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Learning from behavioural changes that fail

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Abstract

Behavioural change techniques are currently used by many global organisations and public institutions. The amassing evidence base is used to answer practical and scientific questions regarding what cognitive, affective, and environment factors lead to successful behavioural change in the lab and in the field. In this piece we show that there is also value to examining interventions that inadvertently fail in achieving their desired behavioural change (e.g., backfiring effects). We identify the underlying causal pathways that characterise different types of failure, and show how a taxonomy of causal interactions that result in failure exposes new insights that can advance theory and practice.

Keywords: Behaviour change, behavioural interventions, nudge, policy making, failure, causal analysis

Highlights

- The behavioural change enterprise disproportionately focuses on promoting successes at the expense of examining the failures of behavioural change interventions.

- We review the literature across different fields through a causal explanatory approach to identify structural relations that impede (or promote) the success of interventions.

- Based on this analysis we present a taxonomy of type of failures of behavioural change, which catalogues different types of failures and backfiring effects.

- Our analyses and classification offer guidance for practitioners and researchers alike, and provide critical insights for establishing a more robust foundation for evidence-based policy.

Behavioural Change: What Is It, Who Uses it, and Why?

Using psychological insights to motivate people to change their opinions, attitudes and behaviour go back at least as far as Ancient Greece[1] and Rome[2]. The 20th century sparked a dedicated interest in the psychological processes underlying **behavioural change**, from psychotherapists[3] and psycholinguists[4] studying the art of persuasion through to the behavioural engineering enterprise of the behaviourists in the 1950s[5] and 60s[6], and on to nudges in the 2000s.[7,8] Early in history, as today, the behavioural change enterprise has been designed to answer a practical problem: What levers can we pull to change behaviour reliably both for personal, and public good? Today, many public and private institutions implement **behavioural change frameworks** and **behavioural change theories**, which aim to provide leverage for changing behaviour on a mass scale (Text Box 1).[9] Essentially, the goal is to identify and describe the factors that determine a targeted behaviour, decompose the contexts in which it is observed, and design and implement interventions to induce positive change. Applications range from efforts to improve dietary choices[10] and help people save more for their retirement[11] through to communicating responses to a public health crisis.[12]

Learning from failure

How successful are behavioural interventions?[13] The OECD created a catalogue of interventions and treatments (we use these terms interchangeably) implemented in public bodies in 22 countries, showcasing the success story of behavioural change around the world (Text Box 2). The problem is that a rather loose inclusion criterion was used to determine what counts as an intervention (e.g., literature review), raising concerns about what is deemed a success.[14,15] Conversely, while failures have recently received some attention in the literature[16,17,18], along with illustrations of particular types (e.g., **backfire effects**)[19], a systematic evaluation of failures is sorely lacking. In the researcher's world this might be the result of publication bias, which also has been instrumental in the replication crisis in

psychology.[20] In the practitioner's world, the preoccupation with the credibility of evidence to determine the efficacy of a treatment overshadows examining what hasn't worked and why. In fact, this is where a causal analysis would benefit both the basic science and policy world: Constructing causal scenarios of potential relations distinguishing what might be relevant (what features of the intervention you think would influence an outcome) from what is not relevant (extraneous factors that influence an outcome), from which to reason effectively over what has been observed and why.[21]

In our view, the upshot from all this is an underappreciation of when and why behaviour change fails, and a clearer conceptualisation of different types of failure. The present paper (i) highlights that reports of failure and backfiring are surprisingly common in the literature, across a wide array of fields and types of interventions; (ii) identifies characteristic regularities and causal pathways underlying these failures; and (iii) presents a taxonomy derived from the identified commonalities, which can be applied by researchers and practitioners to better characterise and analyse different types of failure and map out the broader factors in which interventions are trialled.

Importantly, the proposed taxonomy goes beyond the widespread analytic perspective that behavioural trials mainly fail because they do not exert any influence on the target behaviour or the inability of effects to scale-up or persist. Rather, our classification illustrates that there are several causal scenarios and conditions that can lead to different kinds of failure. Considering this taxonomy will help practitioners to better anticipate possible failures of a planned intervention, gauge the likelihood of failure for a given context and policy problem, and improve trial design and, ultimately, policy. From a theoretical perspective, such analyses are critical to determine the strengths and limits of current behavioural change frameworks and help to put behavioural change on a more robust theoretical foundation.[22,23,24] Importantly, the framework is not restricted to qualitative causal analyses, but also provides a vast array of

computational methods for quantitative causal modelling of behaviour change and public policy (Text Box 3).[25,26,27]

Examining failures of behavioural change

How often do behaviour change interventions fail? What is clear from reviewing the literature is that failed interventions are surprisingly common, that their prevalence presents looming consequences for the field of behavioural interventions, and that not all 'failures' are the same. To gauge the frequency and type of failures we first began with search terms *behavioural change*, *behavioural intervention*, *nudge*, and *nudging*, entered into Web of Science and Google Scholar between the years 2008 to 2019. We filtered the obtained literature to include only articles that referred to terms backfire, **spillovers**, **rebounds**, and **boomerang** effects, and excluded all review articles. For the full details of the filtering process, as well as a comprehensive table that catalogues the 65 studies according to several details (e.g., date, author, country, study type, design, intervention, summary of findings, conclusions) see https://psyarxiv.com/ae756.

Of the 65 studies that were compiled, 58% included a field experiment, and 75% of all studies also included a control or baseline condition to compare the behavioural interventions against. Common domains in which the interventions were trialled included charitable donations (13%), tax compliance (8%), health (diet or exercise; 25%), and pro-environmental behaviour (28%). Sometimes multiple interventions were included in a single study, so we report here the main interventions that were trialled. The studies include different kinds of interventions, notably defaults (15%), social comparisons and social norming (40%), labelling (12%), and provision of information delivered through letters or text messaging (24%). Below we discuss in detail several key examples of different types of failures, with Table 1 summarising critical details of these illustrations.

Figure 1. Taxonomy of failures of behavioural change. Each type of failure is represented in the form of a simple qualitative causal model, where the arrows depict presumed causal relations among the domain variables (nodes). The gears represent the intervention and the node with the double outline represents the targeted behaviour (e.g., energy consumption, calorie intake). Green and red code for positive and negative outcomes relative to the goal of the intervention and a baseline, whereas white indicates that the intervention failed to influence the targeted behaviour. The additional node in (C) to (F) represents further domain variables or behaviours that were not intended or foreseen to be influenced by the intervention (e.g., positive or negative side effects). The globe in (G) and (H) represents the broader environment which may have direct unforeseen influences on the outcome and can also be influenced by the treatment (e.g., environment does not support the intended behavioural change or counteracting forces in the environment offset the effect).

Taking a causal approach to characterising failed interventions

Our review of the literature shows that failures vary from anything between the predicted outcome not being produced or even generating the opposite outcome, to generating unintended side effects that offset the desired behaviour change. The question is, how best to characterise the different failures? Figure 1 provides an overview of different types of failures, each described using simple qualitative causal models to distinguish between different scenarios and outcomes (see below for details). Distinguishing between different types of failures and the corresponding causal scenarios is critical in evidence-based policy contexts[28,29,30], other practical contexts[31], and basic science contexts.[32] Why might this be useful? Essentially when

planning an intervention, one needs to ask oneself: What factors could be causally relevant to the success of the intervention, how could the intervention influence these factors, and what precautionary measures should be taken to avoid failure? Without addressing these questions early on, researchers risk to trial interventions that may work but cannot be scaled up or are not sustainable because the underlying mechanisms and relevant factors are not understood, or trial interventions that fail without understanding the reasons for their failure; both of which leading to a considerable waste of time and public funds.

This is where causal counterfactuals prove to be valuable as a way of scientifically thinking through hypotheticals and different causal scenarios, providing a source of practical gain for researchers and practitioners alike. The ultimate value of taking this kind of approach is that it encourages thinking in a more principled way about the causal structure of the domain and the policy problem. Rather than asking in hindsight after an intervention failed *"what went wrong?"*, researchers and practitioners should ask in advance *"what could go wrong, and how could it go wrong?"*. Anticipating possible types of failures and potential causal pathways already during the design stage could—and should—guide the development of behavioural interventions in a systematic fashion, to expose the relevant factors and potential causal dependencies beyond the local cause and effect relationships that are at the heart of the policy problem. Conducting such a principled analysis in advance is particularly helpful when conducting field experiments, where there is great difficulty in controlling for externalities.

Types of failure

The most basic type of failure are *no treatment effects*, where the intervention was unable to result in behaviour change relative to baseline (Fig. 1A). Using a social comparison nudge to reduce water consumption may fail to do so overall, and even lead subgroups to increase their water consumption.[33] Tax authorities may use a deterrent or moral persuasion message to increase tax compliance and find that this has no overall effect, with some corporations even

incurring higher tax deductions.[34] Using financial incentives to increase people's physical activity might fail to induce behavioural change,[35] and providing calorie information may fail to decrease calorie intake.[36] Such findings are helpful to determine which behaviour change techniques do not work, or work only under specific circumstances or for particular subgroups, thereby helping practitioners to focus on more promising approaches.

The prototypical case of *backfiring* occurs when the intervention does change the target behaviour, but in the opposite direction to what was intended (Fig. 1B). For instance, many educational campaigns aim to change dietary choices by providing information on the negative consequences of unhealthy food consumption. In practice, this does not always pan out as planned. People with strong concerns regarding their weight and physical fitness ('dieters') can express higher desire for and showing increased consumption of unhealthy foods after receiving a message highlighting negative aspects.[37] Anti-soda advertisements used in public campaigns can in fact increase, rather than decrease, consumption of sugary drinks, both in the lab and the field.[38] There are also cases of multi-backfiring, where an intervention yields negative effects on different outcomes (e.g., increased consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages and failure to reduce the number of disposable bottles).[39] Careful analysis of such occurrences helps practitioners to avoid interventions with diametral effects, for instance using descriptive norms, which communicate typical behaviours of a target group (rather than injunctive norms which communicate approved or disapproved behaviours) and can increase undesirable behaviours.[40]

The profile of *treatment offset by negative side effect* are different from backfires because positive treatment effects are observed, but are offset by negative side effects, such that the positive change is attenuated or eliminated (Fig. 1C). A green energy default nudge can decrease support for more comprehensive (but also more onerous) policies like a carbon tax.[41] An environmental campaign may reduce residents' water consumption, but at the same time increase their electricity consumption.[42] Introducing a tax on saturated fats can decrease fat

intake and increase vegetable and fruit consumption, but increase salt consumption.[43] In situations of this kind, often treatment effects are offset because of compensatory choices, for instance when information regarding calories increases the selection of healthier options, but is offset by higher calorific sides and beverages.[44] Failures like this highlight the importance of considering multiple outcome criteria to enable a comprehensive evaluation of interventions.

In *no treatment effect, but positive side effect* examples interventions yield unforeseen positive consequences, even if the actual target behaviour remains unchanged (Fig. 1D). For instance, a comparison of countries with different default policies for organ donation (opt-in vs. opt-out system) showed no difference in overall transplant rates, thereby raising concerns about the effectiveness of implementing an opt-out strategy to increase organ donation rates. At the same time, however, more fine-grained analyses revealed diverging effects when considering live and deceased donor rates separately. For example, while the total number of kidney transplants did not vary between opt-in and opt-out countries (i.e., no overall treatment effect), opt-out countries have a higher number of deceased donor and a lower number of living donors, compared to opt-in countries. This constitutes a positive side effect, because fewer live donors are subject to immediate risk of harm from organ harvesting and associated long-term risks and possible reductions in life expectancy.[45] In addition, a reduction of financial costs is entailed, as deceased donor transplants are significantly less expensive. Generally, assessing positive side effects is important, because it is often hypothesized (tacitly or explicitly) that changing specific behaviours (e.g., reducing water consumption or healthier lunches) would generalise to other behaviours as well (e.g., increase environmentally-friendly behaviour or food choices more generally).[46,47]

An important policy goal is to influence behaviour at the population level, and this can leave practitioners liable to *only proxy changes, not actual criterion*; for pragmatic reasons or because other data is difficult to obtain. However, changes on surrogate criteria do not always

translate to changes in key target criteria (Fig. 1E). A higher number of potential organ donors in countries with an opt-out system does not necessarily translate to higher number of organ donations[48] or can have diametric consequences when focusing specifically on different kinds of organ donations (e.g., higher deceased donor rates but a lower living donor rates).[49] Information provision may increase healthy food selections in a simulated supermarket, but have no long-term impact on body mass index and lifestyle.[50] Such cases illustrate the importance of assessing the sustainability of interventions in the long run and with respect to relevant target criteria, even if it may be more difficult to assess.

Even if an intervention successfully alters a target behaviour, it can happen that a *positive treatment effect is offset by later behaviour* (Fig. 1F).[51,52] Nudging office occupants into environment-friendly behaviour by reducing the default temperature on their thermostats can reduce energy consumption for small reductions – but also make people over-ride the default when reductions are too large, thereby dissipating the treatment effect.[53] Charitable organizations sending reminders to potential donors' can increase donations, but later lead to higher unsubscribe rates from the mailing list, thereby jeopardizing future donations.[54] Taking dietary supplements can subsequently reduce people's desire to engage in physical exercise.[55] These findings are critical because they point to key psychological processes that need to be considered in behaviour change such as moral licensing[56], where a virtuous decision can later lead to indulgent behaviour.[57]

Because of the complexities of introducing interventions in live settings, what can happen is that the *environment does not support change*. In such cases it only becomes clear with hindsight that the effect of an intervention critically depends on the broader environment to support behaviour change, but if the required affordances are not present the intervention will fail to achieve its goals (Fig. 1G).[58] For instance, in the 1980s, Croatia moved from an opt-in to an opt-out system for organ donations, but for several years this had little impact on actual

donation rates because the necessary medical infrastructure was not in place.[59] Introducing bike-sharing systems to increase cycling and reduce traffic congestions and pollution will fail if a major concern of users is road safety.[60,61] What these examples highlight is that behaviour change techniques often cannot be implemented in isolation and without consideration of factors in the broader environment, which can be critical to bring about the intended change.

There are also cases were the *intervention triggers counteracting forces*, in which case positive effects are counteracted by forces in the broader environment (which is different to simply not having the available affordance to support behavioural change) (Fig. 1H). A case in point is a study examining the use of salience messaging to help curb unnecessary spending, where the motives of sub-samples (on group were "spendthrifts" extravagant with money, the other group were "tightwads" miserly with money) with different dispositions counteracted the overall impact of the treatment on behaviour.[62] Another example is financial institutions actively counteracting policy changes that aim to protect consumers, such as new defaults for bank account overdrafts[63], or beverage companies fighting regulators' efforts to ban or tax sugary drinks.[64] Examples of this kind highlight context-specific externalities that reside in the environment and the various ways in which they can counteract interventions.

Concluding Remarks and Future Directions: What Status Should Failures Have?

The current appetite for using behaviour change techniques is undeniable, with terms such as *nudge* having become part of scientific and public vernacular. But where do failures fit into the behavioural change enterprise?

Before addressing this question, we need to draw attention to a critical limit in the conclusions we can draw: In talking about what status failures should have, we need to recognise that we simply don't have (yet) a precise idea of the scale and range of failed interventions. While our survey of the literature show that failures are not isolated cases, our analyses are not a reliable quantitative gauge to assess to what extent the problem is systemic.

This points to a problem regarding a lack of interest in, or even a systemic failure of reporting failed interventions. If the latter, this may be because of publication bias.[65] If the former, then one reason might be that there isn't an agreed scientific language or terminology for classifying different failures, for which we now present a taxonomy that can help with this and serve as a starting point for further and more definitive analyses of failure.

There is a corollary to this, of course: We also don't have a comprehensive and nuanced way of reporting the outcomes of interventions from which we can gain a comprehensive idea of their scale, range, and robustness. The field of behavioural change would benefit from being more accepting of considering different levels and types of success and failure, as well as more systematic classifications of the strength of the available evidence. In this sense, behaviour change research faces similar challenges as other fields that are at the intersection of basic and applied science. Institutions like the Cochrane Collaboration (https://www.cochrane.org/) in medicine and What Works Clearinghouse (https://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/) in education provide practitioners with detailed and systematic reviews that synthesize and evaluate the existing literature, to enable robust evidence-based recommendations and provide information tailored to practitioners' needs and decision-making processes. Establishing similar initiatives in the domain of behaviour change would be valuable from both an applied and basic science view (Box 2). Building an evidence hierarchy which classifies and evaluates interventions on scales of successes failures would present a more accurate depiction of the outcomes and which populations they impact.[66,67] This is all the more important as the literature on behaviour change now spans across many disciplines, problems, and methodologies, raising the need to keep track of the enterprise to ensure that basic research and application mutually inform each other. Despite the limits to the conclusions we can draw at this point, we nonetheless want to discuss two critical implications of our analyses for future empirical work and theory development.

Future empirical work

Notwithstanding the important caveat that we do not have an appropriate base rate of failure and in which social policy domains they are most likely to occur, the most common intervention used in failed interventions were interventions using social norming or social comparisons. Why is this? One possibility is that this merely reflects that social norming or comparisons are more frequently used than other interventions, as they are cheap, simple to implement, and easy to scale. In fact, the overall context doesn't seem to be predictive given that social norming interventions have been applied in several domains, including reduction of energy and water consumption, as well as to increase exercise, healthy eating, tax compliance, and charitable donations. Another possible explanation for the frequent failures is that not all social norms are created equally[68], with diametral consequences for their effectiveness.[69] However, the divergent influence of different kinds of social norms observed in the lab has not consistently been obtained in large-scale field studies, where different subgroups of a target population have been found to respond differently to social norming messages. For instance, in the domain of energy conversation, the effectiveness of a social comparison nudge providing information on a given household's consumption relative to other households can depend on their overall consumption[70] or recipients' political ideology.[71]

In fact, a recurring theme across many studies and types of failures is that subgroups matter. Thus, to the extent that sub-groups are part of the manipulation, or demographic details enable post-hoc analyses, we see that for different sub-groups the interventions either worked, didn't take, or backfired. This constitutes a practical gain of systematically analysing failures and can help answer the question "what works for whom and why (not)?" by pointing researchers and practitioners to relevant factors they need to consider when embarking on new studies. These, in turn, can be guided by a causal analysis where these factors are explicitly represented to make predictions about the effectiveness of an intervention under different

scenarios (e.g., varying proportions of political ideology in the target group). Thus, failures serve as a valuable resource for future interventions. In the absence of a systematic analysis and record of failures, there is no way of anticipating where interventions might fail, in order to improve trial design to surmount the failure, or trial a different intervention that is more likely to succeed.

Theory development

How to best advance the theoretical and methodological foundations of behaviour change research? What is common to almost all behaviour change frameworks (Text Box 1) is the absence of a causal model. The exception is the Behaviour Change Wheel, which uses the COM-B (Capability, Opportunity, Motivation, and Behaviour) system as a causal explanatory approach of behaviour. However, given that all four components contained within it have bi-directional associations, it is ill equipped to support a formal causal analysis to interpret the direction of effect from any intervention on any one component. Computational causal modelling techniques can complement existing behaviour change frameworks by offering an account to formally model behaviour change problems and the context in which interventions are situated. From this perspective, the focus is not on different theoretical perspectives and assumptions about psychological processes[72], but on building robust and predictive models of behaviour change interventions that explicate and formally represent the assumed causal dependencies. Box 3 illustrates this kind of analysis and causal model building for the domain of organ donation, using the framework of causal Bayesian networks.[73,74] By mapping the presumed relations and incorporating the relevant uncertainties this approach can bridge different theoretical perspectives and enable researchers to derive model-based predictions for the effects of interventions.[75] In this case the status of failures is illustrative of the value of a causal analytic approach that should be adopted to improve theorising and hypothesis testing. As Samuel Beckett said: Ever tried. Ever failed. No Matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail Better.[76]

Text Box 1

Behaviour change frameworks: Wheels, checklists, diamonds, and ladders

One way of appreciating the popularity of the behavioural change enterprise is the sheer volume of frameworks and theories of behavioural change that have been developed – by recent counts there are at least 83 such frameworks.[77,78] These frameworks are used by several institutions, including OECD, World Bank, and the WHO, and governmental agencies in several countries worldwide. The purpose of these frameworks is to provide practical and ethical guidance for designing and implementing behaviour change techniques.

Behaviour Change Wheel (BCW)

The framework has two purposes: it is a model of behaviour, as well as a way of designing interventions.[79] The BCW has embedded in it the COM-B (*Capability, Opportunity, Motivation, and Behaviour*) system. Regardless of whether selected interventions are based on existing evidence or not, the BCW and COM-B explicitly assert the value, and necessity, of theory-driven predictions.

MINDSPACE (*Messenger, Incentives, Norms, Defaults, Salience, Priming, Affect, Commitment, and Ego*)

MINDSPACE is a checklist of nine key influences that psychological and economic research have shown to influence behaviour, within narrow as well as broader environments.[80,81] The establishment of criteria for success are quite stringent. The practitioner has to state in advance the direction, magnitude, and period of change in the outcome following the intervention. This approach has been refined by the UK Behavioural Insight Team to four basic principles: *Easy, Attractive, Social, and Timely* (EAST).[82]

BASIC (*Behaviours, Analysis, Strategies, Interventions, and Change*)

BASIC is a behavioural change toolkit developed and used by the OECD.[83,84] The toolkit is prescriptive. Practitioners have several different charts, and diagrams, and checklists that help

defining the policy problem, behavioural outcomes, interventions, and the ethicality of the processes, all of which need to be used to state in advance the rationale for the intervention and the expected outcomes.

Nuffield ladder of intervention

The Nuffield Council on Bioethics ladder of intervention was designed in the context of public health, but has been applied to many other domains outside of health.[85] The focus is on ethical issues surrounding behaviour change techniques. As interventions become more intrusive with respect to the autonomy of individuals, communities, or the population, the greater the effort needed to justify in advance the predicted outcomes, relative to the overall public good.

Nudge

Rather than a framework, nudge is a collection of approaches sharing certain characteristics (e.g., changing behaviour without much leverage) to alter choice environments (so-called *choice architectures*) to achieve behaviour change.[7,8] Its definition is prescriptive because it asserts that the success of a nudge is gauged by the predicted outcome. The nudge approach is rooted in the heuristics-and-biases program[86,87] and dual-process models of cognition.[88]

Text Box 2

Future proofing behavioural change in social and public policy making

There are many innovations that are being explored by governments and intergovernmental organisations (e.g., OECD, WHO) to improve behavioural change approaches for addressing social and public policy needs. The motivation is to share best practices as well as developing tool kits to improve understanding of the policy needs to match behavioural solutions to.

An illustration of a significant innovation, which is in line with open science initiatives in the cognitive and other sciences, is the development of a database by the OECD.[89,90] They promoted the need to develop a catalogue of behavioural interventions that have been implemented by government organisations. They led by example, and were one of the first to compile their own catalogue of 111 behavioural change interventions implemented in 24 countries, ranging widely in the policy sectors areas they were targeting (i.e., business, charity, consumer protection, education, energy, environment, financial products, health and safety, labour market, public service delivery, tax, telecommunications). Later work examining the OECD's catalogue of behavioural interventions showed that it was lacking in basic reporting of key methods (e.g., sample sizes, number of treatment conditions) and statistical details (e.g., effect sizes, statistical analyses).[91]

Nonetheless, this is still a step in the right direction because a database that is regularly updated with interventions that have been trialled in OECD countries, and beyond, that also makes the data sets publicly accessible, allows researchers and practitioners to ask questions that will ultimately lead to a better understanding of what interventions work where and what don't work, with a view to also improving understanding of why they do work, and why they don't work. This same model could be implemented in government departments or even a cross-

governmental database, so that sharing of findings can be achieved more efficiently to expose the success as well as failures of trialled interventions.

In clinical medicine there exists a *Template for Intervention Description and Replication* (TIDieR) which is an agreed approach for ensuring the accuracy of reporting of interventions, and a means of standardising reporting to aid replicability.[92] This along with cost associated with implementing the trials would allow for a thorough assessment of the value for money of the potential gains from successful interventions against the cost of their implementation, as well as the costs of different ranges of failures, or inadvertent successes.

Text Box 3

Bayesian causal analytic approach

We show the value of examining policy situations through a causal analytic lens. To illustrate, Figure II presents a simplified causal Bayesian network (BN) model to characterise the probabilistic relationships between relevant variables in a scenario for which behavioural interventions are used to increase actual donations of organs. Even without any formal knowledge, drawing graphical causal models can help make inferences about where and how to intervene with a behavioural intervention, as well as deriving precise and empirically testable predictions.[25,93,94,95,96]

So, how does one build a causal model? It contains three basic elements: nodes, arrows, and probabilities. Nodes represent the domain variables (with either two or more states) and their associated numerical value (probabilities associated with each state). The arrows indicate presumed probabilistic causal relationships between variables. The strength of the relations is captured in probability tables (not shown in Figure I) whose values are either learned from data or elicited from domain experts. To start with, expert judgment is needed to interpolate probabilities, because there are policy domains where observed specific values for variables may not yet exist, but models can be easily updated with new data to increase the accuracy of the estimates of the effects of behavioural interventions.

The causal model shown in Figure IA comprises four nodes with binary states. The outcome of interest is the likelihood of organ donation in a single case, and the model presents arrows between the default policy in place (opt-in, opt-out), the rates at which families will not consent (veto) organ donation of their dying relative, and the rates at which people are on the donation register.

We consider two scenarios presented in Figure IB (opt-in) and Figure IC (opt-out); this is where we fix the policy variable and let the model reveal the effect on the outcome. It is

likely that knowing whether a dying relative made an active decision (opt-in) to donate carries a clearer signal of their underlying wishes, as compared to a passive decision (opt-out)[97]. This impacts the extent to which a family will take into account the policy on which decisions to donate are expressed. Hence, although there is a large increase in registered donors (60% for opt-out compared to 20% for opt-in) there is also a proportionally much higher probability of veto. So, the overall effect is only a small increase in actual organ donations (14% to 16%).


Figure I. Simplified causal Bayesian network (BN) models representing the probabilistic relationships between variables in the domain of organ donation. *(A)* The causal network without any evidence entered, showing the probability distribution of each variable. *(B)* Setting the policy variable to a default opt-in system results in updated probability values for all variables, based on the presumed relations. Under an opt-in policy, both registration rates and the likelihood of the family vetoing are rather low, and so is the probability of an organ actually being donated. *(C)* Under an opt-out default, registration rates are much higher, but also families are more likely to veto. As a consequence, only a small increase in donation rates results, compared to an opt-in scenario.

Table 1. *Illustrative Examples of the Types of Failures Presented in the Taxonomy of Failures of Behavioural Change in Figure 1 (for Full Set of Studies See https://psyarxiv.com/ae756).*

Type of failure	Studies	Type of study	Design	Domain	Behavioural change intervention
(A) No treatment effect	Chabe-Ferret et al. (2019)[98]	Field	RCT	Environmental Sustainability	Social comparison; provision of information, delivered by weekly mobile text messages
	Ariel (2012)[99]	Field	RCT	Tax Compliance	Saliency manipulation, Messaging, delivered through letter
(B) Backfiring	Pham et al. (2016)[100]	Lab Study 2	Control vs. interventions	Health (eating)	Framing of dietary options
	Berman & Johnson (2015)[101]	Field	Pre vs. Post interventions	Health (beverages) and environmental sustainability	Restructuring the choice set, bottled water ban; provision of information, delivered through an educational campaign
(C) Treatment offset by negative side effect	Hagmann et al. (2019)[102]	Lab Study 1- 6	Control vs. interventions	Environmental sustainability; Saving for retirement	Defaults; framing; carbon tax
	Wisdom et al. (2010)[103]	Field	RCT	Health (eating)	Saliency manipulation; provision of information, delivered via a menu
(D) No treatment effect, but positive side effect	Coelho do Vale et al (2008)[104]	Lab Study 2	Control vs. interventions	Health (eating)	Saliency manipulation; sizing of packaging
	Margetts & Kashima (2017)[105]	Lab Study 1	Control vs. interventions	Environmental sustainability; Charitable donation	Saliency manipulation; restructuring the choice set
(E) Only proxy changes, no actual criterion	Arshad et al. (2019)[106]	Field	Observational	Organ donation	Defaults
	Belot et al. (2019)[107]	Lab	RCT	Health (eating)	Tailored information; provision of information, delivered as a document; decision time
(F) Treatment offset by later behaviour	Castro & Scartascini (2015)[108]	Field	RCT	Tax Compliance	Injunctive social norm; framing; provision of information, delivered in a tax bill
	Damgaard & Gravert (2018)[109]	Field	RCT	Charitable donations	Saliency manipulation; message reminders, delivered as emails
(G) Environment does not support changes	Živčić-Ćosić et al. (2013)[110]	Field	Observational	Organ donation	Defaults; provision of information, delivered via public campaigns
	Richter et al. (2018)[111]	Field	Control vs. interventions	Environmental sustainability	Injunctive social norms; labelling, delivered via signage in supermarket isles
(H) Intervention triggers counteracting forces	Thunström et al. (2018)[112]	Lab	RCT	Personal Finances	Saliency manipulation; messaging, delivered as instructional information
	Fairchild (2013)[113]	Field	Pre vs. post interventions	Health (beverages)	Sizing of packaging; public campaigns; sugar tax

Glossary

Backfire effect: Outcomes in choices and actions resulting from treatments trialled by researcher and practitioners of behavioural change that are in opposite direction to those predicted.

Behavioural change: The use of interventions informed by social science disciplines that are designed for the purpose of supporting decisions and actions that lead to short term and long-term changes that benefit the individual and society.

Behavioural change framework: A synthesis of theoretical constructs that are organised in such a way to help researchers and practitioners identify the cognitive, affective, social and environmental (economic, physical) influences on behaviour, but that does not explicitly propose testable relationships between these constructs.

Behavioural change theory: A description of the psychological mechanisms that characterise human cognition and behaviour such that they enable researchers and practitioners to generate testable predictions of the effects of treatments (moderators of change in behaviour) on behaviour.

Boomerang effects: As a consequence of a treatment, typically through messaging, whereby an individual generates an intentional opposite attitude, choice, or behaviour to what was originally intended by the treatment.

Causal explanatory approach: A process of characterising the structural relationships between variables of interest so that it is possible to infer the influence of data across a causal network to assess the influences of interventions on outcomes.

Reactance: Where an experienced threat (whether real or perceived) to personal freedom and control leads to changes in the valuation of the threated choice such that motivations

increase to restore the choice, either by acting counter to the threat, withdrawing actions altogether, or introducing a new action in the threatened context.

Rebound effects: Typically observed in domains where treatments are designed to increase energy efficiency, the unintended and unanticipated outcome is that potential energy savings induce new behavioural responses that later undercut the original savings observed.

Spillovers: As a result of treatments trialled by researcher and practitioners of behavioural change the observed behavioural change in one context can either be amplified, eliminated, or reversed in another context or related behaviours within the original context.

Outstanding questions

How common are behavioural change intervention failures and is there publication bias? Which interventions fail more often, and in which domains do they most commonly fail? Can a dedicated database be generated and maintained that classifies the different types of failures in ways that can be used by researchers and practitioners?

In the future, should failures receive the same amount of attention as successes? If yes, how do researchers and practitioner ensure this so to avoid potential problems with how failures are reported?

Given that a behavioural intervention can both succeed and fail to different degrees, can we develop a system by which we can score interventions on separate scales of success and failure to obtain a more comprehensive representation of the behavioural outcomes they generate to expand our conceptualisation of them?

What are common cognitive and behavioural signatures of failed interventions that help to validate cognitive and social theories of behaviour?

How do we know when we have achieved successful behavioural change and what are the most relevant indicators of success? Is it the magnitude of positive change, the extent of positive spillovers, the level of uptake in the target population, or the longevity of the behavioural change?

Can computational modelling approaches (e.g., causal Bayesian network approaches) be used to map the causal structure of a context where behavioural change techniques are implemented, to derive precise prediction regarding success and failure?

Should behavioural change frameworks, and more broadly cognitive and psychological theories, be modified to take into account the dynamics of behaviour to identify key factors that motivate change in cognitions, emotions, and behaviour over time?

What methods can be used to determine in a principled manner in advance the length of time a behavioural change technique should be trialled to ensure that it has been given the best chance of not failing (or best chance of succeeding)?

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