away from the EU, this would not go away and, unfortunately for Cameron, he would spend his time as leader, as well as his time as PM, struggling to impose his authority on Europe and assuaging the concerns of his Thatcherite and Eurosceptic backbench MPs.

In terms of security and defence policy, Cameron, like all his predecessors, found his own security and defence policies bound largely by circumstances than ideology. That said, again like all his predecessors, some ideological Conservative themes were evident in Cameron’s approach. Upon his election as leader, Cameron never set about establishing any official security and defence policy. Instead, Cameron’s position from this time on EU security and defence can only be gleaned from various speeches, articles, Parliamentary minutes and published documents associated with the Party.²²³ From these sources, an idea of how Cameron was intending to position his security and defence policy can be ascertained.

The UK security and defence environment Cameron found himself upon his election as leader was relatively chaotic. The challenges he, and UK defence, faced at this time were four-fold: uncertainty, meeting commitments, balancing the budget and

²²⁰ David Cameron, ‘A voice for hope, for optimism and for change’ Speech, (2005)
<https://conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/600180> (accessed 01/07/20)

²²¹ David Cameron, Conservative Party Conference Speech, (2006)
<http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=314> (accessed 02/07/20)

²²² See *Supra* 126, at Chapter 7

²²³ Lee and Beech, *Supra* 20, at 151

procurement cycles. During this time, the UK was on high alert for terrorist attacks (the 7/7 London bombings had occurred just months ago) and the British military had been deployed to at least five major conflicts around the globe (Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan). This had placed a heavy burden on UK defence budget, which was stretched further by the UK's commitments within the UN and NATO,²²⁴ as well as its commitments to procuring 232 Eurofighters at the time.²²⁵ Defence spending at this time was at its lowest since the end of WW2, with only 2.3% of GDP devoted to defence (this compared from a high of 5.3% in 1986).²²⁶ It was under these circumstances that Cameron and his shadow cabinet had the task of formulating his Party's security and defence policy.

Throughout his years as leader of the opposition, certain trends appeared to emerge in Cameron's thinking on security and defence. It appeared that Cameron had retained some of the more traditional Conservative thinking when it came to security and defence, such as the commitment to NATO and the transatlantic partnership with the US – or the 'Special Relationship'. During his time in opposition, Cameron was quite open about these views, stating in one speech in 2008, that Atlanticism was in his and the Conservative Party's 'DNA'.²²⁷ As discussed earlier, Conservatives have traditionally always placed NATO above the EU when it comes to European security. In the same speech, Cameron stated that, when in government, three key principles would govern his approach to security and defence in relation to NATO and Europe. All three of these key principles provided some insight into Cameron's thinking on EU security and defence at this time. Cameron's three principles included calling upon European nations to do more to develop their military capabilities and do more to support NATO. He was careful, however, to caveat that statement with his second key principle, by explaining he did not mean

²²⁴ In NATO, for example, the UK has the obligation to spend at least 2% GDP on military – it is one of only a few NATO members who do this currently (along with the US and Estonia)

²²⁵ B Jenkin, *A Defence Policy for the UK: Matching Commitments and Resources* (Conservative Way Forward, 2007) 50

²²⁶ United Kingdom National Defence Association, 'Overcoming the Defence Crisis' (2008) http://www.uknda.org/uknda_discussion_paper: overcoming_the_defence_crisis/n-154.html (accessed 01/07/20)

²²⁷ David Cameron, 'Crossroads for NATO' Speech, (2008) <https://conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/599672> (accessed 01/07/20)

duplication, warning that duplication would be harmful to Europe's security and defence. Explaining his final key principle, Cameron stated that there must be a closer working relationship between the EU and NATO, and the UN. He also took the opportunity in this speech to criticise the ESDP, which he stated had not produced a close and harmonious relationship between the EU and NATO nor delivered greater military capability. He also accused the EU of empire building through the ESDP and of not doing enough to assist and improve its contribution to NATO.

That said, Cameron has been keen to point out the benefits of the ESDP. This was in stark contrast to prominent Conservatives at the time, particularly the UK Conservative Party spokesman in the European Parliament, Geoffrey Van Orden. In a statement to the House of Commons Defence Committee, Orden described the ESDP as a 'diversion', 'duplicative' and 'wasteful', arguing that it offered no new military capabilities. He also criticized the development of EU Battlegroups, which he also described in the same manner.²²⁸ Whilst this was, and still is, a view that is widespread amongst the Conservative Party, Cameron at this time appeared to take a more balanced and nuanced approach to the ESDP. In his 2008 speech on NATO, Cameron also took the opportunity to praise the ESDP, stating that the EU could deliver crucial contributions to operations on the ground, through the provision of development aid, police trainers, development workers and customs officers.²²⁹ Cameron clearly did not have total disregard for the ESDP and to some extent valued the ways in which it could complement NATO.²³⁰ That said, although Cameron was to some extent supportive of the ESDP, his opposition to duplication and support for giving NATO priority over Europe's defence was clear.

His and the Party's position on security and defence at this time can also be ascertained from two important documents published during this period. The first was authored by Bernard Jenkin MP and published by Conservative think tank

²²⁸ House of Commons Defence Committee (2008)
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmdfence/memo/nato/uc1002.htm>
(accessed 01/07/20)

²²⁹ *Supra* 227

²³⁰ Jenkin, *Supra* 225

Conservative Way Forward entitled '*A Defence Policy for the UK: Matching Commitments and Resources*'.²³¹ The other is '*An Unquiet World*', produced by the National and International Security Policy Group and submitted to the shadow cabinet. The Group was tasked with examining all aspects of the UK's national security, from both a domestic and an international perspective with a view to making policy proposals. Both documents are very US-centric. They espouse the traditional Conservative security and defence policies of Atlanticism (or the 'Special Relationship') and a commitment to NATO. There is a sense within them that Cameron and his Conservatives were seeking to exert a stronger influence over the relationship, something which Cameron considered Blair not to have done enough of.²³² That said, in an *Unquiet World*, the Security Policy Group are keen to recommend that that the UK would need to pursue a close relationship with the EU, particularly in relation to dealing with threats to Europe's borders, in the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, and particularly considering the common threats faced by both parties with the threat of domestic Islamic terrorism.²³³ The Group, however, did call upon the EU to assume a greater role in security and defence, not to duplicate NATO and the US, but to help support them.²³⁴

Cameron's break with old traditions and shift to more liberal policies was evident across the board of his security and defence policies – not just in relation to EU security and defence. A later document also gave some insight to Cameron's position on security and defence more generally during his time in opposition, in a document he authored entitled '*Built to Last: The Aims and Values of the Conservative Party*'.²³⁵ This document was intended to be the launch-pad for Liberal Conservatism. Cameron outlined eight aims that he and his Party would seek to fulfil in security and defence. These aims included a moral obligation of the party to make poverty history, to control immigration and to ensure that security and freedom must go

²³¹ *Ibid*

²³² See P Neville-Jones, *Conservative Party National and International Security Policy Group Report Launch* (Chatham House, 2007)

²³³ P Neville-Jones, *Unquiet World*, (Conservative Party, 2007) 7

²³⁴ *Ibid*

²³⁵ '*Built to Last: The Aims and Values of the Conservative Party*', (Conservative Party, 2006) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_08_06_cameron.pdf (accessed 30/07/20)

hand in hand.²³⁶ It was explained that fulfilling these aims would help contribute to long-term security both at home and abroad.²³⁷ In security and defence terms, these aims demonstrated a split from the old Thatcherite traditions of the Party, and demonstrated Cameron's shift towards more liberal policies.²³⁸

The rationale behind this change in policy, was not just in an attempt to distance himself from his Conservative predecessors, but also to distinguish himself and the Party from Labour. Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Conservatives and Labour had been almost entirely on the same page when it came to security and defence matters. Cameron set about re-thinking his Party's approach to security and defence matters in an attempt to provide the Conservatives with a foothold in the area. One area, for example, in which Conservative policy was reshaped was the area of military and humanitarian intervention in third-party conflicts.²³⁹ In reality, however, Conservative policy had not drifted all that far from the broad strokes of Labour security and defence policy. Cameron instead, used his so-called 'anti-interventionist' policy to give him a foothold to criticise Labour. In a speech he gave during a visit to Pakistan in 2008, Cameron's tactics to try and distance himself from the foreign policies of Labour and the 'neo-conservative' ideology which he claimed informed Blair's and Bush's decision to invade Iraq in 2003, were evident.²⁴⁰ He stated:

We should accept that we cannot impose democracy at the barrel of a gun; that we cannot drop democracy from 10,000 feet - and we shouldn't try... Put

²³⁶ 'The Conservative party's aims and values', Guardian UK, (London, 28 February 2006) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2006/feb/28/conservatives.uk> (accessed 31/07/20)

²³⁷ *Supra* 235

²³⁸ *Supra* 149 at 34

²³⁹ K Dodds and S Elden, 'Thinking Ahead: David Cameron, the Henry Jackson Society and British Neo-Conservatism', (2008), The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 10 (3), 348

²⁴⁰ J Kirkup, 'David Cameron rejects 'neo-conservative' foreign policy', Telegraph UK, (London, 03 September 2008) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/conservative/2675952/David-Cameron-rejects-neo-conservative-foreign-policy.html> (accessed 01/08/20)

*crudely, that was what was wrong with the 'neo-con' approach, and why I am a liberal Conservative, not a neo Conservative.*²⁴¹

It was a tactic that was invoked throughout most of Cameron's years in opposition to demonstrate his new brand of 'liberal conservatism'.

Some insight to the Conservative policies at this time can also be drawn from Party Conference speeches. In his 2006 Party Conference speech, Cameron's then shadow foreign secretary, William Hague, had begun to outline how this 'new direction'²⁴² would influence the UK's external security and defence matters. Hague opened by pledging his support to help those affected by the humanitarian crises in Darfur, Myanmar and Zimbabwe.²⁴³ In a further attempt to separate his party from Labour, Hague stated that a Conservative government would seek to "*make much more of...the Commonwealth*". He also took the opportunity to mention the party's new 'liberal conservative' approach to foreign policy, which Hague defined as "*supportive of spreading freedom and humanitarian intervention*". He also went on to state that "*foreign affairs may be the greatest of all challenges*" for the next British government.

Importantly, this 2006 party conference speech also revealed some insight into both Hague's and the party's perspectives on the EU at this time. In his explanation as to how a Conservative government would make the UK safer, he spoke of making the UK "*stronger by working through NATO, the UN or the G8*", unsurprisingly making no reference to the EU.²⁴⁴ He also went on to praise the, then recent, "*demolition*" of the EU Constitution and warned that whilst the UK recognised the need to deal with Europe it would give up no more powers and rights to the EU. Hague went on to give

²⁴¹ David Cameron, '*Democracy should be the work of patient craftsmanship*' Speech, (2008) <https://conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/599621> (01/08/20)

²⁴² A phrase Hague coined in his 2006 Conservative Party Conference speech in reference to the Conservatives new approach to foreign policy: See William Hague, '*Foreign Affairs may be the greatest of all challenges for the next government of this country*', (2003) <https://conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/599980> (accessed 02/08/20)

²⁴³ *Ibid*

²⁴⁴ *Ibid*

a scathing critique of European integration and the idea of an ‘ever closer union’, saying “*the British people believe it has gone far enough*” and that a Conservative government would not transfer any more powers over to the EU without first giving the British people a referendum. Hague did, however, recognise the need for cooperation with Europe and also denounced the idea of British withdrawal from the EU, stating that advocating leaving the EU was “*myopic*”.

Furthermore, on a visit in 2009 to meet the then French Prime Minister Francois Fillon Cameron, in response to a question regarding his security and defence policy, was alleged to have said “If I’m elected PM, my first priority will be NATO, my second will be NATO, and my third as well”. If true, Cameron made it abundantly clear that, whilst he appreciated the benefits of EU security and defence and was willing to collaborate in areas where it could be of help, he had no interest in duplication of NATO, and in turn, further integration with the EU in security and defence. Fillon did, however, state that Cameron was “very keen on a good bilateral, pragmatic and positive relationship with France”.²⁴⁵

4.4.4.1 Leaving the European People’s Party (2005-2009)

For all of Cameron’s attempts to move his Party away from old traditions and towards more liberal and progressive policies, his time in opposition, as was his premiership, was spent trying to maintain the support of the right wing of his Party, none more so than his Eurosceptic back benchers. Without their support, the Party would be split, and Cameron would have no hope of getting his Party into government. In terms of Europe, Cameron played a constant balancing game, between altering the Party’s image and direction, taking them in a more liberal direction when it came to cooperating and collaborating with the EU in matters such as security and defence, and assuaging the concerns of the ever prominent Eurosceptic wing of the Party. One example of this was the Conservative’s departure from the European People’s Party (EPP) in 2009. In June 2009, making good on his

²⁴⁵ Ashcroft and Oakeshot, *Supra* 168, at 505

pledge during the Conservative Party leadership campaign of 2005, David Cameron took the decision to split the Conservative Party from the centre-right EPP group in the European Parliament, forming a new political grouping under the name of the 'European Conservatives and Reformists' (ECR).

The Conservative Party had long been at odds with the EPP. Although the Conservatives did not join the EPP until 1992, the group was established in 1976, and was originally formed to enable European federalists to wield greater clout in the European Parliament. At the core of the EPP was, and still is, its commitment to supporting further integration within the EU, particularly its support for political union within Europe. Still to this day its manifesto states that it supports the idea of "a European Political Union". The EPP's support for political union is also reflected in its pledge relating to security and defence, in which it states that it wants "a real European foreign policy in which...Member States speak with one voice".²⁴⁶ The manifesto also states that the EPP supports "EU foreign policy decisions being taken by a vote and not unanimously" and that it also supports the development of EU common defence capabilities and a greater sharing of resources within the framework of NATO and the EU.²⁴⁷

Although the Conservative Party and the EPP had many differences, the Conservatives joined the group, albeit reluctantly, as 'allied' members in April 1992²⁴⁸ under PM John Major's leadership. A pro-European, Major had declared in the early years of his premiership to "place Britain at the heart of Europe" and joining the EPP was part of this plan²⁴⁹. Between 1979 and 1992 the Conservatives had been members of the European Democratic Group (EDG), a grouping of some of Europe's centre-right conservative parties. A poor performance by the Conservatives

²⁴⁶ European People's Party Manifesto (2012) https://www.epp.eu/files/uploads/2015/09/Manifesto2012_EN.pdf (accessed 10/08/20)

²⁴⁷ *Ibid*

²⁴⁸ M Ball and J Collett, 'Conservative MEPs and the European People's Party: Time for Divorce', The Bruges Group (2012) <https://www.brugesgroup.com/the-conservative-party/57-issues/the-conservative-party/268-conservative-meps-and-the-european-people-s-party-time-for-divorce>

²⁴⁹ John Major, Speech to Conservative Central Council, (1991) <http://www.johnmajorarchive.org.uk/1990-1997/mr-majors-speech-to-conservative-central-council-23-march-1991/> (accessed 10/08/20)

in the 1989 European elections and defections by other members of the group to the EPP saw the EDG slip to 34 seats and lose influence within the European Parliament.²⁵⁰ The EPP was the largest and arguably the most influential party in the European Parliament at the time. Major advocated EPP membership on the basis of that by joining the EPP, that resources would no longer be stretched and that the Conservatives would retain their influence within Europe.

Whilst Major defended his position, many Eurosceptic Conservatives were dissatisfied with the move and accused Major of sacrificing the principles of the British Conservatives for influence on the continent. This dissatisfaction with the Conservative Party's place in Europe continued through to the election of David Cameron as PM. Tory Eurosceptics have long resented this relationship, saying that the EPP is committed to the federalist project to which Conservatives are implacably opposed. Yet in this choice between influence and principle, successive Tory leaders have chosen the former. For Cameron, however, the choice was based on neither principle or influence, but on necessity. Cameron's promise to withdraw in the 2005 leadership race was made primarily to help to win the votes of Tory MPs who might otherwise have been put off by his progressive plans. For Cameron, the policy of EPP withdrawal was to ease concerns amongst his Party's Eurosceptic majority and to stop them ruining his leadership, and premiership, bids, as they had done to previous leaders.

This new group became known as the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) consisting of political parties from all over Europe, the UK Conservative Party being the largest party in the group. The second largest party was Poland's 'Law and Justice' Party. The Conservatives received criticism due to members of the Law and Justice party expressing anti-gay and anti-German views. The ECR was also comprised of Latvia's 'For Fatherland and Freedom' Party (formerly known as the Latvian National Independence Movement). Some members of the Party had openly

²⁵⁰ P Lynch and R Whitacker, *'A Loveless Marriage: The Conservatives and the European People's Party'*, (2008), *Parliamentary Affairs*, 61 (1), 32

regarded the Latvian Legion – the Latvian units of the Nazi Waffen SS – as brave patriots who fought against Stalin's Soviet Union in WW2.²⁵¹ The split was met with widespread criticism from the other UK political parties. The Liberal Democrats' foreign affairs spokesman, Ed Davey was quoted as describing the Conservatives as leaving the “mainstream of European politics” and joining forces with a “rag-bag of parties with extreme views”, throwing away their influence in Europe in favour of “ideological isolationism.”²⁵² Glenis Willmott, leader of the British socialist MEPs, accused Cameron of “pandering to the Eurosceptic lunatic fringe of his own party” and that Tory MEPs and the wider Conservative Party will have “no influence and no say in the European Parliament.”²⁵³ Foreign Secretary David Miliband said the Tories “have dragged themselves from Euro-scepticism to Euro-extremism”.

Cameron’s move to take the Conservatives out of the EPP was met with scathing criticism internationally, particularly in Europe. The then German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, felt Cameron had made a blunder by leaving the EPP and that the row over the EPP would cast a shadow over the UK and Germany’s relationship for years to come. An aide of Merkel’s stated that Merkel felt Cameron had made a “big mistake” and that the EPP was and remains an indispensable forum in which leaders of Europe’s Conservative parties could meet regularly to forge common policies and prepare key decisions, of which the future PM of Britain just cancelled his membership.²⁵⁴ The move was also met with criticism from France’s then president, Nicolas Sarkozy. At the Franco-British summit in London in early 2008, Sarkozy invited Cameron to the French ambassador’s residence and tried to persuade him to stay in the EPP, to which Cameron is alleged to have said that it was “too late” and that he had made a pledge which he could not get out of.²⁵⁵ Sarkozy, would also criticise the move in later years, where he said that whilst Cameron had been an

²⁵¹ H Mulholland, ‘*Tories unveil group of controversial new allies in European parliament*’, Guardian UK, (London, 22 June 2009) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/jun/22/conservatives-new-eu-group> (accessed 20/08/20)

²⁵² ‘*Conservative MEPs form new group*’, BBC News, (London, 22 June 2009) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8112581.stm (accessed 20/08/20)

²⁵³ S Taylor, ‘*UK Conservatives to leave the EPP-ED group*’, Politico, (London, 11 March 2009) <https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-conservatives-to-leave-the-epp-ed-group/> (accessed 20/08/20)

²⁵⁴ Ashcroft and Oakeshot, *Supra* 168, at 499

²⁵⁵ *Ibid* at 505

effective ally, particularly in the Libyan conflict, he had a major problem with the Eurosceptic wing of the Conservative Party. Sarkozy was also quoted as saying that he wished Cameron didn't make so many concessions, as that wing of his Party, Sarkosy prophetically claimed, would "always ask for more".²⁵⁶

Criticism was also aimed at Cameron, by Hillary Clinton's adviser Sidney Blumenthal, who wrote to Clinton noting that Cameron, although a supporter of UK membership of the EU at heart, was forced to 'lean right' and side with the far right wing of the European Parliament by taking his party out of the EPP and forming the ECR Group. On foreign policy, Blumenthal claimed that Cameron is inexperienced and largely uncommitted, and that his actions of taking his Party out of the EU stemmed from necessity, in order to keep his party behind him going into the election. Blumenthal clearly recognized the insincerity of Cameron's actions, noting that is was only because of his political imperatives that Cameron has aligned his Party with the far right in the European Parliament.²⁵⁷

Following the outcry of criticism following the Conservative's' departure from the EPP, Hague, Cameron's would-be Foreign Secretary, was sent out to defend Cameron's and the Party's actions. In an interview with the BBC, Hague, claimed that the new anti-federalist bloc in the European Parliament was good for European democracy, and that whilst the Conservatives would continue to work on a regular basis with the EPP and other European Parliamentary parties, that did not mean they had to be in the same group as them.²⁵⁸ Hague claimed that the rationale for the departure was on the basis of differences between the Conservative's and the other parties in the group regarding the extent of European integration. Hague was keen to stress that this was about federalism, as well as ever increasing integration, and not about leaving the EU as a whole.²⁵⁹ Although Cameron's hand was forced, in

²⁵⁶ *Ibid* at 504

²⁵⁷ D Bates, 'Hillary aide's warning over 'posh' Cameron', Daily Mail, (New York, 02 July 2015) <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3147881/Hillary-aide-s-warning-posh-Cameron-Adviser-predicted-PM-s-government-aristocratic-narrowly-Etonian-recent-history.html> (accessed 01/09/20)

²⁵⁸ *Supra* 252

²⁵⁹ *Ibid*

taking his Party out of the EPP, the departure and the defence thereafter, was the beginning of Cameron's marketing of his 'in Europe, but not run by Europe' position – a position he would maintain throughout his time in opposition and as PM.

For all the criticism he received and the political fallout that followed, the split from the EPP was a necessity for Cameron. The split meant that he could maintain the support of the right wing, Eurosceptic, back-benchers of his Party, which was vital for him to go on and win the 2010 General Election. As discussed, Cameron's true position on the EU had long been a source of contention. His split with the EPP, however, assured the Eurosceptics within his Party that he was sympathetic to their views and that he was willing to take a strong approach to the EU and on European integration. For Cameron, this move also made his liberal and progressive policies more palatable for the hard-Eurosceptics of the Party. Although the EPP split had mutual benefits for Cameron and his back benchers, his premiership, like his time in opposition would be marred by his concessions to the Party's Eurosceptic right. His ability to put into action his 'modernising' plans would be limited by this wing of the Party. As will be looked at later in this thesis, like many of his predecessors before him, Cameron's concessions to this wing would eventually lead to his downfall.

4.4.4.2 The Lisbon Treaty (2007-2009)

The Lisbon Treaty was the second important European issue that Cameron had to contend with in his time in opposition. Although the European Constitution of 2005 was dead in the water, the then PM, Tony Blair, was pushing for a less ambitious treaty to replace it. As discussed above, like his predecessors since Thatcher, Cameron had been trying to downplay the issue of Europe and push it down the agenda in his own and Conservative Party narrative.²⁶⁰ Still, Cameron was faced again for a second time in his time in opposition with another major European issue which would force him to choose sides within his own Party. Although he wanted to get away from the European issues, Cameron's approach to Lisbon, quickly became

²⁶⁰ This had been a Conservative strategy since IDS became leader in 2001

clear. His approach mirrored that taken by his predecessor, Michael Howard, to the EU Constitution, whose central argument was that it marked another step closer towards EU statehood.²⁶¹ Cameron argued that, as Labour's position towards the Constitution had been to hold a referendum, that the same should apply to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.²⁶² Blair's refusal to hold a referendum on Lisbon, claiming it was merely an 'amending treaty', provided Cameron with a main line of attack, to argue in favour of a referendum. Whilst Cameron agreed with Labour's red lines on EU foreign policy opposition to a ratchet clause of increasing integration in relation to security and defence, he claimed they did not provide sufficient protection to other areas of integration.

Cameron's Conservatives quickly set about outlining their opposition to the Lisbon Treaty. In a September 2007 speech, Shadow Foreign Secretary, William Hague, said that the Conservatives position on the Lisbon Treaty was to campaign for a referendum, strengthen scrutiny of the EU, pursue intergovernmental cooperation and return powers back to the UK in certain areas which had been ceded to the EU. In terms of security and defence, the Conservatives key line of argument was to advocate for continued intergovernmental cooperation post-Lisbon.²⁶³ Hague was also highly critical of the proposed creation under Lisbon of the post of High Representative, which he argued was not much different from the EU Constitution's 'Minister for Foreign Affairs'.²⁶⁴

In his first major speech on Europe, in Brussels in 2007, Cameron also delivered his own criticism of Lisbon. He argued that instead of looking outward and focusing on issues such as globalization, global warming and global poverty, that the EU had become inward looking, by seeking new competences and creating new posts, which

²⁶¹ Michael Howard, Speech on Europe, (2004) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/feb/12/conservatives.uk> (accessed 02/09/20)

²⁶² Labour Manifesto (2005) <https://manifesto.deryn.co.uk/labour-manifesto-2005-britain-forward-not-back/> (accessed 02/09/20)

²⁶³ William Hague, 'Constructive responsible foreign policy' Speech, (2007) <https://conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/599888> (accessed 02/09/20)

²⁶⁴ 'Cameron denies Tory EU 'turmoil'', BBC News, (London, 04 November 2009) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8341577.stm (accessed 03/09/20)

sought to breathe new life into the rejected EU Constitution.²⁶⁵ On the security and defence aspects of Lisbon, Cameron was critical of its ambitions. Cameron reaffirmed his belief that the security of the EU was best provided by working with NATO and the US, not separate to them, and that the EU should be applying pressure on Member States to contribute more defence spending to this task, rather than trying to duplicate NATO. He reaffirmed his position on intergovernmentalism, maintaining that international security and defence was ultimately a task for nation states and bodies such as NATO, and that he did not believe the EU should acquire additional powers in this area.²⁶⁶ There was also concern amongst the Eurosceptic wing of the Party that, whilst a Declaration had been secured by the UK, stating the foreign, security and defence policy would remain the prerogative of Member States, that this was not legally binding.²⁶⁷ In an article for the Sun on 26th September 2007, capitalising on Blair's decision not to hold a referendum on Lisbon and in an attempt to quell fears amongst the Eurosceptic wing, Cameron gave what he called a 'cast-iron guarantee' that, if he became PM, a Conservative government would hold a referendum on Lisbon.²⁶⁸

Cameron's tough stance against Lisbon, however, was short-lived. Following the ratification of the agreement on Lisbon by the Czech Republic in early November 2009 – the last of the 27 Member States to ratify it – Cameron was forced to concede defeat on the referendum on Lisbon.²⁶⁹ Cameron was castigated by the British press for his U-turn and, more seriously for Cameron, received backlash from the Eurosceptic wing of his Party, specifically from the Eurosceptic Bruges Group²⁷⁰

²⁶⁵ David Cameron, 'The EU - A New Agenda for the 21st Century' Speech (2007) <https://conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/599881> (accessed 03/09/20)

²⁶⁶ *Ibid*

²⁶⁷ G Weber and A Menon, 'UK-EU Defence Cooperation', Kings College London (2022) <https://www.kcl.ac.uk/uk-eu-defence-cooperation> (accessed 01/05/22)

²⁶⁸ N Watt, 'David Cameron to shed 'cast iron' pledge on Lisbon treaty', Guardian UK, (London, 03 November 2009) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/03/david-cameron-lisbon-treaty-referendum> (accessed 03/09/20)

²⁶⁹ D Summers, 'David Cameron admits Lisbon treaty referendum campaign is over', Guardian UK, (London, 04 November 2009) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/nov/04/david-cameron-referendum-campaign-over> (accessed 04/09/20)

²⁷⁰ *Ibid*; Barry Legg, co-chair of the Eurosceptic Bruges Group, said: "David Cameron needs to come clean with the British people: why is he breaking his pledge to hold a referendum on the Lisbon treaty?"

and his main rival for the leadership, David Davis, who called upon the PM to make a renegotiation of the UK's relationship with the EU the 'first piece of legislation in the new Parliament'.²⁷¹ Others from the Eurosceptic wing of the Parliamentary Party, wrote to the PM urging him to 'reconsider'.²⁷² Cameron, however, maintained his position and announced that he could "no more hold a referendum on the Treaty than a referendum on the sun rising in the morning."²⁷³ Cameron did, however, take the opportunity to make a pledge to the British public, that, if he was elected as PM, he would change the law and introduce what he termed a 'referendum lock', so that a referendum must be held before any further powers are passed to the European Union. Cameron also stated that, if he won the next election, he would seek to amend the European Communities Act 1972 to prohibit, by law, the transfer of power to the EU without a referendum, covering not just future treaties like Lisbon, but any future attempt to take Britain into the euro.²⁷⁴

In relation to Lisbon, although Cameron had ultimately failed to secure a referendum on Lisbon, he had achieved three things: firstly, he had proven to his Party and the British public that he was willing to stand up to Labour and provide a credible alternative. A Conservative Party whose foreign policy had, since Iraq, been almost indecipherable to Labour's, was now, on this issue at least, distinguishing itself from Labour. Cameron also proved that, by supporting a referendum, he was able to effectively defend against the UKIP threat, who the Conservative were losing support of Eurosceptic voters to. Finally, although he failed to secure a referendum, fortunately for Cameron, the odds had been stacked so much against him, that the hard-Eurosceptic wing, although critical, were able to forgive him and continue to

²⁷¹ D Davis, 'A referendum Mr Cameron COULD give the people', Daily Mail, (London, 04 November 2009) <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1225053/A-referendum-Mr-Cameron-COULD-people.html> (accessed 04/09/20)

²⁷² Eurosceptic Conservative MP Bill Cash said he had written to Mr Cameron urging him to "reconsider" his decision not to hold a referendum, saying the Tory leader had been "badly advised". See: N Watt, 'Davis challenges Cameron with call for referendum on relationship with EU', Guardian UK, (London, 04 November 2009) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/nov/04/david-davis-cameron-eu-referendum>

²⁷³ *Supra* 269

²⁷⁴ *Ibid*

support him.²⁷⁵ Lisbon was, however yet again, another example of the thin line Cameron had to tread as leader on the subject of Europe, and the difficult balance he had to strike between modernising the Party but also maintaining the support of the hard-Eurosceptic wing of his Party, which was essential for him to remain as leader.

4.5 The Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government and its approach to EU security and defence (2010-2011)

4.5.1 The Conservative Manifesto (2010)

The Conservative Manifesto of 2010 provides the first piece of insight into Cameron and his Party's intended approach to the EU and EU security and defence in the first term of his premiership. Although there is no mention of CSDP or CFSP, it is what it says about the Conservative's' approach to UK security and defence that leaves much to be implied about the Party's approach to EU security and defence. The Manifesto reiterates the vision Cameron had outlined throughout his time in opposition and, more specifically, his vision for a liberal Conservative foreign policy. The Manifesto outlines that human rights, protection of democracy, conflict prevention, tackling global poverty and strengthening alliances in Asia and the Middle East would be high on the agenda for the Conservatives in terms of foreign and security policy.²⁷⁶

In terms of what the Manifesto says about how Cameron's government envisioned working with the EU in security and defence, the first indication is given in the opening summary of the Chapter entitled 'Protecting our National Interest'. It states Cameron's government would work constructively with the EU, but vowed that it would not hand over any more competences.²⁷⁷ That said, the Manifesto also

²⁷⁵ *Supra* 264

²⁷⁶ Conservative Manifesto (2010) 109 <https://general-election-2010.co.uk/2010-general-election-manifestos/Conservative-Party-Manifesto-2010.pdf> (accessed 10/09/20)

²⁷⁷ *Ibid* 103

acknowledges the strong role that Cameron's government would like to see the UK have in EU affairs.²⁷⁸ In terms of who the UK would work with to provide its security and defence, however, it stated the UK would seek to utilise its permanent seat on the UN Security Council, its membership of NATO and its relationship with the US before looking to the EU.²⁷⁹ The Manifesto stated, unequivocally, Cameron's commitment to ensuring NATO remains the ultimate guarantor of EU security.²⁸⁰ It also stated that, in terms of spending, in their Strategic Defence and Security Review, a Cameron government would seek to release spending on what it described as 'unnecessary' and 'bureaucratic' EU defence initiatives and divert that money back to the UK's Armed Forces.²⁸¹ It also stated that a Cameron government would seek to re-evaluate the UK's position with the EDA, although it did not expand any further on what type of renewed role it sought.²⁸²

In a section devoted to Europe entitled 'An open and democratic Europe', the Manifesto makes promises to prevent a further transfer of powers to the EU, without a referendum, and vows to stop the UK from entering a 'federal Europe'.²⁸³ That said, it promises that a Cameron government would play an 'active' and 'energetic' role in the EU. It also specifically states where it sees a role for the EU in global affairs: global economic growth, global poverty and global climate change. To these ends, the Manifesto promises that a Cameron government would support and work closely with the EU.²⁸⁴ This section ends with a statement that EU integration had gone too far and a promise that a Cameron government would seek to negotiate a return of powers to the UK.²⁸⁵ The Manifesto provided no major surprises. It was essentially a reiteration of the position Cameron had quite openly taken throughout his time as MP and as leader of the opposition: opposition to transferring further powers to the EU, support for renegotiating the UK's role within the Union, including

²⁷⁸ *Ibid*

²⁷⁹ *Ibid* at 105

²⁸⁰ *Ibid* at 110

²⁸¹ *Ibid* 106

²⁸² *Ibid*

²⁸³ *Ibid* at 113

²⁸⁴ *Ibid*

²⁸⁵ *Ibid* at 114

the returning of certain powers to the UK, but also support for the UK maintaining an active and influential role within the EU.

4.5.2 UK General Election (2010)

The Cameron Premiership commenced on 11th May 2010, when the Conservative Party, led by Cameron, and the Liberal Democrats (Lib Dem's), led by the Lib Dem Nick Clegg, formed the UK's first coalition government since 1945. Although the Conservatives won more seats than any of the other political parties in the 2010 general election, they had fallen short of an overall majority, resulting in a hung parliament. As a result the Conservatives and the Labour Party entered into five-days of separate negotiations with the Lib-Dem's in an attempt to form a government. A deal was eventually reached between the Conservatives and the Lib Dem's which resulted in the then Labour PM, Gordon Brown, resigning from office. In the deal brokered between the Conservatives and the Lib Dem's, it was agreed that Cameron's cabinet would be comprised of both Conservative and Lib Dem MPs, with Conservative MPs holding the majority of positions. In turn, the Cabinet was comprised of 16 Conservative and 5 Lib Dem MP's.

This new political marriage between the Conservatives and the Lib Dems presented a lot of uncertainty.²⁸⁶ One question that was uncertain was what compromises would have to be made and what pledges would be affected made by both parties during the General Election. The coalition's approach to the EU and EU security and defence were included in this. In many areas of policy, the Conservative's and the Lib Dem's were so far apart from each other that, on the surface, the partnership appeared unworkable. There was no other policy area in which they were more polarized than the relationship with the EU. The Lib Dems were the most pro-European party in the country. Their leader, Clegg, who had been a senior official in the European

²⁸⁶ Headlines in the British media at the time revealed a sense of unease regarding the new coalition and the future of the country; See, for example: A Beckett, *'From hung parliament to age of uncertainty'*, Guardian UK, (London, 11 May 2010) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/may/11/hung-parliament-gordon-brown> (accessed 11/09/20)

Commission and who was educated at the College of Europe, had been a vocal supporter of the EU and EU integration for many years.²⁸⁷ The Conservatives, on the other hand, were traditionally the Party of Euroscepticism and, as explored above, had a long history of opposing further integration in the EU.²⁸⁸ Fortunately for Clegg and the Lib Dems, the Conservatives had a pragmatist and a soft-Eurosceptic at the helm, and fortunately for Cameron and the Conservatives, the Lib Dems had a leader who would prove very willing to compromise and who could be surprisingly sympathetic to Eurosceptic views.²⁸⁹

4.5.3 The Liberal Democrats: their perspectives and influence on EU policy

Still, there was a lot of concern within the Conservative Party, that the Lib Dems would have a restraining effect on Conservative policies and manifesto pledges, particularly in relation to the EU.²⁹⁰ As both parties traditionally held diametrically opposed positions on the subject of the EU – the Conservatives wishing to reclaim sovereignty from the EU, whilst the Lib Dems wished to maintain the status quo or integrate further with the EU – this area was considered a ‘red-line’ that neither should cross. This stalemate was reflected in the Coalition Agreement between the two parties. Under the section on ‘Europe’, it was agreed by the two parties that whilst the UK would continue to play a leading role in the EU, no further powers would be transferred to Brussels without a referendum.²⁹¹ It was also agreed between the two parties that they would avoid a referendum on EU membership, at least during the lifetime of the Coalition.²⁹²

²⁸⁷ N Watt, ‘Clegg calls for EU referendum to end ‘crazy’ debate’, Guardian UK, (London, 25 February 2008) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/25/eu.liberaldemocrats> (accessed 11/09/20)

²⁸⁸ C O’Donnell, ‘Britain’s coalition government and EU defence cooperation: undermining British interests’, (2011), *International Affairs*, 87 (2), 419

²⁸⁹ *Supra* 287

²⁹⁰ E Goes, ‘The Liberal Democrats and the Coalition: Driven to the Edge of Europe’, (2015), *The Political Quarterly*, 86 (1), 93

²⁹¹ The Coalition Agreement for Stability and Reform (2010) 19

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-coalition-documentation> (accessed 15/09/20)

²⁹² *Supra* 290, at 94

The Lib Dems, as the junior partner in the coalition, were always going to be the weaker party. That said, it has been argued by some commentators that the Lib Dems were weak even by the standards of previous junior partners in past UK coalition governments. Goes, argues that the Lib Dem's failed in three areas when it came to Europe; firstly, Goes argues that in relation to the ministerial picks, the Lib Dems failed to get members of their party into key roles, such as Foreign Secretary, Defence Minister and Minister of State for Europe. All of these positions were held by Conservative MPs, as will be looked at in more detail below. Instead, Goes argues that the Lib Dem's opted to get more Lib Dem MPs into junior ministerial posts in order to monitor activities and the upholding of the Coalition Agreement across the various committees and Cabinet offices.²⁹³ As Goes argues, however, these positions were limited, particularly in relation to Europe, and Clegg and the Lib Dems were unable to wield any significant influence over the Foreign Secretary, Defence Minister or Minister for Europe. The Lib Dems inability to monitor the Conservatives in this area led to bypassing of the Lib Dems by the Conservatives. Goes gives an example of the bypassing of Clegg when in 2011, Cameron vetoed the revision of the Lisbon Treaty aimed at resolving the Eurozone crisis.²⁹⁴ It was alleged that Clegg and the Lib Dems were not consulted over the use of the UK's veto, leading to a rift between the two parties²⁹⁵ and embarrassing coverage in the British media for the Deputy PM and his Party.²⁹⁶

Goes also argues that the relationship between the two leaders, Cameron and Clegg, was too good and there was too much trust of Clegg's part. As the third largest party in the UK, it is understandable that the Lib Dems wanted to show that coalition

²⁹³ *Ibid*

²⁹⁴ I Traynor, N Watt and D Gow, 'David Cameron blocks EU treaty with veto, casting Britain adrift in Europe', Guardian UK, (Brussels, 09 December 2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/09/david-cameron-blocks-eu-treaty> (accessed 20/09/20)

²⁹⁵ P Wintour, 'Coalition MPs in bid to find common agenda on European policy', Guardian UK, (London, 02 January 2012) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/jan/02/tory-euro-sceptics-lib-dems-europe> (accessed 21/09/20)

²⁹⁶ This said, as part of the Coalition Agreement, Cameron only had to consult with and have regard to the views of the Deputy Prime Minister. There was no requirement for him to follow their views; Goes, *Supra* 290, at 95

governments can work – if not, then what hope would the Party have of ever returning to government again? Goe argues, however, that by trying to avoid conflict, via proposing amendments and making concessions to the Conservatives, they lost their distinctive voice and restraining role on European affairs. This was evident particularly in 2012, when, following plans for the two parties planned talks to find a common agenda on the EU, the Lib Dem’s sought to find common ground with mainstream Conservative Eurosceptics on the EU. During this time, Clegg instructed his office to draw up a list of powers that the Lib Dem’s would be willing to see return to national parliaments and Foreign Office minister, Jeremy Browne – arguably the Lib Dems most ‘influential’ figure in the coalition government after Clegg when it came to Europe – publicly warned that the Lib Dem’s must not be seen as ‘starry-eyed uncritical supporters of the EU’ so not to misjudge its support base.²⁹⁷ Finally, Goe also argues that the Lib Dems were fighting a losing battle in trying to work with the Conservatives on Europe, a Party that was dominated by hard-Eurosceptics over whom, Goe argues, Cameron had little to no control. This will be discussed in more detail below.²⁹⁸

That said, although the Lib Dems were acquiescent to their senior partners in the coalition, they were not so acquiescent in others. The Lib Dem’s can be credited with successfully persuading Cameron and the Conservatives to accept that the Lisbon Treaty and the terms of Britain’s EU membership would not be renegotiated, secured through the Coalition Agreement.²⁹⁹ The Lib Dems can also be credited with convincing the Conservatives to U-turn on their demands for a repatriation of powers in the areas of social policy and human rights, making a formal promise to play an active role in the EU and to support further enlargement of the bloc – it is more than likely that these were promises that Cameron and the Conservatives would not have made if it was not for their coalition partners.³⁰⁰ To support this point further, in 2011, then-Foreign Secretary William Hague conceded that the

²⁹⁷ *Supra* 295

²⁹⁸ Goe, *Supra* 290, at 96

²⁹⁹ Coalition Agreement, *Supra* 291, at 19

³⁰⁰ *Ibid*

presence of the Lib Dems had prevented the coalition government from doing what they really wanted to do in Europe.³⁰¹ Hague made these comments in relation to the coalition government's failure to negotiate with the EU returning certain powers back to the UK. They were also made at a time when Conservative MPs accused Cameron of 'listening too much' to his Deputy PM Clegg's pro-European views, for whom Hague expressed his sympathy.³⁰²

Although much of the literature argues that, on Europe at least, the Lib Dems failed to exercise noticeable influence on the EU, they can be credited with restraining the Conservative's in some respects. Their presence in the coalition certainly prevented a referendum on the EU happening sooner than it did. It can also be argued that their presence provided Cameron with more ammunition to fend off criticisms of his approach to the EU from his Eurosceptic backbenchers. Cameron – as established, a soft-Eurosceptic and pragmatist – now had all the more reason to maintain a soft-Eurosceptic approach to the EU.

4.5.4 The ideological makeup of the Conservative Party following the 2010 General Election

A major factor also affecting the Cameron and the Conservative's' approach to EU security and defence was the makeup of the new Parliamentary Conservative Party (PCP). A 2013 study led by Heppell analysed the new intake of Conservative MPs and their positions on Europe, categorising MPs as either 'Europhile', 'Agnostic', 'Soft-Eurosceptic' or 'Hard-Eurosceptic' – see above for definitions Heppell gave for 'soft' and 'hard-Eurosceptics'. Of the 306 Conservative MPs elected in the 2010 General Election, only 7 (2.3% of the PCP) of MPs elected were categorised by Heppell as Europhiles (Heppell defines these as MPs who support keeping the option of joining the single currency open, support Eurozone bailouts for other EU Member States, oppose an in/out referendum and, finally, who argue remaining a part of the EU is

³⁰¹ 'William Hague 'being held back by Lib Dems' on Europe', BBC News, (London, 10 September 2011) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-14863588> (accessed 21/09/20)

³⁰² *Ibid*

the best option for the UK) and 64 (20.9% of the PCP) categorised as agnostic.³⁰³ The majority of MPs were categorised by Heppell as being soft-Eurosceptics, of which there were 154 (50.3% of the PCP). Although in the minority, Heppell categorised a high percentage of MPs as hard-Eurosceptics, of which there were 81 (26.5%).

Heppell's comprehensive study on the 2010 intake of Conservative MPs showed that, whilst Cameron had strong support within the PCP for his soft-Eurosceptic views, the high number of hard-Eurosceptics elected posed a significant threat to Cameron's approach to the EU. There was no guarantee that his soft-Eurosceptic MPs would remain loyal in relation to all policies and actions relating to the EU. This would prove to be the case. As will be seen below, Cameron's failure to appoint any hard-Eurosceptic MPs to ministerial roles angered the minority hard-Eurosceptic faction of the PCP.³⁰⁴ This led to over 80 of his 230 backbenchers, rebelling in the first 18 months of his premiership on European matters.³⁰⁵ The hard-Eurosceptic faction, although in the minority and although none were in ministerial positions, would and did have the potential to influence Cameron's intended approach to Europe.

4.5.5 Cameron's cabinet and ministerial picks: their perspectives on and role in EU security and defence

Another factor influencing Cameron and his government's approach to EU security and defence, was his Cabinet and ministerial picks. The coalition played a major factor in Cameron's picks and this hit morale within the Conservative Party. 20 ministerial positions were granted to Lib Dem MPs. With 95 Conservative MPs holding shadow ministerial positions in opposition, as Heppell notes, this meant 20 bruised egos on the Conservative backbenches.³⁰⁶ That said, the highest ranking and

³⁰³ Heppell, *Supra* 21, at 345

³⁰⁴ P Lynch and D Seawright, *Cameron and the Conservatives: The Transition to Coalition Government*, (Palgrave, 2012) 78

³⁰⁵ P Cowley and M Stuart, 'The cambusters: The Conservatives European Union referendum rebellion of October 2011', (2012), *Political Quarterly*, 83 (2), 402

³⁰⁶ Heppell, *Supra* 21, at 342

most influential office when it came to the EU granted to the Lib Dems was the ministerial position granted to Jeremy Browne in the Foreign Office. Browne was the only Lib Dem junior minister in the Foreign Office. As Goe notes, although Browne's role covered most regions of the world, this excluded Europe, and it can therefore be argued, that Browne had few chances to monitor the activities of the Foreign Secretary, Defence Minister and the Minister for Europe.³⁰⁷

As for the ideological makeup of the government, according to Heppell's 2013 study, 2 (2.6%) MPs were Europhiles, 6 (7.8%) were Agnostic and the rest, 69 (89.6%) were soft-Eurosceptics.³⁰⁸ Sticking to his promise that no Eurosceptics advocating withdrawal would serve on his front bench, no hard-Eurosceptics made it into his government. Although no ministerial roles were granted to hard-Eurosceptics, interestingly, Cameron did appoint one of the most vocal Europhiles in the Conservative Party, Ken Clarke as his Lord Chancellor, Secretary of State for Justice.³⁰⁹ Not only did this anger the hard-Eurosceptic minority of his Party, but it provided further insight into the approach Cameron was taking to Europe. Although Clarke's post had no real influence on EU policy, his appointment, and the absence of any hard-Eurosceptics in government, provided further indication as to which way the soft-Eurosceptic Cameron leaned to on the subject of Europe. That said, Cameron still appointed soft-Eurosceptics to the most important and influential offices in the government when it came to the EU and EU security and defence. These three offices are arguably the Foreign Secretary, Defence Minister and Minister for Europe (or Europe Minister). All of these posts were granted to Conservative MPs that, by Heppell's standards, could then be categorised as soft-Eurosceptics.³¹⁰

³⁰⁷ Goe, *Supra* 290, at 94

³⁰⁸ Heppell, *Supra* 21, at 347

³⁰⁹ 'Who's who in the coalition cabinet', Guardian UK, (London, 13 May 2010) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/may/13/coalition-cabinet-list-profiles> (accessed 05/10/20)

³¹⁰ What Heppell's study could not have anticipated was the positions taken by these ministers in the 2016 referendum on EU membership. Although categorised as a soft-Eurosceptic by Heppell in 2013, Fox would become a major figure in the 'Leave' campaign. That said, in his short time as Defence Minister, Fox did nothing that could be categorised as rebelling against Cameron.

4.5.5.1 A Prime Minister's role in EU Security and Defence

Before moving on to explain the importance of the three offices of Foreign Secretary, Defence Minister and Europe Minister, it is important to explain the role of the PM in the formation of EU security and defence policy. As security and defence is an area still considered to be the sole prerogative of EU Member States, the European Council – at which the members of the European Council are the Heads of State or Government of the 27 EU Member States and the Presidents of the European Council and of the European Commission, meeting four times a year – is the top decision maker on EU foreign, security and defence policy.³¹¹ Decisions in this area are made on the basis of unanimity, and each Head of State has a veto they can use to block policies in this area being agreed upon. In his capacity as PM, Cameron attended the meetings of the European Council and had the right to use this veto. As mentioned above, this was a power Cameron took advantage of, quite early on in his premiership in 2011, when he vetoed the revised Lisbon Treaty, allegedly without consulting his Deputy PM Clegg.³¹²

4.5.5.2 Foreign Secretary

The Foreign Secretary position (and the Foreign Office of whom they are the Head) is arguably one of the three most influential roles in the UK government when it comes to forging the UK's policy towards EU security and defence. The Foreign Secretary is responsible for the UK's relations with foreign governments and states, including political organisations such as the EU. In terms of the Foreign Secretary's role in the EU, prior to Brexit, they attended the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) meetings, which are held usually once a month. The FAC is a part of the Council of the EU. To recap, the Council is an essential EU decision-maker, which negotiates and adopts legislative acts, usually in conjunction with the European Parliament through the

³¹¹ 'How the European Council works', European Council <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/how-the-european-council-works/> (accessed 05/10/20)

³¹² Goes, *Supra* 290, at 95

ordinary legislative procedure, also known as 'codecision'. Codecision is used for policy areas where the EU has exclusive or shared competence with the member states. In these cases, the Council legislates on the basis of proposals submitted by the European Commission.³¹³ The Council is also responsible for defining and implementing EU foreign and security policy (CFSP), which is set by the European Council – the intergovernmental body of the EU which is comprised of the EU Heads of State. This also includes the EU's development and humanitarian aid, defence and trade. The Council does this through the FAC, which is responsible for the EU's external action, which includes foreign policy, defence and security, trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid.³¹⁴ The FAC is composed of the foreign ministers from all EU Member States, with the meetings chaired by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy ('High Representative'), who is assisted by the European External Action Service (EEAS). When the agenda includes the CSDP, defence ministers from all EU Member States will attend, including the UK's Defence Minister, prior to Brexit.

William Hague was Cameron's pick for the role following his 2010 General Election victory. Interestingly, Hague was also appointed First Secretary of State (ahead of Deputy PM Clegg), an honorific position given to one cabinet member, denoting technical seniority over the other secretaries of state in the cabinet and the person whom, in the event of the PM becoming incapacitated, would take over as PM. He was the first of two MPs who would serve as Foreign Secretary throughout Cameron's premiership. The perspectives and influence of Hague's successor, Phillip Hammond (2014-2016), on EU security and defence will be analysed in the next chapter. Throughout his political career, Hague had been a vocal Eurosceptic.³¹⁵ Hague, like Cameron, could be said to be a 'child of Thatcher' and has been

³¹³ 'The Council of the European Union', European Council
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/> (accessed 05/10/20)

³¹⁴ 'Foreign Affairs Council configuration (FAC)', European Council
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/configurations/fac/> (accessed 05/10/20)

³¹⁵ Hague infamously referred to Britain being invaded by a "foreign land" prior to his bid to become PM in the 2001 General Election; See William Hague, 'Foreign Land' Speech (2001)
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/mar/04/conservatives.speeches> (accessed 06/10/20)

described by some as a 'true blue'.³¹⁶ He had spoken, famously, as a 16-year old at the Conservative Party Conference in Blackpool in 1977 and Thatcher had been instrumental in ensuring Hague's victory as John Major's successor, regularly posing beside him in photographs or making an appearance during his speeches.³¹⁷ In contrast, however, Hague had been a member of the left leaning One Nation Group in 1993 and on many issues he was relatively left leaning in comparison to the rest of the Party. This also defines Hague's approach to the EU. On some issues, he is hardline, but on others, he is more 'liberal'. Hague, a former Party leader, outlined, on numerous occasions, his vision for the UK in Europe. On many occasions, he took a Eurosceptic approach. In his 'Foreign Land' speech to the Conservative Spring Forum in 2001, Hague spoke out against Labour's support for the ratification of the Nice Treaty and European Constitution and warned that they would agree to a European Army.³¹⁸ Further, on announcing his 2001 General Election manifesto, Hague also warned against the formation of a European superstate and of taking back control over the UK's affairs. That said, Hague was also keen to reinforce his view that the UK should remain in the EU. He argued in a 2001 speech that 'the common-sense instinct' is that 'we should be in Europe, not run by Europe'³¹⁹ and, in another, called for what he described as 'a different kind of Europe...a flexible, open Europe that respects the independence of national governments'.³²⁰ His speech in Budapest in 1999, summed up his position. Hague spoke about how the UK's interests were better served by being in the EU and that the UK should be playing its part in making the EU more open to Eastern Europe and the rest of the world.³²¹ Yet Hague also reinforced his fears of EU bureaucracy and of 'ever closer political union'.³²²

³¹⁶ Kilty, *Supra* 96, at 5

³¹⁷ *Ibid*

³¹⁸ Hague, *Supra* 315

³¹⁹ *Ibid*

³²⁰ William Hague, 'It's time for Common Sense' Speech (2001) <https://conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/601120> (accessed 07/10/20)

³²¹ William Hague, Conservative Party Conference Speech (1999) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/1999/oct/07/conservatives1999.conservatives7> (accessed 07/10/20)

³²² *Ibid*

In his first months as Foreign Secretary, Hague set about outlining his plan for the UK's place on the international stage and his approach to Europe. In one of his first speeches as Foreign Secretary in July 2010, explaining how the new coalition Government will conduct the Foreign Policy of the UK, Hague announced that he was determined there would be a 'distinctive British foreign policy'. Unsurprisingly, Hague said that, in terms of its security and defence partnerships, the UK's priority would be the US and NATO, and it would continue to ensure NATO as the primary security provider for the EU. He also stated that the UK would seek to forge and make more of its bilateral partnerships with other nations, both in the EU and globally. That said, in terms of his vision for the UK's role in EU security and defence, Hague stated that the UK would continue to play an 'active' role in the EU. In doing this, Hague stated that the UK would be interested in working with smaller and newer Member States, particularly former-Soviet nations who 'have a wealth of experience of the transition to democracy after decades of dominion which they could share with EU candidate countries and others further afield'.³²³ Hague also said that he would ensure the UK strengthened its influence in the EU, by 'infiltrating' the Commission with more British diplomats, after learning that the number of Britons working in the Commission had fallen dramatically in the years prior to the Conservatives coming into government.³²⁴ Finally, Hague also stated that the UK would be keen to do more to assist the EU in helping crisis hit areas on both EU soil and in the 'European neighborhood', such as Gaza and the Western Balkans. Hague's approach to Europe, therefore – although undoubtedly Eurosceptic – seemed from the outset to be as soft and as pragmatic as Cameron's.

4.5.5.3 Secretary of State for Defence

³²³ William Hague, 'Britain's Foreign Policy in a Networked World' Speech (2010) <https://conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/601461> (accessed 07/10/20)

³²⁴ *Ibid*

According to Hague, the number of British officials serving at director level in the Commission had fallen by a third in the previous three years prior to 2010, falling by 205 posts, and that whilst the UK accounted for 12% of the EU's population it provided just 1.8% of staff in entry level positions; See J Groves, 'Hague's plan to infiltrate EU by filling Brussels with Brits', Daily Mail, (London, 02 July 2010) <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1291377/Hagues-plan-infiltrate-EU-filling-Brussels-Brits.html> (accessed 07/10/20)

The Secretary of State for Defence (Defence Minister) is arguably another of the three most influential roles in the UK government when it comes to forging the UK's policy towards EU security and defence. The Defence Minister makes the UK's defence policy and implements it via the Armed Forces. Part of their responsibilities also includes defence planning, (programme and resource allocation) and managing the UK's strategic international partnerships with other nations and political blocs, such as the EU. As already mentioned, when it came to EU security and defence, prior to Brexit, the Defence Minister could attend FAC meetings, when the agenda concerned the CSDP. Through the FAC, the UK Defence Minister could help define and implement EU security and defence policy.

Cameron's pick for the role was Dr. Liam Fox. Fox would be the first of three MPs who would serve as Defence Minister throughout Cameron's premiership. The perspectives and influence of the other two Defence Ministers on EU security and defence, Phillip Hammond (2011-2014) and Michael Fallon (2014-2017), will be analysed in the next chapter. Fox was arguably more Eurosceptic in his outlook than Cameron, Hague or Liddington. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that this was the case; Fox was a supporter of and significant figure in the 'Leave' campaign during the Brexit referendum, whereas Cameron, Hague and Liddington all campaigned and supported 'Remain'. Early signs of Fox's hard-Eurosceptic views can be gleaned from his bid to become leader in September 2005. During his leadership bid, Fox targeted Eurosceptic right-wingers by unveiling plans to pull the party out of what Fox regarded as the centre-right but federalist EPP group in the European Parliament.³²⁵ Fox was one of the biggest advocates in the Party for leaving the EPP, demands which Cameron eventually gave into.

Although at the time of the 2010 General Election Fox was categorized as a 'soft-Eurosceptic',³²⁶ his hard-Eurosceptic views were also evident in some of the

³²⁵ Dr Liam Fox, Conservative Party Conference Speech (2005)
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/oct/05/conservatives2005.conservatives3> (accessed 08/10/20)

³²⁶ Heppell's study categorises him as this; *Supra* 21

speeches he gave in the lead up to the 2010 General Election and in his first months as Defence Minister. In a speech delivered in February 2010, prior to the May 2010 General Election, Fox spoke on his views on EU security and defence and his vision for the future.³²⁷ The title of his speech provides some insight into Fox's views on EU security and defence at the time: 'The EU should only act when NATO cannot'. Fox's position when it came to EU security and defence was strictly pro-Atlanticist and supportive of NATO. Like Cameron, Fox was a proponent of the idea that any EU military capability must not supplant NATO as the primary provider of security and defence for the EU. Fox was keen to distinguish between what he described as 'political Europe' and 'geographical Europe'. By 'political Europe', Fox explains that he means the political organization that is the EU and its construction of a common defence policy.³²⁸ He criticized what he called the 'deepening of EU defence integration' under Labour and the Conservative Party's issues with the then newly ratified Lisbon Treaty. On Labour, he criticized Labour's commitment to provide more personnel and resources to the EU, as provided for under the Helsinki Headline Goal, arguing that this would overstretch and already overstretched British military.³²⁹ On Lisbon, Fox warned of the new powers acquired by the High Representative which enabled the High Representative to initiate and propose military operations, something which he said blurred the lines between what is supranational and intergovernmental inside EU defence planning. Fox stated that any future Conservative government would reassess the commitments made by Labour at Helsinki and would reassess the UK's commitments made under Lisbon. Fox was also critical of the EU's soft-power, arguing that the UK's priority should be with war fighting with NATO rather than peacekeeping with the EU. That said, Fox did reaffirm the importance of the UK's involvement in the defence of the European continent and that he would consider looking at provisions like Permanent

³²⁷ Liam Fox, 'The EU should only act when NATO cannot' Speech (2010) <https://conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/601535> (accessed 08/10/20)

³²⁸ *Ibid*

³²⁹ At the 1999 Helsinki Council Summit, France and the UK declared that the EU must have the ability to deploy 60,000 troops in 60 days for an operation lasting as long as one year to conduct the Petersberg Tasks of humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, and peacemaking. As part of the Helsinki Headline Goal, the Labour government under Tony Blair committed 12,500 troops, 18 warships, and 73 combat aircraft to form part of these 60,000 troops.

Structured Cooperation (something which will be discussed in Chapter 3) and the EDA to determine if he saw any value in the UK's participation. Ultimately, it was clear that Fox's position on EU security and defence was that he opposed anything that leaned away from NATO.

During his short time as Defence Secretary, Fox spoke only on one occasion on EU security and defence. At the Conservative Party Conference 2011, Fox reaffirmed his views outlined in 2010. He took the opportunity to dismiss the notion that the European Union should play a greater role in defence, stating that "Europe already has a guarantor of its defence—it's called NATO" and that "NATO must maintain its primacy in European defence because NATO is the alliance that keeps the United States in Europe."³³⁰ He also argued that it is "nonsense to duplicate and divert from NATO at a time when resources are scarce across Europe" and attacked EU Member States who were not fulfilling their commitments to NATO (2% GDP obligation). Although Fox was only in the role of Defence Minister for a relatively short period of time – resigning following evidence emerging that he allowed his friend and lobbyist, Adam Werrity, into defence meetings – he oversaw one of the most significant overhauls of UK security and defence during Cameron's premiership: the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010.³³¹

4.5.5.4 Minister of State for Europe

The Minister of State for Europe (Minister for Europe) is arguably another of the three most influential roles in the UK government when it comes to forging the UK's policy towards EU security and defence. A ministerial position within the UK Government, the Minister for Europe is in charge of affairs with the EU and NATO. The Minister can also be responsible for government policy towards European

³³⁰ Dr Liam Fox, Conservative Party Conference Speech (2011)
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/2011/oct/05/conservative-conference-2011-live-coverage#block-18%23block-13> (accessed 08/10/20)

³³¹ Strategic Defence and Security Review (2010)
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62482/strategic-defence-security-review.pdf (accessed 08/10/20)

security and defence. Despite being a junior ministerial role, the position has sometimes conferred the right to attend meetings of the Cabinet, which is occasionally granted to other such ministers at the PM's discretion. Cameron's pick for this role was the 'EU moderate', David Liddington. The pick was a controversial one at the time. In the years preceding Cameron's election, the role had been expected to go to the hard-line Eurosceptic, Mark Francois, who had been the shadow-Minister for Europe. Francois had been instrumental in brokering the Tories' controversial split with the EPP group in the European Parliament. Liddington's appointment was seen as a sign of the influence of the Lib Dems and the passionately pro-European Deputy PM, Nick Clegg.³³² The appointment was also seen as a move by Cameron to repair relations with centre-right leaders across the EU who strongly opposed his decision to leave the EPP.³³³ The appointment was seemingly welcomed by France and Germany.³³⁴ Liddington's appointment, however, did upset the Party's wing of hard-Eurosceptics, who were immediately irritated by Cameron's decision to 'sooth Liberal Democrat nerves'.³³⁵

Liddington has been described as an EU moderate and, less of a pro-European, and more an Euro-realist.³³⁶ His roles prior to undertaking his role as Europe Minister, arguably gave him a balanced position on Europe. He served as a special adviser to the pro-European former foreign secretary Douglas Hurd from 1989-90 and then as a parliamentary aide to William Hague for the first two years of his leadership of the Conservative Party. Liddington's pro-European leniencies have been well documented. Although he is socially conservative – he voted against lowering the age of consent for gay sex to 16 and opposes same-sex marriage – he has been widely categorized as a 'One Nation' Tory.³³⁷ MPs within his Party, have described

³³² N Watt, 'David Liddington appointed Europe minister in sign of Tory thaw on EU', Guardian UK, (London, 13 May 2010) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/may/13/david-liddington-europe-minister>

³³³ *Ibid*

³³⁴ *Ibid*

³³⁵ Lynch, *Supra* 304, at 78

³³⁶ *Supra* 332

³³⁷ S Jacobson, 'Mr Europe' David Liddington: the man who could replace May', Guardian UK, (London, 24 March 2019) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/mar/24/mr-europe-david-liddington-the-obscure-remainer-who-could-replace-may> (accessed 09/10/20)

Liddington's reputation as being "so pro-EU the Brexit hardcore in the ERG will eat him alive".³³⁸ Liddington would be a vocal advocate for the Remain campaign in the build-up to the 2016 Brexit referendum. In a 2016 interview, he outlined his position on the EU unequivocally. In this interview, Liddington criticised Conservative colleagues who wanted to leave the bloc stating: "I do find it extraordinary that those who want Britain to leave the EU seem to hold to two utterly contradictory propositions at the same time...their first belief is that inside the EU we cannot achieve any meaningful change and that too often the other countries are in some sort of nefarious conspiracy against our interests...but their second belief, which they hold equally firmly, is that outside the EU these very same countries and governments would rush to give us some new deal that has all the benefits of EU membership with none of the things that apply to others". In reference to Switzerland and Norway, he also stated that, although outside the EU, "they both have higher EU migration rates than we do, they both have to pay into the EU budget, they both have to accept EU rules and regulations as the price for access to a free-trade single market". Liddington clearly believed the UK did possess significant influence and could bring about meaningful change within the EU. This was a position he espoused throughout his entire time as Europe Minister.

On EU security and defence, Liddington's position was not dissimilar to that of Cameron's. His first speech specifically relating addressing EU security and defence did not come until June 2012.³³⁹ Although somewhat late into his time as Europe Minister, the speech revealed the approach he and the UK's coalition government had taken up until this point, and the approach they intended to take in the years ahead. Liddington spoke on how the UK government believed the CSDP could be more effective in making the EU a more effective provider of international security. In the speech, Liddington reiterated the coalition government's belief that NATO remains the bedrock of Britain and Europe's security, and that the CSDP was only

³³⁸ *Ibid*

³³⁹ David Liddington, 'EU Common Security and Defence Policy: The UK Perspective' Speech (2012) <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-common-security-and-defence-policy-the-uk-perspective> (accessed 09/10/20)

complementary. That said, he also stated that it was the coalition government's belief that the CSDP formed a key component of Europe's security and defence architecture and that it had aspirations to reinvigorate EU security and defence. Liddington outlined the areas in which the coalition government believe the CSDP could be effective. He stated that the CSDP is best used in preventing conflict, in building stability in crisis hit nations, and in tackling crises as they occur. He stated that the EU could utilise its diplomatic, civilian, military, developmental, and financial tools through the CSDP and apply them collectively to promote international peace where NATO and others cannot act. He called upon Member States to play a more active role to help develop the EU's civilian and military capabilities. Liddington also spoke of how proud he was of the UK's role in promoting and developing the CSDP through, what he described as, two of the EU's most "influential military missions" - in Bosnia Herzegovina and off the Horn of Africa – and the UK's instrumental role in developing the Battlegroup concept and the EDA. He concluded his speech by stating that he believed CSDP missions make a real difference to international security and that the UK must play a leading role in ensuring European defence is capable of making a real difference in the world. The speech revealed that Liddington and the Cameron government clearly valued the benefits that the CSDP offered to the EU and to the UK. Their perspective on the CSDP could fairly be described as optimistic.

4.5.6 Strategic Defence and Security Review (2010)

The Strategic Defence and Security Review ('The Review') set out plans to cut defence spending which led to wide-ranging cuts to British military personnel and resources. In its introductory paragraph, the Review states that this:

'...is the first time that a UK government has taken decisions on its defence, security, intelligence, resilience, development and foreign affairs capabilities in the round. It sets out the ways and means to deliver the ends set out in the National Security Strategy. It links judgements on where to direct and focus the available resources, to choices on which risks and policies to prioritise. It

sets a clear target for the national security capabilities the UK will need by 2020, and charts a course for getting there.³⁴⁰

The Review saw a cut to 7,000 jobs go in the British Army; 5,000 in the Royal Navy; 5,000 in the Royal Air Force; and 25,000 civilian jobs at the Ministry of Defence.³⁴¹ In terms of equipment, the RAF lost the Nimrod reconnaissance aircraft programme, the entire Harrier jump-jet fleet and a number of bases. The Army also had tanks and heavy artillery cut by 40%, and Cameron made a commitment to bring home half of UK troops stationed in Germany, with all brought home by 2030. The Navy also had its destroyer and frigate fleet cut from 23 to 19. That said, the Review committed the UK to meeting its 2% GDP obligation to NATO. Overall, the Review caused the defence budget to be cut by 8%.

To assuage concerns about the jeopardy cuts could place UK troops and military operations in, the Review explained how the Cameron government intended to make up for the shortfall in spending.³⁴² The Review outlined eight National Security Tasks, with more detailed Planning Guidelines on how they are to be achieved, set by the National Security Council. The Tasks had the purpose of driving detailed decisions by departments over the next five years on how to prioritise UK military resource allocation and capability development.³⁴³ Two of these National Security Tasks envisioned the UK utilising its membership with the EU to help the UK to achieve it. One of these tasks was for the UK to exert its influence to exploit opportunities and manage risks.³⁴⁴ To ensure it delivered on this, the Review stated that the UK would require a Diplomatic Service that supports its key multilateral and bilateral relationships and the obligations that come from the UK's status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a leading member of NATO, the

³⁴⁰ *Supra* 331, at 9

³⁴¹ David Cameron, 'Statement on Strategic Defence and Security Review' Speech (2010) <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/statement-on-strategic-defence-and-security-review> (accessed 09/10/20)

³⁴² R Norton-Taylor, 'Defence cuts could put operations at risk, MPs warn', *Guardian UK*, (London, 15 September 2010) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/sep/15/defence-cuts-operations-risk-mps>

³⁴³ *Supra* 331 at 10

³⁴⁴ *Ibid* at 11

EU and other international organisations. The other task, was for the UK to work in alliances and partnerships wherever possible to generate stronger responses.³⁴⁵ To deliver this, the Review stated that the UK would engage more in collective security through NATO as the basis for territorial defence of the UK, and stability of our European neighbourhood. The Review also called for an ‘an outward-facing EU that promotes security and prosperity’.

Further into the document, in relation to how the government intends to approach to alliances and partnerships, the Review, unsurprisingly, reaffirms the UK government’s commitment to NATO. It states:

‘The UK is a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which has been the bedrock of our defence for over 60 years. Our obligations to our NATO Allies will continue to be among our highest priorities and we will continue to contribute to NATO’s operations and its Command and Force Structures, to ensure that the Alliance is able to deliver a robust and credible response to existing and new security challenges.’³⁴⁶

That said, the Review provided a comprehensive explanation of how the UK government intended to utilise its membership of the EU to help it achieve the National Security Tasks.³⁴⁷ The Review states:

‘UK membership of the European Union is a key part of our international engagement and means of promoting security and prosperity in the European neighbourhood. The common security interests of the member states are served when they use their collective weight in the world to promote their shared interests and values including on major foreign policy

³⁴⁵ *Ibid* at 12

³⁴⁶ *Ibid* at 62

³⁴⁷ *Ibid*

security concerns. The EU's ability to integrate civilian and military responses coherently will become increasingly important.³⁴⁸

The call on Member States to work together for EU security and defence and its support for the EU integrating civilian and military responses to crises more coherently, demonstrates the Cameron government's commitment to playing an 'active role' in EU security and defence. To achieve this, the Review states that the UK will continue to support EU enlargement; will work to ensure the EEAS places emphasis on conflict prevention and develops its partnership with the UN and NATO; will support EU missions – whether military or civilian – which are in the UK's national interest, are good value for money, have clear objectives and, in the case of military missions, only where it is clear that NATO is not planning to intervene (a commitment not to duplicate NATO); will foster better EU-NATO cooperation and development of EU skills and capabilities that are complementary, rather than a duplication of NATO skills and capabilities; will continue to support the EU's counter piracy operation Atalanta, including through the contribution of a frigate for a period in early 2011, and provision of the Operational Headquarters at Northwood until the end of its current mandate in December 2012; and will ensure that the new EU budget (the financial perspective 2014-2020) targets funding at key security challenges facing the EU. Again, these commitments demonstrate an acknowledgment of the benefits of EU security and defence and an appetite by the UK to play a more active role in it. That said, the Review caveats these positive commitments with a further commitment to NATO and a commitment to persuade other Member States to direct effort and resources towards improved national military and civilian capabilities, as opposed to, what the Review describes as 'institution building and bureaucracy'.

Overall, the Review demonstrates that Cameron and his government were willing to support, contribute to and strengthen EU security and defence capabilities, including EU military missions, in so far as they did not duplicate NATO. It is also evident from

³⁴⁸ *Ibid*

the Review, that the Cameron government recognised areas in which it felt EU security and defence could serve and benefit UK security and defence, namely peacekeeping/conflict prevention and peace-making, via its civilian, economic and even military means. Importantly, the Review revealed the mutual benefit CSDP offered to the UK and the EU. Its emphasis on EU security and defence was in essence an acknowledgment by the UK government of how the UK could make up its shortfall in defence spending by working with the EU under the umbrella of EU security and defence and by playing a more active and leading role in it.

4.6 Conclusion

In his most recent 2019 memoir, 'For the Record', Cameron describes himself as a 'pragmatic Eurosceptic', which he defines as someone who wants to be in the EU, fighting for the UK's interests, but someone who also wants to change it to make it work better for the UK.³⁴⁹ Although some of what he did as leader can be described as being the actions of a hard-Eurosceptic' – leaving the EPP, opposition to the Euro and the European Constitution and Lisbon – Cameron's description of himself is accurate, and falls within the category of soft-Eurosceptic. On EU security and defence, Cameron's position was still Eurosceptic. Cameron was clear, that he did not support the federalist mission of political and military union in Europe. He argued in his memoir, that the British public, whilst in favour of trade and cooperation, would never support a political or military union.³⁵⁰ Cameron also stated that, as part of his renegotiation with the EU, should the UK have voted to remain, he would have sought to opt the UK out of the EU's 'ever closer union' commitment (as provided for by the Treaty of Rome 1957). Instead, he would have introduced a 'red card' system, or veto, for national parliaments, in relation to future EU legislation which Member States felt was not in their national interest and would prevent, the so-called 'ratchet effect'.³⁵¹

³⁴⁹ Cameron, *Supra* 176, at 321

³⁵⁰ *Ibid* at 628

³⁵¹ *Ibid* at 630

This said, his position was soft in comparison to that of his hard-Eurosceptic contemporaries. Although Cameron was an Atlanticist at heart, the Conservative Manifesto and Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2010 clearly highlighted the fact that Cameron and his Party saw and valued a role for the UK in EU security and defence. In 2016, in a discussion with Paul Dacre of the Daily Mail, Cameron stated, while he was a Eurosceptic PM, that did not mean he was in favour of leaving the EU. He also stated that, in relation to a European Army, that Brexit would diminish the UK's position and influence in the world.³⁵² Cameron would also speak of the regrets he had about his approach in the 2016 referendum, and not tapping in more to the emotional arguments surrounding EU security and defence. In a speech given in May 2016, Cameron acknowledged the EU's crucial role in securing peace on the European continent via European integration. He also warned of the dangers and spoke about his concerns of UK isolationism post-Brexit.³⁵³ Cameron was clearly a PM who, although Eurosceptic, recognized and valued the benefits of EU security and defence. His Party's position and approach to EU security seemed also to be clear. Although not reflective of his PCP – which had a high minority of hard-Eurosceptics – Cameron had created a government in his own image, one which was entirely soft-Eurosceptic in outlook. His ministerial picks also revealed more about Cameron's intended soft-Eurosceptic approach to the EU. In relation to the coalition, in his most recent memoir, Cameron describes the Lib Dem's as a Party which was avowedly in favour of European integration. Describing the position of his own Party at the time, Cameron stated that, although the heart of the Party was still Eurosceptic, his Party still wanted to be in Europe.

Cameron's position as a soft-Eurosceptic would seem to add credence to the LI theory of LI, as espoused by Moravcsik, that states are critical actors and act rationally based on serving the interests of various groups at the domestic level. To reiterate, Moravcsik, as well as other proponents of LI, argues that states are rational actors and act as such, and that national preferences mirror the,

³⁵² *Ibid* at 666

³⁵³ *Ibid* at 667

predominantly economic, interests of powerful domestic groups. In terms of explaining integration, LI argues that integration is triggered by crises. Integration crises are situations of heightened interdependence, such as pronounced (negative) international policy externalities that create particularly strong demand for policy coordination. LI assumes that governments respond rationally to such crises. Applying LI to the lead-up to the 2010-2016 Cameron premiership and the formation of policy towards the EU, the theory helps to explain Cameron and the UK government's approach to the CSDP. The political situation in the UK was not what it is currently and Euroscepticism, although growing, was not at the level it is now or what it was during the 2016 referendum campaign. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, public opinion was less concerned with Euroscepticism than it was about the then-recent financial crisis of 2008. The UK's involvement in the CSDP, and in turn the pooling and sharing of resources, equipment and personnel to achieve common goals, was a cost-saving exercise. This environment of relative apathy towards the EU coupled with the fact that the CSDP offered cost-saving incentives, gave Cameron the opportunity to form pro-EU policies, such as greater involvement in the CSDP. Even with a Party that was largely Eurosceptic, albeit soft, Cameron was able to get these policies passed and made official Conservative Party policy. Here was a clear example of a state actor behaving rationally, taking a decision to integrate further with the EU, in the economic interests of its citizens.

All in all, the revelations of this first chapter show that Cameron and his government intended to take a soft-Eurosceptic approach to the EU and EU security and defence in the first term of his premiership. The effect of Cameron's and his Party's position on EU security and defence and, in turn, their approach to it, will now be analysed in more detail in three case studies: Libya, Syria and Ukraine. These case studies will analyse the UK's approach (policies and perspectives) and evaluate the UK's involvement in the CSDP (the UK's contribution to the success of the implementation of CSDP) in relation to each conflict.

Chapter Three: The UK, the EU and the CSDP in Action: Libya (2011) and Ukraine (2014)

5.1 Introduction

Now that the perspectives and initial policies of Cameron and his government in relation to EU security and defence have been established (a largely soft-Eurosceptic approach), focus can now be shifted to how these policies worked in action and, specifically, how they affected the UK's contribution to the CSDP. This Chapter will use two case studies through which to analyse the UK's contribution: Libya (2011) and Ukraine (2014). This analysis, in turn, will provide a basis for evaluating the partnership for both the UK and the EU. Although there were many conflicts and crises during the Cameron Premiership (2010-2016), the rationale for choosing these two conflicts is, as Loschi and Russo describe, that they were cases which dramatically stand out as the conflicts 'at the gates of Europe'.³⁵⁴ Along with Syria (2012), these were arguably two of the most significant conflicts during this period in terms of how internationalised they became, in that they became battlegrounds for some of the world's most powerful external powers, mainly the US, Russia and, most relevant here, the UK and the EU. The difference with Libya and Ukraine, is that they were situated directly on the border of the EU, arguably posing a greater threat and requiring a stronger response from the EU.³⁵⁵

For each case study, a number of key things will be addressed: Following a brief summary of the background to the relevant conflict, firstly, the perspectives and policies of the Cameron government in relation to each conflict will be identified. As noted in the previous Chapter, these perspectives will be limited to the most influential people in the Cameron government when it comes to the UK defence

³⁵⁴ C Loschi and A Russo, 'Whose Enemy at the Gates? Border Management in the Context of EU Crisis Response in Libya and Ukraine', (2020), *Geopolitics*, 26 (5), 1486

³⁵⁵ The reason Syria was not chosen as a case study was because there was no CSDP mission to Syria through which to analyse the UK's contribution and the broader security and defence relationship between the UK and the EU.

policy and policy on the EU: the PM, Deputy PM, Foreign Minister, Defence Minister and Minister for Europe.

The perspectives of the EU to the UK's contribution in the conflict will also be considered. As mentioned in the introduction to the thesis, the EU's perspectives will form only a secondary focus. The perspectives of the EU will be limited to a number of figures and bodies, which have been identified as holding roles which have significant influence over the formation and implementation of the CSDP. These figures and bodies include, but are not limited to, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European External Action Service (EEAS).

The next thing that will be addressed is what action was actually taken by the UK in relation to the conflict, by the UK and the EU through the CSDP. A focus will also be had on the contribution that was made by the UK the EU through the CSDP – militarily or in a civilian capacity.

Finally, each case study will end with a mini-conclusion, assessing the overall success of the partnership in relation to addressing the conflict. Particular reference will be made to the UK's involvement in the CSDP, if any, and an assessment of the extent to which the UK contributed to the overall success or failure of relevant CSDP missions in each conflict. These mini-conclusions will then form the basis for a conclusion at the end of the chapter regarding the success and nature of the overall security and defence partnership between the UK and the EU. To reiterate, this thesis grounds itself in the international relations theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI). An analysis of this theory against the backdrop of the UK's partnership with the EU in security and defence at this time will form part of the overall conclusion of this Chapter, as well as the conclusion to this thesis.

5.2 UK position on CSDP at the beginning of the Cameron premiership (recap)

As established, from the outset of his premiership, Cameron and his government's position on the EU can be said to be 'soft-Eurosceptic'. As argued, this too can be said to apply to EU security and defence and the CSDP. Cameron's government opposed federalism as well as political and military union in Europe.³⁵⁶ They also opposed idea of ever-closer union and the so-called 'ratchet effect' or 'integration creep'.³⁵⁷ In terms of the UK's use of military force, Cameron and his government had made it clear in their manifesto, speeches and other policy documents, that they would look first to NATO and their bilateral partnerships before they would engage in the CSDP to ensure the UK's and Europe's security. That said, however, Cameron and his government had made it clear in their manifesto, speeches and policy documents – and most significantly in the Strategic Defence Review 2010 – that the UK would seek to engage with the CSDP more in its civilian capacity i.e. peacekeeping/conflict prevention and peace-making.³⁵⁸ It seemed clear, that it was within this area of the CSDP that Cameron's government felt the UK contribute to and benefit from the most. Whether and how these policies would be implemented, and their impact on the UK and EU security and defence interests, will now be the focus of the following three case studies.

5.3 Case Study 1: Libya (2011)

5.3.1 Background

The relationship between Libya and the EU and the UK – and the West generally – had been turbulent throughout Colonel Muhamar Gaddafi's 60 years in power. Since Gaddafi's seizure of power from the monarchy and the establishment of Libyan Arab Republic in 1969, Gaddafi had set about promoting Arab nationalism and the removal of Western and US influence in Libya.³⁵⁹ This included the closure of US and British

³⁵⁶ Cameron, *Supra* 176, at 628

³⁵⁷ As described by Haas; See Haas, *Supra* **Error! Bookmark not defined.**

³⁵⁸ *Supra* 331, at 62 para 5.12

³⁵⁹ 'On this day: 1969: Bloodless coup in Libya', BBC News (London)

http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/1/newsid_3911000/3911587.stm
(accessed 03/01/21)

air force bases in Libya and the regaining of control over oil fields in the region, much to the displeasure of these nations.³⁶⁰ Gadaffi's relationship with the US was strained from the beginning, and the same was true for his relationship with the UK and the EU. From the early 1980s, Gadaffi set about on a global campaign to support and fund anti-imperialist, anti-western and anti-American militant groups and resistance movements wherever they emerged. This included the supporting and funding of terrorist plots and attacks against the UK and the EU. Gadaffi was linked to the bombing of a Berlin nightclub in 1986, which resulted in the deaths of two US soldiers and one civilian, which resulted in airstrikes against the Libyan capital of Tripoli and Benghazi.³⁶¹ Gadaffi was also found responsible for the mid-air bombing of Pan-Am flight 103 over the Scottish town of Lockerbie in 1988, resulting in the deaths of 270 people.³⁶² This resulted in almost total severing of diplomatic ties to Gadaffi and his regime. For some time, relations between the US, UK, the EU and Libya were restored in 2002, following Gadaffi's hand over of two Lockerbie suspects to the UK and the agreement to pay compensation to the families of the victims of the Lockerbie bombing. Gadaffi also agreed to abandon his programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction.

Whilst external relations with the West had been tempered, Gadaffi's main threat was now domestic. The popular overthrow of Tunisia's leader, Ben Ali, in January 2011, followed by the ousting of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt only a month later sparked the beginning of the so-called 'Arab Spring'.³⁶³ The Arab Spring consisted of a number of revolutions spreading across the Middle East, with heads of state in a

³⁶⁰ J Hess, 'Libya Soon Gets Wheelus, Including Bowling Alleys', New York Times, (New York, 08 June 1970) <https://www.nytimes.com/1970/06/08/archives/libya-soon-gets-wheelus-including-bowling-alleys.html> (accessed 03/01/21)

³⁶¹ Ronald Regan, Presidential News Conference (1986) <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-959> (accessed 05/01/21)

³⁶² In 2003, Gadaffi admitted responsibility for the attack in 2003 and paid compensation to the victims' families. In 2011, Gadaffi's former justice minister, Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, later admitted that Gadaffi formally ordered the attack.

³⁶³ A term coined by American journalist Marc Lynch in 2011 to describe the spread of popular uprisings across the Middle East; See M Lynch, 'Obama's 'Arab Spring'?', Foreign Policy, (London, 06 January 2011) <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/06/obamas-arab-spring/> (accessed 05/01/21)

number of Arab countries being overthrown by popular uprisings.³⁶⁴ The Arab Spring quickly influenced domestic affairs in Libya, following which demonstrations broke out in Benghazi and other cities.³⁶⁵ Tensions quickly escalated following the arrests of human rights activists and a high death toll, following Gaddafi's attempts to quell the demonstrations by force.³⁶⁶ Several days of fighting ensued between Gaddafi's forces and rebel fighters, with rebels eventually taking over the major Libyan city of Benghazi.³⁶⁷ In February 2011, Gaddafi released a number of key speeches, one in which he blamed protests on foreign intervention in Libya and threatened to "hunt down" protesters, "alley to alley, house to house".³⁶⁸ The stage for the Libyan Civil War was set.

As a result of the escalating conflict, in March 2011, the UN Security Council imposed a no-fly zone over Libya, with the UK, France and the US agreeing NATO would take military command over it. Allied bombing of Libya occurred almost instantaneously following the UN vote. Within months of NATO assistance, the Libyan rebels began to make advances against Gaddafi's forces, capturing the city of Misrata in May 2011 and eventually the capital, Tripoli, reaching Green Square in August 2011. Following the rebels taking control of Tripoli, Gaddafi fled and an interim government was set up in September 2011. The eventual overthrow of Gaddafi came in October 2011, when the city of Sirte fell to rebel forces. Soon after fleeing the city in which he was hiding, Gaddafi's convoy was bombed by NATO aircraft and he was quickly encircled by rebel forces. After being identified by the rebels, Gaddafi was taken hostage and, not long after, was executed. Following the news of his death, the National

³⁶⁴ S Hamid, 'Islamism, the Arab Spring, and the Failure of America's Do-Nothing Policy in the Middle East', *The Atlantic*, (09 October 2015)

<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/middle-east-egypt-us-policy/409537/> (accessed 06/01/21)

³⁶⁵ 'Battle for Libya: Key moments', *Al Jazeera*, (30 April 2017)

<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/libya/2011/10/20111020104244706760.html> (accessed 06/01/21)

³⁶⁶ *Ibid*

³⁶⁷ 'Timeline: How the Arab Spring unfolded', *Al Jazeera*, (14 January 2021)

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/14/arab-spring-ten-years-on> (accessed 01/02/21)

³⁶⁸ Muammar Gaddafi, 'Alley to Alley' Speech (2011)

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/michaeltomasky/2011/mar/17/usforeignpolicy-unitednations-libya-it-will-start-fast>

Transitional Council leader, Prime Minister Mustafa Abdul Jalil declared Libya's liberation, however, the civil war would now enter its next phase.³⁶⁹

Following Gaddafi's murder, rival rebel factions began to fight each other, both competing for overall control of the country. Islamic extremists, taking advantage of the civil unrest, have also exacerbated violence in Libya. Since 2014 the fighting has mainly been between two players: the Tripoli administration, known as the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Tobruk administration (which sits in the eastern city of Tobruk after disputed elections) led by General Khalifa Haftar and the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA).³⁷⁰ The Libyan Civil War continues to this day.

5.3.2 Developments prior to the 2011 Libyan conflict

5.3.2.1 Lancaster House Treaties (2010)

Making good on his promise to 'deepen alliances and build new partnerships' with other nations,³⁷¹ Cameron set about early in his premiership to deepen the UK's security and defence alliance with France, via the Lancaster House Treaties.³⁷² On 2nd November 2011, Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy met to sign two cooperation treaties concerning security and defence.³⁷³ These treaties were major statements of intent by the UK government in relation to their approach to international and European security and defence.³⁷⁴ The treaties sought to bind the UK and France closer together in a shared security and defence partnership, which

³⁶⁹ C Nicholson, 'Libya declares country's official 'liberation'', France-24, (Libya, 23 October 2011) <https://www.france24.com/en/20111023-interim-leader-arrives-benghazi-declare-official-liberation-libya-jalil-gaddafi> (accessed 12/01/21)

³⁷⁰ B McKernan, 'War in Libya: how did it start, who is involved and what happens next?', Guardian UK, (London, 18 May 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/18/war-in-libya-how-did-it-start-what-happens-next> (accessed 12/01/21)

³⁷¹ Conservative Manifesto 2010, *Supra* 276, at 109

³⁷² Ashcroft and Oakeshot, *Supra* 168, at 505

³⁷³ B Gomis, 'Franco-British Defence and Security Treaties: Entente While it Lasts?', (2011) Chatham House, 4

³⁷⁴ O'Donnell and Marina, *Supra* 288, at 419

aimed at increased interoperability and cooperation between the two nations. In essence, the UK and France agreed to set up a joint military force and to share equipment and nuclear missile research centres.

The Agreement was composed of two treaties. The first was an overarching defence cooperation treaty, setting out a framework for cooperation between the two nations. This treaty included joint initiatives on equipment sharing, including the sharing of aircraft carriers. Other areas of military cooperation included the future deployment of ground troops, through the development of a bi-national reaction force, industrial cooperation and cooperation on research and technology. The second treaty contained a subordinate treaty, which related to nuclear cooperation, including safety, nuclear testing simulation and knowledge sharing on nuclear development.

On the face of it, the treaties looked as if the UK was taking positive steps forward in trying to take defence and security actions under the CSDP. The opening paragraphs of the Treaty state that the Treaty reaffirms France and the UK's commitment to supporting the role of the CSDP in strengthening international security.³⁷⁵ One of the stated five objectives of the Treaty, also stated that:

*“(...) the Parties (...) undertake to build a long-term mutually beneficial partnership in defence and security with the aims of... deploying together into theatres in which both Parties have agreed to be engaged, in operations conducted under the auspices of...the **European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy**...and ensuring their support for action in the European Union under the **Common Security and Defence Policy** as well as complementarity between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union in all relevant areas.”³⁷⁶*

³⁷⁵ Treaty Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic for Defence and Security Co-operation (Lancaster House Treaty) (2010) 3 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/238153/8174.pdf (accessed 13/02/21)

³⁷⁶ Lancaster House Treaty, Article 1

Although the text of the Treaty appeared to indicate that British and French security and defence cooperation would be sought to be made via the CSDP, this idea was not supported by very many within Cameron's government or the Conservative Party. Many in the Eurosceptic wing of the Party regarded the new Treaties as a 'St. Malo II'.³⁷⁷ As discussed earlier in the thesis, St. Malo was a European treaty signed on 4th December 1998, by the then PM Tony Blair and then President Jacques Chirac. The Treaty was significant in that it heralded the beginning of the ESDP/CSDP. Whilst for the British, Blair claimed that St. Malo was simply about assisting the US and NATO with European security – a way to focus EU capabilities after its failure to deal effectively with the crises in the Balkans without a strong US or NATO presence³⁷⁸ - for France, it was regarded as a means to revive EU ambitions in the area of security and defence and to prove the EU could play a more autonomous role in global security.³⁷⁹

Defending himself against claims within his Party that the Lancaster House Treaties and France were "duplicious"³⁸⁰ – seeking to duplicate the security and defence provided by NATO – and that they were in fact a 'St. Malo II', Cameron stressed that the treaties would not weaken British sovereignty and did not amount to a sharing of the UK's nuclear deterrent.³⁸¹ Defence Secretary, Liam Fox, also defended against these claims, stating that they were not about increasing the defence capabilities of the EU.³⁸² Cameron stressed that the treaties enabled Britain and France, in their capacity as sovereign nations, to deploy their forces independently and in their

³⁷⁷ *Supra* 373

³⁷⁸ J Howarth, 'Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative', (2010), *Global Politics and Strategy*, 42 (2), 33

³⁷⁹ *Supra* 373, at 8

³⁸⁰ Conservative MP Bernard Jenkin had said this regarding the French: "*There is a long term record of duplicity on the French part when it comes to dealing with their allies (...) France has never and is never likely to share strategic interests with the UK.*"; See P Wintour, 'Britain and France sign landmark 50-year defence deal', *Guardian UK*, (London, 02 November 2010) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/nov/02/britain-france-landmark-50-year-defence-deal> (accessed 15/02/21)

³⁸¹ *Ibid*

³⁸² House of Commons Debate, 2 November 2010, 787, cited in C Taylor, 'Franco-British Defence Co-Operation', (2010), House of Commons Library Report, 8–9

respective national interests as and when they chose to do so. Cameron also stressed that these treaties were about cost-saving (on the back of the recommendations made in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review) rather than as a deliberate attempt to duplicate NATO. Cameron described the treaties as, what he called, a “practical, hard-headed agreement between two sovereign countries” which would “reduce development costs, eliminate duplication and align research programmes”.³⁸³

There was also suspicion surrounding the motives of the French. Sarkozy described France and the UK as being on the same page when it came to security and defence. For France, on the surface their intentions behind the Treaties appeared to be four-fold: it was a way for it to strengthen its defence ties with the UK (which up to this point had been established on an ad hoc basis prior to 2010); it was a way for France to save money by sharing resources and improving defence capabilities jointly with the UK; and it was purely pragmatic response to capability concerns in France, illustrating France’s new approach to security and defence related matters, following its re-entry into the NATO Military Command. Still, in the UK, the treaties and France were still viewed with suspicion by British political commentators and by many within the government and Conservative Party, as being a back door to a European Army and as a means to create a revitalisation of CSDP in the long-term.

From a European perspective, the treaties were met with a mixture of apprehension and cynicism. Former chief executive of the EDA in Brussels and expert on European security and defence, Nick Witney, explained that whilst the Treaties could have the effect of encouraging closer cooperation amongst European nations, particularly if the alliance was opened up to other European nations, that they could also have the opposite effect. Witney explained that whilst there could have been many positive outcomes for EU defence, it was equally possible that the new alliance could ‘elbow aside’ EU defence and cause the EU as a whole to lose its ‘seat in the global game’.³⁸⁴

³⁸³ *Supra* 380

³⁸⁴ N Witney, ‘A Strategic Rubicon’, European Council on Foreign Relations (01 November 2010) https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_a_strategic_rubicon/ (accessed 15/02/21)

Witney's analysis was proven accurate. The statements made by Cameron and Fox (as noted above) made clear that the treaties, for the UK, had nothing to do with the EU. Furthermore, whilst there were a number of mentions of the CSDP made in the text of the treaties (as highlighted above), they were followed by a reaffirmation of France and the UK's commitment to NATO as the essential guarantor of European security.³⁸⁵ This was something reaffirmed by President Sarkozy at the summit declaration.³⁸⁶

Commenting further on the treaties, Whitney has also stated that, far from improving collaboration amongst EU Member States, the treaties would be a blow to those wanting more defence issues handled on a pan-EU basis from Brussels. Whitney stated that rather than encouraging collaboration amongst Member States, the deal would see defence forming around the Anglo-French axis with no reference to the EU.³⁸⁷ Whitney also stated that he was worried what implications the agreement might have for Poland's 2011 presidency of the EU.³⁸⁸ Concerned about Russian interference, one of Poland's key objectives was to push for pan-EU defence – something it had been discussing with its allies France and Germany prior to the treaties. The treaties certainly had the potential to take away this focus of addressing European security and defence under the EU/CSDP umbrella, and to turn it more towards collaborating with other Members States bilaterally or under the new Anglo-French umbrella of Lancaster House. This was a concern shared by Chancellor Angela Merkel, as spokespeople for her explained that it was imperative states worked together across the whole bloc “and not just bilaterally”³⁸⁹ and that

³⁸⁵ Lancaster House Treaty (2010) 3

³⁸⁶ Sarkozy said NATO remained “the essential guarantor of European security” and limited themselves to “encouraging” all EU members to develop their military capabilities; See David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy, ‘UK-France Summit press conference’ Speech, (2010) <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-france-summit-press-conference--2> (accessed 03/03/21)

³⁸⁷ D Brunnstrom, ‘Anglo-French defence deal could hurt Brussels goals’, Reuters, (03 November 2010) <https://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE6A251S20101103> (accessed 03/03/21)

³⁸⁸ *Ibid*

³⁸⁹ *Ibid*

whilst it was good European states were working together, it was unfortunate that the UK and France were doing it without Germany and the rest of the EU.³⁹⁰

The Treaties were to have major implications for the CSDP and the UK's involvement in it, as will become clear below when the UK's response to the Libyan conflict is explored in more detail. The treaties did give a nod to the underlying rationale of the CSDP – that cooperation on security and defence matters were both necessary and desirable for all Member States of the EU. As Antoine Bouvier, Chief Executive Officer of MBDA Missile Systems,³⁹¹ stated, the Lancaster House treaties gave the UK and France 'the opportunity to agree at the highest political level that the only way of sustaining critical sovereign capability was in effect to share it'.³⁹² In theory the treaties seemed as if the UK was taking a step forward in the direction of European integration in security and defence. In reality, the treaties were really more about cost-saving for both France and the UK, a reaffirmation of both nations' loyalty to NATO and a reaffirmation of the two nations' historical bilateral partnership in security and defence.

5.3.2.2 UK domestic affairs (2010-2011)

Adding pressure for Cameron to steer away from the EU and CSDP was the political climate in the UK at the time. As noted in the last chapter, there was unease amongst the Conservative Party's Eurosceptic wing regarding the Conservative's coalition deal with the Lib Dem's and the concessions made by Cameron to Clegg and his junior party. Furthermore, in his election campaign Cameron had made promises to hold an 'in-out' referendum on the EU, to introduce a 'referendum lock' in relation to any further powers transferred to the EU, and to make NATO and bilateral partnerships the UK's preferred partners in relation to external security and defence. The Conservatives were also continuing to fend off the threat of UKIP.

³⁹⁰ *Ibid*; Robert Hochbaum, a lawmaker in Merkel's Christian Democrats who sits in parliament's defence policy committee, said it was good European states were working together, but "a bit unfortunate the British and the French are doing it without us."

³⁹¹ MBDA is the largest European developer and manufacturer of missiles

³⁹² EDA, *Supra* 48

Although they had increased their share of votes by 0.9%, the 2010 General Election was not a huge success for UKIP and they had failed to secure any seats. The Party's popularity, however, was on the rise and following the election, they elected a new leader in Nigel Farage. From the moment of Farage's leadership victory, the popularity of UKIP boomed: their membership figures would double between 2010-2015,³⁹³ their poll ratings would rise, they would win its first seat in Westminster in 2014³⁹⁴ and they would take a greater share as well as the highest number of seats of any UK political party in the European Elections in 2014.³⁹⁵ The threat of UKIP was a real danger to Cameron and his Party's popularity as well as to their prospects of winning another election in 2015.

It could also be argued that Cameron's pledge (in the spirit of his new brand of 'Liberal Conservatism') for the UK to take a bigger role in protecting human rights globally played a role in his push for military intervention. Other factors could also have included the UK's strategic interests in Libya – Gaddafi's removal from power would give them greater access to Libya's gas and oil reserves. However, none of these factors would really have affected Cameron's decision to not intervene under the umbrella of the CSDP.³⁹⁶

Although a soft-Eurosceptic approach was the general approach of Cameron and his government, all of these factors above would guide Cameron's position and decision making when it came to CSDP as well as many other policy areas. This is not to say that Cameron would have calmed the conflict in Libya by leading a CSDP mission had these circumstances not existed. However, given these domestic circumstances in Britain, Cameron could not have conceivably been seen to be the promoter of a security operation in Libya under the umbrella of the CSDP. Cameron had made it clear in his election campaign that military action would be taken outside of the

³⁹³ From 15,535 to 32,447; See A Hunt, 'UKIP: The story of the UK Independence Party's rise', BBC News, (London, 21 November 2014) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21614073> (accessed 10/03/21)

³⁹⁴ Douglas Carswell took the seat of Clacton in 2014

³⁹⁵ 27.5% of the vote share; *Supra* 393

³⁹⁶ 'Facts on Libya: Oil and Gas', International Energy Agency, (21 February 2011) http://www.iea.org/files/facts_libya.pdf (accessed 10/03/21)

CSDP, but the added bonus of increasing his reputation at home by acting outside of it drew Cameron even further away from operating within the remits of the CSDP.

5.3.3 UK perspectives on the Libyan conflict

5.3.3.1 Initial response

This pressure on Cameron – both self-imposed and due to developments domestically – caused the UK played a lead role almost from the very beginning of the crisis. The UK's initial response was to begin evacuating British nationals from Libya and to deploy a number of Royal Navy warships off the coast of Tripoli and near Malta.³⁹⁷ The UK also drafted a UN Resolution condemning Gadaffi's actions, imposing a travel ban and freezing his assets. It demanded an immediate end to violence against protesters in the country and referred Gadaffi and his cabinet to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to face a potential war crimes trial. William Hague visited Geneva to attend a special session of the UN Human Rights Council which the UK helped set up. The UK in agreement with other European nations agreed to freeze the assets of Gadaffi and ban him and a number of other Libyan individuals linked to Gadaffi from entering the UK and the EU. Cameron also revoked the immunity of Gadaffi and his family.

In his first statement to the House of Commons on the Libyan Conflict in February 2011, Cameron gave some insight into how he intended to work with the EU on Libya. Cameron was questioned on how he would seek to address the conflict by Labour and opposition leader Ed Miliband, and how he would seek to act under the umbrella of the EU. In response, Cameron called on the EU to sharpen its neighbourhood policy in the Southern Mediterranean and, whilst he believed there was some room for multilateral action through the EU, he stated that the UK would seek to make more of its bilateral relations with other nations to address the

³⁹⁷ Hansard, House of Commons debate, Vol. 524 (28th February 2011)
<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2011-02-28/debates/11022819000002/LibyaAndTheMiddleEast> (

conflict.³⁹⁸ Cameron also made other mentions of the EU when taking questions from other members of the House. He argued that whilst the UK would work with the EU where it could, the UK would have to act fast, implying his government believed a response via the CSDP would be too slow. He also stated that the Libya conflict would be a test for the EU. However, he assured the House that the UK would seek to work with the EU to ensure the Libyan conflict did not turn into a refugee crisis, revealing his desire to work with the EU in a civilian capacity.

The decision to intervene in Libya has been described as being made top-down by Cameron, with the PM playing a lead role in taking the UK into the conflict.³⁹⁹ Following several meetings of the newly formed National Security Council (NSC), on 28th February 2011, Cameron instructed the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to plan for a no-fly zone (NFZ) over Libya.⁴⁰⁰ This was just days after President Sarkozy of France had taken the same actions, illustrating the two nations' intentions to honour their reinvigorated bilateral partnership agreed at Lancaster House the previous year. Both nations then set about drafting a UN Security Council Resolution proposing a NFZ over Libya. Although in the end Cameron was decisive on the invasion, he as well as key figures on Europe in his government were cautious about intervening militarily.⁴⁰¹ They were also divided on whether to take military action against Gaddafi, with Hague being sceptical of the benefits of intervention for Libya and the UK and Fox being supportive of a plan to arm the rebels rather than the UK intervening directly.⁴⁰² Once the decision to intervene was made, however, Cameron's government, the NSC and MoD united around the PM.

³⁹⁸ *Ibid*

³⁹⁹ M Lindstrom and K Zetterlund, '*Setting the Stage for the Military Intervention in Libya: Decisions Made and Their Implications for the EU and NATO*' Report, (2012) Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), 31

⁴⁰⁰ Hansard, House of Commons Debate (28 February 2011) c25; See also A Macdonald, '*Cameron Doesn't Rule Out Military Force for Libya*', The Wall Street Journal, (28 February 2011) <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704615504576172383796304482> (accessed 20/03/21)

⁴⁰¹ Cameron is reported to have shown caution in the lead up to the invasion, with the PM arranging private meetings with Libyan experts and exiles to gain first-hand information on the conflict in order to ensure that all actions were legally defensible, as well as minimizing casualties in the event of any action. See: FOI Report, *Supra* 399, at 32

⁴⁰² P Wintour and N Watt, '*David Cameron's Libyan war: why the PM felt Gaddafi had to be stopped*', The Guardian UK, (London, 02 October 2011)

5.3.3.2 UN Support for military Intervention

In the lead up to the invasion, the UK sought action against Gaddafi through the United Nations Security Council. On 26th February 2011, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1970 was adopted unanimously by the UN Security Council (UNSC), condemning the use of force by the government of Gaddafi against protesters and imposed a number of international sanctions against his regime. The UNSCR also referred the state of Libya to the International Criminal Court.⁴⁰³ The UK also sought the legal basis for intervention and the introduction of a no fly zone via the UNSC. On 17th March 2011, UNSCR 1973 was passed demanding an immediate ceasefire and authorizing the international community to establish a no-fly zone to protect civilians. The question was now how and by who the NFZ would be implemented.

5.3.3.3 Extraordinary EU Council meeting

Just days earlier, prior to the adoption of UNSCR 1973, the question of a NFZ and military intervention had been discussed at an extraordinary meeting of the European Council on 11th March. Prior to the meeting, William Hague addressed the House of Commons calling upon the EU to ‘radically rethink its neighbourhood policy’ and to take a ‘bold and ambitious’ approach to Libya.⁴⁰⁴ In response to questions by the House, Hague affirmed his belief in the EU having a role in Libya, but argued that this should be in a civilian capacity (Hague called upon the HR to do more to put pressure on African nations to bring about economic and political reform).⁴⁰⁵ Members of the House called on the EU to do more in response to the conflict.⁴⁰⁶ The UK government’s position was reaffirmed in a letter sent to the then

<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/oct/02/david-cameron-libyan-war-analysis> (accessed 20/03/21)

⁴⁰³ S/RES/1970 (2011)

⁴⁰⁴ Hansard, House of Commons debate (7th March 2011)

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid*

⁴⁰⁶ Dr Andrew Murrison, Conservative MP for South West Wiltshire Conservative, criticized the HR and the EEAS during this session. He asked Hague: “If the EEAS has a point, it is surely to engage in a

EU Council President, Herman Van Rompuy, by Cameron and Sarkozy, calling on the EU to prepare to respond to the Libyan Conflict. The letter called upon the EU to undertake a number of things. These included supporting the NTC; to prepare to provide support for 'all possible contingencies'; to support a NFZ; to monitor the humanitarian situation in Libya and be ready to provide humanitarian assistance; to implement the arms embargo against Gaddafi; and to be prepared to provide support to displaced persons via financial and military assistance.⁴⁰⁷ The meeting was attended by Foreign Secretary William Hague, who called upon the EU to put together a "bold, ambitious and historic plan for Libya" and to work on a coordinated basis with NATO.⁴⁰⁸ He also called on the EU to assess what humanitarian assistance it could provide to Libya and to look at how the EU could transform its relationship with the region in order to incentivise change and ensure effective spending of EU funds.⁴⁰⁹

The UK's calls for the EU to prepare to play its part in the conflict were met with a negative response. In an official declaration on 11th March 2011, the Council outlined the EU's position on the Libyan Conflict at that time.⁴¹⁰ The Council condemned the use of force by Gaddafi against the Libyan people and supported UNSCR 1970's referral of the Gaddafi regime to the ICC. It also called on Gaddafi to relinquish power and outlined its sanctions against the Gaddafi regime and those supporting and connected with it. The Council also made assurances that it would help with Libya's transfer to democracy and with its rebuilding of its economy post-Gaddafi, as well as committing itself to providing humanitarian aid and to assist people fleeing the conflict and helping with border control. Finally, the Council committed the EU to

timely fashion in its very near abroad. Is my right hon. Friend aware of any action being taken by Baroness Ashton in advance of this Friday's meeting beyond cancelling a few visas and imposing a few trade sanctions?"

⁴⁰⁷ 'Letter from David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy to Herman Van Rompuy', Guardian UK, (London, 10 March 2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/10/libya-middleeast> (accessed 28/03/21)

⁴⁰⁸ 'EU foreign ministers' meeting on Libya', HM Gov (10 March 2011) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/eu-foreign-ministers-meeting-on-libya> (accessed 28/03/21)

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid*

⁴¹⁰ Extraordinary European Council Declaration, (11 March 2011) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC_11_2 (accessed 28/03/21)

enhancing its European Neighbourhood Policy, with a greater emphasis on the Southern Mediterranean region to ensure deeper economic integration, broader market access and political cooperation. Importantly, however, the Declaration left out any mention of a NFZ. Instead, it committed the EU to examine "all necessary options" if Gaddafi intensified his attacks on civilians.

To make matters more difficult, at the same Council meeting, HR Catherine Ashton was also reported as attacking Sarkozy's and Cameron's calls for military intervention and a NFZ, warning that a NFZ hat a no-fly zone could end up killing many civilians.⁴¹¹ An official from her office also stated that Ashton believed the efficiency of a NFZ was very questionable.⁴¹² Ashton's opposition to a NFZ was met with anger within the Conservative Parliamentary Party, and likely angered many other Eurosceptics within Cameron's government. In a statement to the House of Commons following the HR's comments, Conservative MP Bernard Jenkin addressed the PM and criticised Ashton, questioning 'what mandate' she had to give her opinions on the UK's proposals and arguing that she should seek to serve the Member States rather than pretending to lead them. Although Cameron laughed off the comments, Ashton's comments certainly would have made a CSDP operation even more difficult to achieve. Ultimately, the Council meeting ended without support for Cameron and Sarkozy's proposals, and the EU failed to bring about a CSDP operation to address the Libyan Conflict. The EU would eventually endorse UNSCR 1973 and, in turn, a NFZ, just days later, however, it ultimately came too late to bring together a CSDP operation.⁴¹³

In early April 2011, the EU would eventually prepare for a military operation in Libya with the aim of supporting humanitarian assistance there. The operation was entitled EUFOR Libya and an Operational Headquarters was established in Rome. EUFOR Libya was to be deployed only on the condition if requested by the UN

⁴¹¹ N Watt, 'David Cameron mocks Cathy Ashton after 'rogue briefing'', Guardian UK, (London, 15 March 2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/wintour-and-watt/2011/mar/15/eu-davidcameron> (accessed 28/03/21)

⁴¹² *Ibid*

⁴¹³ Extraordinary European Council Declaration; *Supra* 410

(specifically the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs or OCHA). The UN, however, would never request the EU's assistance through EUFOR and, ultimately, the mission was never launched, leaving the EU without a response to the initial conflict. Although, as Liam Fox would make clear in a speech post-Gadafi in October 2011, the UK wanted the NFZ and military intervention to be under the command of NATO,⁴¹⁴ it was clear the UK still wanted the EU to play a role via the CSDP in addressing the conflict.

5.3.3.4 NATO intervention in Libya

Following the extraordinary meeting of the European Council, on 19th March 2011, an international conference was held in Paris co-chaired by the UK and France. The conference was primarily aimed at building support for a military response to the conflict in Libya. Shortly following the conference, on the same day, the French Air Force initiated airstrikes against Gadafi's forces. There were many question marks around who would take command of the military operation in Libya. It was unclear whether the operation would be led by the US, UK, France or NATO, and in what structure and capacity. The CSDP had been a candidate for the operation, until the extraordinary European Council meeting resulted in a rejection of a military response. At a meeting of the NATO Security Council on 21st March 2011, Sarkozy had made it clear that France did not want NATO taking control of the operation.⁴¹⁵ Instead, Sarkozy wanted to make use of the UK and France's new defence partnership under Lancaster House and launch a bilateral military operation.

The UK on the other hand, saw NATO command and control structures as the only option for the mission. This was largely due to the UK's long-held view that NATO

⁴¹⁴ Dr Liam Fox, Conservative Party Conference (2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/2011/oct/05/conservative-conference-2011-live-coverage> (accessed 02/04/21)

⁴¹⁵ K Willsher, 'Sarkozy opposes Nato taking control of Libya operation', Guardian UK, (London, 22 March 2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/22/sarkozy-nato-libya-france> (accessed 02/04/21)

remains the 'bedrock' of the UK's and Europe's defence. Defence Minister, Liam Fox, who as established in Chapter 1 would eventually be categorised as a hard-line Eurosceptic, was a strong supporter of NATO. In February 2010, Fox had summarised his view on the UK position stating that the US would remain the UK's number one global strategic partner and reaffirming that NATO would remain its preferred security alliance.⁴¹⁶

Ultimately, the NATO security council agreed that NATO would take command, with the UK and France leading the mission. Then US president, Barack Obama, saw a back-seat role for the US. In light of US budgetary cuts and a new focus on the Asia-Pacific region in response to the rise of China, the US had been consistently calling upon European nations to take their share of the burden when it came to European security and defence. Obama and the US saw Libya as the ideal opportunity for the EU and European states to do this. The Obama administration's strategy on Libya would be to support NATO intervention but it would 'lead from behind'.⁴¹⁷

In an address to the House of Commons on 28th March 2011, Cameron spoke of the support the EU had eventually given to the intervention through its support of UNSCR 1973.⁴¹⁸ The PM claimed that the UK had been a primary reason why the EU came to support the conflict and claimed the UK had had a positive influence on the EU's renewed focus on the humanitarian crisis in Libya and in the Southern Mediterranean.⁴¹⁹ Cameron also took the opportunity during this session in the House to call on the EU to do more long-term in Libya and the rest of North Africa to put pressure on North African nations to do more to make their societies more open and more democratic.⁴²⁰ Cameron argued the EU must offer these nations deeper economic integration, broader market access and greater political cooperation in

⁴¹⁶ Dr Liam Fox, 'The EU should only act when NATO cannot' Speech (2010) <https://conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/601535> (accessed 02/04/21)

⁴¹⁷ C Krauthammer, 'The Obama doctrine: Leading from behind', *The Washington Post*, (Washington, 28 April 2011) https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-obama-doctrine-leading-from-behind/2011/04/28/AFBCy18E_story.html (accessed 03/04/21)

⁴¹⁸ Hansard, House of Commons debate (28th March 2011)

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid*

⁴²⁰ *Ibid*

return for evidence of this. Cameron also confirmed that he was a ‘friendly European’ and reaffirmed his promise to ‘get stuck in’ to fight for the British interest in the EU. Cameron’s comments and responses during this session revealed that he valued and saw a place for the EU in helping to contribute to the effort in Libya in a civilian capacity as well as helping rebuild Libyan society post-conflict.

Following NATO assuming command of the NFZ operations, at a conference in London on 29th March 2011, the Libya Contact Group was set up to coordinate international efforts and discuss post-conflict support for Libya. The Contact Group brought together various governments and international organisations, including the UN, the EU, NATO, the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Conference and the Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States. Although the NFZ and military operation was under the umbrella of NATO via Operation Unified Protector (OUP), the Contact Group would be the vehicle through which most of the decision making in relation to the intervention would be made – as opposed to the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The following day, William Hague addressed the Commons on the outcome of the London Conference. Hague, again, would reveal further the government’s position on the CSDP and the EU’s role in Libya.⁴²¹ Although the mission would never go ahead, Hague praised the EU for its contingency military planning through EUFOR Libya. He also outlined how he saw the Libyan crisis would be addressed long-term, stating that the UK and the EU should work together and be a ‘magnet for positive change’ in bringing about a civil society, an open political system and establishing a democracy in Libya. Hague’s comments arguably revealed an appetite within Cameron’s government for the UK to contribute to the CSDP in a civilian capacity.

Ultimately, the OUP would go on to implement the arms embargo, a NFZ, support the rebels and protect civilians from attack or the threat of attack from Gadaffi. The mission ended on 31st October 2011, following the death and overthrow of Gadaffi.

⁴²¹ *Ibid*

5.3.3.5 Blocking of the CSDP Operational HQ 2011

For all Cameron's calls for EU support of a NFZ in Libya, and his support for an EU humanitarian response to address the humanitarian crises there, Cameron also had to rebalance this with making good on his promise to prevent a further handover of powers to the EU. Cameron had promised unequivocally in the Conservative Manifesto that his government would seek to prevent any further 'ratcheting up' of EU integration in security and defence, and his opportunity to make good on this promise came during the Libyan Conflict.⁴²² In July 2011, proposals were put forward at an FAC meeting by HR Catherine Ashton to establish a permanent Operations Headquarters (OHQ) for EU security and defence operations.⁴²³ Ashton considered the creation of the OHQ as being part of the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. Although the proposals were also strongly supported and backed by France and Germany, the UK, represented by Foreign Secretary William Hague, vetoed the proposals. Hague stated that the UK would never agree to a permanent OHQ and that it represented a "red line" for the UK.⁴²⁴ Commenting further on the proposals, Hague stated that the OHQ duplicated NATO structures and would permanently disassociate EU planning from NATO planning. He also argued that the OHQ would be a much more costly solution than existing structures and that more should be done to improve the existing CSDP structures the EU has. Hague did state, however, that the UK sought an improvement in defence capabilities in the EU and in the political will to use them in places such as in the Balkans, as well as in Libya. Criticising the veto of the UK, then-French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe argued that, whilst France respected the UK's decision to veto the OHQ, for France progress of the CSDP was essential, and the OHQ was a way to do this. Juppe also argued that no single European country had the means to have all the necessary defence capabilities alone, and that the Libyan conflict underscored how important it was to improve EU security and defence capabilities.

⁴²² Conservative Manifesto (2010), *Supra* 276, at 114

⁴²³ B Waterfield, 'Britain blocks EU plans for 'operational military headquarters'', The Telegraph, (London, 18 July 2011) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/8645749/Britain-blocks-EU-plans-for-operational-military-headquarters.html> (accessed 04/04/21)

⁴²⁴ *Ibid*

This episode not only soured the partnership between the UK and the EU. Not only was it seen as a snub to improving EU security and defence capabilities, but it also came after a sour episode between the UK and France and the EU in which they failed to address the Libyan conflict via the CSDP. The veto over the OHQ made the partnership between the UK and the EU even more strained. The episode also underscored the political differences between France and the UK when it came to Lancaster House. Despite the landmark defence treaty being signed between the two parties it was clear that, whilst for France the treaties were a way to bolster cooperation through the CSDP between Member States, for the UK it was mainly a way to improve bilateral relations between itself and France and to cost save. The UK's position on the CSDP at this time seemed clear: engagement with the EU in relation to military action was off the cards, as was any further strengthening of the EU's autonomous military capabilities.

5.3.3.6 Action following Libyan conflict (2011-2016)

Following the overthrow of Gadaffi, the Libyan Civil War entered a new phase. As noted above, the rebels who were initially fighting against Gadaffi split into factions and began fighting against each other. The continuing conflict has caused a major humanitarian crisis, with over 2 million refugees forced to flee Libya.⁴²⁵ Refugees have crossed into neighbouring states, such as Tunisia, and, most significantly, into Europe to seek refuge. The collapse of the Libyan state also caused Libya to be turned into a corridor through which migrants from across Africa have attempted to cross illegally into Europe. This has worsened the humanitarian crisis and conditions in Libya, with over 600,000 migrants thought to be stranded in Libya as of 2020, many of whom have been placed in detention centres.⁴²⁶ The conditions of these

⁴²⁵ 'Tunisia's president asks US for help', Al-Monitor, (05 August 2011) <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2014/08/tunisia-africa-summit-terrorists-helicopters.html> (accessed 05/04/21)

⁴²⁶ S Creta, 'As war drags on, troubles mount for Libya's Coast Guard and migrant detention centres', The New Humanitarian, (26 February 2020) <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2020/02/26/Libya-migrants-refugees-Italy-EU-Europe-detention> (accessed 05/04/21)

centres have been the subject of widespread condemnation by human rights groups and organisations such as the UN, who have described the centres as ‘inhuman’.⁴²⁷ The continued fighting also provided Islamist groups, such as Al Qaeda and ISIS, with an opportunity to establish a presence in Libya and attempt to make a grab for power themselves. From 2013, ISIS would establish a presence in Libya, taking control of a number of coastal towns, most notably Gadaffi’s home city of Sirte. The Libyan Civil War and its resulting humanitarian crisis still continues to this day.

The UK and the EU, as well as other state organisations such as the UN and NATO, recognised the humanitarian threat that would flow from the overthrow of Gadaffi. As early as May 2011, plans were being discussed by the UK government for post-conflict reconstruction of Libya and the provision of humanitarian support. William Hague and the then Minister for the Armed Forces, Nick Harvey, announced to the House of Commons that the UK would seek to involve and work with the EU in any post-conflict situation.⁴²⁸ By the end of the Libyan conflict, there were new figures in government steering the UK’s policy on the EU and CSDP. In October 2011, just prior to the death of Gadaffi, Liam Fox resigned as Defence Secretary and Phillip Hammond was appointed in his place. Hammond was regarded in a similar vein to his predecessor as a staunch Eurosceptic, however, unlike Fox, Hammond would support for the UK to remain part of the EU and would also oppose a no deal Brexit.⁴²⁹ According to the Lynch model,⁴³⁰ which categorises soft-Eurosceptics as being supportive of EU membership but opposing the extension of EU competences in social, justice and home affairs and security policy, Hammond meets the criteria of a soft-Eurosceptic. In a speech to the British Embassy in Berlin in May 2012, Hammond addressed the German Council on Foreign Relations regarding the UK government’s perspective on the future of the CSDP.⁴³¹ Hammond called upon the

⁴²⁷ United Nations Report: ‘Desperate and Dangerous: Report on the human rights situation of migrants and refugees in Libya’ (2018) <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/libya-migration-report-18dec2018.pdf> (accessed 05/04/21)

⁴²⁸ Hansard, House of Commons debate (3rd and 24th May 2011)

⁴²⁹ ‘Philip Hammond plans to quit if Johnson becomes PM’, BBC News, (London, 21 July 2019) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-49062514> (accessed 07/04/21)

⁴³⁰ P Lynch, ‘*The Conservatives and the European Union: The lull before the storm*’, in S Lee and M Beech, ‘*The Conservatives under David Cameron: Built to Last?*’ (Palgrave, 2009) 187

⁴³¹ Phillip Hammond, ‘*Shared Security: Transforming Defence to Face the Future*’ Speech, (2012)

EU to 'step up to the plate' to deliver security in the European neighbourhood and to stop being consumers of security but also producers of it. Hammond made the comments in light of the United States' new foreign policy direction, of turning its attention towards the emergence of China and Asia. Hammond argued that for the UK, the EU and the European nations, this meant taking more responsibility for security in the European neighbourhood. Hammond pointed to the Libyan conflict as an example, arguing that Libya exposed the imbalances and weaknesses of European NATO nations and that, without the US, Operation Unified Protector could not have been a success. Hammond called upon EU Member States to do more to act collectively and to work towards common positions, revealing a strong desire within the UK government to work with the EU the CSDP going forward.

In June 2012, Minister for Europe David Liddington gave a speech specifically addressing the UK government's perspective on the CSDP.⁴³² The speech was one of the most comprehensive accounts of the UK government's approach to CSDP at the time. Liddington described the CSDP as a key component of European defence, that the UK was proud of what the CSDP has achieved to date and that it wanted to play a leading role in strengthening and sharpening CSDP. That said, Liddington reinforced his government's belief that NATO formed the 'bedrock' of the UK's national security as well as European security when it comes to what he described as 'high intensity' conflicts. Liddington pointed to the Libyan crisis of 2011, as an example of how NATO allows the UK to act quickly to address these types of international crises. Liddington was quick to note, however, that the EU had its own 'unique selling points' when it came to UK and international security as well as an array of complementary tools. He described these tools as both military and civilian and the selling points as conflict prevention/peacekeeping, combating piracy and helping crisis management. Liddington stated that it was the UK's desire to see the EU at the 'top of the table' of global crisis management. Most notably, he outlined

<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/2012-05-02-shared-security-transforming-defence-to-face-the-future> (accessed 08/04/21)

⁴³² David Liddington, 'EU Common Security and Defence Policy: The UK Perspective', (2012) <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-common-security-and-defence-policy-the-uk-perspective> (accessed 08/04/21)

where the UK believed the CSDP could be a tool to address the Libya conflict, identifying this as helping Libya manage and control its borders, but also noting that this should not duplicate what 'other international actors' are doing. Finally, Liddington signed off by acknowledging the contribution that CSDP makes to UK security and defence, stating that the results of CSDP missions and operations 'matter' to the UK.

Post-Gadaffi, the UK government indicated a clear desire to work with the EU under the umbrella of the CSDP and the areas in which it felt the CSDP could make the greatest impact. For the UK, these areas were clearly in the peace making and peacekeeping process, state building and in the provision of humanitarian assistance. It also made clear that it believed the tools used to achieved this could be both military and civilian and indicated a desire to strengthen these capabilities. Implementing these policies, the UK would support two civilian CSDP operations launched post-Gadaffi: EUBAM Libya and 'Operation Sophia'.

5.3.3.7 EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM)

As mentioned above, following the fall of Gadaffi and as a result of the ensuing conflict, Libya lost control of its land, air and sea borders and became a corridor through which migrants from across Africa could cross into Europe. The lack of border control also meant that Islamist terrorist groups were also able to enter the country. In response to this, on 22nd May 2013, the European Council passed a decision to launch EUBAM Libya, an integrated border management mission in Libya in partnership with Libyan authorities.⁴³³

As a civilian crisis management mission with a capacity-building mandate, EUBAM assisted Libyan authorities at both strategic and operational levels to help the Libyan authorities to regain control of their borders. EUBAM was tasked with advising, training and mentoring Libyan counterparts in strengthening the border services in accordance with international standards and best practices, as well as advising

⁴³³ Council Decision 2013/233/CFSP

Libyan authorities on the development of a national Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy.⁴³⁴ Although the missions HQ would be initially based in Tripoli, the mission was eventually downsized in 2014 due to the deteriorating security situation in Libya and the HQ relocated to Tunis, Tunisia. Its mandate would be amended a number of times, first in February 2016, when its mandate was amended to provide for a possible civilian capacity building and assistance crisis management mission in the field of security sector reform, focussing on police, criminal justice, border security and migration. The mandate was amended again in July 2017, when the Council extended the mandate of EUBAM Libya until 31 December 2018 to plan for a possible non-executive CSDP mission providing advice and capacity building in the fields of border management, law enforcement and criminal justice.

The mission to date has largely been unable to achieve its objectives due to the deteriorating crisis in Libya. After the relocation of its HQ to Tunis, the mission was placed into 'sleep mode', meaning the mission was put on hold until seconded staff could safely return to Libya to carry out the mandate. EUBAM was able to return to Libya in September 2019 and re-establish its HQ there, however, its mandate remains unfulfilled and the Council recently extended the mission until 30th June 2023. That said, to reiterate, the focus of the thesis is on the partnership between the UK and the EU, not the success of the individual missions. The partnership can be evaluated by analysing the contributions made by the UK. In the case of EUBAM, this was a civilian mission. It was therefore funded by the EU's CFSP budget, which is set by the European Parliament, through which all CSDP civilian missions are funded.⁴³⁵ The UK's contribution to this budget is 15% – military missions are funded via the Athena Financing Mechanism, of which the UK's contribution is 16%. This will be looked at in more detail below. Although the UK's contribution of personnel to EUBAM was only small – 4 border experts to a mission

⁴³⁴ 'About the EU's Border Assistance Mission in Libya', EEAS, (15 September 2021) https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eubam-libya/about-eu-border-assistance-mission-libya-eubam_en?s=327 (accessed 04/12/21)

⁴³⁵ Treaty of Lisbon (2009), Article 41(2)

that was supposed to be 165 personnel at full operational capacity – its contribution in terms of finance was similar to the contributions made by France and Germany.

Although EUBAM is yet to fulfil its mandate almost 10 years on, it is clear that at the time of its launch in 2013, the mission was valued by the Cameron government in terms of the impact that it could have to help improve the security situation in Libya. Providing an update to the European Scrutiny Committee (ESC),⁴³⁶ a year on from the mission's launch, Minister for Europe, David Liddington, gave his government's evaluation of both the importance of EUBAM and of the UK's contribution to it. Liddington described the UK's involvement as 'significant', listing examples of the UK's assistance such as providing a Deputy Head of Mission, Border Security Advisers, and training of Libyan border guards. Liddington also drew to the Committee's attention the fact that the UK contributes 15% to civilian missions. In an Explanatory Memorandum brought before the ESC, Liddington outlines a comprehensive list of the government's reasons why EUBAM is in the UK's interests.⁴³⁷ The Memorandum states that Libyan border security is important for UK objectives of combating terrorism, arms dealing and people smuggling in the Southern Mediterranean and that EUBAM Libya makes an 'important contribution' to this. Liddington concedes that the first year of EUBAM was difficult, however, he goes on to defend the mission to the Committee by highlighting some of its achievements up to that date. Liddington described EUBAM as the most significant contribution to Libyan security to date and heralds the EU as Libya's lead partner on border security. Liddington also brought to the ESC's attention the achievements the mission has made in strengthening maritime capabilities of Libyan authorities and Navy and in building a stronger border network by strengthening telecommunications, information exchange and transport infrastructure, amongst other things. Speaking on how he saw the future of the mission and the UK's contribution, Liddington stated that the government wanted to see EUBAM further

⁴³⁶ The ESC is a parliamentary select committee of the House of Commons which assesses the legal and/or political importance of EU documents deposited by the UK government in Parliament.

⁴³⁷ ESC, Explanatory Memorandum (8th May 2014)

<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmeuleg/83-xlv/8317.htm#note67>
(accessed 10/04/21)

'imbed itself' in Libya and the UK was prepared to continue to support the mission. The Committee ultimately agreed with Liddington's assessment of the mission and categorised EUBAM as 'politically important'. The ESC would continue to support the UK's involvement until the UK's withdrawal of the EU in 2020.⁴³⁸ EUBAM still exists and experts in the field still consider it an important mission, giving the EU a head start in supporting state structures for security when circumstances permit.

5.3.3.8 EUNAVFOR Med 'Operation Sophia'

EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia ('Operation Sophia') was another CSDP mission which was launched in June 2015 in response to the continued Libyan conflict and the resulting migration, refugee and human trafficking crisis.⁴³⁹ Sophia complemented EUBAM but was different to it in that it was a military CSDP operation. Through Sophia, the EU conducted a military crisis management operation contributing to the disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in Libya and the wider Southern Mediterranean. Its tasks included identifying, capturing and disposing of vessels and assets used or suspected of being used by smugglers or traffickers. Its mandate included patrolling the Southern Mediterranean seas to detect and monitor migration networks and to conduct boarding, search and seizure of vessels suspected of being used in human trafficking. In June 2016, Sophia's mandate was broadened to include the capacity building and training of the Libyan Navy and Coastguard, as well as contributing to information sharing and contribution to the implementation of the UN arms embargo in accordance with UNSCR 2292.⁴⁴⁰ In July 2017 the Council extended the mandate of Sophia again to provide further and long-term training to the Libyan Coastguard as well as carry out new surveillance activities and information gathering on illegal trafficking of oil exports from Libya. In January 2019, Sophia's mandate was reduced and on 31st March 2020, it was replaced by a new mission EUNAVFOR MED Operation Irini.

⁴³⁸ *Ibid*

⁴³⁹ Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778

⁴⁴⁰ Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/993

The mission was responsible for ‘neutralising’ over 475 assets of human trafficking and rescued more than 40,000 migrants from the Mediterranean Sea. Against this, however, in 2017, the European Union Committee of the House of Lords in a report declared Sophia ‘a failed mission’. The Committee stated that, although the mission had saved lives and apprehended assets, irregular migration into Europe increased by 18% in 2016 and 19% in 2017 compared to the previous year.⁴⁴¹ The report also claimed that Sophia had encouraged human trafficking, with human traffickers sending migrants into the Mediterranean in unseaworthy vessels with migrants believing they would be saved by the EU coastguard. This ultimately resulted in an increase in deaths of migrants. As a result, the Committee recommended the UK government to not renew the mandate of Operation Sophia. It did, however, encourage the UK and the EU to continue with its counter-migration efforts and even recommended the launching of a new CSDP mission to the southern border of Libya.

Again, whilst the success of the EU’s CSDP operations are important, regardless of the success of Operation Sophia itself, the focus here is on the security and defence partnership between the UK and the EU and whether it functioned well as a partnership or not. In terms of the UK’s contribution of personnel, its contribution in this respect has been described as ‘modest’.⁴⁴² That said, providing expert evidence to the House of Lords EU Committee, Angus Lapsley, Director, Defence and International Security, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), stated that the UK has contributed significantly in terms of financing and costs to Operation Sophia. As noted above, CSDP military operations are different to CSDP civilian operations in that they are not funded through the EU budget, rather, they are financed via the Athena mechanism.⁴⁴³ Member States pay into Athena and their contribution is

⁴⁴¹ European Union Committee, ‘*Operation Sophia: a failed mission*’ Report (2017) <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldcom/5/503.htm> (accessed 12/04/21)

⁴⁴² European Union Committee, ‘*Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations*’, (2018) <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldcom/132/13202.htm> (accessed 12/04/21)

⁴⁴³ Lisbon Treaty (2009), Article 41(2)

proportionate to the size of their economy (contributions are calculated according to a Gross National Income scale and varies from year to year). The Athena mechanism means that the EU Member States will, as a whole, cover what is commonly referred to as the 'common costs' of a mission, which includes things like the running costs of a HQ, travel expenses, IT systems etc. This has been estimated to generally only cover 10-15% of the costs of an operation.⁴⁴⁴ The rest of the costs of the mission – 85-90% - are paid for by the Member States participating in it. The UK's contribution of 16% to military CSDP operations is slightly higher than the contribution it makes to civilian CSDP operations (15%). Although the figure differs from year-to-year, in 2011, the common cost of operations funded by Athena was €34.7 million, of which the UK's share was €4.9 million. The equivalent figure for France was approximately €5.8m, and for Germany, approximately €7.2m.

It is unclear what the breakdown in costs of Operation Sophia were, however, by combining the UK's 14% contribution to 'common costs' via Athena and its 16% contribution to military CSDP operations, its contribution to Operation Sophia could be said to be in the region of 30% of the overall operation costs. Giving his expert opinion to the EU Committee in the House of Lords, Angus Lapsley argued that, on the basis of the EU's CSDP financing mechanisms, the UK made a "substantial monetary contribution" to Operation Sophia.⁴⁴⁵ Lapsley also drew the Committee's attention to a £600,000 payment that the UK made towards Operation Sophia, to support the training of the Libyan coastguard. Although the UK's contribution of personnel to CSDP missions have, at times, been disproportionately low, in the case of Operation Sophia, Lapsley argues that the UK dedicated 'serious military assets' to this mission. In the case of Sophia, the UK provided survey vessels HMS Echo and HMS Enterprise, the air-defence destroyer HMS Diamond, the frigate HMS Richmond, and with Merlin Mk2, AW159 Wildcat and AW Lynx Mk8 helicopters.⁴⁴⁶

⁴⁴⁴ 'Athena - financing security and defence military operations', European Council <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/athena/> (accessed 15/04/21)

⁴⁴⁵ European Union Committee, *Supra* 442

⁴⁴⁶ 'EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia—Assets', EEAS https://www.operationsophia.eu/media_category/assets/page/3/?deployment=any&tax=media_category&categories=&nation=&search_archive=filter#038;tax=media_category&categories=&nation=&search_archive=filter (accessed 16/04/21)

Furthermore, as highlighted in the UK's Brexit position paper on foreign policy and defence in 2017, the UK was also one of only a few Member States to have a ship continuously assigned an operation, provide personnel, and on top of its share of common costs, funded almost £600,000 for Libyan Coastguard training.⁴⁴⁷ Although ultimately Operation Sophia was branded a 'failure' by the House of Lords in 2017, it was clear that, for the UK government at the time and the successive government of Prime Minister Theresa May, valued the impact that the EU and the CSDP could have in addressing the fallout of the Libyan Conflict. The level of the UK's contribution to the operation is testament to this.

5.4 Case Study 2: Ukraine Conflict (2014)

5.4.1 Background

The UK and the EU's relationship has historically been a turbulent one. The Soviet Union's occupation of Eastern Europe, the 'Iron Curtain' and the Cold War, had all been major issues, not just in the relationship between Europe and the Soviet Union, but for the world as a whole. The political wounds caused by these events still have not healed to this day. In the case of the UK, these historical events coupled with its 'Special Relationship' with the US, has caused its relationship with Russia to be even more embittered than Russia's relationship with the EU. The poisoning of Russian defectors on British soil – Alexander Litvinenko in 2006 and Sergei Skripal in 2018 – and alleged cyber-attacks and Russian interference in the Brexit referendum have only strained this relationship further. Between the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and 2008, however, relations between the West and Russia had improved significantly. Leaders such as Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin became close allies of the West and even Vladimir Putin was invited to the White House and entertained by President George W. Bush. Bush was quoted as saying about Putin: "I looked the man in the eye. I found him very straightforward and trustworthy – I was able to get

⁴⁴⁷ 'Foreign policy, defence and development - a future partnership paper', HM Gov, (2017) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/foreign-policy-defence-and-development-a-future-partnership-paper> (accessed 16/04/21)

a sense of his soul”.⁴⁴⁸ Russian and Western relations up to 2008 were strained but they were improving substantially.

When it became clear in the mid-to-late eighties that the Soviet Union was near to economic and political collapse, private discussions and negotiations took place between the US and Soviet leadership about a smooth transition from Soviet occupied Germany to German reunification. Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, a formal process took place in which American and Soviet leaders met to discuss German reunification. Although no mention was ever made of it in the Two Plus Four Agreement (the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany) 1990, it has become a repeated assertion by Russian leaders Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin that assurances were made by the US – specifically by US Secretary of State James Baker – that NATO expansion would not move “one inch Eastward”.⁴⁴⁹ These claims were further corroborated by then-German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, who assured Gorbachev “NATO could not expand its territory to the current territory of the GDR”.⁴⁵⁰ Furthermore, former PM John Major also made assurances to Soviet Defence Minister Marshal Dmitry Yazov, that “nothing of the sought will ever happen” in relation to NATO eastward expansion.⁴⁵¹ Russian leaders have repeatedly cited these assurances as one of the key reasons why it left Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe.

Despite these assurances, 14 eastern European states have joined NATO since German reunification in 1990. In a speech given to the Munich Security Conference in 2007, Putin complained about the US’s drive to expand NATO’s ‘missile shield’ into former Soviet states, citing the assurances allegedly given to the Soviet Union during

⁴⁴⁸ See C Rice, *No Higher Honour: A Memoir of My Years in Washington* (Simon & Schuster, 2011)

⁴⁴⁹ Mary Sarotte, *Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of the Cold War Stalemate*, (Yale University Press, 2022)

⁴⁵⁰ A Galkin and A Chernyaev, *Mikhail Gorbachev i germanskii vopros* (Ves Mir, 2006)

<https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16120-document-09-memorandum-conversation-between> (accessed 01/05/21)

⁴⁵¹ *Ambassador Rodric Braithwaite diary, 05 March 1991*, National Security Archive

<https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16142-document-28-ambassador-rodric-braithwaite-diary> (accessed 01/05/21)

the German reunification process.⁴⁵² The 14 new members of NATO, whilst their accession has frustrated Putin, have largely been stomached by him. This said, since coming to power, Putin has repeatedly stated that Ukrainian and Georgian membership of NATO would be considered the crossing of a 'red line'.⁴⁵³ Tensions over Ukrainian and Georgian membership of NATO came to a head following the April 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit. In the summit declaration, it stated that NATO Allies 'welcomed Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership and agreed that these countries will become members of NATO'.⁴⁵⁴ The declaration also stated that NATO supported Ukraine and Georgia's applications for the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP).⁴⁵⁵ The outcome of the Bucharest Summit was met with hostility by Putin, who stated that "NATO's enlargement would be taken as a direct threat" to Russian security.⁴⁵⁶ Immediately following the Bucharest Summit, Putin began preparing the Russian military for war with Georgia.⁴⁵⁷ In August 2008, just four months after the Bucharest Summit, the Russo-Georgian Conflict broke out. The majority of the fighting took place in the disputed South Ossetia, a disputed territory between Russia and Georgia.

The conflict in Georgia only lasted 12 days, however, it has widely been regarded as coming close to triggering WW3. As Whitman notes, the case of Georgia is far from a success story for EU conflict management, however, it was an example of how far EU had come as a security and defence actor.⁴⁵⁸ The EU's intervention in Georgia was one of its finest moments as a conflict manager and, although not perfect, revealed the opportunities that lay ahead for EU security and defence aspirations. Following

⁴⁵² V Putin, Munich Security Conference Speech (2017) <https://russialist.org/transcript-putin-speech-and-the-following-discussion-at-the-munich-conference-on-security-policy/> (accessed 01/05/21)

⁴⁵³ A Macias, 'Biden didn't accept Putin's 'red lines' on Ukraine – here's what that means', CNBC <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/08/biden-didnt-accept-putins-red-line-on-ukraine-what-it-means.html> (accessed 02/05/21)

⁴⁵⁴ 'NATO decisions on open-door policy', NATO (03 April 2008) <https://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/04-april/e0403h.html> (accessed 02/05/21)

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid*

⁴⁵⁶ M Evans, 'Vladimir Putin tells summit he wants security and friendship', The Times (London, 05 April 2008) <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/vladimir-putin-tells-summit-he-wants-security-and-friendship-96655h3k9nf> (accessed 02/05/21)

⁴⁵⁷ See M Herpen, 'Putin's Wars: The Rise of Russia's New Imperialism', (Rowman & Littlefield, 2014)

⁴⁵⁸ R Whitman, 'The EU as a conflict manager? the case of Georgia and its implications', (2010), *International Affairs* 86 (1) 95

the outbreak of war in Georgia, President Bush promised to “come to the aid” of Georgia. The US also sent American warships to the Black Sea and helped transport Georgian troops, initially stationed in Afghanistan, back to Georgia.⁴⁵⁹ It was the closest the US and Russia ever came to direct conflict with one another. The EU was situated in an ideal position politically to mediate between Russia, Georgia and the US in that it had a level of neutrality. On the one hand it had Member States who traditionally rallied behind US foreign policy, i.e. the UK and Poland, and Member States who shared a close relationship with Russia and Putin, i.e. France and Germany. Its strong soft-power capabilities – diplomacy and economic sanctions – also provided it with the necessary tools with which to mediate. In the end, with the help of Sarkozy and France’s close relationship with Putin, the EU was able to make, as Whitman describes it, a ‘remarkably swift and decisive action’ which resulted in a ceasefire agreement and the withdrawal of Russian troops to their positions prior to the war.⁴⁶⁰ The EU also became the sole international actor on the ground in Georgia following the end of hostilities.⁴⁶¹ It has widely been regarded as one of the EU’s finest moments as a security and defence actor.

Although a ceasefire was brokered between Russia and Georgia, tensions between Russia and Georgia and Ukraine continue to this day, coming to a head most recently in February 2022 with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Today’s conflict is somewhat of an extension of the 2014 Ukrainian conflict and the Georgian conflict. Like with Russia’s conflict with Georgia in 2008, Putin has cited Ukrainian membership of NATO as a primary justification for his two invasions of Ukraine.⁴⁶² The 2014 conflict, however, was also rooted in Ukraine’s aspirations for EU membership. Ukrainian membership of the EU had been earmarked for some time. In 2007, Ukraine became the first European Neighbourhood (ENP) country to begin negotiations on a new

⁴⁵⁹ S Pifer, ‘George W. Bush Was Tough on Russia? Give Me a Break’, Politico, (24 March 2014) <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/bush-georgia-obama-ukraine-104929/> (accessed 10/05/21)

⁴⁶⁰ Whitman, *Supra* 458, at 88

⁴⁶¹ ‘Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia’ Report, ECHR, (2009), 35-6

⁴⁶² H Ellyatt, ‘Putin blames the West for Ukraine war in ‘Victory Day’ speech’, CNBC <https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/09/putin-blames-the-west-for-ukraine-war-in-victory-day-speech.html>

Association Agreement for the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). The DCFTA sort to reduce tariffs that European firms faced when exporting to Ukraine.⁴⁶³ The Agreement sort to facilitate trade by making customs procedures more efficient and by gradual approximation of Ukrainian legislation, rules and procedures, including standards, to those of the EU.⁴⁶⁴ In return, the EU agreed to provide Ukraine with political and financial support, access to research and knowledge, and preferential access to EU markets. The agreement also committed both parties to promote a gradual convergence toward the CSDP policies.

The then-Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovich, was a pro-Russian and ally of Putin. Yanukovich's government and Putin viewed the DCFTA as a ploy by the EU and NATO to bring Ukraine closer to EU membership and, in turn, bring it further under the sphere of influence of NATO and the US. In response, in 2013, Yanukovich suspended preparatory work leading to the Agreement and, at the eleventh hour, refused to sign it. Instead, Yanukovich favoured an alternative association agreement presented by Russia in response to the DCFTA, which sort to bring Ukraine under the existing Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. In response to this, a wave of demonstrations and civil unrest – dubbed 'Euromaiden' – erupted in Kiev followed by violent clashes between Ukrainian police and protesters. With protesters eventually getting the upper hand in the capital, the government was toppled and Yanukovich was forced to flee the country. In an attempt to salvage Russian influence in Ukraine, in March 2014, Putin invaded and annexed the Republic Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. Following this, in May 2014, pro-Russian separatists began seizing territory in eastern Ukraine, in the now-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics.⁴⁶⁵ Low-level fighting initially broke out between the Ukrainian military and Russian-backed separatists, which eventually spilled over into outright war. The conflict escalated even further when, in July 2014,

⁴⁶³ <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/eu-ukraine-deep-and-comprehensive-free-trade-area>

⁴⁶⁴ 'EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area', European Commission <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/eu-ukraine-deep-and-comprehensive-free-trade-area> (accessed 02/06/21)

⁴⁶⁵ See N MacFarlane and A Menon, 'The EU and Ukraine', (2014) *Global Politics and Strategy*, 56 (3)

civilian airliner Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 was shot down mid-flight over eastern Ukraine, killing all 298 people on board.

Following an investigation, the Dutch Safety Board (DSB) finds the plane was hit by a Russian ground-to-air missile. In the aftermath of the downing of MH17, international pressure was mounted on Russia and Ukraine to broker a ceasefire. In September 2014, Ukraine and pro-Russian rebels signed the First Minsk Agreement, ending almost 5 months of fighting, however, it collapsed within days.⁴⁶⁶ After more months of fighting, in January 2015, a second Minsk Agreement was signed.⁴⁶⁷ Minsk 2 included 13 points: 9 relating to the management of the actual conflict (ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weapons, exchange of prisoners etc.) and 4 relating to politics in Ukraine, including elections in Donetsk and Luhansk, the granting of ‘special status’ (devolved powers) to these regions, the re-establishment of Ukraine’s borders by Ukraine and constitutional reform in Ukraine (including the adoption of a ‘special neutral status’ by Ukraine). Both parties would eventually break Minsk 2 and tensions between the two nations would ultimately boil over into the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.⁴⁶⁸

5.4.2 UK position on EU intervention in Ukraine

5.2.2.1 EU sanctions

The UK has historically been a close ally of Ukraine. The UK, US and Russia are signatories to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum with Ukraine, which provided security assurances against the “threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine”, including respect for its sovereignty and existing borders, in exchange for Ukraine’s unilateral nuclear disarmament and

⁴⁶⁶ The Minsk 1 Agreement (2014) <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/05/minsk-conundrum-western-policy-and-russias-war-eastern-ukraine-0/minsk-1-agreement> (accessed 10/06/21)

⁴⁶⁷ The Minsk 2 Agreement (2014) <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/05/minsk-conundrum-western-policy-and-russias-war-eastern-ukraine-0/minsk-2-agreement> (accessed 10/06/21)

⁴⁶⁸ In February 2019, an amendment to Ukraine’s constitution, setting NATO membership as a strategic foreign and security policy, enters into force, breaching the terms of Minsk 2 in the eyes of Putin and Russia. Russia also broke the agreement by recognising Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states.

accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since Ukraine got its independence in the early 1990's, the UK's security and defence partnership with Ukraine has been focused on defence reform, defence planning and military capacity building. The UK, like the US and other Western nations, have had to tread a thin line when it has come to assisting Ukraine. Both Russia and the US and its allies (including the UK), have been careful not to come into direct conflict with one another. As military powers, both sides have repeatedly stated that they would not rule out the use of nuclear weapons, should the other attack them. Most recently in the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War, Putin has repeatedly said that Western military assistance would be a provocation to Russia and that it would be met with a 'lightning fast' response.⁴⁶⁹ In turn, both the UK's assistance to and rhetoric on Ukraine in both the 2014 and 2022 conflicts has had to be measured carefully.

Given the gravity of a potential nuclear conflict with Russia, from the very beginning of the 2014 conflict, Cameron's government aligned itself closely with the EU to coordinate an effective response to the Ukrainian conflict, without resorting to hard military tactics. In the initial phase of the conflict, Foreign Secretary William Hague, in a speech to the HoC, condemned the conflict and Russia's interference in it.⁴⁷⁰ He spoke of the UK government's support for the announcement made by the EU's FAC, which condemned Russia's acts of aggression, called on Russia to immediately withdraw its forces to where they were stationed before the conflict, and to agree to the request by Ukraine for direct consultations under the Budapest memorandum.⁴⁷¹ Hague also outline his support for the €610 million in financial assistance the EU provided to Ukraine and stated that the UK would support future EU plans to provide further financial assistance to Ukraine. On 6th March 2014, the EU Council met to address the Ukraine crisis. The Council threatened Russia with economic sanctions, after announcing the freezing of the assets of the ousted pro-Russian

⁴⁶⁹ L Binding, 'Vladimir Putin warns interfering countries of 'lightning-fast' reaction - as EU decries gas cuts as 'blackmail'', Sky News, (London, 27 April 2022) <https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-vladimir-putin-warns-interfering-countries-of-lightning-fast-reaction-as-eu-decries-gas-cuts-as-blackmail-12600221> (accessed 11/06/21)

⁴⁷⁰ Hansard, House of Commons Debate (04 March 2014) c755

⁴⁷¹ *Ibid*

Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich and 17 other Russian officials.⁴⁷² Sanctions such as freezing talks regarding Russian visas and regulating relations between Russia and the EU.⁴⁷³ European diplomats, however, conceded that the sanctions were more symbolic than substantive. At the summit, Cameron gave a speech to the Council, calling on the EU to act, drawing the Council's attention to the 70 years of peace the EU Member States had worked "so hard to keep".⁴⁷⁴ Cameron called on the EU to start work on additional measures, such as travel bans and asset freezes.⁴⁷⁵ Cameron acknowledged that getting agreement on CSDP is never easy, however, told the Council that the UK is proud to have "played an important part" in bringing the EU together over Ukraine.

Following the EU Council summit, Cameron updated the HoC on action being taken in Ukraine. The speech gave some insight to the value that he and his government placed in the EU's ability to address the Ukrainian conflict. In this speech, Cameron assured the Commons that, although the EU has not yet agreed to deploy these measures, they would be introduced if Russia did not open peace talks with Ukraine and if Russia tried to claim that referendum in Crimea about its future was legitimate. Cameron also gave his support to an increase in EU sanctions against Russia that would include a broad range of economic areas. Cameron also defended the EU's course of action, by trying dialogue with Russia first before implementing sanctions. He argued that the EU's approach was "not doomed to not work" and called up the EU Member States to provide a "strong, predictable and consistent" approach to the conflict.⁴⁷⁶

⁴⁷² This would be implemented via Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP 17th March 2014

⁴⁷³ I Traynor, 'Ukraine crisis: Crimea announces referendum on joining Russia', Guardian UK, (London, 06 March 2014) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/06/ukraine-crisis-european-leaders-emergency-summit> (accessed 12/06/21)

⁴⁷⁴ David Cameron, EU meeting on Ukraine Speech, (2014) <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-meeting-on-ukraine-david-camersons-speech> (accessed 12/06/21)

⁴⁷⁵ *Ibid*

⁴⁷⁶ A Sparrow, 'David Cameron's Commons statement on Ukraine', Guardian UK, (London, 10 March 2014) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/2014/mar/10/gordon-browns-speech-on-further-devolution-to-scotland-politics-live-blog> (accessed 14/06/21)

Following the sanctions made by the EU in March 2014, freezing the assets of ‘certain individuals threatening the integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine’, no new sanctions were made against Russia until July 2014. In June 2014, following a meeting between EU foreign ministers, William Hague announced that, if the UK was not happy with Russia’s response to a peace plan being offered by Ukraine, that the UK would be willing to support the imposition of more sanctions against Russia by the EU.⁴⁷⁷ In turn, at a meeting of the European Council in July 2014, the EU concluded that Russia had not sufficiently implemented the steps set out in their previous conclusions, in which they had called on Russia to use its influence on the rebel groups and to stop the flow of militants and weaponry across the border and to achieve rapid results in de-escalating the conflict.

As a result, the Council stopped the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development from granting further loans in the Russian Federation and instructed the European Commission to prepare a list of entities supporting the unrest by and to implement asset freezes and travel bans against them.⁴⁷⁸ As Dr Tomila Lankina points out, the UK, without doubt, represented one of the stronger voices among EU member states advocating sanctions against Russia following its annexation of Crimea and proxy war in the Donbas.⁴⁷⁹

Following the shooting down of MH17, Cameron and the UK government stepped up their pressure on the EU to take a tougher stance against Russia. The then-UK Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond (taking over from William Hague in July 2014) argued that asset freezes and travel bans could be imposed on close associates of Russian leader Vladimir Putin. Press reports at the time suggested that the UK government were pressing for ‘tier three’ sanctions. These are sanctions that target the whole sectors of a state’s economy and impose arms trade bans.⁴⁸⁰ Cameron

⁴⁷⁷ A Croft and J Pawlak, ‘Hague says EU ready for more Russia sanctions if necessary’, Reuters, (23 June 2014) <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-ukraine-crisis-eu-idUKKBN0EY11L20140623> (accessed 14/06/21)

⁴⁷⁸ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/143992.pdf

⁴⁷⁹ European Union Committee, ‘The EU and Russia: before and beyond the crisis in Ukraine

⁴⁸⁰ tier 3 sanctions: what are they?, 6th report, (2015) <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldeucom/115/11509.htm> (accessed 14/06/21)

stepped up his rhetoric on Russia and called on the EU to do more. He criticised European leaders who he alleged were hoping that the crisis “would go away”.⁴⁸¹ He also criticised what he saw as a “reluctance on the part of too many European countries to face up to the implications of what is happening in eastern Ukraine” and that he saw this reluctance at the European Council meeting in July 2014. Over the next few days, the EU expanded its list of sanctions to include more Russian individuals and entities.⁴⁸² Eventually, on 28th July, the EU, the UK, along with France, Germany, Italy and the US, agreed to tier three sanctions against Russia, including restricting Russian banks’ access to European and UK finance. This meant that EU nationals and companies could no longer buy or sell new bonds, equity or similar financial instruments with a maturity exceeding 90 days, issued by major state-owned Russian banks. These sanctions also included an embargo on the export and import of arms and related material, covering all items from the EU common military list and an export ban on goods and technology used for military ends. All of these measures were agreed to and supported by the UK.

The reaction to the use of sanctions against Russia was mixed – and still is to this day. There are some that argue that sanctions enable the EU’s Member States to take effective action against Russia without resorting to military force. Others, on the other hand, argue that they only strengthen nationalistic feelings within Russia.⁴⁸³ That said, following the 2014 EU and US sanctions against Russia, in 2015, Russia entered a recession, with Russia’s Economy Ministry predicting a contraction of the Russian economy of 0.8%, as opposed to the previous expectation of a 1.2% growth in 2015.⁴⁸⁴ Although sanctions had clearly had an impact, there appeared to

⁴⁸¹ David Cameron, ‘MH17 air disaster’ Speech, (2014) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/mh17-air-disaster-article-by-david-cameron> (accessed 15/06/21)

⁴⁸² 15 additional persons and 18 new entities with a travel ban and assets freeze. In total, therefore, 87 persons and 20 entities were now under EU sanctions over the situation in Ukraine

⁴⁸³ Sir Tony Brenton, former UK ambassador in Moscow, argued that sanctions would be counter-productive, both because Vladimir Putin is riding high on nationalistic approval in Russia, and because they could force Russia to turn away from the West; See T Brenton, ‘Sanctions won’t work – we will have to negotiate with Vladimir Putin’, The Telegraph, (London, 24 July 2014) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10986630/Sanctions-wont-work-we-will-have-to-negotiate-with-Vladimir-Putin.html> (accessed 20/06/21)

⁴⁸⁴ ‘Russia warns of recession in 2015’, BBC News, (London, 02 December 2014) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-30288739> (accessed 20/06/21)

be an appetite within Cameron's government and across the EU, to do more to help equip Ukraine in its fight against Russia.

5.2.2.2 EUAM Ukraine

By July 2014, although sanctions were beginning to have an effect on Russia's occupation of Ukraine, there was growing pressure from within the Cameron government to see the EU do more to address the conflict in Ukraine. Writing in the *Sunday Times*, Cameron criticised the EU and its Member States for being 'slow to act' against Russia and called upon the EU to make its 'power, influence and resources count'.⁴⁸⁵ Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, speaking to the *Daily Mail*, warned Russia to get out of Ukraine and that, whilst he agreed sanctions were affecting the Russian economy, the UK would be willing to support more action through the EU to assist Ukraine.⁴⁸⁶ Fallon also indicated the UK would be willing to give more military assistance to NATO member countries in Eastern Europe to help address the threat from Russia.⁴⁸⁷ The UK would provide its own assistance to Ukraine via 'Operation Orbital' launched in October 2015, whereby the UK would provide bilateral assistance to the Ukrainian Government, which included the provision of non-lethal military equipment (defensive and designed to prevent further fatalities and casualties to Ukrainian forces).⁴⁸⁸ The Operation would also include non-lethal training and capacity building, providing guidance and training to the Ukrainian armed forces through several advisory and short-term training teams. In all, the UK would send 100 personnel to Ukraine as part of the operation. In March 2015, the MOD set out the UK's overall policy with respect to military assistance to Ukraine, which stated that it would be the UK's policy to provide non-lethal assistance to Ukrainian armed forces, and that the MOD would continue to

⁴⁸⁵ 'David Cameron criticises Europe for lack of action on pro-Russia separatists', *Guardian UK*, (London, 20 July 2014) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/jul/20/david-cameron-europe-russia-ukraine-mh17> (accessed 20/06/21)

⁴⁸⁶ *Ibid*

⁴⁸⁷ 'Michael Fallon: UK to send troops to Baltic region', *BBC News*, (London, 08 October 2015) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-34472739> (accessed 20/06/21)

⁴⁸⁸ House of Commons, 'Military Assistance to Ukraine 2014-2021' Research Briefing, (2014) <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn07135/> (accessed 20/06/21)

focus on support and assistance that will reduce fatalities and casualties amongst members of the Ukrainian armed forces, whilst building their capacity and resilience.⁴⁸⁹

While UK military assistance was bilateral in nature, the provision of equipment and training was undertaken in coordination with allies, primarily through NATO and the EU, through EUAM Ukraine.

The appetite within the Cameron government to provide non-lethal aid and assistance to Ukraine coupled with the pressure that Cameron and his ministers were putting on the EU to do more in Ukraine, played a significant role in the establishment of EUAM Ukraine. At an FAC meeting in July 2014, the Council, including the UK, discussed the situation in Ukraine following the downing of MH17 and adopted a decision launching the civilian CSDP mission European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine). EUAM was mandated with mentoring and advising relevant Ukrainian bodies in the elaboration and implementation of renewed security strategies and cohesive reform efforts, in order to create sustainable security services delivering the rule of law. EUAM was also mandated with reorganising and restructuring Ukrainian security services in a way to help Ukraine recover control over them. The mission was also tasked with assisting in civilian security sector reform planning process. The HQ was initially in Kiev and it has had its mandate renewed and updated a number of times since 2014. Since the Russian invasion in February 2022, however, EUAM was no longer able to fully implement its mandate in Ukraine and remains on standby at the time of writing this thesis.

In terms of financing, EUAM received a €2.68 million for the start-up of the mission and the Council allocated it a budget of € 13.1m for the first 12 months of the mission's two-year mandate starting on the 1st of December. In terms of personnel, EUAM consisted of 143 personnel. As EUAM Ukraine is a civilian mission, as noted above, the funding for the mission comes from the EU budget, of which the UK's

⁴⁸⁹ *Ibid*

contribution is 15%. In terms of personnel, the UK seconded 6 personnel to the mission for the duration of the mission. Again, in terms of the UK's personnel, the figure was well below what it should be sending (although it was one of the highest number of personnel it had sent to a CSDP civilian mission), however, its 15% share of the totally annual costs of the mission were, again, on par with France and Germany. In the case of EUAM, however, the value of the mission to the UK, is best looked at in what has been said about it since its launch.

5.2.2.3 UK perspectives following EU sanctions and EUAM Ukraine

Not long after the launch of EUAM, in May 2015, the UK General Election was held. In the lead up to the General Election, the Conservatives under Cameron published their 2015 Party Manifesto.⁴⁹⁰ Europe was a key feature of the manifesto, mentioning the word 'Europe' a total of 85 times.⁴⁹¹ Overall, the key points made in relation to Europe in the manifesto were a scrapping of the Human Rights Act and an introduction of a British Bill of Rights and the promise of an in-out referendum on the UK's membership of the EU before the end of 2017. Like the 2010 manifesto, the 2015 manifesto promised no further transfer of powers to the EU and ruled out any support for a European Army. That said, the manifesto did make promises that the UK would continue to use its membership of the EU to 'keep the UK safe'. Furthermore, although promises of a referendum were made, the manifesto clearly highlighted Cameron and the Party's position to remain in the EU and seek a 'new settlement' with the EU.⁴⁹²

In November 2015, following the Conservative victory in the 2015 General Election from which Cameron was able to establish a majority government, the UK

⁴⁹⁰ Conservative Manifesto (2015)

<https://www.theresavilliers.co.uk/sites/www.theresavilliers.co.uk/files/conservativemanifesto2015.pdf> (accessed 28/06/21)

⁴⁹¹ A Sedghi, G Arnett and H Bengtesson, 'What Conservative manifesto's key themes reveal about party's priorities', Guardian UK, (London, 14 April 2015)

<https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2015/apr/14/what-conservative-manifestos-key-themes-reveal-about-partys-priorities> (accessed 28/06/21)

⁴⁹² Conservative Manifesto (2015), *Supra* 490, at 72

government published its National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review.⁴⁹³ The Review spoke positively about the EU's complementary value to NATO and boasted about the UK's involvement in EU CSDP missions in Libya and Ukraine and the lead it took on sanctions against Russia in 2014, claiming the UK played a 'leading role in them'.⁴⁹⁴ The Review also dedicated a section specifically to Ukraine, outlining what it has done with the EU to address the conflict. The Review expressed the desire and intention of the Cameron government to continue to work with the EU in Ukraine through EUAM and to continue to work with the EU to maintain the pressure of sanctions on Russia to comply with the commitments it entered into at the Minsk Summit.⁴⁹⁵ The Review also highlighted the threats of both state-sponsored and non-state actors undermining the security and stability of the Western Balkans and Eastern neighbourhood, such as the spread of extremism and organized crime across Europe.⁴⁹⁶ The Review outlined the Cameron government's intentions to continue to work with NATO and the EU, as well as bilaterally, to build greater resilience in the region, including through EUAM Ukraine. Concluding, the government assessed its own participation in the CFSP and CSDP stating that it was 'strongly in the UK's interests to work through the EU in foreign policy'.⁴⁹⁷

In the lead up to the Brexit referendum in 2016, Cameron made a number of speeches addressing what he saw as the threat Brexit posed to the UK's security. In May 2016, Cameron gave one of his few speeches relating to the UK's security and defence partnership with the EU. Cameron stated that EU membership meant strength, security and safety in the world for the UK.⁴⁹⁸ Cameron also stated that "if you love this country and want to keep it safe" the UK's membership of the EU was one of the tools by which to do that. Cameron also argued that the EU "amplifies"

⁴⁹³ National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review (2015) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-and-strategic-defence-and-security-review-2015> (accessed 28/06/21)

⁴⁹⁴ *Ibid*

⁴⁹⁵ *Ibid*

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid*

⁴⁹⁷ *Ibid*

⁴⁹⁸ David Cameron, 'UK's strength and security in the EU' Speech, (2016) <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-on-the-uks-strength-and-security-in-the-eu-9-may-2016> (accessed 01/07/21)

the UK's power in the world, and enables it to address security challenges. Cameron also devoted a significant portion of his speech to addressing the role the EU played in the UK's security and defence policy. He argued that the UK and the EU shared common threats that these affected both regardless of whether the UK was in the EU or not. He also argued that these threats required a shared approach by the UK and the EU. He reiterated his belief that NATO and the US were the alliances that the UK would always look to for its defence, however, he underscored his belief that the EU was a "vital tool" in the UK's "armory" to deal with its security and defence threats. Cameron also spoke of his fear of the unravelling of the EU following the UK's departure and a return to what he described as "turning the clock back to competing nationalisms". He also states that the Baltic States (i.e. Ukraine) would view the UK's departure from the EU with "utter dismay". He described closer security cooperation and utilizing the EU's soft-power tools as "essential" to addressing security and defence threats such as terrorism, organized crime and illegal migration. Cameron also drew attention to a message given by former heads of MI5 and MI6 – Johnathan Evans and John Sawers – who said the UK was safer inside the EU. Cameron also made reference to EUAM Ukraine and argued that the idea that EU membership emasculated the UK's security and defence powers was complete nonsense. Cameron also used the UK's role in securing EU sanctions against Russia as an example of how the UK's membership of the EU provided it with greater impact in security and defence. He argued that without being in the EU, these sanctions could not have been secured and that he was fearful that the UK would lose the tool of EU security and defence. Cameron concluded by stating that the UK required the closest possible security and defence cooperation with the EU and that the UK was stronger and safer inside the EU.

Cameron's ministers also gave a number of speeches in the lead up to the Brexit referendum in 2016. Home Secretary (Cameron's successor as PM) Theresa May, said that it was her belief that remaining a member of the EU meant that the UK

would be more secure from crime and terrorism.⁴⁹⁹ At a meeting of the House of Commons Defence Committee, Michael Fallon told MPs that he believed leaving the EU would be an “extraordinarily irresponsible things to do at a very dangerous moment”.⁵⁰⁰ Speaking in relation to the Ukrainian conflict, Fallon said that the UK’s departure from the EU would be “applauded in Moscow”. Fallon argued that European security would be put at risk by the UK’s departure, particularly in Ukraine. Fallon also praised EU sanctions and boasted of the “lead role” the UK played in securing them. Fallon argued that without the UK being a member of the EU, EU sanctions would not have been as tough as they were against Russia. In an interview on Brexit, Foreign Secretary Phillip Hammond outlined his position on the CSDP. He began by reiterating his position on ideas such as a European Defence Union and the European super state, describing these ambitions as “ridiculous” and that he was “deeply skeptical” prior to becoming Defence Secretary (his role before becoming Foreign Secretary in Cameron’s cabinet).⁵⁰¹ Hammond, however, stated that, once he became Defence Secretary, and then Foreign Secretary, he began to see the value of the CSDP and realized what he described as the UK’s significant influence and leading role within it. Hammond also recalls how he and HR Catherine Ashton became “really very conscious of how valuable this structure (CSDP) was to the UK”. He also stated his belief that, once the idea of a European super state was stripped back, at the working level, what the UK had was an “extremely valuable forum which leveraged British power” that did not diminish British power but instead was a “multiplier”. Hammond reaffirmed his view that he believed the UK was better off inside the EU. Cameron and his ministers were, therefore, clearly of the view that the UK’s role in Ukraine through the CSDP, and in the CSDP in general, was a valuable one.

⁴⁹⁹ Theresa May, ‘UK, EU and our place in the world’ Speech, (2016) <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretarys-speech-on-the-uk-eu-and-our-place-in-the-world> (accessed 01/07/21)

⁵⁰⁰ R Norton-Taylor, ‘Brexit would absolutely be applauded in Russia, says defence secretary’, Guardian UK, (London, 24 May 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/24/brexit-absolutely-applauded-russia-putin-defence-secretary-michael-fallon> (accessed 01/07/21)

⁵⁰¹ ‘Philip Hammond Interview’, UK in a Changing Europe, (13 and 20 November 2020) <https://ukandeu.ac.uk/interview-pdf/?personid=42190> (accessed 06/07/21)

Although post-Cameron, in the UK's Brexit Position Paper of September 2017, the value placed on the UK's role in EUAM Ukraine during the Cameron premiership was clear.⁵⁰² The paper boasted of how the UK has worked closely with the EU to tackle its shared threats and to enhance European security. The Paper stated that the UK had accomplished a significant amount together with its European partners, including developing a stronger collective European defence effort and responding to Russian aggression in Ukraine.⁵⁰³ The Review also stated that, by working with the EU institutions and other EU Member States, the UK was able to contribute significantly to European action on a range of recent international priorities, such as promoting reform in Ukraine through the EUAM Ukraine Operation. The Review also highlights the role played by the UK in EU sanctions against Russia. The Review describes EU sanctions as a 'vital and effective foreign policy tool' and that the UK took a particularly active role in driving policy on European stage, in support of its shared values with the EU and to tackle the UK and the EU's common threats. The Review also boasted the role played by the UK through the EU in holding Russia to account for its actions, with EU sanctions one of the UK's 'main foreign policy tools'. In terms of its role in EUAM Ukraine, the Review also states that UK played a lead role in the operation and was key in helping promote coordination between the EU and the US.

A report was also published in 2018, by the European Union Committee, looking at the UK's role in the CSDP post-Brexit. A number of EU security and defence experts were called to give evidence to the Committee. In one piece of evidence given at the meeting, European security expert, Dr Andi Hoxhaj, spoke on the value of EUAM Ukraine to the UK and the EU. Dr. Hoxhaj told the Committee that the UK's participation in the CSDP mission in Ukraine was in line with the UK's "geopolitical and national security" interests, because "organised crime and corruption" in these two countries posed "a direct threat to the UK".⁵⁰⁴ Thus EULEX Kosovo and EUAM

⁵⁰² UK Brexit Position Paper (2017) <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/article-50-and-negotiations-with-the-eu> (accessed 06/07/21)

⁵⁰³ *Ibid*

⁵⁰⁴ European Union Committee, *'Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations'*, 16th Report of Session 2017-19, HL Paper 132, (2018)

Ukraine contributed to the UK's priorities as set out in the UK National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2016 and the SDSR 2015. Dr. Hoxhaj described the security threats emanating from Ukraine as a "real threat" to the UK and that EUAM Ukraine was vital in tackling these issues. Speaking on their view regarding the UK's involvement in EUAM Ukraine post-Brexit, Dr. Hoxhaj said that the UK should consider to continue to participate in EUAM and work closely with the EU in support of Ukraine to preserve its independence and territorial integrity. Dr. Hoxhaj concluded that it was their belief that it was crucial for the UK to support with assistance in Ukraine and continue to be part of the EUAM long-term. The report of the Committee concluded that, overall, CSDP missions and operations had made a significant contribution to a number of the UK's foreign policy priorities—including tackling piracy, promoting the rule of law, and peacebuilding in post-conflict states—and have been an important channel of UK influence.

5.5 Conclusion

The two case studies presented in this chapter attempt to reveal the ways in which Cameron and the UK government's soft-Eurosceptic policies towards EU security and defence operated in practice throughout 2010-2016. These two case studies, whilst different in many ways, revealed a number of trends in the UK and EU's security and defence partnership:

In the case of Libya, a number of points can be noted. It was clear that Cameron and his government did not favour military action via the EU CSDP. Both Sarkozy and Cameron wanted to make use of their bilateral partnership via Lancaster House, although both still differed through which vehicle to launch and command the operation. Not even France wanted to go via the CSDP. As Cameron, Hague and Fox made clear on a number of occasions, they made clear during this time period that they did not wish to see any increase in the EU's security and defence capabilities.

<http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp-missions/written/77377.html>
(accessed 08/07/21)

The blocking of the OHQ was the clearest example of this. Through policy documents and speeches, it was clear that Cameron and the UK government regarded NATO as the bedrock of the UK's and Europe's security. In order to keep his Party together, balancing his Euroscepticism against his sympathetic views towards Europe would be a balancing act that Cameron would have to carry out throughout the entirety of his premiership.

That said, it was clear the UK saw a role for the CSDP in addressing the Libyan conflict and wanted the EU to play its part. Cameron saw a humanitarian/civilian role for the CSDP in Libya and outlined on a number of occasions, how he saw a role for the CSDP and how the UK could support the EU in any mission. This was clear from the very beginning of the conflict, through a number of his and his minister's speeches, the UK-French joint letter to the EU Council to support a NFZ and their calls for the EU to 'prepare' for action in Libya. Cameron's soft-Eurosceptic position on the CSDP came to fruition in the UK's support for EUBAM AND Operation Sophia in Libya. The UK devoted significant resources and important personnel to these missions. Although the missions had difficulty in fulfilling their mandates, it is clear from both speeches made by Cameron and his ministers and Parliamentary committee reports that the UK valued these missions and, in turn, that they valued the EU's security and defence military and civilian capabilities. This is clear evidence of Cameron and his government's soft-Eurosceptic policies in action when it came to CSDP.

On the EU's failure to mount a CSDP operation in the initial stage of the Libyan conflict, in defence of Cameron and the UK government, the EU was its own worst enemy. There was not an appetite within the EU for military intervention in Libya. Its failure to give any mention of a NFZ or military intervention in its March 2011 declaration underscored its reluctance to take a position on the conflict. The HR's inability to provide any solid position on the conflict also sealed the CSDP's fate in Libya. As mentioned, the HR struggled in her early years to gain respect from the Member States and from officials within the EU. Just when it looked like the EU would provide a response through EUFOR Libya, it also made the fatal mistake of

making the mission conditional on the basis of the UN requesting its assistance. Libya was the ideal opportunity for the EU to demonstrate the full potential of the CSDP. It had a conflict on its doorstep and ultimately it failed to provide any sort of response. Whilst Cameron and Sarkozy had mostly made up their minds on the inclusion of the EU in terms of any hard-military intervention, the EU did nothing to help itself persuade Cameron, Sarkozy, Obama or NATO of the value it might have been able to offer to any soft-military or civilian intervention in the early stages of the conflict. Ultimately it failed on all levels, both militarily and in civilian terms, although the tables would eventually turn and the EU would claw back credibility through its long-term response to the conflict through EUBAM and Operation Sophia. It was through EUBAM and Sophia that the UK and EU's partnership was at its most well-functioning.

Ukraine, like Libya, is an example of how the EU can benefit from the strong soft-power capabilities that the EU possesses. What is noticeably different about the case of Ukraine, is the rhetoric that was used by Cameron and the UK government. In the case of Ukraine, given the gravity of a potential world war and nuclear war with Russia, Cameron and his government repeatedly deferred to the EU. Whereas in the case of Libya the rhetoric was "the UK and NATO will do (such and such)", in the case of Ukraine, the rhetoric was "the EU will do (such and such)". Through sanctions and EUAM, the UK (via the EU) was able to provide an effective response to the Ukrainian conflict without coming into direct conflict with Russia. Furthermore, through its membership of the EU Council, it was also able to mount pressure on the EU and other Member States to implement tougher measures. It was also able to place its own military resources, personnel and experts on Ukrainian soil through the vehicle of the EU, presenting much less of a threat and provocation to Russia.

Ukraine was also a clear example of how the UK recognised the value that CSDP added to the UK's power in the world. The UK represented one of the stronger voices among EU member states advocating sanctions against Russia and it was a leader in bringing about EUAM Ukraine. Ukraine saw a UK which was willing to play its role in the EU. A senior Downing Street source said Cameron would say sanctions

against Russia from the whole of the EU only exist because of the U.K. and that the Cameron government realised in the Ukrainian conflict that the UK's force was magnified and amplified by being part of the EU.⁵⁰⁵ It can be argued that Cameron's soft-Eurosceptic position got even softer during his time as PM in favour of EU membership and of working closely with the EU on security and defence. Cameron and his ministers were, therefore, clearly of the view that the UK's role in Ukraine through the CSDP, and in the CSDP in general, was a valuable one. Policy documents, speeches, security reviews all highlight the value that the Cameron government attached to the UK's involvement in the CSDP, and to its wider involvement in EU CSDP operations.

This said, the UK and EU's security and defence partnership was arguably at its most well-functioning when it came to the beginning and ends of conflicts, when peacekeeping, peace-making, state building and humanitarian support become more important. It is clear from the UK's contribution in terms of personnel and financing to EU CSDP operations in Libya (EUBAM and Operation Sophia) and in Ukraine (EUAM and EU sanctions), whose mandates included tasks such as border management, police training and surveillance, that it was in these areas that the UK most valued its security and partnership with the EU. It is important not to overstate the UK's level of support and contribution. In comparison to other Member States the contribution was, at times, not proportionate to the size of the UK's economy and military capability. That said, it dispels the myth that is prevalent in the field of European studies, in the British media and in public discourse that the UK and the EU's security and defence relationship was a bad one. It is certainly true that, at times, it was strained. The EU's inability to act in the initial stage of the Libyan conflict is a clear example of this. That said, there are clear cases where the partnership functioned well and where it was clear that both the UK and the EU valued the partnership between them. As has been repeated by Cameron and his ministers, the EU did not diminish the UK's power in the world but rather it amplified it.

⁵⁰⁵ McTague, *Supra* 165

For all its flaws, the partnership provided real value for both the UK and the EU. It is true that the CSDP has never been a central part of the UK's security and defence effort. The UK achieves most of its 'hard' security and defence objectives through its partnerships with NATO and bilaterally and through coalitions with other states. That said, in the context of foreign policy in a broader sense, the CSDP has been a more important tool. As Lapsely stated in his expert evidence to the EU Committee, the CSDP is "something in the toolbox that the UK can mobilise to add value in a number of crisis or stabilisation situations around the world". Where a mix of military, civilian, development, political and diplomatic tools need to be mobilized, the EU through the CSDP is best placed to provide that. Most of the missions have been valuable to the UK from this perspective.

As stated in the introduction to this Chapter, attention is also paid to the role LI theory plays in explaining and helping understand the actions of the Cameron government and the partnership between the UK and the EU during this period. As argued in Chapter 1, in theoretical terms, this Chapter has shown that the UK's engagement with the CSDP in these crises would seem to support to the LI theory. To reiterate, its proponents argue that states will act rationally and will in turn integrate and cooperate at the international level to further the interests, predominantly financial interests, of various groups at the domestic level. As argued by Moravcsik, the Member States of the EU, when faced with crises, will seek to minimize their crisis burden, whilst maximizing their benefits from policy and institutional changes. Moravcsik also argues that states that asymmetric interdependence and the unequal international distribution of the costs and benefits of integration give rise to intergovernmental bargaining. Those states that are hardest hit by the crisis and stand to gain most from more integration or lose most from disintegration, find themselves in a weak bargaining position and most willing to compromise. Conversely, states that are least affected by the crisis are best able to achieve their preferred policy and extract concessions. For the UK in the case of Libya, the UK was able to burden share, both through its role in NATO, with its bilateral partnership with France via the Lancaster House Treaties, as well as via the

CSDP. The UK's ability to burden share via these alliances meant that it was not wholly dependent on the EU or the CSDP and could rely less on the CSDP. That said, however, involvement in the CSDP still offered a cost saving incentive and the UK maintained its support for and involvement in the CSDP on this basis. In the case of Ukraine, the UK placed greater reliance on the CSDP due to the high risk that the Ukraine conflict posed to the UK i.e. all out conflict with Russia. Not only could the UK save money in the way of sanctions by collaborating with the EU via the CSDP, but it could also burden share in the way of blame. Being a part of a wider European response towards Russian aggression allowed the UK to deflect attention from itself and prevent itself from coming into direct conflict with Russia. Here again, the UK's actions between 2010-2016 saw a largely Eurosceptic government, acting rationally and collaborating with the EU via the CSDP in order to further and protect the interests of groups in society.

The CSDP missions and operations listed in this chapter have made a significant contribution to a number of the UK's foreign policy priorities—including tackling piracy, promoting the rule of law, and peacebuilding in post-conflict states—and have been an important channel of UK influence. These missions have benefitted significantly from the UK's contribution of important strategic guidance and advice from expert personnel as well as from the support of major UK military assets such as naval vessels and aircraft. Although in some cases these operations have not been successful in fulfilling their mandate, the UK's contribution has gone a long way to helping these operations have the best chance of fulfilling them. The EU has also benefitted from the UK's influential role through its 'special relationship' with the US as well as the leverage it wields as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to secure authorisation for EU missions and operations. It is for these reasons the UK and the EU's security and defence partnership should be preserved post-Brexit. It is in these areas – peacekeeping, peace-making, state building, humanitarian assistance – that the UK and the EU could and should continue to work together and where both can make a real contribution to each other's foreign policy objectives, of which they will continue to share many.

Chapter Four: The UK/EU security and defence partnership (2010-2016): its role in Brexit and the implications for a post-Brexit security and defence partnership

6.1 Introduction

The first chapter of this thesis focused on Cameron and his Conservative government's perspectives, policies and approach to EU security and defence. It was established that, whilst Cameron and his government were Eurosceptic, they fell into the category of soft-Eurosceptics, meaning they opposed deeper integration with the EU, but supported membership of the EU. In security and defence terms, it was established that whilst Cameron and his government fully supported NATO as the EU's primary security and defence provider, they recognised the areas in which the CSDP could be beneficial to UK security and defence, including humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peace-making and state building.

The second chapter focused on how these perspectives and policies worked in action and how they affected the UK and EU's security and defence partnership. It was established UK did not pull its weight overall when it came to seconding personnel to the CSDP. That said, in the cases of the military and civilian CSDP missions sent to Libya and Ukraine, the UK contributed significantly in terms of funding and resources. The UK also took a lead role politically in these missions, both in terms of putting political pressure on the EU to take action prior to these conflicts and in terms of strategic leadership once CSDP missions were sent. Again, through the analysis of key speeches, government white papers, Parliamentary reports, policy documents, and other supporting documents and statements, the Cameron government's appetite to work within the CSDP and take a lead role in these missions was obvious. The chapter also established that Cameron did implement the soft-Eurosceptic policies that he pledged his government would enact – it could be argued that they went further than what they pledged. The findings of and

arguments made in Chapter Two therefore challenged the commonly held assumption that the UK and EU security and defence partnership was a bad one. Chapter Two contends that this partnership did in fact work very well at times and, in the cases of Libya and Ukraine, it was the UK that was more forthcoming to utilize this partnership.

This third, and final, chapter will now focus on, first, the role of security and defence in the Brexit referendum and then, primarily, what lessons can be learnt from the past partnership during the Cameron years and how can it inform any post-Brexit security and defence partnership. This chapter will aim to establish how the security and defence partnership was portrayed in the campaigns leading up to Brexit and whether a post-Brexit security and defence partnership is worth pursuing and, if so, what could and should that look like. This chapter will also seek to explore and evaluate any opportunities and challenges that may lie ahead for any post-Brexit partnership. Attention will also be given to how the theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism can help to explain the UK's departure from the EU as well as help inform how the UK's future partnership with the EU may unfold in the years and decades to come.

The structure of this chapter will be as follows: firstly, this chapter will look at the role of EU security and defence in the Leave and Remain campaigns in the lead up to Brexit. For both Leave and Remain, what was said and what was promised by both campaigns on EU security and defence will be analysed with the aim of creating a clearer picture of how EU security and defence was portrayed and the extent to which it might have played a role in the Brexit referendum. Focus will then be shifted to the UK's position on a post-Brexit security and defence partnership with the EU. This section will analyse what has been said by both the May and Johnson governments in relation to their ambitions for a post-Brexit partnership. This section will also explore what other developments have occurred since Brexit and what other security and defence arrangements the UK has pursued. The next section will then turn to look at the EU's position on a post-Brexit security and defence partnership with the UK. This section will analyse what has been said by the relevant

EU officials (specifically the EU leadership) in relation to their ambitions for a post-Brexit partnership. As with the UK, this section will also explore what other developments have occurred since Brexit and assess what challenges and opportunities might lie ahead for the EU in security and defence following the UK's departure. The next section of this chapter will seek to focus on what wider global developments might affect any post-Brexit partnership between the UK and the EU. Developments such as the 2022 Russian-Ukrainian War, US involvement in NATO, and the ambitions of France will be analysed in relation to the effects they might have on any post-Brexit partnership. Finally, the focus of this chapter will then shift to what potential partnerships the UK and the EU might be able to share post-Brexit. Third-party arrangements such as a 'loosely integrated' partnership and 'closely integrated partnership', amongst others will be evaluated in terms of the opportunities and challenges they might present to the UK and the EU.⁵⁰⁶ This chapter will then conclude with an assessment of the merit of a post-Brexit partnership and, drawing on the findings of all three chapters, make some recommendations as to what any post-Brexit partnership should seek to include.

6.2 The role of EU security and defence in the Brexit referendum

As mentioned in Chapter One, the seeds of Brexit sown the moment the UK joined the EEC in 1973. From then on, the Conservative Party has faced what has been labelled as some commentators as an 'existential crisis' over Britain's role in the EU, primarily between those Conservatives who believed the UK was stronger inside the EU and those who believed it would be stronger outside.⁵⁰⁷ Every Conservative PM's premiership since the EU's accession to the EU had been marred by the Party's internal division on Europe. In an attempt to put an end to his party's obsession with the EU, Cameron set about fairly early on in his premiership to put in motion plans for an in-out referendum on EU membership that would solve the European issue

⁵⁰⁶ These terms are taken from an article by Richard Whitman in which they assess what post-Brexit security and defence arrangements might be possible between the UK and the EU; See *Supra* 29

⁵⁰⁷ 'Conservatives face existential threat if they fail to deliver Brexit', Independent, (London, 05 June 2019) <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/conservative-party-contest-brexit-deadline-boris-johnson-tory-mps-eu-a8944511.html> (accessed 10/01/22)

once and for all. As early as 2013, in a speech at Bloomberg, Cameron discussed the future of the EU declaring for the first time that he was in favour of an in-out referendum.⁵⁰⁸ During his first premiership, Cameron had experienced a number of backlashes and rebellions within his Party. In June 2012, an open letter from 100 Conservative colleagues called on Cameron to commit to an in-out referendum on the EU after the 2015 General Election⁵⁰⁹ and some months later, Conservative rebels united with Labour to vote down EU budget contributions, defeating Cameron. As mentioned in Chapter One although the Conservative government had reached a compromise over the EU issue with Lib Dem's following the 2010 General Election, for the majority within the Conservative Party, the issue had not gone away.⁵¹⁰ Many had felt betrayal by Cameron over his failure to deliver a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, which he had committed to in the lead up to the 2010 General Election.⁵¹¹ A further pressure acting on Cameron was the rise of UKIP, which had threatened the Conservatives in the 2010 General Election. UKIP had made a number of gains between 2013-2014 in the local elections and had polled better than both the Conservatives and Labour in the 2014 European Parliament elections.⁵¹² Furthermore, in late 2014, two Conservative MPs defected to UKIP, and consequently won the resultant by-elections.⁵¹³ It has been argued by some commentators that the mounting internal Party pressure against Cameron – particularly from backbenchers – and the continuing rise of UKIP in the lead up to the 2015 General Election, made the promising of an in-out referendum on the EU Cameron's only ticket to an election victory.⁵¹⁴

⁵⁰⁸ David Cameron, 'Future of the EU at Bloomberg' Speech, (2013)

<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg> (accessed 10/01/22)

⁵⁰⁹ J Farrell and P Goldsmith, 'How to Lose a Referendum, The Definitive Story of Why the UK Voted for Brexit' (Backbite Publishing, 2017), 228

⁵¹⁰ Cameron stated that he was hopeful the coalition would enjoy 'five relatively Europe-free years' Cameron; See Cameron, *Supra* 176, at 320

⁵¹¹ Watt, *Supra* 268

⁵¹² P Cowley and D Kavanagh, 'The British General Election of 2015' (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 18

⁵¹³ P Wintour and N Watt, 'UKIP wins European elections with ease to set off political earthquake', Guardian UK, (London, 26 May 2014) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/may/26/ukip-european-elections-political-earthquake> (accessed 30/01/22)

⁵¹⁴ H Thompson, 'Inevitability and contingency: The political economy of Brexit', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 19, No.3, (2017), 444

As a result, Cameron and his Conservatives included in their manifesto for the 2015 General Election, a pledge to ‘negotiate new rules with the EU’ on immigration and then ‘put these changes to the British people in a straight in-out referendum’ on membership of the EU by the end of 2017.⁵¹⁵ The result of the 2015 General Election saw the Cameron and the Conservative Party win a 12-seat majority. The Conservatives’ pro-European coalition partners, the Lib Dems, had lost 15.2% share of the vote since 2010 and UKIP had gained a seat, with a 9.5% increase in their share of the vote since 2010.⁵¹⁶ The results of the General Election gave those within Cameron’s Party more ammunition to force Cameron to hold an in-out referendum. As a result, in February 2016, Cameron formally announced that the UK would hold an in-out referendum on EU membership on 23rd June 2016. Immediately, Conservative Ministers split into ‘Leave’ and ‘Remain’ camps ahead of campaigning, with Cameron leading the Remain campaign.⁵¹⁷ After four months of campaigning, the referendum was held and the majority of the British public voted in favour of leaving the EU – 52% against 48%. The following day, following the defeat of the Remain campaign, Cameron announced his resignation as PM, triggering a Conservative Party leadership race to determine who would lead the Brexit negotiations and lead the UK out of the EU.⁵¹⁸

To discuss the history of the Brexit and the referendum would require not just a chapter, but an entire thesis. The focus of this section of this chapter, therefore, is specifically on the role security and defence played in the Brexit referendum. The purpose of this is to understand what kind of image of EU security and defence was presented by both sides of the Brexit debate and the role this may have played in the overall Brexit result. It will also attempt to answer whether the positive image as presented in Chapter One and Two was presented and, if not, whether more could

⁵¹⁵ Conservative Manifesto (2015), *Supra* 490, at 29

⁵¹⁶ ‘UK General Election 2015: Results’, BBC News, (London, 07 May 2015) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2015/results> (accessed 30/01/22)

⁵¹⁷ ‘EU referendum: Cameron sets June date for UK vote’, BBC News, (London, 20 February 2016) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-35621079>

⁵¹⁸ H Stewart, R Mason and R Syal, ‘David Cameron resigns after UK votes to leave European Union’, Guardian UK, (London, 24 June 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/david-cameron-resigns-after-uk-votes-to-leave-european-union> (accessed 02/02/22)

have been done by Remain to have presented a clearer picture of the UK and EU's security and defence partnership to the public. This section will also attempt to understand how the rhetoric on EU security and defence during the Brexit campaign may have influenced the outcome of the Brexit negotiations.

6.2.1 Leave perspectives on EU security and defence

6.2.1.1 Vote Leave

Under the rules that governed the running of the referendum, there was a designated lead group for each side in the campaign, decided upon by the Electoral Commission. The Vote Leave group held this position for the Leave camp (the Britain Stronger in Europe group was the main Remain body).⁵¹⁹ The secondary, and unofficial campaign group, was Leave.EU, led by then-UKIP leader, Nigel Farage, and British businessman and political donor, Arron Banks. Both these groups were set up for the particular purpose of the EU referendum and each was made up of individuals from a wide variety of political, business and other backgrounds. Both groups campaigned in 2016 from February to June in favour of leaving the EU. Some of the prominent Conservative figures in the Leave campaign included Boris Johnson and Michael Gove – Cameron's Lord Chancellor and close ally. Another close ally of Cameron's who would join the Leave campaign was Liam Fox – former Defence Minister, amongst other roles, under Cameron. Another prominent politician involved in coordinating the Leave campaign was UKIP leader, Nigel Farage.

In terms of the effects of Brexit on UK security and defence, Vote Leave published a number of 'policy briefings' on its website, outlining the Group's position. In terms of security, one document claimed that as a member of the EU, the UK 'must accept the free movement of people' EU treaty provisions which are controlled by the European Commission and ECJ. This, Vote Leave claimed, meant that the UK had no

⁵¹⁹ 'Who were the key Leave and Remain groups?', UK in a Changing Europe <https://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-facts/who-are-the-key-leave-groups-and-remain-groups/> (accessed 02/02/22)

control over its borders and resulted in terrorists and criminals entering the UK.⁵²⁰ In terms of foreign policy and defence, the Group also claimed that the UK would gain by voting leave. The policy document draws attention to a claim made by former Labour PM, Tony Blair, who it alleges said that the EU would never have control of defence policy. The document claims that these promises were broken and that EU rules have also caused problems for defence procurement which, it claims, 'has been in a disastrous state for years'. The policy document also quotes the former head of MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove, who said that a vote to leave the EU would not damage the UK's defence and intelligence relationship with the United States and that this partnership outweighed anything European. Vote Leave also claimed in the document that the replacement of Trident, the access to overhead satellite monitoring capabilities, the defence exchanges that are hidden from public view, the UK-US co-operation over signals intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency/Secret Intelligence Service/Federal Bureau of Investigation/MI5 liaison and much more would continue as before Brexit.

In another policy document, focusing specifically on EU defence, Vote Leave made a number of claims in relation to EU defence. Interestingly, the policy document opened by acknowledging that 'EU defence cooperation in Europe was a good thing'.⁵²¹ Vote Leave claimed, however, that the problem with the EU's approach was not cooperation, but about centralising control of defence in Brussels, similar to the Euro. The document claimed the UK has given too much control of defence away to the EU and that it would be safer to take back control and negotiate a new deal based on international cooperation. The document made a number of claims about EU defence. One claim Vote Leave made was that the European courts were taking control of the UK's intelligence services and armed forces. The document claims that, in July 2011, the ECHR would decide how the UK's armed forces would operate overseas, and that in June 2013, the UK Supreme Court had accepted that, because

⁵²⁰ 'Security - Vote Leave is the safer option', Vote Leave, http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/briefing_safety.html (accessed 02/02/22)

⁵²¹ 'Being in the EU undermines our defence', Vote Leave http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/briefing_defence.html (accessed 03/02/22)

the UK was subject to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, that this allowed the EU to assert control over UK armed forces. Examples it gives are of the blocking of the deportation of Islamic extremist Abu Hamza's daughter-in-law due to the Charter. Another, is that it claims the EU is competing with the Geneva Convention on the 'laws of war', and that EU law was forcing troops into 'impossible' situations over laws relating to detention of prisoners of war.

Other claims made in the document included was that the EU 'wastes billions and delays (defence) projects by years'. The document claims that the ECJ forces the MoD to comply with EU procurement laws and that this causes extremely expensive delays for military projects by years. The document also claims that the EU has adopted several directives specifically governing defence procurement and that these complex EU rules create constant threats of legal action against the MoD either by equipment companies or the EU itself and leads to the MoD making decisions to comply with EU rules that are not in the UK's interest in order to avoid these supposed legal challenges. Vote Leave references the procurement of new Aircraft Carriers under the Cameron administration, and Typhoon Aircraft, the introduction of which was postponed for two decades and as a result of EU procurement confusion.

The core claims of the document, and of Vote Leave and other pro-leave groups during the referendum campaign, was that the EU planned to create an 'EU army'. The document lists the CSDP as a step towards this alleged goal of the EU and quotes the then-President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, which it claims said he would like to see the introduction of an EU army. The document also quotes Article 42(2) of the TEU and claims that this Article is being used as a roadmap to accelerate plans for a European army and that these plans are supported by European governments, such as Spain and Germany. The document speaks of an EU army undermining NATO and that this is a concern shared by the US Congress, which warned that any such army would rival NATO structures. Vote Leave warns that if the UK remained in the EU, the Commission would take more and more control from the UK in security and defence. The document references the

introduction of a European border force and coastguard which it claims the Commission would take sovereign control over and is a step towards a common EU navy.

A final, but core claim, it also makes is that the EU's record on defence is bad. The document claims that the EU has shown itself inept at dealing with defence issues, referencing its so-called failure to cope with the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. It quotes the former Secretary of State for Defence, John Nott, who made the claim that the only time the EU actually took charge of security was during the Bosnian War and that its so-called mishandling of that crisis led to more than one million people being displaced and up to half a million being killed or wounded. The document also references the Ukrainian conflict, which it claims the EU has handled 'extremely badly', so bad, it claims, that US officials have had to resort to asking that the EU is excluded from the whole process because it is 'making the situation worse'.

A lead voice in the Leave campaign, and future PM, Boris Johnson, made a number of statements concerning EU security and defence which followed a similar narrative presented in these Vote Leave policy documents. In one of his first speeches on Brexit in April 2016, Johnson stated that the claim that a vote for leave would imperil peace in Europe, "grossly underestimates the way Europe has changed and the NATO guarantee that in reality has underpinned peace in Europe."⁵²² Johnson described the EU's handling of Yugoslavia as a "disaster" and that NATO was forced to run to the EU's rescue. In a later speech, in May 2016, Johnson again attacked EU security and defence. Johnson wrongly described Brussels as having exclusive or explicit competence over security policy and also claimed that the EU now had its own foreign minister – an assumed reference to the 'High Representative' post. Johnson also implied that the area of security and defence was not already intergovernmental. Johnson argued that outside the EU the UK could "help lead the

⁵²² J Lowe, 'Boris Johnson: NATO, Not EU, Responsible for Peace in Europe', Newsweek (05 September 2016) <https://www.newsweek.com/brexit-boris-johnson-david-cameron-security-nato-eu-457370> (accessed 03/02/22)

discussions” on security and defence policy, but claimed that the conversation could be conducted within an intergovernmental framework, and without the need for legal instruments enforced by the European Court of Justice. This point is also incorrect, as the EU’s security and defence is one of the few purely intergovernmental areas that still exists within the EU, as argued in the introduction to this thesis.

6.2.1.2 Leave.EU and other pro-Leave voices

Another leading, yet unofficial, Leave group was ‘Leave.EU’, founded and spearheaded by the then-UKIP leader, Nigel Farage. Farage and ‘Leave.EU’ made a number of references to EU security and defence throughout their campaign. Leave.EU’s website was shutdown in early 2021 due to disputes over their internet domain name.⁵²³ As a result, a number of documents that related to Leave.EU’s position on EU security and defence were lost. That said, their Twitter and Facebook accounts remain active and their position during this time can still be deciphered through these posts. What can also be studied is what was said by its leader, Nigel Farage, at the time of the referendum.

Leave.EU posted extensively on EU security and defence, particularly on the idea of a European army. In a Facebook post from February 2016, Leave.EU quoted Field Marshal Montgomery, who allegedly stated that EU membership was a surrender of sovereignty, freedom and military flexibility. The post also claimed that a European army was already being planned by the EU, stating that it was being demanded by the then German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, and the European Commission, and that the European Union Force (EUFOR) under the command of EU Military Staff (EUMS) – both discussed in Chapter Two – were sowing the seeds for a European army.⁵²⁴ In Facebook posts from May 2016 on its official Facebook page, Leave.EU

⁵²³ ‘Brexit group’s website suspended’, Independent, (London, 16 January 2021) <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/leave-eu-brexite-site-arron-banks-b1788267.html> (accessed 03/02/22)

⁵²⁴ Leave.EU, ‘Field Marshal Montgomery, arguably Britain’s most successful wartime commander, was opposed to European integration “on military and strategic grounds”, arguing that it meant “the

claimed that a vote to remain would be a mandate for much closer political integration with Europe and that the UK would be dragged into a European army.⁵²⁵ It also claimed that a commitment to a European army would be reckless and a surrender of the UK's national security.⁵²⁶

The lead voice of the Leave.EU campaign, and of UKIP and the Eurosceptic movement in Britain, Nigel Farage, made a number of statements about EU security and defence. During the campaign, Farage made a number of statements, articles and even Tweets, referencing the EU's security and defence capabilities and ambitions. In one Tweet made on his personal Twitter account, Farage claimed that the "pro-EU establishment not telling the truth - European Union pushing for a full EU army". Farage sought to back up these claims in a piece he wrote in the Express in June 2016, where he claimed that he knew that the EU is "hell bent" on further, deeper centralisation and that plans for a full EU army have been "put on ice only until the very day after the referendum".⁵²⁷ Farage also claimed that it was clear to him that so-called "EU nationalists" were biding their time, waiting for a Remain vote before they will hike up the EU's budget and then reveal their full military ambitions.⁵²⁸ Farage also claimed that the EU is not an organisation which is standing still but that it is expanding in powers, expanding in size and that it is determined to become a United States of Europe. In another piece, Farage also claimed that if the UK remained that it would get swept up into a European army and a United States of Europe.⁵²⁹

surrender of sovereignty, freedom of action, and military flexibility", Facebook, (24 February 2016) <https://www.facebook.com/leaveeuofficial/photos> (accessed 05/03/22)

⁵²⁵ Leave.EU, 'A vote to remain is a mandate for much closer political integration with Europe', Facebook, (29 May 2016)

<https://www.facebook.com/leaveeuofficial/photos/a.805855112846065.1073741829.794492093982367/960526014045640/?type=3&theater> (accessed 05/03/22)

⁵²⁶ *Ibid*

⁵²⁷ N Farage, 'Why we must vote LEAVE in the EU referendum', Express, (London, 21 June 2016)

<https://www.express.co.uk/comment/expresscomment/681776/nigel-farage-eu-referendum-brexit-vote-leave-independence-ukip> (05/03/22)

⁵²⁸ *Ibid*

⁵²⁹ N Farage, 'Why you should vote for Brexit this Thursday', Independent, (London, 20 June 2016)

<https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/eu-referendum-brexit-nigel-farage-on-why-you-should-vote-to-leave-a7091021.html> (accessed 20/02/22)

Another voice which was prominent in the Leave campaigns was former defence secretary Liam Fox. Fox made claims to the Telegraph in 2016, that the EU was “wedded” to the “dangerous fantasy” of creating a single defence force.⁵³⁰ He told the Telegraph that “those of us who have always warned about Europe’s defence ambitions have always been told not to worry, but step-by-step that ever closer union is becoming a reality. We cannot afford to be conned in this referendum as we were conned in 1975. Fox stated that the best way to protect ourselves is to stay close to the US, arguing that the US defence budget is bigger than the next 11 countries in the world put together. Fox argued that Europe’s defence intentions are a dangerous fantasy and risk cutting us off from our closest and most powerful ally and that, whilst the UK was always told not to worry about the next integration, that it still happened. Fox concluded stating that the UK has been too often conned by the EU and that it must not be conned again.

6.2.2 Remain perspectives on EU security and defence

Like the Leave campaign, the Remain campaign was also designated an official group. The official campaign group, as decided by the Electoral Commission, was the Britain Stronger in Europe group (BSE).⁵³¹ Unofficial but affiliated grassroots groups included European Movement International, amongst others. BSE had further support from the UK government as, under Cameron, remain was its official position. Notable people within the Remain campaign from Cameron’s premiership included Cameron himself, Phillip Hammond, David Liddington and, taking more of a backseat role, William Hague. These individuals and BSE made a number of references during the campaign to EU security and defence.

6.2.2.1 Britain Stronger in Europe and the UK Government

⁵³⁰ M Bet, ‘EU army plan a ‘dangerous fantasy’ that was hidden from UK before Brexit vote’, Express, (London, 10 March 2021) <https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/1407581/eu-news-army-brexit-referendum-headquarters-germany-spt> (accessed 20/02/22)

⁵³¹ ‘Lead EU referendum campaigns named’, BBC News, (London, 13 April 2016) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36038672> (accessed 20/02/22)

In one of its policy documents released for its launch, BSE made a number of references to EU security and defence.⁵³² In this document, BSE claimed that the UK is stronger, safer and better off in Europe and that the UK would be out on its own. BSE argued that the UK would have stronger security within the EU, arguing that the threats to Britain's security are global in nature, such as global terrorism, cross-border crime or climate change. In the document, BSE references the sanctions the UK made against Russia via the EU as an example of how the UK is stronger. It also references the UK's sharing of intelligence about terrorists and arresting criminals using the European Arrest Warrant. BSE also argued that there is strength in numbers and that international co-operation brings the UK more power and more influence. The document also claims that the EU gives the UK stronger leadership. BSE argued that the UK has more control over its destiny by staying inside organisations like the EU, UN and NATO. It argues that if the UK wants to be a leader in the world, it needs to be in Europe helping to take the "big decisions". It also argues that if the UK has the best of both worlds in the EU, being an independent nation within Europe.

Further into the document, BSE went onto argue the case further as to why it believed the UK was safer in Europe. BSE argued that by the UK working with its European partners, the UK is able to influence key decisions and work with its partners to ensure a coordinated response to international threats such as terrorism, organised crime or climate change. The document referenced again the European Arrest Warrant, which it claims helped the UK arrest criminals across the EU and, in the last Parliament, helped the UK remove over 5,000 criminals to face justice across the Europe and bring back 675 criminals to the UK to be tried. The document, however, covered nothing about the CSDP or the UK's involvement in CSDP missions up to 2016.

⁵³² Britain Stronger in Europe, 'Key Benefits of Staying In' Flyer (2016) <https://nawo.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Britain-Stronger-In-Europe-Key-Briefings.pdf> (accessed 21/02/22)

To further bolster BSE's campaign, the government under Cameron released a pamphlet, outlining the government's official position on the referendum and committing its support to the Remain campaign.⁵³³ In the document, the government makes some reference to EU security and defence, arguing that, in the EU, the UK is a strong, independent and leading force in the world. The pamphlet also states that the UK's EU membership magnifies the UK's ability to get its way on the issues it cares about, stating that EU action helped the UK prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and that the EU is leading the world on tackling climate change. The pamphlet also argues that EU membership keeps the UK safer, Keeping us safer, but references only the European Arrest Warrant, which it states the UK police can use to keep criminals and terrorists out of the UK. Again, like BSE's policy documents, no mention is made of the CSDP. At a glance, it is clear that the bulk of the BSE and government literature is devoted to defending against the cost of membership, immigration, the economy, trade and the benefits of EU membership to British businesses.

As well as BSE's campaign literature containing very little about EU security and defence – and virtually nothing about the CSDP – key figures in Cameron's cabinet, as far as EU security and defence was concerned, also featured very little in the campaign. Cameron's Foreign Secretary and Defence Minister made no formal speeches regarding Brexit during the referendum campaigns. The only contributions made by these figures during the time of the referendum can be found in Hansard, in response to questions from MPs in the Commons. In April 2016, in response to a question from Labour MP, Gavin Shuker, about the effects of EU withdrawal on UK security and defence, Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon stated that, whilst NATO remained the cornerstone of the UK's defence, the European Union did have an important complementary role in addressing and managing international crises, especially where NATO could not, or chose not to, act. Fallon also highlighted that, in

⁵³³ *'Why the government believes that voting to remain in the EU is the best decision for the UK'*, HM Gov, (06 April 2016) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/515068/why-the-government-believes-that-voting-to-remain-in-the-european-union-is-the-best-decision-for-the-uk.pdf (accessed 01/03/22)

response to the complex security threats that the UK faced, this required a united, comprehensive approach, including use of the EU's diplomatic, humanitarian and economic "levers". In response to further questions from Mr Shuker, Fallon stated that he could not think of one ally of the UK's that thought the world or the UK would be safer if it left the EU. Fallon also highlighted the role played by the EU in applying sanctions against Russia following its annexation of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine. Fallon also concurred with a statement made by Labour MP, Kate Hollern, who highlighted an ADS survey, which showed that 70% of companies wanted Britain to remain in the EU and that access to EU funding—particularly in research and development—was critical for British defence companies to maintain a leading edge in the global defence market. These were insightful contributions by Fallon highlighting the complementary nature of EU security and defence, however, there appears to be no evidence of his statements in the Commons ever reaching a wider audience or the mainstream media.

The contributions of Cameron's Foreign Secretary, Phillip Hammond, also appeared to be relatively thin in terms of security and defence during the referendum campaign. His contributions on the topic during this time also can only be found in Hansard. In February 2016, in a debate on European Affairs, Hammond was asked by Labour MP, Pat McFadden, whether his time as Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary under Cameron had changed the balance of his view on the EU's impact on the UK's collective security.⁵³⁴ In response, Hammond stated that he had seen how, in practice, working with EU partners is an important tool in the UK's armoury. He reiterated, like Fallon and the rest of Cameron's cabinet, that the EU would never, in any way, replace the security benefit that the UK gets from NATO, however, he stated that the EU does a different thing. Hammond used the EU's economic sanctions in Ukraine as an example of this and argued that the EU's soft-power capabilities were a very important weapon in the UK's armoury against Russian

⁵³⁴ Hansard, House of Commons Debate, Volume 606, (25 February 2016) <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2016-02-25/debates/16022537000001/EuropeanAffairs?highlight=eu%20security%20defence#contribution-16022537000490> (accessed 04/03/22)

aggression. Later in June 2016, in response to questions from MPs on economic security should the UK leave the EU, Hammond made a number of references to EU security and defence. Hammond was asked by Conservative MP, Mark Pritchard, whether there could be economic security without national security and how many NATO AND Commonwealth allies wanted the UK to leave the EU. In response to this, Hammond agreed that leaving the EU was a threat to national security and stated that he believed the answer to the second question was zero. Hammond also stated that he had not found any foreign leaders who were urging Britain to leave the European Union and saying that Britain would be a more influential and valuable partner if it left the EU.

Another voice that was quiet on EU security and defence was Cameron's Minister for Europe, David Liddington. Again, like Hammond and Fallon his only contributions made on this topic were in the House of Commons. In a debate regarding the Cameron government's release of their EU referendum leaflet, in favour of remain, Liddington addressed a number of questions from MPs. In one address, Liddington stated that Europe mattered to the UK's security and global interests. Liddington made the point to MPs that security decisions in the EU will affect the UK and that the UK should be at the table, leading debate and shaping the rules.⁵³⁵ Liddington also stated that those who were arguing that the UK should be unconcerned about security risks were ignoring the security and defence opportunities that EU membership gave the UK. Liddington pointed to the part the UK played in what he described as successful European initiatives, such defeating piracy in the Indian ocean, reconciling Serbia and Kosovo, training the military in Mali and imposing sanctions that brought Iran to the nuclear negotiating table. Liddington concluded by stating that he believed it would be foolish to throw these security and defence opportunities away.

⁵³⁵ Hansard, House of Commons Debate, Volume 609, (09 May 2016) <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2016-05-09/debates/1605098000001/EUReferendumLeaflet?highlight=remain#contribution-3DDD85D5-171F-4516-8E3A-75D0FC192321> (accessed 04/03/22)

One of the few – possibly the only – formal speeches made by the official remain campaign was made by Cameron himself. In May 2016, in a speech entitled ‘The UK’s strength and security in the EU’, Cameron set about addressing the security benefits EU membership offered and the threats the UK would face without it.⁵³⁶ In the speech, Cameron stated that it was his belief that the UK, despite its faults and its frustrations is stronger, safer and better off by remaining a member of the EU. Cameron stated that if the UK wanted to keep itself strong in the world, and keep its people safe, that membership of the EU is one of the tools that helps the UK to do these things. Cameron also stated that his experience as Prime Minister had taught him that the UK’s membership of the EU was in no way holding Britain back or undermining its global influence and stated that his experience was the opposite. Cameron also highlighted some of the history around the foundations of European integration following WW2 and the UK’s involvement in it. He pointed to Churchill’s support to see a united Europe. Cameron explained how in the post-war period that Churchill had argued passionately for Western Europe to come together, to promote free trade, and to build institutions which would endure so that Europe would never see such bloodshed again. Cameron argued that isolationism has never served the UK well and that the serried rows of white headstones in Commonwealth war cemeteries stand as silent testament to the price that the UK paid to help restore peace and order in Europe. Cameron warned that the UK could not be so sure that peace and stability in Europe are assured beyond any shadow of doubt and that Brexit would put this at risk. Cameron also discussed the merits of EU security and defence, complimenting the EU for the work that it has done in nation building, peacekeeping and peace making. Cameron argued that these soft-power capabilities were a vital tool in the armoury of the UK. Cameron also discussed the action the UK took through the EU in Ukraine against Russia. Cameron argued that when Russia invaded Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, there was a real risk of a feeble European response, and of a split between the United States and Europe. Yet, Cameron argued that, it was the UK that convened a special meeting of the key European countries in Brussels, agreed a package of sanctions, and then drove that package through the

⁵³⁶ Cameron, *Supra* 498

full meeting of EU leaders – the European Council – later that same evening. Cameron argued that he could not have done that outside the EU and warned that if the UK left the EU, that it would lose this tool. Cameron concluded by addressing the EU Army argument made by the Leave campaign. Cameron made it clear in his speech that decisions on foreign policy are taken by unanimity and that Britain has a veto, and that therefore suggestions of an EU army were fanciful.

This key speech on EU security and defence was a mix of cold facts on EU security and defence and impassioned arguments about the risks of a divided Europe. Whether it was to make up for the lack of discussion of the topic up to that point or a revelation of Cameron's genuine passion for EU security and defence, or both, this was certainly the most comprehensive speech on EU security and defence during the referendum. In his most recent memoir, 'For the Record', Cameron admitted that Remain did not push the case enough for EU security and defence.⁵³⁷ Cameron states that a weakness of his campaign was that it relied excessively on technical arguments, whereas Leave had more emotional ones. Cameron stated that he tried to put this right in his May 2016 speech on EU security and defence, speaking about how the EU had helped entrench peace in Europe and of how the 'serried rows of white headstones' stood as silent testaments to the price the UK paid for peace in Europe. Yet for all Cameron said on EU security and defence, as Cameron himself admits, it was too little too late.

6.3 UK perspectives on a post-Brexit security and defence partnership

It is unclear to what extent security and defence issues contributed to the UK's decision to leave the EU. What is clear, however, is that Leave was much more vocal on the topic and their narrative, in turn, reached a wider audience. Remain, on the other hand, as conceded by Cameron himself, did not do enough to advocate for the benefits of EU security and defence and the UK's role in it. In any event, on the 23rd

⁵³⁷ Cameron, *Supra* 176, 667-68

June 2016, the British public voted to leave the EU by 51.9% to 48.1%.⁵³⁸ Following through on his promise to resign as PM if Remain lost the referendum, Cameron announced his intention to resign on 24th June 2016, triggering a leadership race within the Conservative Party to select the new PM. On 13th July 2016, following the drop out of candidate Andrea Leadsom from the leadership race, Theresa May became the new leader of the Conservatives and new PM of the UK.

May had supported Cameron and had campaigned in favour of Remain. During the referendum, as Home Secretary to Cameron, May had argued that being a member of the EU “maximised” the EU’s security and defence and warned against the UK’s loss of access to the European Arrest Warrant and passenger name records (PNR) would make the UK less safe.⁵³⁹ Even upon becoming PM, May vowed in her maiden speech that she would be a ‘one nation prime minister’, arguably positioning herself from the outset to the left of the hard-Brexiteers.⁵⁴⁰ That said, May entered the leadership contest fully aware that the primary aim of the next PM would be to begin the process of leading the UK out of the EU. Launching what would be a short-lived campaign to become leader of the Conservative Party, on 11th July 2016, May vowed that there would be no attempts to remain inside the EU, no attempts to rejoin it “by the back door”, and no second referendum.⁵⁴¹ May also promised that as PM she would make sure the UK would leave the EU and, coining the infamous phrase, that “Brexit means Brexit”.⁵⁴² Furthermore, although little mention was made of the EU in her maiden speech as PM, May signed off vowing that the UK would “rise to the challenge” of Brexit and that the UK would “forge a bold new positive role” for itself outside the EU.⁵⁴³

⁵³⁸ ‘EU Referendum Results’, BBC News, (London, 23 June 2016)

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/eu_referendum/results

⁵³⁹ May, *Supra* 499

⁵⁴⁰ Theresa May, Maiden Speech as PM, (2016)

<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/statement-from-the-new-prime-minister-theresa-may> (accessed 15/03/22)

⁵⁴¹ A Asthana, ‘No staying in the EU by the back door, says Theresa May’, Guardian UK, (London, 31 August 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/aug/31/no-staying-in-eu-by-back-door-theresa-may-brexit> (accessed 15/03/22)

⁵⁴² *Ibid*

⁵⁴³ May, *Supra* 540

May's intentions to take the UK out for the EU were unequivocal and, despite the political and legal attempts to stop Brexit, the UK was on straight path to leaving the EU. How the Conservative governments of May and Johnson envisioned a future security and defence partnership with the EU will be the focus of this section.

6.3.1 May Government perspectives on a post-Brexit security and defence partnership

The first occasion at which May gave any mention of her government's perspectives on a post-Brexit security and defence partnership was at the Conservative Party Conference in October 2016. May gave speech outlining her vision for a 'Global Britain'.⁵⁴⁴ In the speech, May stated that her government's vision for a partnership between the UK and the EU was one in which the UK and the EU were close friends and allies, but where the UK made its own laws and played its full part in promoting peace and prosperity around the world, beyond the EU. May gave a more detailed account of her government's plan for Britain in her Lancaster House speech in January 2017.⁵⁴⁵ In this speech, May stated that her government wanted the UK to remain a friend and neighbour to the EU but also one that went out into the world to build relationships with new allies. May argued that the UK's vote to leave was not an attempt to "turn the clock back" and make Europe less peaceful. She also acknowledged the serious threats that Europe as a collective faced and vowed that the UK's intelligence capabilities would continue to help keep Europe safe from terrorism. May also stated that the British servicemen and women would continue to serve in bases across Europe. Further into the speech, May highlighted Britain and France's roles as the only 2 nuclear powers in Europe, as well their permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council, stating that the UK's armed forces were a

⁵⁴⁴ Theresa May, Conservative Party Conference Speech, (2016)
<https://www.conservativehome.com/parliament/2016/10/britain-after-brexit-a-vision-of-a-global-britain-theresa-mays-conservative-conference-speech-full-text.html> (accessed 20/03/22)

⁵⁴⁵ Theresa May, 'The government's negotiating objectives for exiting the EU' Speech, (2017)
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech> (accessed 20/03/22)

crucial part of Europe's collective defence and that after Brexit, the UK wanted to be a good friend and neighbour to the EU. In terms of how this partnership would work, however, not much was said. May made clear that her government did not want partial or associate membership of the EU and that nothing but a complete withdrawal would suffice. That said, May stated that her government wanted the UK to cooperate more with the EU in security and defence post-Brexit.

A more detailed outline of May and her government's strategy came with the publication of the government's Brexit White Paper in February 2017, in which they formally set out their strategy for the UK to leave the EU.⁵⁴⁶ On the topic of security and defence, the white paper had more of a focus on intelligence sharing and counter terrorism post-Brexit and the government's plans for a post-Brexit partnership in these areas were much more comprehensive. In terms of external defence, beyond the borders of Europe, their plans were less detailed. That said, their position on it could still be discerned. The white paper stated that the UK wanted to use its role as a nuclear power and as a permanent member of the UNSC to continue to work with the EU on foreign policy, security and defence. The paper stated that the UK would continue to play a leading role alongside EU partners in buttressing and promoting European security and influence around the world, however, it also stated that the UK would aim to enhance its bilateral relationships with European partners and beyond. The paper acknowledged the role the UK played in the CSDP and some of its achievements (referencing EUAM Ukraine, Libya and sanctions against Russia), however, it stated that it was the objective of the UK to ensure that the EU's role on defence and security was complementary to, and respected the central role of, NATO. The paper stated that post-Brexit, the UK would remain committed to European security and would aim to add value to EU foreign and security policy. No further details were given, however, on how that partnership

⁵⁴⁶ *'The United Kingdom's exit from, and new partnership with, the European Union'* Policy Paper, HM Gov, (2017) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-united-kingdoms-exit-from-and-new-partnership-with-the-european-union-white-paper/the-united-kingdoms-exit-from-and-new-partnership-with-the-european-union--2> (accessed 01/04/22)

might look. More detail was given to how the government saw the UK's continued role in NATO.

Just a month later, in March 2017, May sent a letter to President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, triggering Article 50 TEU, marking the beginning of the UK's withdrawal from the EU.⁵⁴⁷ In the letter, May clarified her government's intentions for a post-Brexit security and defence partnership. May stated that the UK and the EU should work towards securing a comprehensive agreement and that the UK wanted to agree to a 'deep' and 'special' partnership, taking in both economic and security cooperation. The letter also stated that the UK recognised that Europe's security was more fragile at that moment than at any time since the end of the Cold War and that weakening the cooperation between the UK and the EU would be a costly mistake for the security of Europe's citizens – essentially May was warning against the risks of a no deal Brexit. May also confirmed that the UK's objectives for a post-Brexit partnership remain those set out in her Lancaster House speech of 17th January and the subsequent White Paper published on 2nd February (complete withdrawal from the EU), however, as noted above, no detail was included in either of these about a security and defence partnership. Although the letter revealed an appetite within the May government for a post-Brexit security and defence partnership, it lacked information on the finer details pertaining to the framework of any such partnership.

May's next speech on EU security and defence came later in the year, during a visit to Florence in September 2017.⁵⁴⁸ In the speech, May stated that the UK would be the strongest friend and partner to the EU post-Brexit and insisted that the UK would continue to work with the EU on security. In the speech, May elaborated further on the new security partnership she wanted to see between the UK and the EU. May

⁵⁴⁷ 'Prime Minister's letter to Donald Tusk triggering Article 50', HM Gov, (2017) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/604079/Prime_Ministers_letter_to_European_Council_President_Donald_Tusk.pdf (accessed 01/04/22)

⁵⁴⁸ Theresa May, 'A new era of cooperation and partnership between the UK and the EU' Speech, (2017) <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-florence-speech-a-new-era-of-cooperation-and-partnership-between-the-uk-and-the-eu> (accessed 04/04/22)

began by stating she believed cooperation on security and defence should be maintained and that the two parties should be as open-minded as possible about how they continued to work together. May acknowledged that there was no pre-existing model for co-operation between the EU and external partners which replicates the full scale and depth of the collaboration that existed between the EU and the UK on security, however, she stated that she believed it was vital that the two parties worked together to design a 'new' and 'dynamic' arrangement that went beyond the existing arrangements that the EU had in this area and drew on the legal models the EU previously used to structure co-operation with external partners in other fields such as trade. This framework, May suggested, should be in the form of a treaty. The Treaty, May suggested, should complement the bi-lateral relationships that the UK already has with European nations to promote common security. In terms of the content of the treaty, May was less clear. She stated that the treaty should be flexible and create a framework within which the two parties could cooperate. May also stated that the UK would seek to ensure that it was unprecedented in its depth, in terms of the degree of engagement that the UK would aim to deliver. In terms of what the treaty would look to tackle, May stated that the UK would seek to include spreading the rule of law, dealing with emerging threats, handling the migration crisis, helping countries out of poverty and helping EU countries that are the victims of armed aggression, terrorism and natural or manmade disasters. May concluded by stating that the UK would be committed to the EU's security unconditionally. Again, whilst the speech indicated a clear commitment by the May government to establish a post-Brexit security and defence partnership, little was said about the substance of any arrangement.

With every speech, May revealed more about her government's intentions for a post-Brexit security and defence partnership with the EU. At the Munich Security Conference in 2018, May gave a clearer idea of what she wanted to have included in any partnership.⁵⁴⁹ In the speech, May, once again, urged the EU to agree to a new

⁵⁴⁹ Theresa May, Munich Security Conference Speech (2018) <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-at-munich-security-conference-17-february-2018> (accessed 04/04/22)

security treaty with the UK. May stated again, that the UK had an “unconditional” commitment to European security that would not change after the country’s departure from the EU. May honed in on the threats of cyberwarfare, terrorism and organized crime which she stated were European problems that demanded continued close cooperation on arrest warrants and intelligence sharing. May declared that the UK wanted the security pact to be signed fast, even before an agreement on the overall Brexit deal. Arguably giving an indication of her desire to broker a security and defence partnership with the EU, May also offered a big concession, stating that when cooperating with European agencies, the UK would be willing to respect the jurisdiction of the ECJ – something which hard-Eurosceptics in her Party had argued that the UK should take back control of its laws and judicial system and no longer be beholden to the rulings of the European court. “Another red line has gone pink,” said Mark Leonard of the European Council on Foreign Relations.⁵⁵⁰ As in earlier speeches, May again warned that if a security deal was not reached soon, or at all, both Europe and Britain would be less safe than they are today.

The speech, however, was a tale of two halves. It was clear that May’s priority for any post-Brexit deal would be on internal security – combating counter-terrorism, human trafficking and the migration crisis, through cooperation with European agencies via things like the EAW and PNR. On external security post-Brexit, however, such as inter-state conflict, peacekeeping and humanitarian aid beyond the border of Europe, May appeared to have a different plan for the UK. In response to these external security challenges, May stated that she believed it was the defining responsibility of the UK to come together and reinvigorate the transatlantic partnership and the UK’s other global alliances. May stated that as a permanent member of the UNSC and as a lead contributor of NATO, the UK had never defined its global outlook through the collective EU foreign policy, i.e. CSDP. May declared

⁵⁵⁰ K Bennhold and S Erlanger, ‘Theresa May, in Munich, Calls for Swift Security Pact and Offers Concession’, New York Times, (New York, 17 February 2018)
<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/17/world/europe/uk-theresa-may-munich.html> (accessed 05/04/22)

that the UK would be pursuing an independent foreign policy and would seek to engage with the EU in this respect via “ad hoc groupings”. May did say that the UK would be willing to continue to engage with and contribute to CSDP missions where it was in the UK’s interests. May stated that she believed there should, at a diplomatic level, be means for the UK and the EU to consult each other regularly. May stated that her government was keen to continue to work closely with the EU on sanctions, to enforce them and to develop them in the future. May also stated that the UK would be open to continuing to contribute to the EU development funds. All of this, however, May made clear would only be on an ad hoc basis and only when the UK felt it strengthened its interests and furthered its partnership with NATO. May concluded by stating her government was keen for the UK to continue working with the EU on R&D and developing Europe’s defence capabilities – in defence, cyber and space - to meet future threats.

Following on from May’s speech, the Government released a document entitled ‘*Foreign policy, defence and development—a future partnership paper*’.⁵⁵¹ This paper was a formal declaration by the Government of the speech made by the PM at the Munich Security Conference on the government’s vision for a future security and defence partnership with the EU. The paper reiterated what May said, about the UK being committed to European security and defence and that the UK wanted to secure a future relationship that was deeper than any current third country partnership. It also reiterated May’s vision for a partnership in which the UK could still contribute and engage in the CSDP but could do so on an ad hoc basis. Following on from this, a report was published by the European Union Committee, which considered the importance of the CSDP and CSDP missions to the UK’s foreign policy priorities, and looked at how the UK could participate in and influence missions and operations post-Brexit. The Report made a number of conclusions and recommendations in respect of the UK’s future participation in the CSDP. The Report

⁵⁵¹ ‘*Foreign policy, defence and development - a future partnership paper*’, HM Gov, (12 September 2017) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/643924/Foreign_policy_defence_and_development_paper.pdf (accessed 05/04/22)

found that, as the UK's foreign policy priorities were unlikely to change significantly upon leaving the EU, the UK would continue to derive value from participation in current CSDP missions and operations. The Report also concluded that the UK would require a higher level of political control to participate in military operations, more than any other third party has enjoyed before, in order to carry out the tasks required of it in these missions. The existing model for third country involvement in CSDP missions and operations would not give the UK the input and influence that it currently enjoys as a Member State. In turn, the Report concluded that it is unlikely that the remaining EU27 would be willing to allow the UK—as a non-Member State—a decision-making role on CSDP missions and operations, ruling out the May Government's aspirations for a deep partnership, including 'mandate development' and 'operational planning'. The Report also highlighted the fact that negotiations on the UK's withdrawal from the EU had not yet focused on foreign policy and defence, and had focused more on internal security. It also raised concerns over the fact that it was not yet clear how negotiations on foreign policy and defence co-operation were going to be structured, by whom they will be conducted, or how far they will be separated from the negotiations on future trade and other issues. The Report also raised concerns about the Government's lack of detailed proposals and called upon it to explain how its high-level aspirations for a post-Brexit security and defence partnership with the EU could be put into practice. The Report also warned the Government about relying too much on the UK's significant capabilities as leverage in the negotiations, given the fact that most CSDP missions and operations are at the lower end of the crisis management spectrum, with a focus on training and capacity building. The Report concluded, by recommending that, in the event of no post-Brexit security and defence partnership being agreed, as a last resort, the UK should seek to negotiate observer status in the EU's planning and decision-making bodies, such as the Political and Security Committee, for example – the merits this status will be evaluated in more detail below.

The response to the May government's aspirations for a security and defence partnership post Brexit were met with scepticism within the academic literature. Whitman argued that the UK government's aspiration of a deeper, unprecedented,

treaty-based relationship on security, was fanciful and would be something very complicated to negotiate and would unlikely be something the EU would agree to.⁵⁵² Whitman argues that the complex distribution of EU security policy - operating on the basis of different degrees of integration between the member states, pursued across different institutions (with differing roles for the European Commission, other EU agencies and member states) and based upon different EU treaty articles - throws up complexities for negotiating a future trade relationship. Furthermore, Whitman argues that as the UK's external relations such as the environment, food security, energy and development policy - all of which contain security dimensions - had all been intertwined with EU policies, the scope of an EU-UK security treaty would be very broad. Whitman also argues that there would what he calls a 'docking problem' for the UK in terms of its involvement in the CSDP.⁵⁵³ Whitman states that, whilst EU security and defence remains intergovernmental and Member States retain control over it, the evolution of Brussels-based decision-making and implementation structures of the CSDP and the fact that only member states can be members of the EU's key foreign, security and defence decision-making bodies (Foreign Affairs Council and the Political and Security Committee) makes the task of finding the UK a seat around the 'CSDP table' a very difficult one. May's proposals present a partnership within which the UK would engage with the CSDP as and when it felt it served its interests and have full decision making powers - essentially the UK would reap all of the benefits of CSDP yet pay nothing into it. As Whitman argues, it is unlikely the Member States would ever go for anything mirroring this.

Cardwell also makes a number of observations about the ambitions of the May government on EU security and defence.⁵⁵⁴ Like Whitman, Cardwell does not think the EU will agree to a deal like the one presented by May. He argues that the UK should not assume that the EU will acquiesce to the UK's demands on security and defence simply because of the UK's military might. As noted above, the CSDP is more

⁵⁵² R Whitman, *'The UK's European diplomatic strategy for Brexit and beyond'*, (2019), International Affairs, 95 (2)

⁵⁵³ R Whitman, *'UK foreign and security policy post-Brexit: The search for a European Strategy'*, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 6

⁵⁵⁴ Cardwell, *Supra* 22, at 21

about soft-power capabilities and relies less on hard military tactics. That said, and as Cardwell concedes, the removal of the UK in the CSDP should not be underestimated. The UK has contributed significant resources and highly skilled personnel to these mission and, in turn, its absence will undoubtedly affect the success of future CSDP missions. This was also a view shared by other commentators such as Smith and Drent, who argue that the May government's proposals "created a bit more of a positive atmosphere" but that they "lacked specificity on what it means".⁵⁵⁵ The FAC scrutinised the May government's position in a 2018 report on the future of UK diplomacy in Europe.⁵⁵⁶ The response of government representatives seemed to underline the lack of detail in any of the government's proposals. When asked if the ambitions outlined in the UK position paper included observer status in the FAC or the PSC, the Foreign Secretary stated that "there is no Government position—we have not decided what we want to seek" and that the precise format for co-operation was subject to negotiation. FCO Permanent Under Secretary (PUS), Sir Simon McDonald, also gave a similarly unclear answer about the Government's position, stating that the government was "not making a pitch" for observer status in the FAC and the PSC and that the mechanisms would "emerge in the negotiations over the next 12 months". Furthermore, when asked to clarify the government's vision for a UK/EU security and defence partnership post-Brexit, the Minister for Europe stated that he could not "state categorically which rooms we are going to be in" and that there was a "spectrum of possibility". Ultimately, no deal was reached by the May government on security and defence, however, the overly ambitious proposals and the severe lack of detail in any proposals made by the May government as to a future security and defence partnership make it unsurprising that no deal was reached during this premiership.

⁵⁵⁵ K Smith, *'Brexit and British foreign policy: between a rock and a hard place'*, UK in a Changing World, (20 June 2017) <http://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-and-british-foreign-policy-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place/> (accessed 10/04/22)

<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/514/51405.htm>

⁵⁵⁶ *'The future of UK diplomacy in Europe'* Report, Foreign Affairs Committee, (2018) <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/514/51405.htm> (accessed 10/04/22)

6.3.2 Johnson government perspectives on a post-Brexit security and defence partnership

During the final year of her premiership, May had struggled to convince her party and MPs across the Commons to support her EU Withdrawal Agreement Bill. Since December 2018, May's resignation following her failure to gain support for her Withdrawal Agreement had become a talking point within the Conservative Party and across the British media. After winning a vote of no confidence against her in December 2018, May had promised the Conservative Party that, if it supported her Brexit deal, she would resign. May's strategy, however, backfired, and in March 2019, her deal was rejected for, what was then, a third time, leading to a delay in the UK's withdrawal from the EU. In May 2019, May made one final attempt to obtain support from Parliament for her Brexit deal, this time promising a vote on whether to hold a second referendum on EU membership, if her EU Withdrawal Agreement Bill was passed. The offer was an attempt to gain support from Labour, however, it enraged hard-Eurosceptics within her party.⁵⁵⁷ This led to one of her senior ministers, Andrea Leadsom, to quit her cabinet, adding to the pressure for her to go. In turn, on 24th May, May announced her resignation, triggering another Conservative leadership race within her party.

Favourite to replace her was her former Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, who had resigned from May's cabinet in July 2018 after opposing her Brexit plans drawn up at the PM's country retreat, Chequers.⁵⁵⁸ As noted above, Johnson had been one of the leading advocates for Vote Leave. Whether a genuine Eurosceptic or not – Cameron had said of Johnson that he does not really believe in Brexit and had accused him of supporting Leave for personal gain⁵⁵⁹ - Johnson represented the hard-Eurosceptic

⁵⁵⁷ 'Theresa May resigns over Brexit: What happened?', BBC News, (London, 24 May 2019) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-48379730> (accessed 11/04/22)

⁵⁵⁸ H Stewart, 'May's plan 'sticks in the throat', says Boris Johnson as he resigns over Brexit', Guardian UK, (London,, 09 July 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jul/09/boris-johnson-resigns-as-foreign-secretary-brexit> (accessed 11/04/22)

⁵⁵⁹ Cameron, *Supra* 176, at 652

wing of the Conservative Party.⁵⁶⁰ Upon May's resignation as PM, Johnson announced his leadership bid and joined the race to become the next PM. Whilst May had made clear her fear and opposition to a no-deal Brexit,⁵⁶¹ Johnson, in his launch speech for his leadership campaign, stated that he was open to the possibility of a no-deal.⁵⁶² During this speech, Johnson stated that he believed the UK must leave the EU on 31st October 2019 – the deadline for reaching a withdrawal agreement – and that, whilst he was not aiming for a no-deal outcome, he would “prepare vigorously and seriously for no deal”.

By July 2019, the leadership race had been narrowed down to Johnson and, former Health Secretary under May, Jeremy Hunt. Johnson won the election comfortably with 92,153 votes to his Hunt's 46,656.⁵⁶³ In his first speech as PM, outside No.10 Downing Street on 24th July 2019, Johnson made only four references to Brexit and gave no detail about any future partnership with the EU in any area. Johnson vowed to take the UK out of the EU by 31st October 2019 and vowed that his government would do a new and better deal with the EU that would allow the UK to develop a “new and exciting partnership with the rest of Europe”.⁵⁶⁴ The following day, Johnson made his first speech to the Commons, committing to the 31st October 2019 date for Brexit and – whilst he stated he hoped for a renegotiation of the Withdrawal Agreement – he refused to rule out the possibility of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit.⁵⁶⁵ Although Johnson had revealed his willingness to accept a no-deal, by 17th

⁵⁶⁰ Ironically, Johnson had supported the idea of an EU army when he was Foreign Secretary under Theresa May; See ‘Boris Johnson says UK should support ‘EU Army’ in wake of Brexit’, Sky News, (London, 13 October 2016) <https://news.sky.com/story/boris-johnson-says-uk-should-support-eu-army-in-wake-of-brexiteers-10615685> (accessed 11/04/22)

⁵⁶¹ A Santolo, ‘BREXIT CHAOS as Theresa May issues no deal U-TURN – ‘she wants to divide Brexiteers’, Express, (London, 15 February 2019) <https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/1087286/Brexit-news-update-Theresa-May-motion-no-deal-brexiteers-ERG-andrew-bridgen> (accessed 12/04/22)

⁵⁶² Boris Johnson, ‘Leadership Campaign Launch’ Speech, (2019) <https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/full-text-boris-johnson-launches-his-tory-leadership-campaign> (accessed 12/04/22)

⁵⁶³ ‘Boris Johnson wins race to be Tory leader and PM’, BBC News, (London, 23 July 2019) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-49084605> (accessed 12/04/22)

⁵⁶⁴ Boris Johnson, ‘First Speech as Prime Minister’ Speech, (2019) <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/boris-johnsons-first-speech-as-prime-minister-24-july-2019>

⁵⁶⁵ Boris Johnson, ‘First Speech to Parliament as Prime Minister’, (2019) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-leader-speech-text-idUSKCN1UK1JK> (accessed 14/04/22)

October 2019, Johnson's government had struck a deal with the EU. The new Withdrawal Agreement was brought before Parliament on 22nd October 2019 and, although the timetable for the beginning of the transition period is defeated, the Withdrawal Agreement Bill passes its second reading. Following the defeat of the timetable, the UK agrees a Brexit extension with the EU until 31st January 2020.

The Withdrawal Agreement set the terms of the UK's withdrawal from the EU and outlined the future of the UK and the EU's economic and trade relationship. The Agreement makes only two references to the CSDP (and CFSP), establishing that the UK will be bound by Chapter 2 Title V TEU (the Treaty establishing CSDP and Member States obligations) and will continue to contribute to the finance of the EDA and the costs of CSDP operations, amongst other things, until a new agreement is reached or 31st December 2020 (whichever came first).⁵⁶⁶ The Withdrawal Agreement makes no mention of any terms for a future security and defence partnership or outline how either side want that partnership to look in the future. In turn, the failure to include any provisions pertaining to EU security and defence saw the UK leave the EU on 31st January 2020 without any deal secured with the EU on the future of UK and EU security and defence cooperation.

Following the passing of the Withdrawal Agreement in Parliament, a few days later on 30th October 2019, the Johnson government introduced the Early Parliamentary General Election Bill, which set the date for a General Election to take place on 12th December 2019. Although no mention was made of the CSDP in the Withdrawal Agreement, the Conservative's manifesto for the 2019 General Election have some insight into where the Johnson government saw the UK's security and defence priorities. Under a section entitled 'We Will Strengthen Britain In The World', the manifesto stated that the Johnson government would bolster the alliances and institutions that it believed helped the UK project its influence and keep it safe. The alliances and institutions listed were the UN and the UN Security Council, NATO, the

⁵⁶⁶ Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (Withdrawal Agreement) Article 127 and Article 156

Commonwealth, Five Eyes, the G20, the G7, and the World Trade Organisation. The manifesto gave no mention of the EU or CSDP, arguably highlighting Johnson's intentions to steer the UK away from EU security and defence post-Brexit. Johnson and the Conservatives would go on to win the election with a Conservative majority, giving Johnson a mandate for 5 years until 2024.

To date, whilst the Johnson government has yet to agree a partnership with the EU in security and defence, their approach to any such agreement and how they may want that partnership to look, can be gleaned from a number of speeches and policy documents released by Johnson and his government. As a proponent of Vote Leave and an advocate for the hard-Eurosceptics of the Conservative Party during the Cameron and May premierships, it is unsurprising that Johnson does not hold the same esteem for EU security and defence as his predecessors, Cameron and May. Whilst Johnson had been uncomfortable (although willing) to leave the EU without a withdrawal agreement, it appears no agreement on security and defence was something he and his government had been prepared to accept for some time before the UK's departure. Back in early October 2019, the Spectator published a leaked 700-word memo from a Downing Street staffer on the state of the Brexit negotiations, which contained a warning that the UK might halt security cooperation with the EU if Brexit was not achieved by Johnson's deadline of 31st October 2019.⁵⁶⁷ The leaked memo and the Johnson government's position was met with criticism from former MI6 chief, Sir John Sawers, who has said Brexit negotiations had got to "an extraordinarily damaging state" and that any attempt to stop working with EU countries" in security and defence would be an act contrary to the UK's own self-interest. Regardless of the criticism it has received, it would seem, given the absence of any deal, the Johnson government is content to continue without a security and defence agreement with the EU.

⁵⁶⁷ D Sabbagh, 'Ex-MI6 chief criticises threat to withdraw security cooperation with EU', Guardian UK, (London, 09 October 2019) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/oct/09/ex-mi6-chief-criticises-threat-to-withdraw-security-cooperation-with-eu> (accessed 14/04/22)

This said, the Johnson government has given some indication of the type of partnership it would like with the EU in security and defence. In February 2020, the Johnson government released a policy paper setting out the UK's negotiating objectives, entitled 'Our approach to the Future Relationship with the EU'.⁵⁶⁸ The Johnson government indicated that it is no longer seeking an institutionalised future UK-EU relationship in foreign affairs and defence and instead, it appears to be favouring a flexible, ad-hoc approach. The negotiating objectives state that foreign policy will be determined "within a framework of broader friendly dialogue and cooperation between the UK and the EU". The document, however, made no direct reference to defence or participation in EU programmes such as the EDF and PESCO. Further detail about the Johnson government's approach to security and defence post-Brexit came with the publication of its 'Integrated Review of Defence and Security' in July 2021.⁵⁶⁹ In the Review, the government outlined the UK's view for what it called a 'Global Britain' post-Brexit. The Review stated that the UK's European neighbours and allies remain vital partners and vowed that the UK would be the greatest single European contributor to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area to 2030. The government promised to 'work with its partners to defend common values, counter shared threats and build resilience in the European neighbourhood'. The government also states that it recognises the 'important role' played by the EU in the peace and prosperity of Europe and will seek to find 'new ways' of working with it on shared challenges – although, again, no detail is given as to what this new way of working might look like. The Review makes clear, however, that the UK will seek to pursue different political approaches to the EU in many areas where it suits its interests and reiterates the Johnson government's belief in NATO as the foundation of collective security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Review does state, however, that when it came to the issue of Russia, the UK would continue to support

⁵⁶⁸ 'Our approach to the Future Relationship with the EU' Policy Paper, HM Gov, (2020) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/our-approach-to-the-future-relationship-with-the-eu> (accessed 15/04/22)

⁵⁶⁹ 'Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy' Policy Paper, HM Gov, (2021) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy> (accessed 15/04/22)

closer practical cooperation between NATO and the EU. On the subject of EU security and defence, the Review concludes that the UK will cooperate with the EU on matters of security and defence as independent partners, where this is in our interest – mirroring the proposals made by May, in which the UK would seek to cooperate and engage with EU security and defence on an ad hoc basis.

The Johnson government's proposals appeared to support the proposals made by May – cooperating and engaging with the EU in security and defence on an ad hoc basis. Unlike May, however, Johnson appeared ready to accept no agreement with the EU on security and defence. In fact, much of what Johnson has done during his tenure as Prime Minister has suggested that he is looking to meet the UK's security and defence needs post-Brexit by building new alliances elsewhere – arguably putting his government's 2021 Integrated Security Review into practice. The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic halted any progress for the UK to make new security and defence pacts, however, as the world began to recover in mid-2021, and as restrictions began to be lifted, the Johnson government set about forming new security and defence partnerships around Europe and the rest of the world. Its first pact came with its new security and defence agreement with France. In the Integrated Security Review, the government stated that it would seek to pursue bilateral partnerships with European nations on security and defence, and one of these nations mentioned specifically was France (others included Germany and Italy).⁵⁷⁰ The Review mentions France 11 times, with the European Union gets only a few passing references, which arguably indicates the direction in which the Johnson government intends to steer the UK. In pursuit of these objectives, in July 2021, the UK and France signed a limited post-Brexit security treaty, entitled the 'UK-France Maritime Security Treaty', specifically aimed at protecting passengers on Channel ferries from terror attacks.⁵⁷¹ In a statement, the UK FCO said the agreement included sharing security information on potential threats, mounting swifter and

⁵⁷⁰ *Ibid*

⁵⁷¹ M Honeycombe-Foster, 'UK and France sign post-Brexit Channel security pact', Politico, (London, 26 July 2021) <https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-and-france-sign-post-brexit-channel-security-pact/> (accessed 16/04/22)

stronger initial responses to serious security incidents, and cooperating more effectively in the aftermath of a terror attack or incident. The FCO also said that the treaty would enable the two countries' security services to work more closely together. The treaty also saw the UK pledge €62.7 million to reinforce police patrols on French beaches. At the same time as the agreement, a meeting with the French minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Jean-Yves Le Drian, UK Foreign Secretary, Dominic Raab, and Defence Secretary, Ben Wallace, the UK and France discussed potential future collaborations to address the migration crisis across the channel and the continued civil war in Libya. This piecemeal approach – forming individual agreements with other nations on an ad hoc basis in areas that suit the UK's interests – seems to be the direction in which Johnson is steering the UK. Although the treaty is a sign of progress for British and French relations, French officials are reported to have stated that the UK's approach of bypassing the EU and forming these bilateral partnerships is severely limiting, given the EU is the biggest standard-setter in the world on issues like trade and climate.⁵⁷² The relationship between the French President, Emmanuel Macron, and Johnson is also reported to be a sour one, with a former UK ambassador to France describing the relationship between the two nations as being as bad as they can remember.⁵⁷³

The Johnson government followed up its treaty with France with a new defence pact, this time with the creation of a trilateral defence partnership with the US and Australia, entitled AUKUS. The pact was announced on 15th September 2021 and focuses specifically on enhancing the military capabilities of all three parties in cyber, artificial intelligence and quantum technologies. Arguably the main feature of AUKUS is that it will enable Australia to build nuclear-powered submarines for the first time, a technology provided to it by the US. It has been viewed by commentators in the area as an effort to counterbalance the so-called threat of China.⁵⁷⁴ In terms of UK

⁵⁷² R Momtaz, 'Not much entente, barely cordiale: Franco-British ties in the doldrums', Politico, (London, 02 August 2021) <https://www.politico.eu/article/france-uk-relationship-entente-cordiale-emmanuel-macron-boris-johnson/> (accessed 16/04/22)

⁵⁷³ *Ibid*

⁵⁷⁴ 'Aukus: UK, US and Australia launch pact to counter China', BBC News, (London, 16 September 2021) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-58564837> (accessed 16/04/22)

and EU relations, it is not so much what the pact says that has soured the partnership between the two parties, but more whom it excludes. The exclusion of France from the pact, and the provision of nuclear submarine technology to Australia, caused the Australians to cancel their £48 billion submarine-building contract with France. The Pact was met with outrage from France, with the French recalling its ambassadors to the US and French Foreign Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian calling it a “stab in the back”.⁵⁷⁵ The pact was also met with criticism from commentators in the field, with some arguing that AUKUS risked the UK becoming isolated from the EU and European states even more after Brexit.⁵⁷⁶ Others have argued that the humiliation caused to France and the rest of the EU may also further intensify ambitions within the EU to develop a credible, independent European military force. Witney makes similar points about how the agreement will embitter relations between the UK and the EU and also points how, with the UK not directly benefiting from AUKUS, the UK will become ever more subordinate to the US in security and defence post-Brexit.⁵⁷⁷

Johnson’s next port of call to build a new security and defence alliance was to India in April 2022. This was again in pursuit of pledges made in its Integrated Security Review to become ‘the European country with the broadest, most integrated presence in the Indo-Pacific in support of trade, shared security and values’. During his first visit to India since becoming Prime Minister, Johnson and Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, announced the new partnership agreeing to advance their new defence partnership to a ‘new level’, with a particular focus on maritime and industrial collaboration.⁵⁷⁸ The partnership included new agreements on maritime information sharing, an invitation to the UK to join India’s Information Fusion Centre (IMAC) in Gurgaon and an exercise programme which includes joint tri-lateral

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid*

⁵⁷⁶ ‘View on Anglo-French relations’, The Observer, (London, 19 September 2021) <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/sep/19/observer-view-on-anglo-french-relations-aukus-pact> (accessed 19 September 2021)

⁵⁷⁷ N Witney, ‘AUKUS: After the sugar rush’, European Council on Foreign Relations (24 September 2021) <https://ecfr.eu/article/aukus-after-the-sugar-rush/> (accessed 30/10/21)

⁵⁷⁸ ‘UK and India Prime Ministers announce Enhanced Defence Cooperation’, British High Commission New Delhi, HM Gov, (2021) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-india-prime-ministers-announce-enhanced-defence-cooperation>

military exercises. The partnership also included new agreements on security and defence R&D, including commitments to build the Indian military's air, maritime propulsion and space and cyber capabilities. An agreement was also made to move the manufacturing of the MT30 Gas Turbine engine to India. Again, the new pact was an unequivocal statement by Johnson and his government as to where it intends to have the UK's security and defence needs met.

The Johnson government's latest security and defence alliance was created with Sweden and Finland in May 2022. The new defence pacts came in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which sparked a discussion within Finland and Sweden over NATO membership. The pact included an agreement between the UK, Finland and Sweden to come to each other's aid, should any of the three nations come under attack. Announcing the new defence pact, Johnson stated that the pact would become the "foundation of an intensification" of the three-party's security and defence relationship in other ways as well. In a statement released by the UK government, the UK intends to see a step-change in defence and security cooperation between the UK and Finland and Sweden, intensifying intelligence sharing, accelerating joint military training, exercising and deployments, and bolstering security across all three countries and northern Europe.⁵⁷⁹ The UK government also announced that it hoped the new agreement will also see the UK bolster its collaboration on traditional threats facing all three nations, while working also with Sweden and Finland to tackle new geopolitical challenges, such as hybrid and cyber threats.⁵⁸⁰ Although the agreement was almost entirely about countering the Russian threat northern and eastern European, as well as putting Finland and Sweden's NATO membership back on the table, the partnership's secondary ambitions for intensified cooperation and increased security and defence R&D, can also be viewed as another example of the UK bypassing the EU for bilateral

⁵⁷⁹ UK-Sweden Political Declaration of Solidarity (2022) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/united-kingdom-sweden-statement-11-may-2022>; UK-Finland Statement (2022) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/united-kingdom-finland-statement-11-may-2022>

⁵⁸⁰ 'Prime Minister signs new assurances to bolster European security: 11 May 2022', HM Gov, (11 May 2022) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-signs-new-assurances-to-bolster-european-security-11-may-2022> (accessed 17/04/22)

partnerships with individual member states. The UK's pact with Finland and Sweden is yet another partnership in what is becoming a long list of new bilateral security and defence partnerships for the UK and is a strategy that Johnson shows no signs of detracting from any time soon.

The UK's new identity in international relations, with greater autonomy for international diplomacy, not just in security and defence but also in its foreign economic policy, it is difficult to determine how a future partnership with the EU might look like, if one will ever be agreed at all. As Whitman notes, the implication of the UK continuing with its current strategy is that there will be a divergence from the EU's norms, practices and ambitions in the security and defence field.⁵⁸¹ The longer this divergence occurs in, will increase – quite possibly to the point where a future security and defence pact with the EU may become impossible. As Whitman describes, the UK looks less likely to agree a security and defence pact with the EU and more likely to continue 'muddling through'. As Whitman notes, the current Integrated Security Review will define the UK's approach for the next decade. It would therefore be unsurprising to see any post-Brexit security and defence partnership with the EU in the next 10 years, or at least during Johnson's premiership. Whitman also highlights the politics of the Conservative Party, which he argues has become even more embittered with EU security and defence cooperation since Brexit and the election of Johnson as leader. A broadening and deepening of cooperation beyond trade policy will face significant opposition as the topic of EU security and defence cooperation is a taboo for many Conservative Party Members of Parliament and also for elements in the grass roots of the party, which has a growing hard-Eurosceptic base.⁵⁸² At present, the prospects of a UK/EU security and defence partnership are very slim.

⁵⁸¹ Whitman, *Supra* 552

⁵⁸² Heppell, *Supra* 21, at 340

6.4 EU perspectives on a post-Brexit security and defence partnership

The possibility of a future partnership and how it may look, also depends on the position of the other party to it: the EU. The EU has expressed its disappointment and regret at the UK's departure from the bloc. Following the triggering of Article 50 by Theresa May back in March 2017, the then President of the European Council, Donald Tusk expressed his and the EU's sadness over the UK's decision to leave the EU.⁵⁸³ In the speech, Tusk said that most Europeans want the UK to stay and not drift apart and stated that, for him, he was not happy to see the UK go. Tusk signed off, addressing the British public, by saying, "we already miss you". Whilst the EU did not want Brexit to happen, Tusk, however, made clear in his speech – which was made at the outset of the Brexit negotiations – that he and the Commission had a strong mandate to protect the interests of the 27 remaining EU Member States. Tusk argued that there was "nothing to win in this process" for either the UK or the EU, and that negotiations and any future partnerships would be more about damage control, minimising the costs of Brexit for EU citizens, businesses and the Member States.

The EU has consistently made it clear that it wanted the UK to remain a part of the EU and that it will seek to have as close a partnership with it as possible post-Brexit. That said, however, the EU maintained throughout the negotiation process, and still to this day, that any future partnership must also be in the best interests of the EU and the remaining 27.

6.4.1 EU's Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (2016)

This approach by the EU is also taken to a future security and defence partnership with the UK. In 2016 – coincidentally the same year as Brexit – the EU published its '*Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*' (EUGS), giving insight into the security and defence strategy it intends to pursue over the next

⁵⁸³ Donald Tusk, '*Remarks by President Donald Tusk following the UK notification*' Speech, (2017) <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/29/tusk-remarks-uk-notification/> (accessed 18/04/22)

couple of decades.⁵⁸⁴ The EU produced its first security strategy back in 2003, with the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003. The ESS worked as a narrative for the EU security and defence and provided it with a framework and a reference point when deciding on EU security and defence policy. As noted by Biscop, the ESS was important in that it ensured commonality amongst the 27 Member States, all of which had their own strategic security and defence cultures.⁵⁸⁵ Since its adoption, there was a number of attempts to revise and update the ESS, however, it was not until 2014, with the appointment of Federica Mogherini as High Representative, that the HR finally received a mandate from the European Council to produce an entirely new strategy. As a result, the EUGS was presented to the European Council on 28th June 2016 – just days after the Brexit referendum.

Like the ESS, the EUGS 2016 will guide the EU's foreign, security and defence policy for the foreseeable future and will also influence how it will negotiate and seek to frame any future security and defence partnership with the UK, and any other third-party for that matter. Under a section entitled 'Principles Guiding our External Action' in the EUGS, the EU sets out how its position on third-party partnerships, stating that the EU will seek to be a responsible global stakeholder, but will seek to share that responsibility by 'investing in its partnerships'.⁵⁸⁶ The EU also states that 'co-responsibility' will be its guiding principle in advancing, what it describes as, the 'rules-based global order'. The EU states that it will reach out to states, regional bodies and international organisations and work with 'core partners', like-minded countries and regional groupings. The EUGS also states that the EU will partner selectively with players whose cooperation, it believes, is necessary to deliver global public goods and address common challenges.

⁵⁸⁴ 'Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS)' (2016) https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/global-strategy-european-unions-foreign-and-security-policy_en (accessed 17/04/22)

⁵⁸⁵ S Biscop, 'The European Security Strategy. Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security', (2004), *Sécurité & Stratégie*, 82, 16

⁵⁸⁶ EUGS, *Supra* 584, at 16

The EUGS has appeared to give a new impetus to EU security and defence. The new High Representative, Josep Borrell, echoed the EUGS statements on partnerships, when he identified building security and defence partnerships as one of his key priorities for his mandate upon being made HR.⁵⁸⁷ Since the publishing of the EUGS, the EU has concluded Framework Partnership Agreements (FPAs)⁵⁸⁸ with selected partner countries to facilitate their contributions to CSDP missions and operations. To date, the EU has signed 20 such agreements with third-party states, and 12 of these partners currently participate in 10 of the 17 established CSDP missions and operations. Beyond cooperation in the framework of CSDP missions and operations, the EU continues to organise bilateral dialogues on a regular basis with more than 20 countries, covering a broad range of security- and defence-related topics. In addition to all of this, the EU invested more than €900 million in assistance programmes with priority partner countries.⁵⁸⁹ The aims of the EUGS to create more security and defence partnerships with third-party member states has also been supported by the FAC. In its conclusions of 18 May 2017, the Council stressed the importance of enhancing cooperation with partners, both with third countries and other international organisations.⁵⁹⁰ Whilst the Council was keen to express its desire to build these partnerships, it underlined its belief that partnerships between the EU and third-party countries should be of mutual benefit and should contribute to strengthening the EU's security and defence efforts, while fully respecting the EU's institutional framework and its decision-making autonomy.

⁵⁸⁷ Josep Borrell, 'A stronger European Union within a better, greener and safer world - key principles that will be guiding my mandate' Speech (2022) https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/stronger-european-union-within-better-greener-and-safer-world-key-principles-will-be-guiding-0_en (accessed 20/05/22)

⁵⁸⁸ The European Commission states that a Framework agreement is concluded as part of a long-term cooperation between the Commission and the partner with the aim to contribute to the objectives of the Union policy in the field of accreditation as referred to in the Preamble of the FPA.

⁵⁸⁹ A Weston and F Maduraud, 'Partnerships in Security and Defence', in J Rehl, 'Handbook on CSDP: The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union', (Federal Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Austria, 2021) 175 <https://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2021/06/CSDP-HANDBOOK-4th-edition.pdf> (accessed 20/04/22)

⁵⁹⁰ Foreign Affairs Council, European Council, (18 May 2017) <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2017/05/18/> (accessed 20/04/22)

6.4.2 EU Strategic Compass (2022)

The EUGS also gave rise to the EU's Strategic Compass ('the Compass'), which was approved by the Council in March 2022.⁵⁹¹ As stated by the Council, the Compass gives the EU an ambitious plan of action for strengthening the EU's security and defence policy by 2030. Announcing the launch of the Compass, the Council stated that the Compass represented what it described as a 'quantum leap forward' in EU security and defence capabilities. The Council stated that an objective of the Strategic Compass was to make the EU a stronger and more capable security provider and to enhance the EU's strategic autonomy, as well as its ability to work with partners to safeguard EU values and security and defence interests. The Council states that one of the Compasses key objectives, and one of the four pillars it will be structured around is 'partnership' (the other four being action, investment, and security). In pursuit of that objective, the Compass states that the EU will seek to develop more tailored bilateral partnerships with like-minded countries and strategic partners, listing the UK amongst those potential partners.

6.4.3 EU's Negotiating Mandate (2020)

As well as revealing its desire to form a bilateral partnership with the UK post-Brexit, via the EUGS and the Compass, the EU gave some detail as to what type of partnership it envisaged with the UK. In February 2020, the Council adopted what it calls its Negotiating Mandate ('the Mandate' – also known as the 'Directives for the Negotiation of a New Partnership with the UK').⁵⁹² In the Mandate, the EU states that the envisaged partnership should enable structured consultations between the Union and the United Kingdom. The EU also stated that it believed its partnership should enable cooperation between the Union and the United Kingdom in third countries, including on consular protection, and in international organisations,

⁵⁹¹ EU Strategic Compass (2022) <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7371-2022-INIT/en/pdf> (accessed 20/04/22)

⁵⁹² EU Negotiating Mandate (2020) <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/42736/st05870-ad01re03-en20.pdf> (accessed 20/04/22)

notably in the framework of the United Nations, with a view to combining efforts in external action and management of global challenges. In relation to sanctions, the EU also states that any future partnership should facilitate dialogue and mutual exchange of information between the EU and the UK to ensure alignment of the UK and EU sanctions policy, when and where foreign policy objectives are shared, i.e. against Russia. In relation to the CSDP, the Mandate states that any future partnership should establish a framework in line with existing rules to enable the UK to participate on a case-by-case basis, however, that this should be upon *invitation* by the EU, and *only* in CSDP missions and operations open to third countries. The EU also states that, under any framework, and in the context of a CSDP mission or operation in which the UK participates in, the envisaged partnership should provide for interaction and exchange of information with the UK that are proportionate to the level of the UK's contribution. The UK recognises that it has been the EU's longstanding view that, as a third country, the UK cannot have the same rights and benefits as an EU Member State, and the EU's Negotiating Mandate makes that clear.⁵⁹³ The EU seeks to ensure that any future partnership with the UK will preserve the autonomy of the EU's decision making, including in the shaping of its foreign and defence policies. There will be no standing invitation to participate in CSDP operations.

6.4.4 EU Security and Defence Ambitions Post-Brexit

The EU has made it clear, with the adoption of the EUGS, the Strategic Compass and the Negotiation Mandate, that it wants a post-Brexit security and defence partnership with the UK. Through its Negotiation Mandate, it has also given some detail as to how it would like that future partnership to look. These are all positive developments for the future of a UK/EU security and defence partnership. That said, since the UK's departure, although the UK's departure has undoubtedly been a blow to EU security and defence capabilities, its departure has also presented the EU with

⁵⁹³ C Mills, 'Brexit next steps: Defence and foreign policy co-operation', UK Parliament, (05 March 2020) <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/brexit-next-steps-defence-and-foreign-policy-co-operation/> (accessed 21/04/22)

many opportunities. Although this thesis has highlighted where and when the UK and EU's security and defence relationship worked well, during its time as a member, as noted earlier in the thesis, the UK had been one of the biggest opponents to further integration in EU security and defence.⁵⁹⁴ The UK was also a state around which other dissenting Member States could rally behind and oppose CSDP. This was most notable during the USA's invasion of Iraq, something which the UK supported in spite of formal EU opposition to the war. The EU and some of its Member States now see the UK's departure as an opportunity to deepen integration in security and defence and, in turn, there have been a number of developments since Brexit.

6.4.4.1 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)

Permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) in security and defence has been an ambition of the EU's since the failed ratification of the European Constitution (discussed earlier in the thesis). Although the EU Constitution failed, PESCO was revived under the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, which introduced the possibility for certain EU countries to strengthen their cooperation in military matters by creating permanent structured cooperation under Articles 42(6) and 46 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In order to do establish PESCO, the Treaty states that interested countries must intensively develop defence capacities through the development of national contributions and their participation in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes and in the activities of the EDA in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments. Interested countries must also have the capacity to supply combat units and support logistics for the tasks referred to in Article 43 TEU within a period of 5 to 30 days and, depending on needs, for a period of 30 to 120 days⁵⁹⁵. Following the UK's departure, PESCO was established by the Council on 11th December 2017, by 25

⁵⁹⁴ Sweeney & N Winn, 'EU security and defence cooperation in times of dissent: analysing PESCO, the European Defence Fund and the European Intervention Initiative (EII) in the shadow of Brexit', (2020), *Defence Studies*, 20 (3), 232

⁵⁹⁵ These tasks under Article 43 include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation.

of the EU's 27 remaining Member States.⁵⁹⁶ PESCO establishes a legal framework for these 25 Member States to jointly plan, develop and invest in shared capability projects, and enhance the operational readiness and contribution of armed forces. PESCO has not changed the intergovernmental nature of EU security and defence – Member States still retain full control over policy direction and decision-making when it comes to this area – however, PESCO now legally binds EU Member States to the commitments made under PESCO, to deepen defence integration, as opposed to political declarations to do so. To date, over 60 projects have been put forward by the participating Member States. In terms of third-party involvement, whilst membership of PESCO is only for those Member States who have undertaken the more binding commitments, third-party states may be invited to participate in PESCO projects upon meeting certain conditions. As noted by Witney, these new developments offers new capabilities and a “new promise of technological and industrial progress” for the EU in security and defence.⁵⁹⁷

PESCO, in fact represents one of the latest developments in UK/EU post-Brexit security and defence relations. In early November, the EU's High Representative Josep Borrell announced that the bloc had accepted the UK's request to join PESCO's military mobility project. Among PESCO's 60 collaborative projects, military mobility has the most countries involved, including 24 EU member states and three non-members, namely the US, Canada and Norway. The Dutch-led initiative aims at simplifying and standardising cross-border military transport logistics by enabling the unhindered movement of military personnel and assets within the borders of the EU, be it via rail, road, air or sea. Specifically, the PESCO project functions as a political platform which keeps member states aware of the work that needs to be done to achieve these objectives.

The UK joining PESCO's military mobility project represents the first post-Brexit formal engagement between the UK and the EU's CSDP. While this is undoubtedly a

⁵⁹⁶ COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2017/2315

⁵⁹⁷ N Witney, 'European Defence and the New Commission' European Council on Foreign Relations, (London, 30 September 2019) https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_eur (accessed 22/04/22)

good sign for UK–EU rapprochement, it is still a long way from a return to institutionalised cooperation between the two parties. The issue of UK participation in PESCO initiatives has been sensitive since the country officially left the EU, with some Brexiteers fearing that accepting the conditions for third country involvement in PESCO would fail to deliver on the promise of Brexit and that the UK would be permanently tied to EU defence structures and principles, over which it would have no formal influence. Following a similar line of thinking, some commentators have recently gone so far as to suggest that the UK’s participation in the military mobility project is part of a slippery slope towards joining an EU army. Besides overlooking the pragmatic reasons behind the UK’s decision to join a European military mobility project at a time of war on the European continent and the transatlantic nature of this particular project, these claims fundamentally fail to grasp how PESCO is situated within the European defence architecture and its separation from EU supranational institutions.

It is likely that the UK’s rationale for joining PESCO are related to the war in Ukraine and motivated by the need to send military kit to Ukraine faster and more easily, as well as equipment and troops to other vulnerable countries in Europe. Thus, there is high pragmatic value in the UK wanting to improve the speed at which its troops and kit can be deployed across Europe. The UK’s joining of PESCO also falls in with the Johnson and May governments plans to engage in a flexible, ad hoc partnership with the EU on defence cooperation and where EU defence initiatives where they complement NATO activities. PESCO’s military mobility project ticks these boxes.

Whilst the addition of the UK to PESCO is a sign that the UK is moving in the right direction, it is important not to overstate this development. The UK seeking to cooperate with European countries under the PESCO framework could potentially lead to further rapprochement with the EU and closer liaison with its CSDP structures, but it does not have to. For now, all that matters is that it is a sensible move which makes sense from the UK’s perspective. This move will help the UK address the Ukrainian crisis much more easily. The move, overall is unsurprising This sort of cooperation is precisely the type of arrangement envisaged under Brexit: the

UK liaising with European states where it is mutually advantageous to do so, and on issues mutually critical to European security.

6.4.4.2 European Defence Fund (EDF)

Following Brexit and the departure of the EU, another opportunity presented itself to the EU. In November 2016, the Commission released its 'Implementation Plan on Security and Defence'.⁵⁹⁸ The Plan proposed the creation of a European Defence Fund (EDF) which it stated could 'support the financing of capabilities commonly agreed by Member States and with recognised EU added value'. It was calculated by the Commission that lack of cooperation between EU Member States in the field of security and defence costs up to 100 billion Euros every year and that an integrated military hardware procurement could save that money. To prevent this waste in spending and unnecessary duplication of capabilities, turn, in 2017, the Commission launched the EDF. The EDF supports support multinational cooperation in defence research and development. The EDF also provides matched funding to member state expenditure on cooperative multistate initiatives. The current EDF budget is 8 billion for 2021-2027, which will fund collaborative defence research and collaborative capability development projects.⁵⁹⁹ The EDF has the potential to make a significant contribution to strengthening EU security and defence capabilities, especially if fully integrated with PESCO.⁶⁰⁰ The EDF is also a clear sign of a push towards strengthening the European security defence capabilities and will be fundamental to any prospect of EU strategic autonomy.

⁵⁹⁸ 'European Defence Action Plan: Towards a European Defence Fund', European Commission, (30 November 2016) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_4088 (accessed 22/04/22)

⁵⁹⁹ 'About the European Defence Fund (EDF)', European Commission https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf_en (accessed 23/04/22)

⁶⁰⁰ Sweeney, *Supra* 594 at 237

6.4.4.3 European Intervention Initiative (EII) (2018)

Another significant development in security and defence since Brexit has been the creation of the European Intervention Initiative (EII). The EII is a French-led initiative that was set out by President Macron in September 2017. In a speech given to Sorbonne University in Paris, Macron announced the launch of the EII stating that it is as part of his vision for a “sovereign, united and democratic Europe”.⁶⁰¹ The EII has the aim of building a shared strategic culture that would enhance the ability of its members to act together on missions as part of NATO, the EU, UN or other ad hoc coalitions. The project is resource neutral and makes use of existing assets and other joint forces available to its members. Participation in the EII is by invitation only and a Letter of Intent launching the initiative was signed by nine European countries on 25 June 2018. Finland has since joined the EII, taking the current number of participating European countries to 10. Italy formally announced its willingness to join in mid-September 2019. The EII was intended to be a flexible and non-binding forum of European states that are able, and willing, to engage their military forces when and where necessary in order to protect European security interests across the spectrum of crises, and without prejudice to the framework through which action is taken (i.e. the UN, NATO, the EU or as an ad hoc coalition). Macron has stated that it will not create a standing European force, nor does it envisage the creation of a new rapid reaction force. Participation in any of its specific initiatives, or any military operations that result, will be subject to sovereign national decision-making. The EII also intends to contribute towards ongoing efforts within the EU and NATO to deepen defence cooperation. In terms of the UK’s involvement, it first signalled its intent to get involved in January 2018 following a Franco-British summit on defence cooperation and is one of the signatories to the Letter of Intent. Given that the EII is a defence initiative outside of the governance of the European Union, UK participation in it will not be affected in any way by Brexit, however, UK participation in an initiative that is so closely linked to EU defence projects, and

⁶⁰¹ Emmanuel Macron, Sorbonne University Speech, (2017) <http://international.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2017/09/29/macron-sorbonne-verbatim-europe-18583.html> (accessed 23/04/22)

PESCO in particular, has raised some concerns among pro-Brexit commentators who fear that the initiative could involve Britain in an embryonic European Army 'by the back door'.⁶⁰² The E12 has been considered as a huge boost to strengthening EU security and defence capabilities. Whilst it is outside the EU structures, it has been argued by some that it manages to get around the cumbersome EU processes institutional complexities, and inter-state wrangling, whilst still contributing to enhancing EU defence capabilities and autonomy.⁶⁰³

6.4.4.4 Aachen Treaty (2019)

A further significant development in EU security and defence was the signing of the Aachen Treaty between France and Germany in 2019. Aachen was a reaffirmation of France and Germany's Élysée Treaty, or Treaty of Friendship. The Élysée Treaty was signed by French President, Charles de Gaulle, and German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, and was a declaration of friendship and cooperation between the two. The two parties agreed to institute regular meetings between French and German cabinet ministers and senior military officers, coordinate their foreign policies and agreed to establish programs in the realm of education teaching each other's language and culture.⁶⁰⁴ In the new Treaty of Aachen, France and Germany have pledged to enhanced cooperation between each other on security and defence policies. The Treaty also reaffirms their foreign policy, security, and military cooperation, underscores their commitment to culture, education, and has established new initiatives on cross-border cooperation. Whilst the Treaty is largely symbolic, it is statement of intent from France and Germany on how they see EU security and defence in the future. The Treaty legally binds France and Germany to pursue further security and defence integration, policy coordination, and

⁶⁰² C Mills, 'The European Intervention Initiative (EII/EI2)', UK Parliament, (23 September 2019) <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8432/> (accessed 23/04/22)

⁶⁰³ C Mölling and C Major, 'Why Joining France's European Intervention Initiative Is the Right Decision for Germany', Egmont (Brussels, 15 June 2018) <https://www.egmontinstitute.be/why-joining-frances-european-intervention-initiative-is-the-right-decision-for-germany/> (accessed 24/04/22)

⁶⁰⁴ N Dungan, 'The new treaty of Aachen: More than just a symbol?', New Atlanticist, (23 January 2019) <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/france-germany-treaty-of-aachen/> (accessed 24/04/22)

cooperation and sets out a road map for that. Furthermore, as arguably the two remaining leading Member States, it sends a signal to the rest of Europe, the world and, most notably, the UK, about their positive view of deeper integration in the EU and the direction they intend to steer Europe towards.⁶⁰⁵

6.4.4.5 Changes in EU Rhetoric

The departure of the UK from the EU has clearly unlocked some – not all – of the EU's security and defence potential. Initiatives such as PESCO, EDF, E12, and Aachen, would almost certainly have been initiatives that the UK would have opposed had it still been a member, given its long standing policy of opposing further integration in EU defence. The rhetoric within the EU has changed also. Topics, once considered highly sensitive are being openly discussed by EU officials. Speaking to students at the Tsinghua University, China, HR Federica Mogherini said that, whilst the EU will lose an important member state, the UK will lose more than the EU.⁶⁰⁶ Her successor, Josep Borrell, in a speech commenting on the first draft of the Strategic Compass in November 2021, stated that the EU has to become a 'security provider'⁶⁰⁷. Borrell also stated that European citizens want member states to improve their capacities in order to be more effective, and they want to project Europe in the world.

Following Brexit, the EU also started to attract pro-federalists to some of its top jobs. Upon the UK's decision to leave the EU, the European Parliament appointed Guy Verhofstadt as its representative on Brexit. Verhofstadt became the counterpart of the EU's chief negotiator, and chief negotiator of the Commission, Michel Barnier. The two negotiators were tasked with presenting the EU's position in negotiations

⁶⁰⁵ E Perot, 'The Aachen Mutual Defence Clause: A Closer Look at the Franco-German Treaty', Egmont, (26 February 2019) <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/the-aachen-mutual-defence-clause-a-closer-look-at-the-franco-german-treaty/> (accessed 24/04/22)

⁶⁰⁶ G Završnik, 'Mogherini: 'Britain will lose more from Brexit than EU'', Politico, (20 April 2017) <https://www.politico.eu/article/mogherini-britain-will-lose-more-from-brexit-than-eu/> (accessed 24/04/22)

⁶⁰⁷ A Brzozowski, 'Europe has to become a security provider, says EU's Borrell', Euractiv, (10 November 2021) <https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/interview/europe-has-to-become-a-security-provider-says-eus-borrell/> (accessed 25/04/22)

and approving any possible agreements on the conditions of the UK's departure. Prior to this role, Verhofstadt had been a prolific federalist, who once published a book entitled 'The United States of Europe' in 2006⁶⁰⁸ which put forward the argument for a federal United States of Europe. Verhofstadt's position had not changed by the time he became a chief negotiator on Brexit for the EU. In an interview in May 2019, about his ambitions to take the EU's 'top job' – President of the Commission – Verhofstadt stated that he did not want a superstate, however, he stated that he saw nothing wrong with the idea of a United States of Europe and that he believed it would be a way to organize common action on a European level.⁶⁰⁹

As well as Verhofstadt, in December 2019, a fellow pro-federalist, Ursula von der Leyen, was elected as President of the European Commission. Although von der Leyen has backtracked on some of her past views, for a large part of her political career she had been a devote European federalist.⁶¹⁰ In an interview with Der Spiegel in 2011, von der Leyen stated that her aim as a politician "is the United States of Europe – modelled on federal states like Switzerland, Germany or the US".⁶¹¹ She repeated this call for a United States of Europe again in 2016, stating that she imagined the Europe of her children and grandchildren "not as a loose union of states trapped by national interests".⁶¹² Prior to becoming President of the Commission, von der Leyen was defence minister in her native Germany, during which she pushed for greater security cooperation in the EU, advocating for European Defense Union and calling for the establishment of an "army of

⁶⁰⁸ See G Verhofstadt, *The United States of Europe (The Federal Trust)*, (Federal Trust for Education & Research, 2006)

⁶⁰⁹ A Jamieson and C Harris, 'Watch again: 'I don't want a superstate' says Verhofstadt', Euro News, (13 May 2019) <https://www.euronews.com/2019/05/13/guy-verhofstadt-eu-presidential-hopeful-talks-to-euronews> (accessed 25/04/22)

⁶¹⁰ Z Wiese, 'Von der Leyen rows back on 'United States of Europe'', Politico, (18 July 2019) <https://www.politico.eu/article/ursula-von-der-leyen-rows-back-on-united-states-of-europe/> (accessed 25/04/22)

⁶¹¹ 'Schuldenkrise: Von der Leyen fordert die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa', Spiegel, (27 August 2011) <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/schuldenkrise-von-der-leyen-fordert-die-vereinigten-staaten-von-europa-a-782879.html> (accessed 25/04/22)

⁶¹² K Bennhold, 'E.U.'s Top Pick: Too Pious for Feminists, Too Feminist for Conservatives', New York Times, (5 July 2019) <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/05/world/europe/eus-top-pick-too-pious-for-feminists-too-feminist-for-conservatives.html> (accessed 25/04/22)

Europeans". During her time as Defence Minister, von der Leyen stated that "Europe must be able to act independently precisely in the areas where Europe must act independently".⁶¹³ On Brexit and the UK, von der Leyen has taken a much tougher stance than her predecessor, Tusk. She did not support a second referendum for the UK, stating that "as much as I would like to see the Brits stay in the EU, they voted to leave".⁶¹⁴ Giving some insight into how von der Leyen may approach any future security and defence negotiations with the UK, as defence minister, von der Leyen stressed that, whilst she wanted the UK and the EU to still cooperate on security matters in the future, she would not allow special treatment for the UK post arguing that if the EU defines a special path for the UK, other partners like Norway would demand the same.⁶¹⁵

6.4.5 Towards a Defence Union?

The EU has made clear in its policy documents relating to Brexit that it does want a security and defence partnership with the UK. That said, it has reiterated that any future partnership must benefit both parties and no special treatment or bespoke arrangements will be made for the UK. Since the UK's departure, the EU has expanded its security and defence capabilities. Brexit has undoubtedly unlocked some of the EU's security and defence potential and the EU has been able to establish initiatives that would almost certainly have been blocked by the UK had it still been a member. Furthermore, since Brexit, the EU's rhetoric has changed, and arguments favouring a United States of Europe, EU army and EU defence union, which were once made on the fringes of the EU, have now become part of mainstream discussions by some of the EU's top officials. The EU is certainly a long way from becoming a defence union, and ideas such as an EU army and federal Europe

⁶¹³ 'Ursula von der Leyen wirbt für "Armee der Europäer"', Spiegel, (12 November 2018) <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/ursula-von-der-leyen-wirbt-fuer-armee-der-europaeer-a-1238076.html> (accessed 26/04/22)

⁶¹⁴ J Gaugele, 'Ursula von der Leyen: Durch den Brexit verlieren alle', Morgen Post, (18 November 2018) <https://www.morgenpost.de/politik/article215819939/Ursula-von-der-Leyen-Durch-den-Brexit-verlieren-alle.html> (accessed 26/04/22)

⁶¹⁵ A Hellemann, R Eichinger and N Starnick, 'Ist der Brexit wirklich so katastrophal?', Bild, (25 June 2016) <https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/ursula-von-der-leyen/ist-der-brexit-wirklich-so-katastrophal-46492172.bild.html> (accessed 26/04/22)

are still just that. That said, developments since Brexit within the EU have revealed a noticeable appetite within the EU and Europe's remaining 'Big Two' – France and Germany – to work towards some of these things. Regardless, as things stand, both the EU and UK's security and defence are diminished in the absence of a partnership between them.⁶¹⁶ On the one hand, the UK continues to miss out on the EU's soft-power military and diplomatic capabilities, and on the other, the EU is deprived of the UK's hard-power capabilities, including its nuclear deterrent, permanent seat in the UNSC, and its 'Special Relationship' with the US.⁶¹⁷

6.5 Potential post-Brexit partnerships

For the foreseeable future, a post-Brexit security and defence partnership between the UK and the EU looks unlikely. As discussed above, the two parties appear to be going in different directions on security and defence; the EU is focusing on deepening integration and developing its own capabilities within the Union, whereas the UK is developing its bilateral partnerships with European nations and nations beyond the borders of Europe, as well investing more in NATO (with the UK recently pledging to spend 2.5% GDP on defence by 2030 at the June 2022 NATO summit).⁶¹⁸ Furthermore, the terms of both party's proposals are a long way off from each other. The UK, on the one hand, seeks a partnership in which it can still make decisions on the CSDP but has the freedom to contribute to and finance those missions it feels suits its interests. On the other hand, the EU seeks a partnership in which it invites the UK to engage with and contribute to CSDP missions as and when it feels the UK's involvement can add value. As stated above, the EU has made clear that it will not make special arrangements for the UK and that any partnership must be in the EU's interests as well as the UK's. The EU will not allow the UK to 'have its cake and eat it' – reaping all the benefits of CSDP and contributing nothing to it (or contributing only

⁶¹⁶ Sweeney, *Supra* 594, at 238

⁶¹⁷ D Barrie, 'Opportunities for Defence-industrial Collaboration after Brexit', International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), (June 2018) <C:/Users/USER/Downloads/Opportunities%20for%20defence-industrial%20collaboration%20after%20Brexit%20IISS%20DGAP.pdf> (accessed 26/04/22)

⁶¹⁸ C Gallardo, 'UK defense spending to hit 2.5 percent of GDP by 2030, vows Boris Johnson' Politico, (Madrid, 30 June 2022) <https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-pledge-2-5-percent-defense-end-decade/> (accessed 01/07/22)

to those missions it wishes to be involved in). As it stands, therefore, negotiations between the two on a post-Brexit security and defence partnership have reached stalemate.

Whilst it looks unlikely that a partnership will be formed in the near future, this has not stopped academics in the field from exploring what a future partnership could and should look like. Across the academic literature, a number of themes have emerged about the types of partnership the UK and the EU may engage in. Three types of potential partnership have emerged from the academic literature: tightly integrated, loosely integrated and detached. Whitman identifies and defines these three possible scenarios as for the UK in the CSDP post-Brexit as an '*integrated player*', an '*associated partner*', or a '*detached observer*'.⁶¹⁹ With the UK and EU's proposed terms in mind, starting with the 'integrated player' scenario, each scenario will now be looked at in more detail:

6.5.1 Integrated player

As an integrated player, in order for the UK to take on this more integrated role, the EU would have to make a bespoke arrangement for it. As Cardwell states, in this scenario, the UK would take on what he describes as a 'reverse Denmark' (outside the EU but inside the CSDP), retaining involvement in EU battlegroups, CSDP operations and in the FAC on relevant agenda items.⁶²⁰ That said, under this scenario, the UK would lose its ability to make strategic decision-making relating to the CSDP. As a non-member state, the UK would be outside the mechanisms of the FAC, the Council, the Political and Security Committee and its working groups. Under this scenario, the UK would regain access to the EU's diplomatic and soft-power military capabilities, whilst the EU would also have access to the UK's hard-power military capabilities and expertise. With both party's foreign policies almost certainly remaining in correspondence with one another, it is likely that the UK's involvement

⁶¹⁹ Richard G Whitman, '*The UK and EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after Brexit: Integrated, Associated or Detached?*' (2017) 238 *National Institute Economic Review* 43, 48

⁶²⁰ Cardwell, *Supra* 22, at 23

in the EU's policy-making infrastructure would be a regular occurrence. At present, however, this type of arrangement sits outside the terms proposed by both parties and neither has made any indication yet that they would agree to such a partnership. This view was shared by a number of experts involved in the House of Lords' European Union Committee report on Brexit and CSDP missions and operations. Expert witnesses stated that could not foresee a role for the UK in CSDP decision-making after Brexit⁶²¹ and that a decision-making role for the UK would be an option that the EU would probably not be happy about.⁶²² Lord Ricketts, commenting in the Report, stated that the EU would always draw a line at EU autonomy.

A number of other similar scenarios have been suggested, which would enable the UK to have an integrated role within EU security and defence as a third-party state. This scenario was put forward by the European Union Committee in their report on CSDP post-Brexit. This partnership would require the UK to negotiate a privileged advisory or consultative role in the EU institutions, but without decision-making power and vetoes. This would mirror the type of partnership that Finland and Sweden currently have within NATO. Speaking to the EU Committee, expert witness, Andrew Lapsely, stated that these two nations, as non-NATO countries, have become very close partners within NATO and have been contributing to NATO operations. They have made broad intellectual and political contributions and, in some ways, have been more active than some allies within NATO. Finland and Sweden have become regular participants" in North Atlantic Council meetings, and while they do not have a formal decision-making role, these two states contribute to debate. Another integrated player scenario for the UK that was also suggested in the EU Committee's report was for the UK to have an early and permanent continuing consultation role, including an established mechanism for the UK to have influence and be part of the consultative process before any decisions are made by the EU

⁶²¹ 'Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations', 16th Report, European Union Committee, (2018)

<http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp-missions/written/77355.html>

⁶²² *Ibid*

Member States.⁶²³ In this scenario, the UK could be involved thinking on policy early on when a crisis breaks out. It is not difficult to imagine that a similar sort of partnership could be agreed between the UK and the EU, with the UK participating in the debates at the meetings of the FAC and PSC, for example, but having no veto. Again, this type of scenario remains outside the terms proposed by the two parties.

6.5.2 Associated partner

The second possible type of partnership the UK and the EU might have is where the UK is an associated partner to the EU. In this scenario the UK's position would be similar to the position of Norway: having no membership of the FAC but participating in dialogue with the EU on policy and related issues.⁶²⁴ Whilst it would still have the opportunity to participate in battlegroups and the European Defence Agency via special agreements, this would likely be a functional arrangement with little or no influence over policy-making. This would clearly be a much looser partnership with the EU in security and defence. Exchanges between the UK and the EU on security and defence policy would be on a dialogue basis, however, the UK would have no direct involvement in policymaking. The UK's involvement in the CSDP missions, both civilian and military, would require the two parties to sign an FPA, as discussed above, allowing the UK to join missions on a case-by-case basis, at the invitation of the EU. As Whitman states, under this scenario, the UK would relinquish its ability to have a direct influence on the development of EU security and defence policy.⁶²⁵

Academics in the field have described this as a partnership that would 'die out' quite quickly.⁶²⁶ Others have argued that this model would be unlikely to satisfy the UK's interests and strategic ambitions in security and defence and would not be a good outcome for either party.⁶²⁷ Representatives of the Johnson government have also

⁶²³ *Ibid*

⁶²⁴ T Tardy, 'CSDP: Getting Third States on Board', (2014) European Institute for Security Studies Brief, 6, 6

⁶²⁵ Whitman, *Supra* 619, at 7

⁶²⁶ European Union Committee, *Supra* 621

⁶²⁷ *Ibid*

made clear that this would not be something it would seek to engage in as the existing way in which the EU handles third countries would not allow the UK reasonable input.⁶²⁸ The Global Europe Centre have made suggestions that there may be an opportunity for a rethink of the structure of FPAs so that it integrates partner countries at every stage of the planning and implementation of CSDP missions.⁶²⁹ This would enable the UK to have a reasonable and proportionate degree of influence over what that operation was doing, however, the EU is yet to indicate whether this would be something it would be willing to do.

6.5.3 Detached observer

The only other possible scenario for the UK, post-Brexit, is to become what Whitman defined as a 'detached observer' – in which the UK would not participate in any institutional formats and would be limited to participation in civilian missions on a case-by-case basis at the invitation of the EU.⁶³⁰ This is essentially the position the UK finds itself in today. The UK's foreign, security and defence policy does not necessarily run counter to the EU's, however, it remains formally disconnected from strategic decision-making or policy making when it comes to EU foreign, security and defence policy. As Whitman argues, the UK may seek to influence the EU by building bilateral partnerships with EU Member States. This appears to be the approach that it is already taking, with its recent bilateral security and defence partnerships with Finland, France and Sweden. It is also possible that the UK could mirror the position taken by the US; participating in civilian CSDP missions on a case-by-case basis via a framework agreement on crisis management operations, allowing it to work in a separate mission alongside any CSDP missions, rather than being integrated into EU military deployments.⁶³¹

⁶²⁸ *Ibid*

⁶²⁹ *Ibid*

⁶³⁰ Whitman, *Supra* 619, at 7

⁶³¹ *Ibid*

Academics in the field have argued that the UK's diplomatic weight, military capabilities and prominent position in organisations such as NATO and the UN – as well as its special relationship with the US – would continue to count with the remaining 27 EU Member States on foreign security and defence policy, but that this would depend largely on what 'Global Britain' will mean in practice.⁶³² For these reasons, and its geographical location to continental Europe, the UK will undoubtedly have influence on the EU's security and defence policy from outside the EU. The level of influence that it will have, however, depends on how much it is willing to invest in ensuring it retains influence. The UK would have to invest in staff and financial resources in Brussels. The EU will still look to the UK for support. The EU engages regularly with the US beyond individual missions in forums such as the PSC in which representatives from the US are invited to participate in both formal and informal meetings. A similar sort of arrangement could be set up for the UK. Regardless of all of this, however, the fact still remains that the UK would have no direct influence on decision-making or policy formation.⁶³³ As has been argued by some, agenda-shaping was difficult enough for the UK when it was a member – as argued earlier in the thesis, it is very difficult to form policy due to the Member States' opposing foreign, security and defence policies. Being outside the EU now, shaping an agenda will be a very complex task for the UK.

It is likely that under this scenario, the UK will seek to make more of its bilateral partnerships with other European nations and nations beyond the borders of Europe, as has been evident with the partnerships the UK has recently forged with India, Finland and Sweden. Although the UK is planning to make more of its bilateral partnerships, it is useful to look at how one of their most famous bilateral partnerships, with France under the Lancaster house treaties, panned out, to gauge just how successful these might be. France is one of the European states the UK will most likely seek to build a stronger bilateral partnership with. It is now over ten years since the Lancaster House treaties, however, and the partnership that was

⁶³² European Union Committee, *Supra* 621

⁶³³ A Bakker, M Drent and D Zandee, 'The UK as a non-member state in EU defence', Clingendael Institute, (1 July 2017) <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05446.5?seq=8> (accessed 27/04/22)

developed between the UK and France under these treaties has had a mixed record. As noted earlier in the thesis, as the EU's two only nuclear powers, the two nations agreed to nuclear cooperation under one of the treaties. In pursuance of this aim, the two nations established the Teutates project, which had the aim of building a single shared facility in France for testing the safety and reliability of their nuclear warhead designs. Cameron forecasted several hundred million pounds of savings. By 2018, the UK and France were using the same vast radiographic machines for their national experiments. The full site is almost completed 2022, and the treaty is valid for 50 years. For this time, the UK and France will be mutually dependent for a critical aspect of their nuclear deterrents.

The main aim of the second treaty was to launch practical work in two areas: strengthening cooperation between the two armed forces, and joint procurement of equipment. One of the real success stories of the Lancaster House process has been much closer operational cooperation between the two militaries. The main vehicle for this was developing a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), capable of deploying a joint brigade-level force with air and naval assets and conducting high-intensity combat operations. Bringing this force up to full operating capability has involved regular joint exercises and exchanges of personnel. As a result, units across the two armed forces have trained together, communications problems have been ironed out, and personal links established up to senior levels. In turn, the two countries now have a fighting force which they could jointly deploy if the two governments decided to act together. In the meantime, the two armed forces are operating together increasingly often: from air strikes against the Islamic State in Syria, joint naval deployments, humanitarian relief and French participation in the UK-led NATO Enhanced Forward Presence in Estonia.

Progress on defence equipment cooperation has by contrast been disappointing. The initial high hopes that the UK and France could develop a joint Future Combat Air System have amounted to nothing thus far. Instead, France turned to a joint project with Germany on a next-generation fast jet, and the UK is pursuing the Tempest programme with Italy and Sweden. Cooperation on missiles has made more

progress, particularly on a new anti-ship missile for the two navies, however, the ambitious plans for industrial cooperation between the UK and France have been a casualty of Brexit and the wider geopolitical environment. French energies under President Emmanuel Macron have turned towards European strategic autonomy, as has been discussed in this chapter.

In terms of the future of Lancaster House and the wider British/French security and defence relationship, the nuclear relationship is underpinned by the Teutates deal. There is scope for the two countries to consult more closely on nuclear deterrence. The CJEF has been successful in strengthening links between the armed forces. If European countries ever needed to deploy forces into combat, it would arguably be France and the UK in the lead.

Whilst Brexit does not weaken the case for Europe's two major military powers work together, in practice Brexit has pulled in them in opposite directions. Whilst the UK has joined a PESCO project, which signals progress, there is not a great deal of appetite in the UK government for structured dialogue with the EU on defence and security, while France is busy promoting EU-based autonomy. What is also striking is that the two governments did not plan a major event on the 10th anniversary of Lancaster House to celebrate the achievements and relaunch cooperation for another decade. That may partly be a casualty of the coronavirus pandemic but it is likely to be part of a larger breakdown in relations, almost inevitably a symptom of Brexit. For now, it would be wise to not expect too much to come from France and the UK in this field.

6.5.4 What next?

Although the academic literature in the field points to viable scenarios for the UK and the EU's post-Brexit security and defence partnership, at present, both party's proposals do not match up. As things stand, with no partnership agreed, both the UK and EU's security and defence capabilities are diminished. For the EU, the loss UK hard-military capabilities and expertise will deliver a blow to European security, a

development likely to be welcomed hard-Eurosceptics.⁶³⁴ The EU is set to lose out on one of Europe's only full spectrum military powers, representing 40% of the EU's military capability and 20% of its armed forces.⁶³⁵ The UK's permanent seat on the UNSC and its leading role within NATO, mean the EU's influence over such organisation will be diminished, as well as its influence on the US, with the access to the UK's special relationship with America gone. The EU, at present, is also losing out on the UK's military industrial capability and risks degrading Europe's military-industrial credibility. This will also impact the UK defence industry in the long-term, having been disadvantaged by exclusion from transnational European projects which it would have once had contracts for. That said, whilst the UK's nuclear deterrent is of note, given that nuclear weapons have always been off the table when addressing crises in places such as Ukraine and Libya, or any crises for that matter, it is unlikely that this will have any real affect on the EU's ability to address crises of this nature. Most significantly for the UK, it is currently losing out on the EU's soft-power military, civilian and diplomatic capabilities, which enabled the UK to address global crises without coming into direct conflict with other nations (i.e. Russia) and contributing to missions involving state building, peace keeping and peace making without taking on the full burden of financing these missions (i.e. Libya).

It is clear from the arguments made above, that the best post-Brexit scenario for both the UK and the EU would be for the UK to take on an *integrated player* role. This appears to be a viable option. To get to this point, however, both parties will have to take a step down on their expectations for a future partnership and swallow some of their pride. For the UK, whilst it is without argument one of Europe's biggest military powers, it should not seek to over rely on this status in any future

⁶³⁴ N Witney, 'The Brexit Threat to Britain's Defence Industry', European Council on Foreign Relations (London, 01 February 2018) https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_brexit_threat_to_britains_defence_industry/ (accessed 27/04/22)

⁶³⁵ P Round, G Bastien and C Mölling, 'European Strategic Autonomy and Brexit', IISS, (June 2018) [http://file:///C:/Users/Simon/AppData/Local/Packages/Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe/TempState/Downloads/European%20strategic%20autonomy%20and%20Brexit%20IISS%20DGP%20\(1\).pdf](http://file:///C:/Users/Simon/AppData/Local/Packages/Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe/TempState/Downloads/European%20strategic%20autonomy%20and%20Brexit%20IISS%20DGP%20(1).pdf) (accessed 27/04/22)

negotiations. The EU has discovered new opportunities without the UK and has made clear that it will walk away from the negotiation table if it feels any future partnership does not serve its interests. Furthermore, to assuage EU concerns about UK 'freeriding' on EU security and defence, the UK must be prepared to pay its fair share into the CSDP.⁶³⁶ For the EU, on the other hand, it must be prepared to take a step down from its expectations. The EU has made it clear that the UK will not receive any special treatment, through fear of setting a precedent for other EU nations – but the UK is unlike any of the other remaining EU 27 (except France). The EU must face up to the impact that the UK's departure will have on the EU's influence around the world and on its security and defence capabilities. A bespoke arrangement can – and this thesis argues should – be made for the UK. The risk to British and European security is too great.

6.6 Implications for LI Theory

As noted in the introduction to this thesis and this Chapter, this arguments made in this thesis about the UK's past and future security and defence partnership with the EU is grounded in liberal intergovernmentalism. Given both the financial and political harm that Brexit will have for the UK, forecasted by commentators mentioned throughout this thesis, it would appear what has been discussed in this Chapter has the potential to discredit LI theory – or at least seems to discredit the arguments made by one of its leading proponents, Moravcsik, concerning states acting rationally and taking decisions to integrate in the financial interests of its citizens, or groups within its society. Every conclusion in this thesis has put forward the argument that the Member States will cooperate and integrate more deeply to further the economic interests of its citizens. Brexit was a clear example, however, of a Member State taking a decision to isolate itself politically and harm itself economically. It is difficult to rationalise the UK's departure from the EU considering that its departure will negatively impact the UK's economy. What is also difficult to

⁶³⁶ S Biscop, '*Brexit, Strategy, and the EU: Britain Takes Leave*' Egmont, (31 January 2018) <https://www.egmontinstitute.be/brexit-strategy-and-the-eu-britain-takes-leave/> (accessed 27/04/22)

rationalize is the Johnson government's support for a 'hard' Brexit, since a hard-Brexit will further impact the British economy and political system negatively, as well as in security and defence terms. In the case of Brexit, not only does the state actor appear to be acting irrationally but, by preferring a 'hard-Brexit', which would hurt the economy and its security and defence interests, the state appears to be actively making the situation worse for itself domestically. Economists from international organizations such as the OECD and the IMF, the British Treasury, think tanks, and private consultancies were in almost full agreement about the harm that Brexit would do to the UK economy. In addition to this, the UK business community and major business interest groups were been overwhelmingly in favour of remaining in the EU and the internal market. With the UK's participation in the internal market at stake – a policy area, which involves intense domestic economic interests – logic would suggest that economic interests and domestic economic interest groups would sway the UK government and determine the UK's preference of remaining or leaving the EU. Instead, arguments of self-determination and identity politics which won over the UK voters and which the UK government upheld. Ultimately, the UK government's position on Brexit was inconsistent with LI expectations. That said, this thesis still contends that LI is still the theory best placed to explain the EU integration process and to act as the grounding for the arguments put forward in this thesis.

Whilst no post-Brexit security and defence partnership between the UK and the EU has been agreed to date, several significant insights can be gleaned from the agreements that the UK has negotiated with the EU in other policy areas, such as trade. The EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement set out the UK and the EU's future trading partnership. Brexit, along with this Agreement, essentially split the Single Market into two. The UK's withdrawal and the Agreement has introduced a number of barriers in the way of trade between the UK and the EU, making trade between the UK and the EU more complicated than ever before. As noted above, a great deal of the commentary and analysis surrounding the Agreement, and the UK's withdrawal from the EU, has been negative and that both parties are set to lose out. That said, whilst withdrawal from the EU has not been in the best interests of either party, the UK has aligned itself closely with the EU on trade. The two parties

jurisdictions continue to have similar rules on trade, and In other areas relating to workers' rights, social and environmental protection, taxation, and government subsidies for business. In spite of its self-determination priority and hard initial bargaining positions, the UK has accepted almost all EU conditions for the Agreement in order to avoid the risk of 'crashing out' of the EU. The EU enjoyed and continues to enjoy superior bargaining power both before and after Brexit when it comes to trade. Whilst, as noted, the EU and the UK are both likely to lose from Brexit, interdependence favours the EU. Whereas 44% of UK exports go to the EU, only 6–7% of EU exports go to the UK.

Like the in the area of trade, this thesis contends that both the UK and the EU are set to lose out post-Brexit. The area of security and defence is an entirely different one to trade and, as argued earlier in the thesis, the parties are on a more equal footing when it comes to the area of security and defence, with the UK arguably holding more bargaining power. If the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement is anything to go by, however, it is entirely likely that in the post-Brexit world, the UK will continue to align itself with the EU when it comes to security and defence related issues. Like all policy areas currently, it is still too early to determine the trajectory the UK is heading along, The Covid-19 pandemic has also made this trajectory a difficult one to determine. For most other areas of Brexit, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has had a similar effect as Covid, but for the area of security and defence, however, it has had the opposite effect. As in its response to the 2014 invasion, the UK aligned itself closely with the EU on sanctions when it came to the 2022 Russian invasion. The EU imposed an extensive range of trade, financial and individually-targeted sanctions against named individuals; implemented a variety of macro-financial and other financial support measures, including assistance to refugees within and beyond Ukraine's borders; and, most notably, provided a €2.5 billion financial support package for direct military assistance to Ukraine using the recently created. The UK's response in essence mirrored the EU's, with the UK matching the EU's collective £2.5 billion in financial support. This is the only similar case study of note similar to the ones listed in Chapter 2 to date since the UK left the EU. If it is anything to go by, it can be fairly argued that the UK may continue to align itself

closely with the EU in response to similar international crises in the future and, as this alignment becomes more apparent, the opportunities for collaboration and integration will increase.

Ultimately, as will be argued in the conclusion to this thesis, whilst the UK has split from the EU calling the entire LI theory into question, it is still too early to say whether the UK will pursue an isolationist, as opposed to an integrationist, path. If the trade agreements to date and the recent crisis in Ukraine are anything to go by, it would seem that the UK, although outside of the EU now and without any post-Brexit security and defence partnership, may still continue to pursue close alignment with the EU in the post-Brexit world, supporting the LI contention that states will act *rationality* largely in the *economic* interests of its citizens.

6.7 Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has attempted to show how EU security and defence was portrayed in the EU referendum and how it may have contributed to its outcome. It has also attempted to show what any post-Brexit partnership in security and defence between the UK and the EU both could look like. Taking each section in turn:

As for the role of EU security and defence in the EU referendum, Vote Leave made some accurate claims – there is support and appetite for EU army within the EU and there is concern within the US and NATO about an EU army rivaling and duplicating NATO. That said, its claims about the EU taking more and more control from the UK in security and defence and its record in defence missions is flawed. This area, as noted earlier in the thesis, operates on an intergovernmental basis and is entirely within the control of the Member States. The UK used its veto more times than any other EU Member State and, in cases such as Iraq invasion in 2003, turned its back on the EU, which opposed the invasion, to join the coalition of the willing led by the US and invaded Iraq. Furthermore, the image that Leave presented was not the full picture of the CSDP. It is irrefutable that the CSDP has had many issues and it has not always worked as it should at times. Throughout its history, there have been many

embarrassing moments for the CSDP – this thesis mentions the EU’s initial response to Libya as a prime example of this. Yet, as this thesis has argued in Chapter Two, there have been some very good aspects to the CSDP and many times when it has worked well and in the interests of the UK. The CSDP has in many ways bolstered the UK’s soft power – its humanitarian, peacekeeping and peacemaking capabilities – and has helped plug gaps in UK security and defence when UK defence spending has struggled.

Whilst in some of its key policy documents on EU security and defence, the Leave groups acknowledged that EU defence cooperation was a good thing, for the most part, they wrongly omitted this part of the account of the CSDP during their campaigns. The UK and the other EU Member States were in full control of EU security and defence and the CSDP’s record was not all bad, in fact this thesis contends that it is quite the opposite and that any bad that came from the CSDP was as a result of Member States being unable to agree on the CSDP and exercising the control they had over it. This fact also makes Leave’s claims about an EU army redundant, given that the UK has full control over the speed of integration in security and defence matters and could block any move towards an EU army at any time it pleased. This area, as noted earlier in the thesis, operates on an intergovernmental basis and is entirely within the control of the Member States. So while much of what Leave said about the CSDP was true, much of it was entirely false or, at best, exaggerated.

As for the Remain campaign, less was said on EU security and defence. EU security and defence was mentioned only a handful of times in the official campaign group’s literature. Even when EU security and defence was mentioned, focus was solely on aspects such as the European Arrest Warrant and counter terrorism. Virtually nothing was said about the CSDP or its missions and the UK’s role in them. When it came to formal speeches and addresses made by key Remain advocates, even less was said about EU security and defence and, again, virtually nothing was said about the CSDP. The only contributions of key Remain advocates can be found in Hansard, in response to debates and MPs questions. Whilst these contributions were detailed

and insightful, they failed to reach a wider audience via the mainstream media. The only formal and impactful contribution on EU security and defence was made by Cameron himself, in a speech in May 2016 at the British Museum in London, in which he spoke about the achievements made by the EU in securing a real and lasting peace in Europe and of the threats that Brexit made to destroying that peace. As Cameron concedes in his most recent memoir, however, it was too little too late for Remain. In the end, Remain did not help itself. It dodged the question of EU security and defence too often, arguably for fear of angering Eurosceptics within the Conservative Party more and handing them more ammunition on their claims of a European Army conspiracy. Yet, its failure to discuss the merits of EU security and defence, the UK's contribution to it and the important role it played in EU security and defence on a major platform left a vacuum which the Leave narrative was able to fill. In place of no counter arguments, the picture presented by the Leave campaigns of the CSDP, of a United States of Europe, European Army and EU dictatorship etc., arguably took its place. It is difficult to tell how Leave's campaign against EU security and defence affected the British public's decision to leave the EU, but it is clear that Remain did not do a good enough job of informing the British public about its merits.

In terms of looking at how, if any, future security and defence partnership might look, it was clear that neither the May government or Johnson government have done enough to secure one. It was clear that security and defence was not at the top of either May or Johnson's priorities when it came to Brexit. It was clear from May's speeches and the policy documents of her government, however, that she valued the merits of a post-Brexit security and defence partnership. Her concessions and U-turns on the prospective arrangements indicated a strong desire within herself and within her government to get this deal done. Although May never formally said she would have like the UK to have continued contributing towards the CSDP, given her track record of concessions during her premiership, it would not have been outside the realms of possibility that May and her government would have conceded on this point. Her proposals for an ad hoc partnership, however, were too aspirational. The UK wanted to come and go as it pleased whilst having a full say in setting mandates,

developing operations and deciding how they would be funded. Essentially May's proposals included a scenario in which the UK did not want to pay any of the cost towards the CSDP yet wanted to reap all of its benefits. This was fanciful at best and almost certainly something the EU is unlikely to have agreed. May's government had not conceded enough – the negotiations were always doomed to fail on these terms.

Johnson's proposals for a post-Brexit security and defence partnership echoed those made by May. What was clear from Johnson's speeches and his government's policy documents, was that, if it was to agree any post-Brexit security and defence partnership with the EU, that it would be one in which the UK could engage with the CFSP and CSDP on an ad hoc basis. Unlike May, however, Johnson appears comfortable with the current situation in which the UK has no security and defence agreement with the EU. Johnson's government has made it clear that it will look to the US, the UN, NATO, and the Five Eyes, amongst other alliances and organisations, for the UK's security and defence needs. Furthermore, in terms of building new alliances, the Johnson government has also made clear that it will look beyond the EU, evidenced by the UK's recent security and defence pacts with Finland, India, France and the establishment of Aukus. In stark contrast to Johnson, Cameron and May (May less so) did appear to recognise the merits of EU defence and, in May's case, tried to secure a deal. Given Johnson's hard-Eurosceptic rhetoric on the EU and Brexit, and given the strong mandate he received at the 2019 General Election, it would be unsurprising if no security and defence agreement was struck with the EU during his tenure as Prime Minister.

For the EU, from the outset of the UK's decision to leave the EU, with the publication of the EUGS and, more recently, the adoption of the Strategic Compass, it has made it clear that it wants to pursue security and defence partnerships with third-party states, including the UK. The publication of its Negotiating Mandate has given some detail as to what type of partnership it would seek to agree with the UK. Whilst these are all positive developments in terms of the UK and EU's future partnership, the EU's proposed partnership does not match up with that of the UK's, in terms of CSDP. Both parties agree that any future partnership should be on a case-by-case

basis, or ad hoc, however, the two parties disagree on what basis that should be. Whereas the UK would like to have the option of being involved in all CSDP missions, and contributing only to those operations it decides serves its interests, the EU would want that participation to be on the basis of an invitation from the EU. Furthermore, although the EU has not demanded that the UK contribute to the CSDP operations overall, it is likely that if it agreed to the UK having the option to be involved in all CSDP operations, it would likely not agree to the UK only contributing to those operations that it is involved in. Both parties are still a long way from agreement on what any future security and defence partnership may look, particularly when it comes to the UK's involvement in and contribution to CSDP operations. That said, whilst it wants to pursue a partnership with the UK, the EU appears to have discovered a new lease of life since Brexit. With the UK gone, the biggest bulwark to EU integration in security and defence has disappeared. The EU has been able to establish initiatives that, had the UK still been a member of the EU, would never have been achieved. Whilst the EU is a long way from becoming a defence union, it has certainly deepened and strengthened its security and defence autonomy. That said, the impact of the UK's departure should not be overstated and both parties look set to lose out in terms of their capabilities and influence around the world.

Whilst the UK and the EU do appear to be heading in different directions, the final section of this chapter has shown that there are viable options available to the two parties that, whilst they will not provide as good an arrangement as UK membership inside the EU, will mitigate many of the negative affects of Brexit. This thesis argues that the UK and the EU should seek to negotiate a partnership in which the UK has a deeply integrated role (described by Whitman as an integrated player role) in EU security and defence. In this way, the EU will have access to the UK's hard-military power capabilities and expertise, whilst conceding some of its autonomy on policy making, and the UK will regain access to the EU's soft-power military and civilian capabilities, whilst respecting the EU's strategic autonomy and deepening integration in security and defence. It is unlikely that the UK will seek to engage in any other type of partnership other than one in which it can have some involvement

in policy making and, as a result, this thesis argues that the integrated player model is the only viable option for both parties post-Brexit.

Conclusion

In conclusion, to reiterate, this thesis sought to answer two questions: firstly, whether the security and defence partnership between the UK and the EU during its final years was an effective and beneficial one for both parties and, secondly, whether a post-Brexit security and defence partnership is possible and worth pursuing for both the UK and the EU. To help answer these two overarching research questions, this thesis had a number of objectives. In Chapter 1, the thesis sought to determine what perspectives and policies drove the UK's security and defence partnership with the EU in its final years and why these perspectives were held. This required an analysis of the Conservative Party's policies towards the EU and the perspectives of some of the key people in Cameron government in terms of security and defence. It was established in Chapter 1 that Cameron and his government took a soft-Eurosceptic approach to the EU and EU security and defence throughout his premiership. It was established that, whilst the Conservative Party has historically been sceptical of EU security and defence, and whilst the Party was predominantly Eurosceptic during Cameron's tenure as leader and PM, Cameron and his government were soft-Eurosceptics. This meant that the Cameron government opposed deeper integration in EU security and defence and wanted to negotiate a better deal within the EU for the UK, but he opposed leaving the bloc and recognised the role EU security and defence played in the UK security and defence and the benefits of that partnership with the EU. It was established from Cameron's speeches and the policy documents of his Party and government that the UK intended to cooperate with the EU in security and defence, particularly in civilian CSDP operations such as peacekeeping, state building and humanitarian missions. The Cameron premiership was therefore set up to have a cooperative relationship with the EU during his premiership.

In Chapter 2, this thesis then sought to analyse how the soft-Eurosceptic policies and perspectives of the Cameron government worked in action using two case studies – Libya (2011) and Ukraine (2014) – and sought to determine whether or not this

partnership was successful one in terms of meeting the security and defence needs of each party in each case study. It was established that the two case studies, whilst different in many ways, revealed a number of trends in the UK and EU's security and defence partnership. When it came to taking hard-military action, the UK favoured its own military capabilities and its bilateral ties with allies, as well as its role within organisations such as the UN and NATO, to meet these needs – although Cameron did attempt to persuade the EU to respond to the initial conflict. In Libya, this was evident from the alliance it made with France under the Lancaster House Treaties of 2011 and the NATO intervention it and France led into Libya to quash the Gaddafi regime. That said, it was established that Cameron and the UK saw a role for the UK in the CSDP in the case of Libya, particularly in terms of helping rebuild Libyan society and sending humanitarian assistance. Cameron's soft-Eurosceptic position on the CSDP came to fruition in the UK's support for EUBAM and Operation Sophia in Libya, and the UK devoted significant resources and important personnel to these missions taking a leading role in the missions. Although the missions had difficulties in fulfilling their mandates, it is clear from both speeches made by Cameron and his ministers and Parliamentary committee reports that the UK valued these missions and, in turn, that they valued the CSDP's military and civilian capabilities. This was also true in the case of Ukraine in 2014. Cameron and the UK found themselves in a position with Russia, where hard-military power was not an option, or risk nuclear war. It was established that Ukraine was a clear example, again, of how the UK benefited from the strong soft-power capabilities that the EU possesses. Through sanctions and EUAM, the UK (via the EU) was able to provide an effective response to the Ukrainian conflict without coming into direct conflict with Russia. Furthermore, through its membership of the EU Council, it was also able to mount pressure on the EU and other Member States to implement tougher measures against Russia. It was also able to place its own military resources, personnel and experts on Ukrainian soil through the vehicle of the EU, presenting much less of a threat and provocation to Russia and, thereby, preventing itself from coming into direct conflict with Russia. Libya and Ukraine showed how the UK and EU's partnership through the CSDP worked well. It is contended that the arguments made in Chapter 2 dispel, or go some way to dispelling the myth that is prevalent in the

field and in the mainstream media, that the UK and the EU's security and defence relationship was a bad one. It is certainly true that, at times, it was strained, but there are clear cases like these where the partnership functioned well and where it was clear that both the UK and the EU valued the partnership between them. Chapter 2 therefore contends that this partnership did in fact work very well at times.

In Chapter 3, this thesis sought to determine how EU security and defence influenced the EU referendum and to explore how a future security and defence partnership could look between the UK and the EU, if at all, in the future. It was established that during the referendum campaign a false and exaggerated image of EU security and defence was portrayed by the leading Leave campaign groups. Leave attempted to argue that the UK was having its sovereignty stripped by the EU in security and defence and that the EU was deepening integration in this area. As stated throughout this thesis, the area of EU security and defence – CFSP and CSDP – is intergovernmental, meaning all the power of strategic planning and policy making lies with the Member States themselves, not the EU. Leave also focused on only the negative aspects of EU security and defence and the CSDP, omitting cases like the ones presented in Chapter 2 where the partnership worked very well. On the other side of the debate, Chapter 3 established that Remain did not do enough to counter the claims made by Leave and failed to put forward the positive account of the UK/EU security and defence partnership. This was a failure even admitted by Cameron after he had resigned as PM. In the absence of any counterarguments, all the British public were left to go on was the narrative presented by Leave. It is difficult to measure to what extent the narrative on EU security and defence during the referendum campaign affected the British public's decision to leave the EU, but it is clear that Remain did not do a good enough job of informing the British public about its merits.

The focus of Chapter 3 then turned to how a security and defence partnership between the UK and the EU might look in the future, analysing the approaches taken by post-Brexit PMs, May and Johnson. It was clear, given the outcome of the EU

referendum, that soft-Eurosceptics were swimming against the tide. Furthermore, it was clear that, given the lack of positive discussion on EU security and defence during the referendum campaign, there appeared to be no appetite amongst the British public for a post-Brexit security and defence partnership. In turn, it was evident from the actions, speeches and policy documents of the May and Johnson governments, that a post-Brexit security and defence partnership was on the bottom of their list of priorities, focusing much more things like the economy and trade. As a Remainer and soft-Eurosceptic, May made more of an attempt to broker a post-Brexit security and defence partnership with the EU. Her proposals early on in her premiership lacked substance and detail and the proposals she eventually did make, towards the end of her premiership, were too aspirational. The election of hard-Eurosceptic, Johnson, saw a post-Brexit security and defence partnership slip even further down the list of the UK's priorities, with Johnson going as far as saying he would be prepared to accept a no deal Brexit in all policy areas. Again, the proposals Johnson's government did make mirrored that of May's in being too aspirational and, ultimately, the UK crashed out of the EU with no post-Brexit security and defence agreement with the EU. Since the UK's departure, the EU has made it clear that does want a post-Brexit partnership with the EU in security and defence, however, it has also made clear that any post-Brexit deal must be in its interests, that it will not make any special arrangements for the UK and that it will not accept any freeriding from the UK on EU security and defence. Since Brexit, the EU has also discovered new potentials for itself in security and defence. It has been able to establish initiatives and deepen integration to an extent which it would not have been able to do had the UK still been a member of the EU. That said, whilst both parties appear to be heading in different directions post-Brexit, this thesis has put forward the argument that both parties are set to lose out and that both their security and defence capabilities and political influence around the world are diminished by the absence of any post-Brexit partnership in security and defence. After having explored a number of post-Brexit scenarios, Chapter 3 makes the recommendation that the UK and the EU seek to agree a partnership in which the UK becomes an integrated player in EU security and defence: where it can still be present in forums of policy making and make decisions on policy, engage with CSDP

missions it and the EU chooses, but also pays its fair share towards CSDP and EU security and defence so as to ensure it does not become a free rider. To get to this point, however, the UK and the EU will have drastically to rethink their negotiating positions and take a step down on their expectations of what a future security and defence partnership between them should look like. This thesis recommends that both parties do this.

As reiterated throughout the thesis, the findings and arguments made in this thesis are grounded in the IR theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) and this thesis has consistently analysed the focus of the thesis in the context of LI theory throughout. To reiterate, the theory, as espoused by Moravcsik, argues that states, in deciding to integrate, will act rationally in the interests of their citizens, predominantly but not exclusively, economic interests. Chapter 1 of this thesis argued that due to the relatively low salience of Euroscepticism within the UK and within his Party in lead up and early years of his premiership, Cameron was able to adopt policies which would see the UK integrate further and cooperate with the EU under the umbrella of the CSDP. This, as was argued, Cameron knew would save the UK money through pooling defence resources and personnel with the rest of the EU-27. In, Chapter 2, this thesis argued that, in the context of LI, Cameron put his policies into action, collaborating with the EU under the CSDP substantially in both Libya and Ukraine. Again, this was a rational choice made by Cameron on the grounds that working with the EU would both share the burden of each crises, both politically and economically. Finally, in Chapter 3, this thesis argued that, whilst the UK ultimately left the EU (giving more weight to nationalistic feelings of Euroscepticism over economic interests in its decision to leave) and in spite of May and then later Johnson arguing for a 'hard Brexit', the UK has aligned itself closely with the EU since leaving the bloc. In order to support this point, the thesis argued that in trade, the UK accepted most of the EU's demands under the UK-EU Free Trade Agreement and, although no agreement currently exists between them in security and defence, taking the only similar case study to those analysed in Chapter 2 available to date, the UK aligned itself closely with the EU when it came to imposing sanctions against Russia. All in all, this thesis argued that, whilst Brexit threatened the LI theory and

that the UK has taken a step away from integration in the sense of leaving the EU, that it remains tightly aligned with it even outside the EU in both trade and, as was argued in Chapter 3, in terms of security and defence. Whilst no partnership currently exists between the UK and the EU in this area, the UK's response mirrored that of the EU and the UK matched the sanctions imposed by the EU. Although there has only been one relevant case study to date, this thesis contends that it is entirely reasonable to assume that this trend will continue going forward given the UK's response to Ukraine. Brexit has undoubtedly challenged the theory of LI. It has called into question the argument made by LI theorists that states will act rationally and integrate in the economic interests of its citizens. Whilst Brexit is a step in the opposite direction, this thesis contends that that step may not be too big and that the UK's partnership with the EU outside the bloc, in the area of security and defence, may be a tightly integrated one. It is ultimately too early, however, to tell and, in which case, it is entirely too early to rule LI theory out. It is for these reasons why this thesis argues that LI theory still stands to explain the EU integration process and remains a solid basis on which to ground the arguments made within this thesis.

To explain how this partnership worked during the Cameron premiership and whether it was a successful one, this thesis first had to explain what the perspectives and policies were that were driving the UK's actions during this time. This thesis has established that Cameron and his Conservatives took a positive approach to this partnership and recognised its benefits. This thesis has also established that the benefits of this partnership were realised in the cases of Libya in 2011 and in Ukraine in 2014. In answer, therefore, to one of the primary research questions posed by this these – was this a valuable partnership, this thesis answers in the affirmative.

Turning to the second primary research question – is this a partnership worth pursuing post-Brexit, this thesis also answers in the affirmative, having not just established that a future partnership is viable but that it is also in the interests of both the UK and the EU. The security and defence partnership between the UK and the EU was an effective one and, as long as a post-Brexit partnership is not agreed between the two parties, both the UK and the EU's security and defence capabilities and influence around the world are diminished. This thesis calls upon both the UK

and the EU to find an agreement to make the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, a safer place.

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